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I. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. The Defendant's Right to a Public Trial
In Watters v. State, I the Court of Appeals held that the exclusion
of the public during the voir dire of prospective jurors was a denial
of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.2 In a
unanimous decision, the court found that the public may be ex-
cluded from a trial-including the voir dire phase-only when the
closure is narrowly tailored and necessary to protect an overriding
state interest. 3 Recognizing that not every technical violation of the
Sixth Amendment right to a public trial will mandate a new proceed-
ing,4 the court nevertheless held that when the violation of the right
to a public trial is substantial, specific prejudice is to be presumed
and an appropriate remedy must be afforded.5
1. The Case.-In December 1988, Ronald Watters was charged
with felonious homicide, first and second degree rape, assault with
intent to murder, assault with intent to rape, and assault and battery
in the death of Lisa Taylor.6 The murder was highly publicized both
at the time of the victim's disappearance and when the victim's body
was found three months later near Salisbury State University.7
On the first day of trial in the Circuit Court for Wicomico
County, a deputy sheriff barred members of the public, including
the defendant's family and the news media, from the courtroom
1. 328 Md. 38, 612 A.2d 1288 (1992).
2. Id. at 45, 612 A.2d at 1291. The applicable portion of the Sixth Amendment
provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149
(1968) (finding the Sixth Amendment applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment). Long before the Sixth Amendment was applied to the states, however,
the Supreme Court suggested in dicta that exclusion of the public would violate due
process. See, e.g., Gaines v. Washington, 277 U.S. 81, 86 (1928).
3. Watters, 328 Md. at 45, 612 A.2d at 1291.
4. Id. at 49, 612 A.2d at 1293.
5. Id.
6. Brief for Petitioner at App. 17, Watters (No. 134). Taylor never returned to her
apartment after a visit with her parents on June 7, 1988. There were no immediate
suspects in her disappearance. On December 1, 1988, however, Watters asked to speak
to the police while he was being held on unrelated charges at the Wicomico County
Detention Center. Subsequently, Watters made statements implicating himself in the
murder of Taylor. Watters v. State, 84 Md. App. 230, 233, 578 A.2d 810, 811 (1990),
rev'd, 328 Md. 38, 612 A.2d 1288 (1992).
7. Waiters, 328 Md. at 41-42, 612 A.2d at 1289.
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during voir dire.8 The deputy sheriff closed the courtroom
"[w]ithout the knowledge or consent of the trial judge or the par-
ties." 9 While the courtroom was closed, a jury was selected and
sworn in.10 Upon returning from a lunch recess, Watters informed
the court that he had learned that members of the public had been
excluded from the courtroom during voir dire." Watters then
moved for a mistrial, arguing that he was deprived of his right to a
public trial. 2
At the hearing on this motion, the defense presented the testi-
mony of Watters's mother and the deputy sheriff.' 3 Watters's
mother testified that she arrived at the courthouse with her aunt and
two sisters at approximately 9:30 a.m." Although she identified
herself as the defendant's mother, she was denied admission into
the courtroom by the deputy sheriff.' Spectators were eventually
admitted into the courtroom at 1:30 p.m., following the lunch re-
cess.' 6 When questioned, the deputy sheriff testified that he closed
the courtroom because he was concerned about the "nature of the
number of people involved in the case and [that] the courtroom
would not handle all the persons who wanted to get into the court-
room."' 7 The sheriff further testified that he only allowed witnesses
and prospective jurors into the courtroom, despite the availability of
extra seats.' 8 Nevertheless, the trial court denied Watters's motion
for a mistrial, finding that the closure "was done as a matter of court
security because of the crowded conditions of the courtroom, and it
[did] not deny[] him his right to a public trial." 19
Watters was subsequently convicted of first degree murder and
was sentenced to life without parole.20 The Court of Special Ap-
peals affirmed the conviction, holding that the unilateral actions of
the deputy sheriff did not constitute a deprivation of Watters's Sixth
8. Id. at 42, 612 A.2d at 1289.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id., 612 A.2d at 1290.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 42-43, 612 A.2d at 1290.
14. Id. at 43, 612 A.2d at 1290.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 42, 612 A.2d at 1290.
18. Id., 612 A.2d at 1289-90.
19. Id. at 43, 612 A.2d at 1290.
20. Id. at 41, 612 A.2d at 1289.
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Amendment right to a public trial. 2' The Court of Appeals granted
a writ of certiorari to consider whether the denial of public access to
the voir dire proceedings would constitute a violation of a defend-
ant's right to a public trial.22
2. Legal Background.-Open criminal trials have long been a
prominent part of the American judicial system. 3 The Sixth
Amendment expressly guarantees that "the accused shall enjoy the
right to a .. .public trial."'24 Because this language is so explicit,
there is little explanatory case law. The Supreme Court has recog-
nized that a defendant has an absolute right to a public trial.25
Courts have disagreed, however, as to what constitutes a public trial
and to what extent a court may constitutionally exclude members of
the public from attending parts of a trial. The constitutional right of
access to attend criminal trials, held by the public and the press, has
developed through several recent Supreme Court decisions.
a. Constitutional Jurisprudence.-The Supreme Court first
considered the issue of a Sixth Amendment right to a public trial in
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale.26 The Gannett Court noted that the Sixth
Amendment right to a public trial is a right created solely for the
benefit of the accused.27 The Court stated:
The requirement of a public trial is for the benefit of the
accused; that the public may see he is fairly dealt with and
not unjustly condemned, and that the presence of inter-
ested spectators may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense
of their responsibility and to the importance of their
functions... 28
Gannett declined to recognize an independent and enforceable Sixth
Amendment right held by the public and the press to access to a
21. Watters v. State, 84 Md. App. 230, 238, 578 A.2d 810, 814 (1990), rev'd, 328 Md.
38, 612 A.2d 1288 (1992).
22. Watters, 328 Md. at 41, 612 A.2d at 1289.
23. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 567-68 (1980) (noting
that court records in the 1600s from Virginia, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania indicate
that trials were open to the public).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
25. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 385 (1979) ("There is no question
that the Sixth Amendment ...presumes open trials as a norm." (emphasis added));
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 36 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("By express
command of the Sixth Amendment the proceeding must be a 'public trial.'" (emphasis
added)).
26. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
27. Id. at 379-80.
28. Id. at 380 (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 n.25 (1948)).
534 [VOL. 52:532
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pretrial suppression hearing.29 Additionally, the Court found it un-
necessary to consider whether such a right existed under the First
Amendment, reserving that issue for future consideration.3"
One year later, in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,3 1 the
Supreme Court addressed the First Amendment issue reserved in
Gannett. The Richmond Newspapers Court held that although there is
no explicit constitutional right given to the public to attend criminal
trials, such a right is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amend-
ment.32 The Court drew this recognition of a public right of access
from the First Amendment freedoms of speech, press, and assem-
bly, which guarantee open communication regarding affairs that re-
late to the functioning of government.33 In addition, the Court
specifically recognized that these rights were adopted against the
backdrop of the historical openness of criminal trials. 34 The open-
ness of the trial is considered important in assuring fair trials: open
proceedings encourage witnesses to come forward, discourage per-
29. Id. at 391. In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger emphasized that the
holding of Gannett applied only to pretrial proceedings and not to trials. Id. at 394-97
(Burger, C.J., concurring). But see Justice Blackmum's dissent,joined by Justices Bren-
nan, White, and Marshall, in which the dissenters favored recognition of a public right of
access to criminal trials under the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 406-07 (Blackmum, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
30. Id. at 392. The Gannett Court declined to address the First Amendment issue but
suggested that the balancing test conducted by the trial judge, between the defendants'
constitutional right to a fair trial and the press's constitutional right of access, was
proper. Id. at 392-93. Further, the Court noted that the denial of access was not abso-
lute because the closure was a temporary measure and the transcript of the proceedings
would be made available to the public and press at a later time. Id. at 393.
For a discussion of the right of public access to criminal trials, see generally Beth H.
Fleming, Comment, First Amendment Right of Access to Pretrial Proceedings in Criminal Cases,
32 EMoRy L.J. 619 (1983).
31. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
32. Id. at 575, 580. Although Richmond Newspapers was a plurality opinion, seven jus-
tices recognized that the First Amendment embodies a right of access. 448 U.S. at 558-
81 (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J., with White, J., and Stevens, J.); id. at 584-98 (Bren-
nan,J., with Marshall,J, concurring in thejudgment); id. at 598-601 (StewartJ., concur-
ring in the judgment); id. at 601-04 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). In a
more recent decision addressing the First Amendment right of public access, six justices
joined in the opinion of the Court recognizing that the First Amendment was "broad
enough to encompass those rights that, while not unambiguously enumerated in the
very terms of the Amendment, are nonetheless necessary to the enjoyment of other First
Amendment rights." Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604
(1982).
33. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575-78.
34. See id. at 575; see also id. at 569 (noting that "at the time when our organic laws
were adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long been presumptively
open").
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jury, and ensure unbiased decisions.15 Additionally, public trials af-
ford communities with an opportunity to see that justice is being
served, thereby reinforcing public understanding of, and confidence
in, the legal system. 36 Public trials thus provide a critical therapeu-
tic and educational value.
In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 7 the Supreme Court ex-
tended the presumptive right of access established in Richmond News-
papers to include voir dire proceedings. The Press-Enterprise Court
found that the jury-selection process was conducted in public as
early as the 16th century, noting that "the entire trial proceeded
'openly, [and] that not only the [12 jurors], but the Judges, the par-
ties and as many [others] as be present may heare.' "8 Historically, by-
standers served as jurors if peremptory challenges reduced the jury
to an insufficient number.3 9 The United States subsequently
adopted England's open and public jury-selection process and it was
the traditional practice at the time the Constitution was ratified.4"
Nevertheless, the Court recognized that there are circum-
stances, albeit limited ones, when the public can be barred from a
criminal proceeding.4 ' The Press-Enterprise Court adopted a balanc-
35. Id. at 569. In a later decision, the Court stated:
The value of openness lies in the fact that people not actually attending trials
can have confidence that standards of fairness are being observed; the sure
knowledge that anyone is free to attend gives assurance that established proce-
dures are being followed and that deviations will become known. Openness
thus enhances both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of
fairness so essential to public confidence in the system.
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984).
36. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 571-73. The Court found that public access
to criminal proceedings promotes several societal interests. Id. at 569 (plurality opin-
ion) (noting that public access assures that "the proceedings were conducted fairly to all
concerned," promotes the public "perception of fairness," and serves as a check on
corrupt practices assuring that decisions are not based on "secret bias or partiality"); id.
at 569 n.7 (plurality opinion) (noting that public access enhances the performance of all
parties); id. at 570-71 (plurality opinion) (noting that public access has a therapeutic
value as an "outlet for community concern, hostility and emotion"); id. at 594 (Stevens,
J., concurring); id. at 595 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Open trials assure
the public that procedural rights are respected, and that justice is afforded equally.
Closed trials breed suspicion of prejudice and arbitrariness, which in turn spawns disre-
spect for law."); id. at 596-97 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that
public access discourages perjury).
37. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
38. Id. at 507 (quoting THOMAS SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM 96, 97 (Alston ed.
1906)).
39. Id. at 507 & n.6 (noting that the practice of selecting jurors from the people
present in the courtroom was known as awarding a "tales de circumstantibus").
40. Id. at 508.
41. Id. at 509-10. The Press-Enterprise Court noted that "a trial judge may, 'in the
interest of the fair administration ofjustice, impose reasonable limitations on access to a
536 [VOL. 52:532
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ing test that must be satisfied before a courtroom can be closed to
the public, ruling that "[t]he presumption of openness may be over-
come only by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is
essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve
that interest."42 The Court additionally noted that the overriding
interest should be articulated with specific findings to enable a re-
viewing court to determine whether the closure was proper in light
of reasonable alternatives.43
When faced with the issue of how far the Sixth Amendment
right to a public trial extends, the Supreme Court applied much of
the analysis from its earlier decisions regarding the public's First
Amendment rights.44 In Waller v. Georgia,45 the Court addressed the
question of whether the closure of an entire suppression hearing
over the objection of the defendant violated his Sixth Amendment
public-trial guarantee.46 The Court unanimously pronounced that
"there can be little doubt that the explicit Sixth Amendment right of
the accused is no less protective of a public trial than the implicit
First Amendment right of the press and public."47 Accordingly, the
Waller Court held that the four-part balancing test adopted in Press-
Enterprise should be applied whenever there is a Sixth Amendment
objection by the accused to the closure of a hearing. Therefore, the
party seeking to close the hearing must establish "an overriding in-
terest that is likely to be prejudiced."'48 The trial court must then
consider reasonable alternatives to closure, make findings on the
record adequate to support the closure, and assure that "the closure
trial.'" Id. at 511 n.10 (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,
581-82 n.18 (1980)). The Court emphasized, however, that the defendant's right to a
fair trial is superior. Id. at 508. Thus, when public attendance at a trial presents a sub-
stantial danger to the defendant's right to a fair trial, the public's access can be limited.
See id. at 509.
The Court has additionally recognized as an example of interests that compete with
the defendant's right to a public trial, situations where sexual conduct and children are
involved. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1982) (hold-
ing, however, that even though the well-being of a child is a compelling interest, such an
interest will not "justify a mandatory closure rule" in all instances involving children and
that closure of a courtroom must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis).
42. Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S at 510.
43. Id.
44. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 44-45 (1984) (applying precedent to decide
whether the accused's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial extends to suppression
hearings).
45. 467 U.S. 39 (1984)..
46. See id. at 43.
47. Id. at 46.
48. Id. at 48.
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•.. [is] no broader than necessary to protect that interest."49
The Waller Court also affirmed a position adopted by the Third
Circuit-that "the defendant should not be required to prove spe-
cific prejudice in order to obtain relief for a violation of the public-
trial guarantee."' 5' The Court clearly expressed, however, that
although specific prejudice is presumed, every violation will not re-
quire a new trial.5 '
b. Maryland Jurisprudence.-Similar to the approach taken
by the Supreme Court, Maryland courts have established public-ac-
cess rights through a free speech analysis. Maryland case law un-
questionably recognizes a First Amendment right of public access to
criminal trials.52 While the Supreme Court has not ruled directly on
the issue, the Court of Appeals has specifically recognized a pre-
sumptive right of access to pretrial proceedings in criminal cases.53
Accordingly, before pretrial proceedings can be closed, Maryland
requires advance public notice by the filing of a motion to close the
49. Id.; see Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 511-12 (1984).
50. Waller, 467 U.S. at 49-50. The Court noted:
The general view appears to be that of the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit. It noted in an en banc opinion that a requirement that prejudice be
shown "would in most cases deprive [the defendant] of the [public-trial] guar-
antee, for it would be difficult to envisage a case in which he would have evi-
dence available of specific injury."
Id. at 49 n.9 (quoting United States ex rel. Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599, 608 (3d Cir.
1969)).
51. Id. at 50 ("[Tlhe remedy should be appropriate to the violation."). The Waller
Court concluded that the appropriate remedy in the case would be to require a new
suppression hearing. If at that time the hearing produced a different result, a new trial
would be warranted. Id.
52. See Buzbee v. Journal Newspapers, Inc., 297 Md. 68, 76, 465 A.2d 426, 431
(1983) (recognizing that the public right of access is based on the First and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article 40 of the Maryland Declara-
tion of Rights). Article 40 provides "[tihat the liberty of the press ought to be inviolably
preserved; that every citizen of the State ought to be allowed to speak, write and publish
his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege." MD.
CONST. DECL. OF RTs. art. 40. See also News Am. Div., Hearst Corp. v. State, 294 Md. 30,
40-41, 447 A.2d 1264, 1269-70 (1982) (holding that the press has sufficient standing to
challenge orders that infringe upon its First Amendment rights); Patuxent Publishing
Corp. v. State, 48 Md. App. 689, 692, 429 A.2d 554, 556 (1981) (recognizing a constitu-
tional right of access in the public and the press grounded in the First Amendment).
53. See Buzbee, 297 Md. at 76, 465 A.2d at 431 (holding that there is a right of public
access to pretrial judicial hearings). In Buzbee, the Court of Appeals recognized that the
societal interests announced by the Supreme Court in Richmond Newspapers were as appli-






Like the Supreme Court, Maryland courts have also acknowl-
edged that the public right of access is not absolute.55 In order to
determine whether an order to close a courtroom is proper, the
Court of Appeals has adopted a balancing test similar to the stan-
dard announced in the Press-Enterprise decision. 56 For example, in
Baltimore Sun Co. v. Colbert,57 the court reiterated that the presump-
tion of openness "can be overcome only by an 'overriding interest,'
such as an accused's right to a fair trial."'58 Further, "[t]he party
moving for closure has the burden of proving that 'higher values'
will be infringed by publicity; that closure of the courtroom will pre-
vent such prejudice; and that reasonable alternatives to closure can-
not protect the asserted values." 5 The Colbert court proclaimed
that closure is to be considered an extreme remedy and as such will
be improper when reasonable alternatives exist.6" In addition, in
Buzbee v. Journal Newspapers, Inc. ,6 the Court of Appeals held that
"[i]f the conclusion is that some form of restriction on public access
is required, the trial court must adopt the least restrictive means
necessary to protect the interest which, on the facts of the case, has
outweighed public access. "62
While Maryland courts clearly recognize a First Amendment
right of access to criminal trials, prior to Watters the Court of Ap-
peals had not considered the specific issue of whether a temporary
exclusion of the public would violate the Sixth Amendment. It
should be noted, however, that in Patuxent Publishing Corp. v. State,63
the Court of Special Appeals had previously recognized that "[t]he
Sixth Amendment right to a public trial is one that runs to the crimi-
nal defendant alone and not to the people."'  That decision noted
that the language of the Sixth Amendment expressly establishes a
54. Baltimore Sun Co. v. Colbert, 323 Md. 290, 300, 593 A.2d 224, 229 (1991)
(holding that a motion to exclude the public from pretrial hearings in a criminal case
requires prior public notice in order that the public may assert its right of access).
55. See Patuxent Publishing, 48 Md. App. at 692, 429 A.2d at 556; Buzbee, 297 Md. at
80, 427 A.2d at 433.
56. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
57. 323 Md. 290, 593 A.2d 224 (1991).
58. Id. at 302, 593 A.2d at 229.
59. Id., 593 A.2d at 229-30.
60. Id. at 303, 593 A.2d at 230. Reasonable alternatives suggested by the court in-
clude "continuance, change of venue, voir dire, voluntary cooperation of the media, and
jury instructions." Id.
61. 297 Md. 68, 465 A.2d 426 (1983).
62. Id. at 82, 429 A.2d at 434.
63. 48 Md. App. 689, 429 A.2d 554 (1981).
64. Id. at 691, 429 A.2d at 556.
1993]
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right to a public trial in the criminal defendant. 65
3. The Court's Reasoning; Analysis.-
a. Constitutional Standard.-In Watters, the State argued on
appeal that the constitutional standard announced in Press-Enterprise
and Waller applies only to situations where a determination is to be
made on a motion to close a trial.66 The State further contended
that because the courtroom was closed without the authority of the
court, the proper issue was whether the trial court's refusal to grant
a mistrial was an abuse of its discretion. 67 The Court of Appeals,
however, rejected the State's argument by holding the Press-Enter-
prise and Waller standards appropriate in all cases where the public is
excluded from a trial, whether the objection to the closure is made
by the defendant under the Sixth Amendment or by the press under
the First Amendment.68 Recognizing this standard, the court con-
cluded that "the public may only be constitutionally excluded from
a trial, including voir dire, pursuant to a narrowly tailored order
necessary to protect an overriding state interest. '69
Applying this standard, the Watters court found no compelling
reason to exclude members of the public from the voir dire, espe-
cially the defendant's family and members of the press.70 Although
it is generally recognized that people may be excluded from the
courtroom to prevent overcrowding, 7' the Watters court concluded
that the facts did not suggest that such a situation existed.72 In fact,
testimony presented by the deputy sheriff confirmed that seats in
the courtroom were available.73 The court further warned that even
if the potential for overcrowding existed, the exclusion of everyone
from the courtroom was not a "narrowly tailored means of protect-
ing that interest. '"" Based on the facts presented, the court con-
65. See id.; see also supra note 2 and accompanying text.
66. Watters, 328 Md. at 44, 612 A.2d at 1290.
67. Id., 612 A.2d at 1290-91.
68. See id. at 45, 612 A.2d at 1291.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919, 922 (3d Cir. 1949) (recognizing that
spectators not connected with the case may be excluded from the courtroom to prevent
overcrowding); People v. Jelke, 123 N.E.2d 769, 722 (N.Y. 1954) (recognizing that a
court may limit spectators to prevent overcrowding); E.W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 125
N.E.2d 896, 903 (Ohio 1955) (recognizing that a judge may exclude spectators to pro-
tect public health and safety).
72. See Waiters, 328 Md. at 45, 612 A.2d at 1291.
73. Id. at 42, 612 A.2d at 1290.
74. Id. at 45, 612 A.2d at 1291.
540 [VOL. 52:532
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cluded that the courtroom closure violated Watters's Sixth
Amendment right to a public trial."5
In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals focused its analy-
sis exclusively on whether the 'esulting closure violated Watters's
public-trial right rather than on the circumstances leading to the
closure. By so doing, the court signalled that all future courtroom
closures-whether by a motion to close or because of an accident or
mistake-will be subject to the strictest scrutiny. The Court of Ap-
peals's interpretation is clearly supported by both Supreme Court
and Maryland case law.76
Although the Watters court failed to discuss the implications of
the accidental closure, it is clear that a defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment public-trial right should not be any less protected because of
the accidental nature of a violation. In fact, when a courtroom clo-
sure takes place without the safeguard of a prior hearing for the de-
fendant to object, there is an even greater cause to believe that the
public-trial guarantee has been violated. By expressly including the
right to a public trial in the Sixth Amendment-with other highly
regarded rights such as the right to an impartial jury, a speedy trial,
and the assistance of counsel-,the Framers plainly thought the right
to be paramount to a criminal defendant.77 Furthermore, as the
Supreme Court noted, "To work effectively, it is important that soci-
ety's criminal process 'satisfy the appearance ofjustice,' . . . and the
appearance of justice can best be provided by allowing people to
observe it."7 Recognizing the dual focus of the provision, the
Court of Appeals gave considerable weight to the resulting harms of
a violation of the public-trial guarantee.
b. Specific Prejudice.-In the second part of its opinion, the
Court of Appeals considered whether specific prejudice is to be pre-
sumed when a violation of the public-trial guarantee has occurred
and whether the appropriate relief would be a new trial.79 The State
had argued that even if a constitutional violation did exist, such an
error was de minimus, and Watters was not entitled to a new trial.8 0
In its decision, the Court of Special Appeals rejected the argu-
ment that the trial judge must apply the balancing test announced in
75. Id.
76. See supra notes 23-65 and accompanying text.
77. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
78. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571-72 (1980) (quoting
Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).
79. Watters, 328 Md. at 46, 612 A.2d at 1291.
80. Id., 612 A.2d at 1291-92.
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Press-Enterprise and Waller because there was no motion made to ex-
clude the public. 8' Consequently, the intermediate appellate court
focused its decision entirely on whether the unilateral actions of the
deputy sheriff constituted a constitutional deprivation.82
Although there is persuasive case law in other jurisdictions sug-
gesting that minor errors of exclusion do not amount to a constitu-
tional deprivation,8" the Court of Special Appeals failed to
recognize the gravity of the exclusion in Watters. In so doing, the
court overlooked the Supreme Court's ardent protection of the con-
stitutional mandate of open and public trials.
The Court of Appeals clearly recognized that not every acciden-
tal or technical violation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
a public trial will warrant a new proceeding.84 Although the court
did not establish a bright-line test to be applied in all circumstances,
it offered several factors for trial courts to consider: the scope of the
closure, the period of time over which the closure extended, and the
other harms that resulted to the defendant.85 The Watters court also
noted that other harms were created because the defendant's family
was unable to aid him in the jury selection process and because po-
tential jurors could not view the interested individuals.86 Because
the scope of the closure was substantial in that it encompassed the
entire voir dire proceeding and excluded all members of the public,
81. Watters v. State, 84 Md. App. 230, 236, 578 A.2d 810, 813 (1990), rev'd, 328 Md.
38, 612 A.2d 1288 (1992).
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Snyder v. Coiner, 510 F.2d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 1975) (holding that a
bailiff's unilateral action of barring entry and exit from the courtroom during the attor-
neys' arguments to the jury was "entirely too trivial to amount to a constitutional depri-
vation"); Butler v. Smith, 416 F. Supp. 1151, 1154-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding that the
clearing of the public from the courtroom during the testimony of a witness who had
otherwise refused to testify due to threats on his life was not a denial of the defendant's
right to a public trial where the duration of the exclusion was relatively minimal); State
v. Clark, 616 P.2d 888, 894 (Ariz.) (holding that the unilateral action of a deputy sheriff
who closed the courtroom to the public for approximately 30 minutes did not violate the
defendant's right to a public trial because the situation lasted for an extremely short
period and was immediately corrected), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980); Common-
wealth v. Burton, 330 A.2d 833, 837 (Pa. 1974) (holding that the district attorney's uni-
lateral request to court personnel to exclude the defendant's wife and members of the
Black Panthers from the courtroom during the testimony of a witness did not constitute
a constitutional deprivation of the right to a public trial, even though other members of
the defendant's family were also accidently excluded); but see People v. Kan, 574 N.E.2d
1042, 1044-45 (N.Y. 1991) (holding that the exclusion of all members of the public,
including the defendant's family, during the testimony of a witness, violated the defend-
ant's constitutional right to a public trial, thus warranting a new trial).
84. Watters, 328 Md. at 49, 612 A.2d at 1293.
85. See id.
86. Id. at 48, 612 A.2d at 1293.
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the court considered the violation to be significant.87 The Court of
Appeals concluded that "we would be hard pressed to declare a vio-
lation of this magnitude de minimus, or otherwise not of constitu-
tional significance."8 8
Because the Court of Appeals considered the exclusion to be
substantial, it determined that the "violation of the defendant's
Sixth Amendment right carries with it the presumption of specific
prejudice mandated by Waller, and thus requires the granting of ap-
propriate relief."8 9 As discussed in Waller, the Court of Appeals ac-
knowledged that requiring the plaintiff to prove specific prejudice
would likely deprive the accused of the constitutional protection of a
public trial for it would be nearly impossible to pinpoint evidence of
specific injury.90 As stated in Waller, the "benefits of a public trial
are frequently intangible, difficult to prove, or a matter of chance,
[however] the Framers plainly thought them nonetheless real." 9'
Although the Supreme Court has adopted the general rule that
"a constitutional error does not automatically require reversal of a
conviction,"' 92 the Court recently reaffirmed that a violation of the
right to a public trial is not subject to harmless error analysis.9" The
Court considered a public trial error to be a
structural defect affecting the framework within which the
trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial pro-
cess itself. "Without these basic protections, a criminal
trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for deter-
mination of guilt or innocence, and no criminal punish-
ment may be regarded as fundamentally fair."9 4
Because a violation of the public-trial guarantee is not subject
to harmless error analysis, the Maryland court properly concluded
that the appropriate remedy in the present case would be to grant
Watters a new trial.95 There can be no other satisfactory remedy
when the violation of the public-trial guarantee occurs during the
critical phase of jury selection and the trial has been concluded.96
87. Id. at 49, 612 A.2d at 1293.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 47-48, 612 A.2d at 1292.
91. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984).
92. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1263 (1991).
93. See id. at 1265.
94. Id. (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986)).
95. See Waiters, 328 Md. at 48-49, 612 A.2d at 1293.
96. Id. at 47 n.4, 612 A.2d at 1292 n.4.
1993]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
c. Mistrial.-The final issue addressed in Watters was the
State's assertion that even if there was a violation of constitutional
magnitude that would normally compel a new trial, that principle is
not applicable to the present case.97 The State argued that because
the constitutional violation was committed without the court's
knowledge and was not raised as an issue until after it occurred, by a
motion for a mistrial, the appropriate test on review should be sim-
ply whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant
a mistrial.98
The court found little merit in the State's argument. The court
recognized that the granting of a mistrial lies within the discretion of
a trial judge,99 and that a decision by the trial court will not be dis-
turbed on appeal unless it is determined that the defendant was
clearly prejudiced.' As the Watters court found, however, the lan-
guage of Waller conclusively establishes that specific prejudice is
presumed when there is a violation of the defendant's public-trial
right. Because specific prejudice is presumed, the court necessarily
found that the trial court inappropriately denied Watters's motion
for a mistrial.
4. Conclusion.-The Court of Appeals's decision in Watters does
not represent a drastic departure from established precedent. The
court's decision leaves open for argument the possibility that the
First Amendment standard does not go far enough in protecting a
defendant's explicit Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. Never-
theless, the court's decision clearly establishes that an accused's
public-trial right will at least be furnished the same protections as
the rights of the general public. Thus, the Watters decision merely
reiterates that when trial judges are faced with a public-trial issue,
they must carefully weigh the rights of the accused to a fair trial
against the interests of the public and the defendant to an open and
public trial. In the absence of a compelling interest factually estab-
97. Id. at 49, 612 A.2d at 1293.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 50, 612 A.2d at 1294. See also Kosmas v. State, 316 Md. 587, 594, 560 A.2d
1137, 1141 (1989) ("[T]he decision of whether to grant a motion for a mistrial rests in
the discretion of the trial judge.").
100. See Watters, 328 Md. at 50, 612 A.2d at 1294. See also Johnson v. State, 303 Md.
487, 516,495 A.2d 1, 16 (1985) (stating that a trial court's denial of a motion for mistrial
will not be overturned unless the defendant was so clearly prejudiced that the denial
constituted an abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1093 (1986); Wilhelm v. State,
272 Md. 404, 429, 326 A.2d 707, 723 (1973) ("The decision by the trial court in the
exercise of its discretion denying a mistrial will not be reversed on appeal unless it is
clear that there has been prejudice to the defendant.").
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lished on the record, Maryland courtrooms will be strictly held open
to the public throughout all parts of all criminal proceedings.
RENATA J. BAKER
B. The Constitutionality of Maryland's Non-economic Damage Cap
In Murphy v. Edmonds, l°" the Court of Appeals held that Mary-
land's $350,000 statutory cap on the recovery of non-economic
damages in personal injury actions °2 does not violate the Maryland
Constitution. 0 In particular, the court held that the cap neither
violates the equal protection guarantee of article 24 of the Declara-
tion of Rights' 0 4 nor infringes upon the right to a jury trial under
articles 5 and 23 of the Declaration of Rights.' 0 5
101. 325 Md. 342, 601 A.2d 102 (1992).
102. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 11-108(b) (1989). Section 11-108 pro-
vides as follows:
(a) Noneconomic damages.-In this section:
(1) 'Noneconomic damages' means pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical im-
pairment, disfigurement, loss of consortium, or other nonpecuniary injury; and
(2) 'Noneconomic damages' does not include punitive damages.
(b) Limitation of $350,000 established.-In any action for damages for per-
sonal injury in which the cause of action arises on or after July 1, 1986, an
award for noneconomic damages may not exceed $350,000.
(c) Award under § 3-2A-06 included.-An award by the health claims arbitra-
tion panel in accordance with § 3-2A-06 of this article shall be considered an
award for purposes of this section.
(d) Jury Trials.-(l) In a jury trial, the jury may not be informed of the limita-
tion established under subsection (b) of this section.
(2) If the jury awards an amount for noneconomic damages that exceeds the
limitation established under subsection (b) of this section, the court shall re-
duce the amount to conform to the limitation.
Id. § 11-1 108.
103. Murphy, 325 Md. at 370, 375, 601 A.2d at 116, 118.
104. Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights provides: "That no man ought to be
taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or
exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by
the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land." MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTs. art. 24.
105. Article 5 of the Declaration of Rights provides:
That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of England,
and the trial by Jury, according to the course of that Law, and to the benefit of
such of the English statutes as existed on the Fourth day of July, seventeen
hundred and seventy-six; and which, by experience, have been found applicable
to their local and other circumstances, and have been introduced, used and
practiced by the Courts of Law or Equity; and also of all Acts of Assembly in
force on the first day ofJune, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven; except such as
may have since expired, or may be inconsistent with the provisions of this Con-
stitution; subject, nevertheless, to the revision of, and amendment or repeal by,
the Legislature of this State. And the Inhabitants of Maryland are also entitled
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The court also used this case to set forth the standard it will
employ in reviewing the constitutionality of statutes of this nature.
Specifically, Maryland courts will not subject economic regulations
to "any level of scrutiny higher than the traditional, deferential ra-
tional basis test."'10
6
1. The Case.-On December 14, 1987, Sarah Murphy was driv-
ing her car southbound on Interstate 83 in Baltimore County.10 7
Richard Edmonds was traveling northbound when the left front tire
of his tractor-trailer blew out.'0 8 The truck swerved to the left,
crossed the median and the three southbound lanes, and collided
with an embankment.' 0 9 Murphy's car collided with the truck and
she sustained serious physical injuries." 0
Murphy and her husband filed suit in the Circuit Court for Bal-
timore County against Edmonds and Port East Transfer, Inc., Ed-
monds's employer and the owner of the tractor-trailer."' The
complaint alleged gross negligence and sought compensatory and
punitive damages." 2
Murphy presented evidence to the jury that on the day of the
accident Edmonds was late making a delivery to Pennsylvania and
therefore was in a hurry, that the blown tire had been improperly
repaired prior to the accident and had two visible holes in it, and
that Edmonds dove to the floor of the cab after the blow out instead
of trying to control the truck.' Edmonds testified that he had in-
spected the tires before leaving for Pennsylvania and had found
nothing wrong." 4 He further stated that he was told by the mainte-
to all property derived to them from, or under the Charter granted by His Maj-
esty Charles the First to Caecilius Calvert, Baron of Baltimore.
Id. art. 5.
Article 23 of the Declaration of Rights states in pertinent part that "[t]he right of
trial by Jury of all issues of fact in civil proceedings in the several Courts of Law in this
State, where the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of five hundred dollars, shall be
inviolably preserved." Id. art. 23.
106. Murphy, 325 Md. at 362, 601 A.2d at I11.
107. Id. at 347, 601 A.2d at 104.
108. Id.
109. Edmonds v. Murphy, 83 Md. App. 133, 139, 573 A.2d 853, 856 (1990), af'd, 325
Md. 342, 601 A.2d 102 (1992).
110. Id.
111. Murphy, 325 Md. at 347, 601 A.2d at 104.
112. Edmonds, 83 Md. App. at 139, 573 A.2d at 856. The plaintiffs sought compensa-
tory and punitive damages for personal injuries to Mrs. Murphy and for loss of consor-
tium on behalf of Mr. and Mrs. Murphy. Murphy, 325 Md. at 347, 601 A.2d at 104.
113. Edmonds, 83 Md. App. at 139, 573 A.2d at 856.
114. Murphy, 325 Md. at 348, 601 A.2d at 105.
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nance department at Port East that the tire was new. 1" 5
Additional evidence revealed that after the accident, Port East
sent the tire to the manufacturer, Michelin, who inspected it to de-
termine the cause of the blow out. 6 According to Michelin's prod-
uct-analysis engineer, the blow out was caused by an improper
repair." t 7 The engineer also testified that a visible hole in the tire
would have been detected if a proper inspection had been
performed. "t
8
The jury returned a verdict against both Edmonds and Port
East for compensatory damages totaling $797,165.31, including
$510,000 in non-economic damages." 9 Punitive damages were also
assessed against Edmonds in the amount of $3000 and against Port
East in the amount of $1,000,000.120
The defendants filed a post-trial motion' 2' to reduce the non-
economic damages to $350,000 pursuant to section 11-108(b) of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. 122 The trial judge deter-
mined that section 11-108 created two seemingly illogical classifica-
tions of tort plaintiffs: those who are less-severely injured and
therefore entitled to their entire awards, and those who are more-
seriously injured but cannot keep any award for non-economic dam-
ages greater than $350,000.12 s Finding that section 11-108 in-
fringed upon an "important right," the trial judge applied a
"heightened scrutiny" test and found that the section 11-108 cap
violated the equal protection guarantee embodied in article 24 of
the Declaration of Rights. 124
Edmonds appealed, asserting that the statutory cap on non-eco-
nomic damages was constitutional and should be enforced.' 25 The
115. Id.
116. Id.




121. The defendants actually filed three post-trial motions. In the first one, the de-
fendants wanted the compensatory award for non-economic damages aggregated with
the loss of consortium awards, including the loss of household services awards, and that
total reduced to the $350,000 cap. The judge, by concluding that loss of household
services constituted economic damages, denied the motion for consolidation. The sec-
ond motion, for judgment not withstanding the verdict, and the third motion, for remit-
titur, were both denied by the trial judge. See id.
122. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 11-108(b) (1989).
123. Murphy, 325 Md. at 350, 601 A.2d at 105.
124. Id., 601 A.2d at 106.
125. Id. The defendants also raised additional issues with respect to liability, and
compensatory and punitive damages.
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Murphys re-asserted that section 11-108 violated the equal protec-
tion guarantee of article 24 and the right to ajury trial under articles
5 and 23 of the Declaration of Rights. 2 6
The Court of Special Appeals upheld the statute's constitution-
ality on all grounds, reversing the trial court's ruling. 27 The court
ruled that the statute was subject only to the traditional rational ba-
sis test and that under such a test it did not violate the equal protec-
tion guarantee.12 1 Pursuant to its ruling, the court reduced the
award of non-economic damages to $350,000.129
The Court of Appeals granted both the Murphys' petition for a
writ of certiorari and Edmonds's cross-petition.' 30 In an opinion
authored by Judge Eldridge, a six-to-one majority affirmed the deci-
sion of the Court of Special Appeals.' 3 ' By concluding that the sec-
tion 1 1-108 classification of tort plaintiffs was neither arbitrary nor
irrational, the Murphy court held that the statute did not violate
Maryland's equal protection guarantee. 3 2 The court also held that
the statute did not infringe upon the right to a jury trial.' 33
126. Id. See supra note 105. In the intermediate appellate court, the plaintiffs also
contended that § 11-108 violated article 19 of the Declaration of Rights and was incon-
sistent with the separation of powers requirement under article 8. These issues were not
brought before the Court of Appeals. See Murphy, 325 Md. at 351, 353, 601 A.2d at 106,
107.
127. Edmonds v. Murphy, 83 Md. App. 133, 164, 573 A.2d 853, 868 (1990), aff'd, 325
Md. 342, 601 A.2d 102 (1992).
128. Id. at 162, 573 A.2d at 867. The court stated that even if it were to apply a
"heightened scrutiny" test to the statute, it would still "hold § 11-108(b) constitutional
because we believe the classifications the statute creates are 'reasonable, not arbitrary,
and.., rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation.' " Id. (quoting Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Smith, 79 Md. App.
591, 631, 558 A.2d 768, 788, cert. denied, 317 Md. 393, 564 A.2d 407 (1989)).
129. Id. at 179, 573 A.2d at 876. In addition, the court reversed the award for puni-
tive damages on the basis that the evidence was not sufficient to constitute gross negli-
gence. Id. at 175, 573 A.2d at 874.
130. Murphy v. Edmonds, 321 Md. 46, 580 A.2d 1066 (1990).
131. Murphy, 325 Md. at 378, 601 A.2d at 119.
132. Id. at 370, 601 A.2d at 116.
133. Id. at 375, 601 A.2d at 118. In addition to attacking the constitutionality of § 11-
108 on the grounds that it violated equal protection rights embodied in article 24 of the
Declaration of Rights, the Murphys also argued that the statute infringed upon their
right to a jury trial as set out in the Declaration of Rights. Id. at 370, 601 A.2d at 116.
See also supra note 105. Specifically, they contended "that the procedure required by
§ 11-108, which prohibits the jury from being informed of the $350,000 limitation on
noneconomic damages, interferes with the jury's ability properly to determine dam-
ages." Murphy, 325 Md. at 370-71, 601 A.2d at 116.
As the court explained, the General Assembly merely modified the cause of action
for non-economic damages in tort actions by eliminating a remedy of more than
$350,000. "As the wording of Article 23 itself indicates, the jury trial right in civil cases
relates to 'issues of fact' in legal actions. It does not extend to issues of law." Id. at 371,
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The dissenting opinion favored a standard different than the
rational basis test.'3 4 Judge Chasanow wrote that "the right to re-
cover full and fair compensation from a tortfeasor is an important
personal right, and any limitation on that right should be subject to
'heightened' or 'intermediate' scrutiny," 135 noting that section 11-
108 would not survive a constitutional challenge under that
standard.
2. Legal Background.--Courts have developed several standards
to review the constitutionality of governmental classifications under
an equal protection analysis. Which standard to apply is determined
by deciding whether the legislative classification infringes upon a
suspect class or a fundamental right.
Courts apply the commonly used rational basis test when the
statute does not implicate a suspect class or infringe upon a funda-
mental right. 13 6 Under this low level of scrutiny, a classification will
be upheld " 'unless the varying treatment of different groups or per-
sons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legiti-
mate purposes that [the court] can only conclude that the
[governmental] actions were irrational.' ,,137 Due to strong pre-
sumptions of constitutionality and legislative competence, statutes
reviewed under the rational basis test are generally upheld.13 8
If, however, the classification burdens a "suspect class" or in-
fringes upon a "fundamental right," courts subject the legislation to
strict scrutiny. A class is "suspect" primarily when legislation
discriminates against a group that is politically powerless or in the
minority. A statute that focuses on a suspect class or fundamental
right will withstand an equal protection challenge only if it is "suit-
601 A.2d at 116. "'A remedy is a matter of law, not a matter of fact.... A trial court
applies the remedy's limitation only after the jury has fulfilled its fact-finding function.'"
Id. at 374, 601 A.2d at 117 (quoting Etheridge v. Medical Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525,
529 (Va. 1989)). Accordingly, Murphy concluded that § 11-108 does not infringe upon
the right to a jury trial as protected by articles 5 and 23 of the Declaration of Rights. Id.
at 375, 601 A.2d at 118.
The court also upheld the Court of Special Appeals's ruling that the evidence was
insufficient for the jury to have concluded that gross negligence occurred. Id. at 378,
601 A.2d at 119.
134. Murphy, 325 Md. at 378, 601 A.2d at 120 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 379, 601 A.2d at 120 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
136. See Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 195-96 (1983).
137. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2406 (1991) (quoting Vance v. Bradley,
440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)).
138. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) ("The
general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classifi-
cation drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.").
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ably tailored to serve a compelling state interest."' I3 9
In some instances, courts have imposed an intermediate level of
scrutiny, called heightened scrutiny.' 4 ° This less-deferential stan-
dard is applied if the classification infringes upon an important per-
sonal-but not necessarily fundamental-right or interest.' 4 ' The
legislation must have a legitimate purpose and the means employed
to effectuate that purpose must bear a "fair and substantial" rela-
tionship to it.
14 2
The Supreme Court has applied an intermediate level of scru-
tiny to cases involving classifications based on gender, 4 ' alien-
age,' 44 and illegitimacy.' 4 5 The Court of Appeals has employed an
intermediate scrutiny standard to invalidate a law that denied re-
tired judges the right to practice law, the profession for which they
were trained and licensed.
146
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Murphy, the Court of Appeals be-
gan its analysis by stating that although the Maryland Constitution
does not contain an express equal protection clause, "it is settled
that the Due Process Clause of the Maryland Constitution, con-
tained in Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights, embodies the con-
cept of equal protection of the laws to the same extent as the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 47 Maryland
courts have "consistently taken the position that the Maryland equal
protection principle applies ' "in like manner and to the same extent
as"' the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."' 48 Hence, Supreme Court decisions regarding the Equal
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Attorney General v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 426 A.2d
929 (1981).
141. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
142. See Waldron, 289 Md. at 713-14, 426 A.2d at 946.
143. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
By law, gender is a suspect class in Maryland. See MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 46.
144. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217-18, 224.
145. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 68 (1968).
146. Waldron, 289 Md. at 716-28, 426 A.2d at 947-54.
147. Murphy, 325 Md. at 353, 601 A.2d at 107 (citing Hargrove v. Board of Trustees,
310 Md. 406, 416, 529 A.2d 1372, 1377 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1027 (1988); Ennis
v. State, 306 Md. 579, 591,510 A.2d 573, 579 (1986); State v. Wyand, 304 Md. 721, 726,
501 A.2d 43, 46, cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1095 (1986); Waldron, 289 Md. at 704-05, 426 A.2d
at 940-41).




Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment " 'are practically
direct authorities' " with respect to article 24 of the Declaration of
Rights.149
Although the Court of Appeals recognized Supreme Court de-
cisions that employed a "less deferential standard of review than
had previously been applied under the traditional rational basis
test" to strike down legislative classifications,' it concluded that
where the legislation is an economic regulation, the traditional "ra-
tional basis" test should be used unless the classification clearly bur-
dens a suspect class or infringes on a fundamental right.' 5 '
Following Supreme Court precedent, the Court of Appeals re-
jected the argument that section 11-108 infringed upon important
personal rights and was therefore subject to a heightened level of
scrutiny.' 5 2 The Murphy court stated that
[w]hatever may be the appropriate mode of equal protec-
tion analysis for some other statutory classifications, in our
view a legislative cap of $350,000 upon the amount of
noneconomic damages which can be awarded to a tort
plaintiff does not implicate such an important 'right' as to
trigger any enhanced scrutiny. Instead, the statute repre-
sents the type of economic regulation which has regularly
been reviewed under the traditional rational basis test by
this Court and the Supreme Court. 5
3
The court relied on Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study
Group 15 to support its conclusion that the great majority ofjurisdic-
tions use the rational basis test when reviewing legislative caps on
non-economic damages.' 55 In Duke Power, the Supreme Court up-
149. Id. (quoting Waldron, 289 Md. at 705, 426 A.2d at 941, quoting Bureau of Mines
v. George's Creek Coal & Land Co., 272 Md. 143, 156, 321 A.2d 748, 755 (1974)).
150. Id. at 359, 601 A.2d at 110 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473
U.S. 432, 446-50 (1985); Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985);
Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S.
869 (1985); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982)). The Court's review in these cases
has been characterized as "rational basis with teeth" or "rational basis with a bite." See
David 0. Stewart, A Growing Equal Protection Clause?, 71 A.B.A. J. 108, 112 (Oct. 1985);
Gayle L. Pettinga, Rational Basis With Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND.
L.J. 779 (1987); Gerald Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1972).
151. See Murphy, 325 Md. at 362, 601 A.2d at 111. The court disagreed with the hold-
ings in the cases cited by the Murphys in which a "heightened" scrutiny test was applied
to legislation capping recoverable tort damages. Id. at 361, 601 A.2d at 111.
152. Id. at 361-62, 601 A.2d at 111.
153. Id. at 362, 601 A.2d at 111-12.
154. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
155. See Murphy, 325 Md. at 363, 601 A.2d at 112.
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held the constitutionality of a statute limiting the recovery of dam-
ages in the event of a major nuclear accident. 156 The Court
described the cap "as a classic example of an economic regulation-
a legislative effort to structure and accommodate 'the burdens and
benefits of economic life.' ,'17 In addition to Duke Power, the Murphy
majority referred to cases in other jurisdictions that applied the
traditional rational basis test and held that the statutes in question
did not deny equal protection.15 8
Applying the rational basis test to the facts in Murphy, the Court
of Appeals found a legitimate legislative purpose behind the statu-
tory cap. 159 The cap "was enacted in response to a legislatively per-
ceived crisis concerning the availability and cost of liability
insurance in this State."' 60  The court stated that the cap was
neither irrational nor arbitrary because it was reasonably related to a
legitimate legislative objective.' 6 ' The Murphy court concluded,
therefore, that the legislative classification did not violate article 24
of the Declaration of Rights.' 62
At oral argument, the Murphys contended that section 11-108
restricted access to the courts and thus implicated article 19 rights,
creating the need for a higher degree of scrutiny.' 63 The court re-
jected this argument, pointing out that "Article 19 does guarantee
access to the courts, but that access is subject to reasonable restric-
tions. A statutory restriction upon access to the courts violates arti-
cle 19 only if the restriction is unreasonable."'" The court found
that the limitation imposed on recoverable damages under section
156. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 93.
157. Id. at 83 (quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)).
158. Murphy, 325 Md. at 364, 601 A.2d at 113. The court cited a number of cases,
including Davis v. Omitowoju, 883 F.2d 1155, 1158 (3d Cir. 1989); Boyd v. Bulala, 877
F.2d 1191, 1196-97 (4th Cir. 1989); Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665,
682-84 (Cal.), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985); Etheridge v. Medical Ctr. Hosps.,
376 S.E.2d 525, 533-34 (Va. 1989).
159. Murphy, 325 Md. at 369, 601 A.2d at 115.
160. Id. at 368, 601 A.2d at 115.
161. Id. at 370, 601 A.2d at 115-16.
162. Id., 601 A.2d at 116.
163. Id. at 365, 601 A.2d at 113. Article 19 of the Declaration of Rights states in
pertinent part that every person "for any injury done to him in his person or property,
ought to have remedy by the course of the Law of the land, and ought to have justice
and right, . . . fully without any denial .... according to the Law of the land." MD.
CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 19.
164. Murphy, 325 Md. at 365, 601 A.2d at 113. See Hill v. Fitzgerald, 304 Md. 689,
702, 501 A.2d 27, 34 (1985); Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Coupard, 304 Md. 340,
360, 499 A.2d 178, 189 (1985); Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 298-99, 385
A.2d 57, 71 (1978).
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11-108 did not "amount to a restriction upon access to the courts"
but merely modified the substantive law of damages in tort cases. 165
Even if section 11-108 could be viewed as somehow restricting ac-
cess to the courts, the court would view it as an entirely reasonable
restriction that would not require heightened scrutiny. 166
Judge Chasanow argued in dissent that a middle level of scru-
tiny had indeed been developed. 167 Quoting Professor Tribe, Judge
Chasanow explained the emergence of this intermediate level of re-
view as
a judicial response to the growing awareness that the "all-
or-nothing choice between minimum rationality and strict
scrutiny ill-suits the broad range of situations arising under
the equal protection clause, many of which are best dealt
with neither through the virtual rubber-stamp of truly mini-
mal review nor through the virtual death-blow of truly
strict scrutiny, but through methods more sensitive to risks
of injustice than the former and yet less blind to the needs
of governmental flexibility than the latter."'' 68
The dissent further contended "that the right to recover full and fair
compensation from a tortfeasor is an important personal right, and
any limitation on that right should be subject to 'heightened' or 'in-
termediate' scrutiny."' 169 Applying this standard, the dissent pos-
ited that legislation to limit non-economic damages in motor vehicle
tort actions would not survive a constitutional challenge because of
the lack of a clearly established need for such legislation. Judge
Chasanow found that "[t]here was clear evidence that there was a
crisis in the availability and affordability of medical malpractice liability
insurance.... No one has demonstrated there was a crisis, or that the
cap would solve any crisis, in the availability and affordability of
automobile liability insurance. v170
4. Analysis.-At issue in Murphy was whether equal protection
analysis of legislative caps on non-economic damages required
heightened scrutiny. Because the legislation clearly did not involve
a fundamental right, there was no question that strict scrutiny was
165. Murphy, 325 Md. at 366, 601 A.2d at 114.
166. Id. at 367, 601 A.2d at 114.
167. Id. at 379, 601 A.2d at 120 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 381, 601 A.2d at 121 (Chasanow, J., dissenting) (quoting LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-32, at 1609-10 (2d ed. 1988)).
169. Id. at 379, 601 A.2d at 119 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).




not applicable. The question then became whether the legislation
implicated a personal right important enough to warrant application
of a heightened scrutiny test. The Court of Appeals correctly de-
cided that the right to receive full non-economic damages in a per-
sonal injury action was not such a pivotal personal right and
appropriately applied the traditional rational basis test to the
legislation.
The Court of Appeals had applied heightened scrutiny to only
one case involving a legislative classification. In Attorney General v.
Waldron,' 7 1 a retired judge who accepted a pension was prohibited
by statute from practicing law for compensation. 172 The court justi-
fied applying an intermediate level of scrutiny in Waldron by stating
that "the right to pursue one's calling in life is a significant liberty
interest entitled to some measure of constitutional preservation. "173
The Supreme Court, Waldron noted, "has long recognized that the
right 'to engage in any of the common occupations of life' is encom-
passed within the concept of liberty guaranteed by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment."'' 74
In Murphy, however, there was no similar constitutionally pro-
tected right to receive compensation for non-economic damages in
a tort action. The Murphys looked solely to the common law as the
source of that right.' 75 The court correctly noted, however, that
Maryland's constitution clearly indicates that common law may be
statutorily changed. 176 In addition, "unlike many of the 'rights' at
common law, the right to recover for pain and suffering is not of
ancient origin and does not enjoy a long history."' 177
The legislation at issue in Murphy was typical economic regula-
tion, "which has regularly been reviewed under the traditional ra-
tional basis test.'1 78 The court has recognized that "[wihen a court
analyzes what it considers to represent a 'local economic' regulation
impacting on business interests, it should defer 'to legislative deter-
minations as to the desirability of particular statutory discrimina-
171. 289 Md. 683, 426 A.2d 929 (1981).
172. Id. at 686, 426 A.2d at 931.
173. Id. at 722, 426 A.2d at 950.
174. Id. at 721, 426 A.2d at 950 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572
(1972)).
175. Murphy, 325 Md. at 362, 601 A.2d at 112.
176. Id.
177. Edmonds v. Murphy, 83 Md. App. 133, 161-62, 873 A.2d 853, 867 (1990), aff'd,
325 Md. 342, 601 A.2d 102 (1992).
178. Murphy, 325 Md. at 362, 601 A.2d at 111-12.
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tions.... ' "179 By applying the traditional rational basis test to the
legislation in Murphy, the Court of Appeals was consistent with its
prior approaches to evaluating legislative classifications.
The Murphy decision also comports with the Supreme Court's
treatment of a legislative damages cap in Duke Power.' s° In Duke
Power, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute
capping the amount of damages recoverable as a result of a major
nuclear accident.'' Although the Court applied a due process anal-
ysis, its review was akin to an application of the traditional rational
basis test under equal protection analysis.' s2 The Court afforded
the legislation the "traditional presumption of constitutionality gen-
erally accorded economic regulations"'8 3 and found the legislative
purpose to be rational and legitimate.18 4
Murphy can be distinguished from Duke Power, however, by
considering the different governmental interests at issue. As one
commentator has noted, "[T]he protections, purposes, and govern-
mental interests involved in Duke Power are strikingly different from
those present where a state P[ersonal] I[njury] R[ecovery] C[ap] is
involved."'18 5 Under the statute in Duke Power, unlike a typical stat-
ute limiting recovery for personal injury, a plaintiff had better pro-
tection-a greater likelihood of recovering anything-than he would
have had without the act.'1 6 The issue in question in Murphy, how-
ever, was not the state's interest, but the relative importance of an
individual's right to damages. A plaintiff injured under either scena-
rio would arguably have the same right of recovery. Under the Duke
Power facts, however, the Supreme Court did not consider this right
of recovery important enough to warrant heightened scrutiny.
Recognizing the absence of a bright-line test to determine the
importance of an individual's interest, the Court of Appeals did not
179. Attorney Gen. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 713, 426 A.2d 929, 946 (1981) (quoting
City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)).
180. See supra text accompanying note 154.
181. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 84 (1978).
182. Id. at 82-93. The Court's conclusion that there was no equal protection violation
was premised on the idea that "the equal protection arguments largely track and dupli-
cate those made in support of the due process claim." Id. at 93.
183. Id. at 83.
184. Id. at 85-86.
185. James R. Andersen, Comment, Blasting the Cap: Constitutional Issues Arising From
Maryland's Limitation of Noneconomic Damages in Personal Injury Claims, 16 U. BALT. L. REV.
327, 337 (1987).
186. Id. at 337-38 (noting that "a private nuclear power plant operator would almost
assuredly be driven to insolvency well before liability payments reached the cap set forth
in the .. .[a]ct").
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base its conclusion solely on the Supreme Court's decision in Duke
Power. It also looked to other jurisdictions for guidance. In Etheridge
v. Medical Center Hospitals, 187 the Supreme Court of Virginia recently
applied the traditional rational basis test to a statute capping recov-
erable damages in medical malpractice actions. s8 8 The court did
not even discuss whether the legislation infringed upon an impor-
tant personal right because the plaintiff agreed that the rational ba-
sis test was the proper one to use.' 89
Similarly, in Fein v. Permanente Medical Group,190 the Supreme
Court of California applied the rational basis test to a legislative cap
on non-economic recovery in medical malpractice cases. 19 ' Fein
contended that the limit on damages "violates equal protection be-
cause of its differential effect within the class of malpractice plain-
tiffs,' 1 92 an argument similar to that advanced by the Murphys. The
California court dismissed the claim, stating that "[j]ust as the com-
plete elimination of a cause of action has never been viewed as in-
vidiously discriminating within the class of victims who have lost the
right to sue, the $250,000 limit-which applies to all malpractice
victims-does not amount to an unconstitutional discrimination."193
Thus, the reasoning that section 11-108 did not create a discrimina-
tory classification is consistent with the California Supreme Court's
analysis.
Of those state courts that have struck down legislation limiting
recovery in medical malpractice actions, "[w]ith only one exception,
all of the invalidated statutes contained a ceiling which applied to
both pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages."' 194 These courts ap-
parently felt that a higher degree of scrutiny of the legislation was
warranted when total damages were limited. This position is not
inconsistent with the Murphy decision because section 11-108 limits
only non-economic recovery, not total damages.
In Carson v. Maurer,195 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
struck down legislation limiting recovery in medical malpractice ac-
187. 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989).
188. Id. at 534.
189. Id.
190. 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985).
191. See id. at 679-84.
192. Id. at 683.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 682 (citing Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978); Carson v. Mau-
rer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980); Baptist Hosp. of Southeast Tex. v. Barber, 672 S.W.2d
296 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984)).
195. 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980).
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tions as violative of equal protection. 196 The Carson court consid-
ered the right to recover for personal injuries to be an important
right. The court applied an intermediate level test to the statute,
stating that the legislative classification " 'must be reasonable, not
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a
fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation' in order
to satisfy State equal protection guarantees."' 19 7 The New Hamp-
shire court noted that the Supreme Court has only applied this
heightened scrutiny in "cases involving classifications based upon
gender and illegitimacy" but warned that "[i]n interpreting our
State constitution . . . we are not confined to federal constitutional
standards and are free to grant individuals more rights than the Fed-
eral Constitution requires."98
The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, has invariably held
that the equal protection guarantees embodied in article 24 of the
Declaration of Rights are consistent with those in the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 9 9 While a state is al-
ways free to be more protective of individual rights than the federal
government, it is also free to choose not to expand federal constitu-
tional protections. The Murphy court was extremely reluctant to ex-
pand individual protections under an unclear standard. Because no
real guidelines have emerged as to when to use heightened scrutiny,
and no clear definition of "important right" is available, the court
concluded that the logical standard to be applied in the instant case
was the rational basis test. With its holding, the court has mandated
that any economic legislation will be reviewed under the rational
basis test.
5. Conclusion.-In Murphy, the Court of Appeals applied the ra-
tional basis test to the legislative cap on non-economic damages in a
personal injury tort action. This practice is consistent with the
Supreme Court's treatment of similar statutes and the treatment
adopted by a majority of other courts. It is likely that future chal-
lenges to the constitutionality of economic-based legislation will be
met with equal treatment. Maryland's lower courts now have a clear
196. Id. at 836.
197. Id. at 831 (quoting State v. Scoville, 304 A.2d 366, 369 (N.H. 1973)).
198. Id.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 147 & 148.
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ruling from the State's highest court to guide their analysis in equal
protection challenges to similar statutes.
LYNN A. DYMOND
C. The Due Process Requirements of Tax Sale Notice
In St. George Church v. Aggarwal,2 °° the Court of Appeals held
that a purchaser's failure to comply with statutory notice provisions
prescribed by the Tax-Property Article denied the previous property
owner due process in an action to foreclose its right of redemption
following a tax sale. 20 ' The decision reversed the Court of Special
Appeals, which had sustained an order of the Circuit Court for
Prince George's County foreclosing the property owner's right of
redemption. 20 2 Because the applicable section of the Tax-Property
Article-section 14-839-was completely rewritten in 1986,203 this
case provided the court with its first opportunity to determine the
constitutionality of the newly crafted statute, as well as to interpret
its meaning. The court interpreted the statute to require more ex-
tensive efforts by tax-sale purchasers to locate and give notice to
property owners than were seemingly dictated by the statute.20 4
Based on its expansive interpretation, the Aggarwal court found that
the statute--on its face and in practice-comported with federal due
process standards.2 0 5
1. The Case.-The controversy began on July 31, 1992, when
St. George Antiochian Orthodox Christian Church received a dona-
tion of "an unimproved parcel of land in Prince George's
County. ' 20 6 The transfer deed did not, however, list an address for
the property or the new owner.20 7 It did contain an address for the
Commonwealth Title Company, a Washington, D.C.-based firm that
200. 326 Md. 90, 603 A.2d 484 (1992).
201. Id. at 104, 603 A.2d at 491.
202. See St. George Church v. Aggarwal, 83 Md. App. 599, 576 A.2d 224 (1990), rev'd,
326 Md. 90, 603 A.2d 484 (1992).
203. In 1986, amendments to the statute regulating tax sales were promulgated in
House Bill 1828. As part of this process, § 14-839, which governs notice in actions to
foreclose the right of redemption, was completely rewritten. Senate Judicial Proceed-
ings Committee, Summary of Committee Report on House Bill 1828 at 2 (1986) [herein-
after Committee Report]. See Aggarwal, 326 Md. at 96, 603 A.2d at 487.
204. Aggarwal, 326 Md. at 103, 603 A.2d at 490.
205. Id. at 102, 603 A.2d at 490.




handled the transfer. 218 In addition, an address in Bladensburg,
Maryland, supposedly belonging to the transferred property, was
supplied to the Supervisor of Assessments for Prince George's
County.20 9 No other addresses were given to county officials by the
parties involved in the conveyance.21 0
Tax bills for the property were subsequently mailed to the va-
cant lot located at the Bladensburg address and were never received
by the Church.2 l' When the taxes for the property went into arrears
in May 1984, the Director of Finance for Prince George's County
sold the property at a tax sale.2 t2 On April 2, 1986, Rakshpal Ag-
garwal-the purchaser of the property-filed a complaint to fore-
close the Church's right of redemption.2 t3
An attempt was made to serve the property owner in accord-
ance with Tax-Property Article, section 14-839.2 14 Aggarwal's ef-
forts to locate an address for the Church included a title search,
contacting the Maryland Department of Assessments and Taxation,
consulting the white pages of local telephone directories and writing
to the postmaster for the town in which the vacant lot was lo-
cated. 1 5 As a result of this search, Aggarwal directed all attempts at
notice to the address of the vacant lot listed in the tax records.216
No effort was made to contact the Commonwealth Title Company to
inquire as to the whereabouts of the Church.2 17 A summons, sent
208. Id. at 100, 603 A.2d at 489. The deed consisted of two pages, both of which were
recorded. Id. The second page contained the name and address of the Commonwealth
Title Company. Id.
209. Id. at 92, 603 A.2d at 485. The address provided to the tax office was described
as one "that someone believed corresponded to the lot which was transferred to the
church." Id.
210. St. George Church v. Aggarwal, 83 Md. App. 599, 599, 576 A.2d 224, 225
(1990), rev'd, 326 Md. 90, 603 A.2d 484 (1992).
211. Aggarwal, 326 Md. at 93, 603 A.2d at 485.
212. Id. The tax sale was held pursuant to MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, §§ 70-123C (1980)
(recodified as MD. CODE ANN., TAX-PROP. §§ 14-808 to -854 (1986)). See Aggarwal, 326
Md. at 93, 603 A.2d at 485.
213. Aggarwal, 326 Md. at 93, 603 A.2d at 485. Section 14-833 of the Tax-Property
Article allows a holder of a certificate of sale to file a complaint to foreclose the right of
redemption any time after six months from the date of the tax sale. MD. CODE ANN.,
TAX-PROP. § 14-833 (1986 & Supp. 1992).
214. Aggarwal, 326 Md. at 99, 603 A.2d at 488. Section 14-839 of the Tax-Property
Article sets forth the notice procedures in actions to foreclose a property owner's right
of redemption following a tax sale. See MD. CODE ANN., TAX-PROP. § 14-839(a)(1),(2)
(1986 & Supp. 1992). See infra note 245 for the text of the section.
215. Aggarwal, 326 Md. at 99, 603 A.2d at 488.
216. "All subsequent notices, publication, and an attempt to serve process were di-
rected to that [vacant lot]." Id. at 93, 603 A.2d at 485.
217. Id. at 100, 603 A.2d at 489. Commonwealth's address was on the deed to the
property, which the purchaser is required to search as part of the title search described
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by certified mail, was returned marked "non est" and a summons
that the county sheriff attempted to serve was returned marked "per
fire board bad address. '2 8 Determining that Aggarwal's attempts
to effect actual notice were valid, although unsuccessful, the Circuit
Court for Prince George's County issued an order on July 28, 1987,
to foreclose the property owner's right of redemption.21 9
Never having received notice of any of these proceedings, the
Church did not realize it had lost its property until it sought to list
the lot for sale.221 In March 1989, the Church filed a motion to set
aside the tax sale,22' claiming that it was deprived of its property
without due process of law.222 In an affidavit accompanying the mo-
tion, the Church claimed that it had received neither tax bills nor
notice of the tax sale and the subsequent proceeding to foreclosethe right of redemption.23 Furthermore, the Church stated that it
believed it was not required to pay taxes as it held tax-exempt
status.224
The Circuit Court for Prince George's County denied the
Church's motion, finding that Aggarwal's efforts were "reasonably
diligent" and complied with section 14-839 of The Tax-Property Ar-
ticle.225 The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the denial of the
motion and held that the statute itself was constitutional.2 2 6 The
Court of Appeals granted certiorari to address the constitutional
227issues.
2. Legal Background.-
a. The Federal Due Process Standard.-In any proceeding
that might potentially deprive an interestholder of a protected prop-
by § 14-839(a)(1)(i). See id., 603 A.2d at 488. See also MD. CODE ANN., TAx-PROP. § 14-
839(a)(1)(i) (1986 & Supp. 1992).
218. Aggarwal, 326 Md. at 100, 603 A.2d at 488.
219. Id. at 93, 603 A.2d at 485.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 94, 603 A.2d at 486. The motion asserted that "Aggarwal had failed to
comply with the requirements of the statute governing tax sales and had failed to make a
reasonable investigation to obtain the church's address. Id.
223. See id. at 93-94, 603 A.2d at 485-86.
224. Id. at 94, 603 A.2d at 486. The Church conceded, however, that its assumption
that it did not owe taxes on the unimproved parcel of land was incorrect. See id. at 94
n.6, 603 A.2d at 486 n.6.
225. Id. at 94, 603 A.2d at 486.
226. St. George Church v. Aggarwal, 83 Md. App. 599, 611-12, 576 A.2d 224, 230
(1990), rev'd, 326 Md. 90, 603 A.2d 484 (1992).
227. 321 Md. 449, 583 A.2d 249 (1990).
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erty right, the standards of notice that must be given to that inter-
estholder are governed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."' In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. ,9
the Supreme Court articulated the rule that due process requires
"notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to ap-
prise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford
them an opportunity to present their objections. 2 ° Although the
Mullane Court recognized that states have a vital interest in the final
disposition of property within their borders, it held that this state
interest must be balanced against "the individual interest sought to
be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. "231
This standard requires that the notice-giver make a reasonably
diligent effort to ascertain the identity and address of interested par-
ties.2" 2 In Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams,233 the Supreme Court
held that if a party's name and address can be obtained by exerting a
reasonable effort, notice by mail--or a method equally as certain to
reach the party-is constitutionally mandated. 234 The Court recog-
nized that the notice-giver has much to gain by not accomplishing
228. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
229. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Mullane addressed the constitutional sufficiency of notice
provided to the beneficiaries of a common trust fund. As dictated by the governing New
York statute, the beneficiaries-even those whose names and addresses were readily as-
certainable-were given only notice by publication. Id. at 309. The Court found that
this notice was insufficient as to those beneficiaries whose names and addresses could be
obtained with a reasonable effort because notice by publication was not reasonably cal-
culated to reach the interestholders. Id. at 318.
230. Id. at 314.
231. Id.
232. See Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800 (1983). The Mennon-
ite Court stated, "We assume that the mortgagee's address could have been ascertained
by reasonably diligent efforts." Id. at 798 n.4. See also id. at 796 n.3 (discussing the
efforts required to identify and notify interested parties).
233. 462 U.S. 791 (1983). Mennonite dealt with the issue of which interestholders de-
served notice of a tax sale. An Indiana statute provided for notice by mail to the prop-
erty owner, but said nothing about notice to a mortgagee. The Court decided that
notice under the standard developed in Mullane must be given to any party with a consti-
tutionally recognized interest in the property. Id. at 798, 800 (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at
314-17).
234. Id. at 800. In its decision, the Court concluded, first, that the "mortgagee pos-
sess[ed] a substantial property interest that [would be] ... significantly affected by a tax
sale." Id. at 798. As the mortgagee's interest was legally protected, the purchaser was
required to provide "notice reasonably calculated to apprise him of a pending tax sale."
Id. See, e.g., Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315 ("[P]rocess which is a mere gesture is not due
process."); Tulsa Professional Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 491 (1988) ("If
appellant's identity was know or 'reasonably ascertainable,' then termination of appel-
lant's claim without actual notice violated due process.").
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actual notice23 5 and it addressed this inherent bias by mandating a
reasonably diligent effort.23 6
Thus, the due process standard articulated by the Supreme
Court is a fact-specific rule. Although the standard establishes that
constructive notice alone is not constitutionally adequate to provide
due process in actions that may deprive a person of a property
right,237 the ultimate determination of whether an individual was
deprived of due process depends upon the particularities of the spe-
cific situation.23 ' The key questions are whether a reasonable effort
was initially put forth to obtain the name and address of the prop-
erty owner for notification purposes and whether, under the specific
set of facts, the method of notice-mail or otherwise-was reason-
ably calculated to reach the property owner.23 9
b. Notice Under Maryland Law.-The section of the Mary-
land Code governing tax sales provides that local tax collectors may
sell property on which tax is in arrears at the time established by
local law.24 0 The purchaser of the property receives a certificate of
sale that acknowledges that the property has been conveyed to
her.24' The original owner of the property, however, possesses a
right to redeem the property by paying specified taxes and fees at
any time until the right of redemption is foreclosed.24 2 Generally,
the holder of a certificate of sale may bring an action to foreclose the
right of redemption six months after the tax sale. 243 Once a judg-
ment foreclosing the right of redemption has been entered, it may
be reopened only on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction or fraud in
the conduct of the foreclosure proceedings.24 4
235. See Aggarwal, 326 Md. at 96, 603 A.2d at 487 ("[T]he plaintiff often stands to
benefit from failed attempts to notify the defendant(s).") (citing Mullane and Mennonite).
236. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315.
237. In the case of a tax sale or similar proceeding, for example, the Court has deter-
mined that a statute must first provide for actual notice. See Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 800.
If a statute meets this first test, questions as to whether it safeguards due process are
addressed on a case-by-case basis. See id. at 802 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
238. The Mullane court stated, "[I]fwith due regard for the practicalities and peculiar-
ities of the case these conditions are reasonably met, the constitutional requirements are
satisfied." 339 U.S. at 314-15. See also Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 799 (finding that the re-
quired effort may be more extensive depending upon the circumstances).
239. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
240. See MD. CODE ANN., TAX-PROP. § 14-808 (1986 & Supp. 1992).
241. See id. § 14-820.
242. See id. § 14-828.
243. See id. § 14-833.
244. See id. § 14-845 (outlining the procedure for reopening a judgement foreclosing
the right of redemption).
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In Aggarwal, the Court of Appeals was forced to decide whether
the recently rewritten notice requirements of the tax-sales statute,
section 14-839, passed constitutional muster.245 This section, which
245. See id. § 14-839. The notice section provides as follows:
(a) Notice to defendants.-(1) The plaintiff shall show in the title of the complaint
the last address known to the plaintiff or to the attorney filing the complaint of
each defendant, as obtained from:
(i) any records examined as part of the title examination;
(ii) the tax rolls of the collector who made the sale, as to the property de-
scribed in the complaint; and
(iii) any other address that is known to the plaintiff or the attorney filing the
complaint.
(2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection does not require the plaintiff or the attor-
ney for the plaintiff to make any investigations or to search any other records or
sources of information other than those stated.
(3) On the filing of the complaint, the court shall issue a summons to procure
the answer and appearance of all the defendants as in other civil actions.
(4) This paragraph does not apply if a last known address for a defendant is
not obtained as provided under paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection. The
plaintiff shall cause a copy of the order of publication to be mailed by first class
mail or certified mail, postage prepaid, to each defendant at the defendant's
address as determined by the provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) of this sub-
section. As to any defendant not served by summons or as provided by para-
graph (5) of this subsection, the plaintiff shall file an affidavit in the
proceedings, which affidavit:
(i) shall certify that this provision has been complied with; and
(ii) shall be accompanied by:
1. the receipt obtained from the post office for the mailing; or
2. the certified mail receipt.
(5) Notice to a defendant may be made in any other manner that results in
actual notice of the pendency of the action to the defendant. When notice is
made under this paragraph it shall be certified to by an affidavit that fairly de-
scribes the method and time of service.
(6) A final judgement may not be entered before the last of:
(i) where actual service is made on the defendant, the passage of the time spec-
ified in the summons issued by the court;
(ii) the actual time specified in the order of publication; or
(iii) 33 days after the date of mailing the copy of the order of publication under
paragraph (4) of this subsection.
(b) Same-Declared reasonable and sufficient.-The provisions of this section as to
notice to persons who may have an interest in property sold for nonpayment of
taxes, coupled with the order of publication and the other publicity and notices
as ordinarily accompanies the sale of such property, as well as the knowledge of
the taxes and the consequences for nonpayment of the taxes is declared:
(1) to be reasonable and sufficient under all of the circumstances involved, and
necessary in light of the compelling need for the prompt collection of taxes;
and
(2) to supersede any other requirement in other cases or civil causes generally.
(c) Notice to collector.-Notice of the institution of proceeding to foreclose the
right of redemption also shall be given to the collector where the property is
located.
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was entirely rewritten in 1986, applies to notification of interested
parties in actions to foreclose the right of redemption after tax sales
of property.246
The language of section 14-839 provides three directives that a
tax-sale purchaser must follow in furnishing notice to a property
owner. First, the purchaser must look to the documents consulted
as part of a title search.247 Second, the purchaser must inspect the
tax records.2 48 Finally, the purchaser must consult any other ad-
dress known to her or her attorney.249 The provision further states
that the purchaser need not "make any investigations or search any
other records or sources of information other than those stated.
250
The intent of the legislature in setting out this specific course of
conduct was to "provide greater protection for due process by facili-
tating notice of tax sales of property in the State."' 25 ' In addition,
the statute expressly recognizes the interest of the State in the
prompt collection of taxes.25 2
3. The Court's Reasoning; Analysis.-In formulating its holding,
the Aggarwal court addressed two major issues: first, whether the
statute was constitutional on its face; and, second, whether the steps
taken by the purchaser to notify the property owner in this case
complied with the statute.253 The court's ultimate decision con-
firmed the constitutionality of section 14-839,254 but found that Ag-
garwal failed to fulfill the statute's requirements. 255
a. The Statute's Constitutionality.-The bulk of the court's
opinion was devoted to developing a constitutionally valid construc-
tion of the statute. The court's approach was governed by the prin-
246. Aggarwal, 326 Md. at 96, 603 A.2d at 487. House Bill 1828 was ratified to amend
the provisions of the Tax-Property Article, which govern tax sales of property. The bill
accomplished significant alterations. Id. The impetus behind these changes developed
out of concern on the part of law makers and the American Bar Association that the
former provisions did not adequately safeguard the due process rights of property own-
ers. Committee Report, supra note 203, at 3.
247. See MD. CODE ANN., TAx-PROP. § 14-839(a)(1)(i) (1986 & Supp. 1992).
248. See id. § 14-839(a)(1)(ii).
249. See id. § 14-839(a)(1)(iii).
250. See id. § 14-839(a)(2).
251. See Committee Report, supra note 203.
252. See MD. CODE ANN., TAX-PROP. § 14-839(b)(1) (1986 & Supp. 1992).
253. See Aggarwal, 326 Md. at 98, 603 A.2d at 487-88.
254. See id. at 102, 603 A.2d at 490.
255. Id. at 104, 603 A.2d at 491. The court interpreted § 14-489 to require more
than that demanded by the explicit statutory language in order to construe the statute to




ciple that "a court will, whenever reasonably possible, construe and
apply a statute to avoid casting serious doubt upon its constitution-
ality."'2 56 Consequently, Aggarwal read the statute to not permit a
purchaser to ignore reasonable sources of information concerning a
property owner's whereabouts by narrowly reading the language of
section 14-839.257 Rather, the court held that the statute mandates
a reasonable effort to provide actual notice to the property
owner.
258
Although acknowledging the seemingly narrow requirements of
the statute,259 the court indicated that "the fact that the statute does
not require the purchaser to employ all reasonable sources in an
effort to notify the owner does not contradict the conclusion that
using the sources required by the statute will result in notice reason-
ably calculated to reach the owner.12 60 This approach enabled the
court to uphold section 14-839 by construing it in such a way to
ensure that, in practice, it would meet the mandated constitutional
guarantees.
Establishing a broad scope for the efforts required by the stat-
ute, the court focused on section 14-839(a)(1)(iii), which requires a
purchaser to consult "any other address that is known to the plain-
tiff or the attorney filing the complaint."'26 ' By expansively defining
the term "known" in that subsection, the court created a catch-all
provision which essentially dictates that the purchaser must comply
with federal due process standards.2 62 The court's definition was
extracted from its recent decision in Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia,265
256. Aggarwal, 326 Md. at 102, 603 A.2d at 490 (citing Schochet v. State, 320 Md. 714,
725, 580 A.2d 176, 181 (1990); Board of Trustees v. Mayor of Baltimore, 317 Md. 72,
97, 562 A.2d 720, 732 (1989); Craig v. State, 316 Md. 551, 566, 560 A.2d 1120, 1127
(1989)).
257. See id. at 103, 603 A.2d at 490. Through his title search, Aggarwal found the
name and address of the title company, which in all likelihood would have been able to
provide him with the Church's correct address. Id. at 100, 603 A.2d at 489.
258. See id. at 98, 603 A.2d at 488.
259. See MD. CODE ANN., TAX-PROP. § 14-839 (1986 & Supp. 1992). Reading sections
(a)(1)(i),(ii),(iii) and (a)(2) together, it is logical to conclude that a very limited search is
all that is required, as § 14-839(a)(2) states that the purchaser must make no search
beyond the documents listed. Id.
260. Aggarwal, 326 Md. at 98, 603 A.2d at 488. To support this position, the court
noted that the statute, in accordance with federal due process standards, does not prefer
notice by publication. Id.
261. See id. at 101, 603 A.2d at 489 (quoting and interpreting MD. CODE ANN., TAX-
PROP. § 14-839(a)(1)(iii) (1986 & Supp. 1992)).
262. See supra notes 228-239 and accompanying text (discussing the federal due pro-
cess standard).
263. 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992).
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in which it held that "actual knowledge" includes the "wilful refusal
to know.''264 In Aggarwal, the court applied the same definition to
"known" in section 14-839, concluding that the section requires ef-
forts beyond a mere perusal of the documents listed in the stat-
ute.2 6 5 Specifically, a purchaser may not ignore plausible leads-
aiding proper notice-discovered through a search of title and tax
documents.26 6 The court reasoned:
If Aggarwal's argument is correct, subsection (a)(2) of
§ 14-839 obviates the need for any additional investigation,
even consulting one's own files where correct information
is known to be. On the other hand, if the word "known" is
given its usual meaning as defined in Owens-Illinois, then
subsection (a)(2) means only that no investigation or
search beyond that necessary to avoid willful ignorance is
required. 67
The Court of Appeals further stated that the most logical read-
ing of section 14-839 leads to the conclusion that the legislature did
not intend to condone disregard for information that may lead to
the discovery of a taxpayer's identity or address. 26 The sanctioning
of such behavior by the statute would ignore the constitutional re-
quirement of a reasonably diligent search.2 6 9 In addition, the court
recognized that the strong financial disincentive for purchasers to
provide actual notice makes it necessary to use a high standard in
judging a purchaser's attempts to locate and notify property
owners.
2 70
The court went to great lengths to read section 14-839
(a)(1)(iii) to require investigative steps that section 14-839(a)(2)
264. Id. at 462 n.23, 601 A.2d at 654 n.23. The court stated that "a defendant cannot
shut his eyes or plug his ears when he is presented with evidence of a defect and thereby
avoid liability for punitive damages." Id.
265. Aggarwal, 326 Md. at 102, 603 A.2d at 490.
266. Id. at 103, 603 A.2d at 490.
267. Id. at 102, 603 A.2d at 490.
268. See id. at 101-02, 603 A.2d at 489-90.
269. The Aggarwal court stated:
Given the importance of the property right that is involved in the foreclosure of
a right of redemption, and the principles of due process so recently enunciated
by the Supreme Court, we adopt the latter interpretation of the statute which
embraces the conventional meaning of the word 'known.' Indeed, we believe
an interpretation that would permit a purchaser to engage in deliberate igno-
rance to the detriment of the owner's interest in the land would be at least
constitutionally suspect.
Id. at 102, 603 A.2d at 490.
270. See id. at 96, 603 A.2d at 487.
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seemed to exclude. 2 7 ' The court's interpretation mandates that if a
purchaser uncovers a plausible lead during a search of the sources
listed in subsections (a)(1)(i), (ii) and (iii) of the statute, she must
take the next logical step to investigate those leads. 272 In a sense,
the court interpreted the section 14 -8 39(a)(2) limitations out of the
statute entirely.
In applying the federal due process standard, the court's main
concern was ensuring that the effort demanded by the statute to ob-
tain the identity and address of interested parties was one of reason-
able diligence.2 7 3 Thus, the court established a flexible construction
of the statute that requires the purchaser to take all reasonable
steps, as dictated by the specific facts, to identify the property
owner.
b. Compliance under the Statute.-After upholding the valid-
ity of section 14-839, the court addressed whether Aggarwal's ac-
tions did, in fact, comply with its interpretation of the statute's
requirements. In concluding that he did not comply with section
14-839, the court focused on the fact that Aggarwal and his attorney
were aware that the address to which they were continually mailing
notices was a "bad" address.2 74 The court indicated that when the
validity of an address is questionable, a purchaser may be required
to undertake a more extensive search of public records, and to fol-
low-up on any leads the initial search provides.2 75 The court stated
that in instances where purchasers or attorneys are aware that an
271. Section 14-839(a)(2) states: "Paragraph (1) of this subsection does not require
the plaintiff or the attorney for the plaintiff to make any investigations or to search any
other records or sources of information other than those stated." MD. CODE ANN., TAX-
PROP. § 14-839(a)(2) (1986 & Supp. 1992). Aggarwal argued that the language in this
section was intended to eliminate any duty to go beyond a search of the title, the tax
records, and any address the purchaser actually had in his possession. Aggarwal, 326
Md. at 100-01, 603 A.2d at 489.
272. The court determined that because the address of the title company was in the
deed to the property, and the deed was consulted as part of the title search, a purchaser
acting in good faith would have made a phone call or written a letter to find out if the
title company knew the address of the property owner. Aggarwal, 326 Md. at 104, 603
A.2d at 490-91.
273. The court did not address the adequacy of the statute's method of notice. The
statute requires mailing that is generally considered to be reasonably calculated to reach
the interested party. See, e.g., Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800
(1983); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 318 (1950).
274. Aggarwal, 326 Md. at 99, 603 A.2d at 488. Aggarwal and his attorney knew that
the address they were using corresponded to a vacant lot and would therefore "not
serve to accomplish notice." Id.




address is incorrect, it will almost certainly apply a heightened stan-
dard for compliance with the statute.27 6 Aggarwal concluded:
[W]here, as here, the plaintiff or his attorney becomes
aware that the address given on the tax rolls is a "bad ad-
dress," . . . the plaintiff and his attorney will be held to
"know" an address of the owner within the meaning of the
statute when, except for manifest indifference to informa-
tion shown in the land records or the tax rolls, they would
have actually discovered that address.277
c. Recent Application of the Interpretation.-Aggarwal's inter-
pretation of section 14-839 has been recently applied in two deci-
sions of the Court of Special Appeals: Kennedy v. Cummings278 and
Scott v. Seek Lane Venture, Inc.2 79 In Scott, the court directly applied
the Aggarwal definition of "known" in section 14-839(a)(1)(iii) to
conclude that the purchaser in a tax sale failed to comply with the
requirements of the statute.280 The court concluded that the pur-
chaser did not provide appropriate notice because she ignored in-
formation that, if acknowledged, would have resulted in actual
notice to the property owner, a defunct corporation.2 8' The court
found that "under the facts of this case, Scott's failure to search for
this readily available information constituted a willful refusal to
know."-
2 8 2
In Kennedy, the court followed the reasoning of Aggarwal by in-
terpreting section 14-839 (a)(1)(i)-the provision relating to title
searches-in a similarly broad manner. The Kennedy court set aside
a tax sale, finding that when the purchaser's search of county
records did not reveal the property owner's address, the purchaser
[u]nder these circumstances, the failure to put forth this minimal effort is analo-
gous to the failure to check one's own records when reasonably certain that a
valid address will be found therein. Here Aggarwal's attorney must have be-
lieved it highly probable that Commonwealth [Title Company] possessed the
correct address of the Church, and that he could obtain that information with a
minimum of effort. He cannot, in those circumstances, be permitted to avoid
making reasonable inquiry with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the
truth.
Id. at 104, 603 A.2d at 491.
276. See id. at 103-04, 603 A.2d at 490-91.
277. Id. at 103, 603 A.2d at 490.
278. 91 Md. App. 21, 603 A.2d 1251 (1992).
279. 91 Md. App. 668, 605 A.2d 942 (1992).
280. Id. at 685, 605 A.2d at 950.
281. Id. at 687, 605 A.2d at 951.
282. Id. at 687-88, 605 A.2d at 951. The Scott court stated that the names of the direc-
tors could easily have been found in a search of the circuit court records. Id.
568 [VOL. 52:532
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failed to comply with the statute's requirement by not also searching
the municipal tax records.283 The purchasers argued that the search
required by section 14-836, which identifies the parties who must
receive notice of an action to foreclose the right of redemption, 284
only requires a search of county tax records, and that the limited re-
quirements of searches under section 14-836 govern the title search
under section 14-839.2a5 The court rejected this argument and held
that section 14-839 required a more extensive search.
Section 14-839(a)(1)(i) . . .does not so limit the places to
be searched to obtain a defendant's last known address to
three places; the last known address is obtained from "any
records examined as part of the title examination." ...
We believe the legislature intended § 14-839(a)(1)(i) to re-
quire a broader search than § 14-836(b)(1)(i) .... Once a
name of a defendant has been determined, it is sensible to
conduct a broader search to determine the address of the
defendant.28 6
The Kennedy decision illustrates that a court should employ a stricter
standard for compliance with section 14-839 when purchasers or at-
torneys are aware that they are dealing with a "bad address. '"287
5. Conclusion.-Clearly, the court's purpose was to ensure that
due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment are
protected for Maryland property owners. The approach taken by
the Court of Appeals allowed it to find section 14-839 constitutional
on its face and to construe it in a manner that insures that it will be
constitutional in operation. The result of the Aggarwal court's inter-
pretation of section 14-839(a)(1)(iii) is to demand, based on the
given circumstances, a reasonable effort commensurate with the due
process standard articulated by the Supreme Court. The decision
requires a purchaser to exhaust all reasonable avenues, and further
warns purchasers that if they are aware that they possess informa-
283. Kennedy, 91 Md. App. at 34-35, 603 A.2d at 1257-58.
284. See MD. CODE ANN., TAX-PROP. § 14-836(b)(1)(i) (1986 & Supp. 1992). Defend-
ants in an action to foreclose the right of redemption shall be "the record title holder of
the property as disclosed by a search performed in accordance with generally accepted
standards of title examination of the land records of the county, of the records of the
register of wills of the county, and of the records of the circuit court for the county." Id.
285. Kennedy, 91 Md. App. at 30, 603 A.2d at 1255.
286. Id. at 30-31, 603 A.2d at 1255.
287. The Kennedy court noted that an important element leading to its decision was
the fact that the purchasers "knew the address they had was a 'bad address.' " Id. at 34,
603 A.2d at 1257. The court then went on to say that if the purchasers had conducted
the required title search they would have discovered the address. Id.
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tion that could lead to the provision of actual notice, a stricter stan-
dard for compliance-often requiring a search beyond the tax and
title records-will be applied.
SUSAN M. ROCHE
D. Public Employees and Free Speech
In Hawkins v. Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services,288
the Court of Appeals held that the Secretary of Personnel of the
Maryland Department of Public Safety did not violate an employee's
First Amendment right to free speech by discharging him for di-
recting racist remarks toward a private citizen, 289 even though the
employee was off duty, away from work, and out of uniform. 29° Ap-
plying what amounted to a rational basis test, the court found that
the State's concerns about possible disruption and physical violence
at Hawkins's place of employment based on his attitude were rea-
sonable, and therefore the Secretary's action was constitutional.29'
1. The Case.-On November 27, 1985, Donald Hawkins, a pro-
bationary correctional officer at the Maryland House of Corrections,
presented his payroll check to Hanaa Elabd, a teller at a Maryland
National Bank branch. 92 Hawkins did not have an account with the
bank, but he had been cashing his payroll checks there for the previ-
ous nine months. 293 On this occasion, however, Elabd refused to
cash his check. 294 Hawkins argued with her and eventually spoke to
her superior, who instructed the teller to cash the check. After she
cashed the check, Hawkins walked away approximately twenty feet
and loudly proclaimed, "Hitler should have gotten rid of all you
Jews. '"295 Elabd was surprised at the remark and motioned to the
teller next to her that she was not Jewish. 296 Hawkins watched her
reaction and then added, " 'and all the Poles too,' 297 before he
turned and left the bank.
288. 325 Md. 621, 602 A.2d 712 (1992).
289. Id. at 639, 602 A.2d at 720-21.
290. Id. at 622, 602 A.2d at 713.
291. See id. at 638-39, 602 A.2d at 720-21.
292. Id. at 622, 602 A.2d at 712.
293. Id. at 622-23, 602 A.2d at 712-13.
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Shortly after Hawkins's outburst, an official from the Maryland
Department of Natural Resources entered the bank and learned of
the incident. 298 That official reported the incident to the personnel
officer at the House of Corrections. 299 Several weeks later, the war-
den of the House of Corrections reviewed the information regard-
ing the bank incident, along with other deficiencies in Hawkins's
record, and terminated his employment.3 0 0
Hawkins appealed to the Secretary of Personnel, arguing that
the termination violated his First Amendment rights.3"' The Secre-
tary held an administrative hearing and found that Hawkins's in-
flammatory remarks were "mere personal abuse, "302 which did not
fall under the shield of the First Amendment. 0 3 The Secretary con-
cluded accordingly that Hawkins's termination from employment
was for a legal and valid reason. 0 4
298. Id.
299. Id. at 623-24, 602 A.2d at 713.
300. Id. at 624, 602 A.2d at 713. Hawkins's record apparently included other defi-
ciencies in his work performance, including failures to appear for work. Id. The State,
however, did not deny that Hawkins's conduct in the bank was a "substantial" or "moti-
vating factor" in its decision to fire him. Id. at 624 n.l, 602 A.2d at 713 n.l. Nor did the
State argue that it would have discharged Hawkins for these other deficiencies in the
absence of his comments in the bank. Id.
301. Id. at 624, 602 A.2d at 713. The State may discharge probationary employees
"without reason and without cause," Small v. Secretary of Personnel, 267 Md. 532, 535,
298 A.2d 173, 174 (1973), as long as the State is not discharging the employee for exer-
cising a constitutional right. See 60 Op. Att'y Gen. 545, 550 (1975).
302. Hawkins, 325 Md. at 625, 602 A.2d at 714. The Secretary apparently relied on
the Supreme Court's decision in Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), described infra
text accompanying notes 323-337, to decide that personal abuse is beyond the protec-
tion of the First Amendment. Connick, however, did not hold that personal abuse--or
even personal speech by public employees-is beyond the protection of the First
Amendment. It simply held that federal courts were inappropriate forums for reviewing
personnel decisions made by public agencies in reaction to an employee's speech on
matters of personal interest. Id. Several lower federal courts have extended Connick's
holding to include speech characterized as personal grievances. See Toni M. Massaro,
Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in the Public Sector Workplace, 61 S.C. L. REV. 3, 20 n.95
(1987). The Supreme Court seems to be less inclined than the lower courts to restrict
speech and has held that certain types of personal abuse are constitutionally protected.
See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987) (striking down a Houston ordinance that
made it illegal to oppose, molest, abuse, or interrupt a police officer in any manner
during the execution of his duties and explaining that the First Amendment protects a
significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge). Such speech is only prescribable if
" 'shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that
rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.' Id. at 461 (quoting Ter-
miniello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)).
303. Hawkins, 325 Md. at 625, 602 A.2d at 714.
304. Id.
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On appeal, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City reversed and
held that although Hawkins's remarks were not on a matter of pub-
lic concern, they were nevertheless protected by the First Amend-
ment.3 °5 The circuit court remanded the case to the Secretary to
make findings of fact concerning "whether Hawkins's comments ad-
versely affected the State's ability to perform its functions. ' 0 6
On remand, the Secretary acknowledged that Hawkins's re-
marks did not have an adverse effect upon the operation of the
House of Corrections.3 0 7 Nevertheless, the Secretary found that
Hawkins's behavior had the potential to disrupt the internal opera-
tion of the correctional institution .30  The Secretary concluded that
Hawkins's termination was valid because the lack of confidence in
his ability to perform his job impeded the Division of Corrections's
ability to perform its functions.30 9
Hawkins again appealed to the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City.3 10 This time, the court affirmed the Secretary's determination,
emphasizing that "the conduct at the bank was rationally related to
potential disruption of the employer's operations." 31 ' Hawkins ap-
pealed to the Court of Special Appeals, but prior to that court's con-
sideration of the case, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of
certiorari on its own motion.3 1 2 By a four-to-three majority, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the circuit court.31 3
2. Legal Background.-The idea that public employees enjoy
First Amendment protection is relatively new.31 4 As recently as
1952, the Supreme Court held that "[people] may work for the [gov-
ernment] upon the reasonable terms laid down by the proper au-
thorities of [the state]. If they do not choose to work on such terms,
they are at liberty to retain their beliefs and associations and go
elsewhere."3 1 5
In 1967, however, the Court rejected the notion that public em-
ployment could be conditioned on the surrender of constitutional
305. Id. at 625-26, 602 A.2d at 714.
306. Id. at 626, 602 A.2d at 714.




311. Id. at 627-28, 602 A.2d at 715.
312. Id. at 628, 602 A.2d at 715.
313. Id. at 639, 602 A.2d at 721.
314. See Massaro, supra note 302, at 8.
315. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952).
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rights. In Keyishian v. Board of Regents,"16 the Court concluded that
" '[i]t is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and
expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of condi-
tions upon a benefit or privilege.' "1317
The Court refined its position on public-employee speech in
Pickering v. Board of Education."'8 In Pickering, a school board dis-
missed a teacher for writing a letter to a local newspaper criticizing
the board's handling of a bond proposal and its allocation of funds
between athletic and academic programs.31 9 The Court held that
unless the teacher knowingly or recklessly made false statements,
the board could not base his dismissal on the exercise of his First
Amendment rights.3 °
To reach this conclusion, the Court balanced the teacher's in-
terests in commenting on matters of public concern against the gov-
ernment's interest in promoting the efficiency of the public services
it performs.3 2 ' Finding that Pickering's public statements neither
impeded the proper performance of his daily duties nor interfered
with the regular operation of the school, the Court concluded that
Pickering's interests in speaking freely on a matter of public concern
outweighed the board's interest in maintaining the efficient func-
tioning of its schools. 22
The Court applied the Pickering test but reached a different re-
sult in Connick v. Myers. 23 Myers, an assistant district attorney in
New Orleans, was involved in a dispute with her supervisor concern-
ing her impending transfer to a new department.3 4 She distributed
a questionnaire to her coworkers asking them, inter alia, for their
views on the office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a
grievance committee, the level of confidence in particular supervi-
sors, and whether the coworkers felt pressured to work on political
campaigns.3 25 Upon learning of the questionnaire, Connick fired
Myers for insubordination. 26
Myers sued, claiming that her termination violated her free
316. 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967).
317. Id. at 606 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963)).
318. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
319. See id. at 564, 566.
320. Id. at 574-75.
321. Id. at 568.
322. Id. at 572-73.
323. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
324. Id. at 140.
325. Id. at 140-41.
326. Id. at 141.
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speech rights.32 7 The Supreme Court ultimately decided against
her, finding that the district attorney's interest in preventing the dis-
ruption of his office outweighed Myers's First Amendment inter-
ests. 32 8 The Court's decision in Connick is distinguishable, however,
in that Pickering involved a public employee commenting as a citizen
on a matter of public concern 329 whereas Connick involved a public
employee commenting as an employee on a matter of personal inter-
est.33 ° The Connick Court held that the state's burden varies de-
pending on the nature of the employee's expression and the
manner, time, place, and context in which the expression oc-
curred.3 3 ' Because Myers distributed the questionnaire solely to
gather ammunition for her personal battle with her supervisor,3 3 2
and because the questionnaire had the potential to interfere with
the close working relationships essential to the running of the of-
fice, 3 the Court decided that Connick's interest in maintaining har-
mony in his office outweighed Myers's First Amendment
interests.3 3 4
The Court warned, however, that its dicta and holdings should
not be interpreted as suggesting that speech by public employees on
matters of personal concern is "totally beyond the protection of the
First Amendment. '3 3 5 In fact, it explicitly rejected the idea that
such speech fell into one of "the narrow and well-defined classes of
expression which carries so little social value, such as obscenity, that
the State can prohibit and punish such expression by all persons in
its jurisdiction. "336 In its closing statements, the majority reiterated
that "[a]lthough today the balance is struck for the government, this
is no defeat for the First Amendment.13 3 7
In its third major decision involving public-employee speech,
Rankin v. McPherson,33 8 the Court held that a county constable's dis-
charge of a clerical employee was a violation of the employee's First
Amendment rights.3 3 9 After hearing of an attempt on President
327. Id.
328. Id. at 154.
329. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 574 (1968).
330. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.
331. Id. at 151-53.
332. Id. at 153.
333. See id. at 151-52.
334. Id. at 154.
335. Id. at 147.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 154.
338. 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
339. Id. at 392.
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Reagan's life, the employee had remarked to a coworker, "[I]f they
go for him again, I hope they get him." Applying the Pickering bal-
ancing test, the Rankin Court held that the content, form, and con-
text of the employee's speech supported the conclusion that the
speech was on a matter of public concern. 340 The Court then held
that the State did not meet its burden of showing that McPherson's
speech interfered with the efficient functioning of the office.341 Her
speech did not disrupt her work, personnel relationships, or job
performance.3 42 Furthermore, there was no danger that her speech
would discredit the office.3 43 Accordingly, the State failed to
demonstrate sufficiently strong counter-interests to outweigh Mc-
Pherson's First Amendment rights.3 44
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Hawkins, the majority acknowl-
edged that the underlying dispute did not "fully fit within the fact
pattern of any of the three principal cases."'3 45 The court neverthe-
less described, in detail, these cases and the balancing test they ap-
plied.3 46 Instead of using this balancing test, however, the court
devised what amounted to a rational basis test, holding that because
the State had a reasonable basis for terminating Hawkins, it did not
violate his First Amendment rights.3 47
To achieve this result, the majority first decided that Hawkins's
speech was not on a matter of public concern, stating that "[c]learly,
340. See id. at 384-87.
341. Id. at 389.
342. Id. at 388-89.
343. Id. at 389.
344. Id. at 388. There are several Maryland cases dealing with public-employee
speech. See De Bleecker v. Montgomery County, 292 Md. 498, 438 A.2d 1348 (1982)
(holding that the trial court erred in directing a verdict for a public employer when the
public employee produced sufficient evidence that his constitutionally protected speech
rights were a substantially motivating factor in his discharge, and when reasonable
minds could differ on whether the employee would have been discharged anyway be-
cause of unprotected conduct); DiGrazia v. County Executive, 288 Md. 437, 418 A.2d
1191 (1980) (holding that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to a po-
lice official when a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether the County Executive
removed him from his position as a punitive measure for exercising a constitutionally
protected right of free speech); Brukiewa v. Police Comm'r, 257 Md. 36, 263 A.2d 210
(1970) (holding that the Baltimore City Police Department violated the appellant's First
Amendment rights by discharging him for statements he made on television because the
Department did not establish that the statements adversely affected the Department's
public services or made the appellant unfit for his job).
345. Hawkins, 325 Md. at 628, 602 A.2d at 715.
346. See id. at 628-31, 602 A.2d at 715-17.
347. Id. at 639, 602 A.2d at 720-21. See infra note 377 and accompanying text for an
explanation of why the test the court applied is really a rational basis test and not a
balancing test.
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Hawkins was not attempting to stimulate a dialogue on the Holo-
caust. He was giving vent to his anger, and relying on his fallible
ability to identify persons of Jewish heritage, he used speech as a
weapon to abuse the teller who had inconvenienced him."34 The
court then concluded that "[n]o balancing is required because the
threshold requirement of speech on a matter of public concern has
not been met." 3 4 9
The Hawkins court did not, however, end its analysis there. It
explained that "[s]ome doubt necessarily remains whether a literal
application of the Pickering-Connick rule is the appropriate analysis in
the instant matter where the speech was away from the job site,
outside of business hours, and did not discuss or comment upon any
aspect of the public employment. "350 The court then proceeded to
analyze several federal cases involving public-employee speech.35'
These cases held that certain types of public-employee expression
not involving matters of public concern were protected by the First
Amendment. The court stated that if the rationale of these cases
was applied, Hawkins's comments may have been constitutionally
protected.5 . The court, however, went on to state that if the com-
ments were protected, they were "near the periphery, and not at the
core, of that protection. '35 3 As a result, the court ruled that any
First Amendment protection potentially applicable to Hawkins's
speech was not great.3 54
348. Id. at 633, 602 A.2d at 717-18.
349. Id., 602 A.2d at 718.
350. Id.
351. See id. at 634-37, 602 A.2d at 718-20. The court described the facts of several
Maryland cases, but concluded that these cases lacked an "all fours" factual analogy to
Hawkins's case and, accordingly, did not rely on the cases in its opinion. Id. at 634, 602
A.2d at 718. See supra note 344 for a description of those cases. The court also de-
scribed the facts and holdings of several federal circuit court cases to support its conclu-
sion that Hawkins's comments may be within First Amendment protection. See Hawkins,
325 Md. at 634-37, 602 A.2d at 718-20. See also Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 999
(4th Cir. 1985) (holding that a police officer's "off-duty speech had to be accorded the
same weight in absolute terms that would be accorded comparable artistic expression by
citizens who do not work for the state"); Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557 (10th Cir.
1989) (ruling that the public-concern test does not apply when public-employee, non-
verbal, protected expression does not occur at work and is not about work); Waters v.
Chaffin, 684 F.2d 833, 837 (11 th Cir. 1982) (holding that the plaintiff-police officer's
abusive comments about the police chief were within the First Amendment protection
because he, "like every citizen, has a strong interest in having the opportunity to speak
his mind, free from government censorship or sanction").
352. Hawkins, 325 Md. at 637, 602 A.2d at 720.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 638, 602 A.2d at 720.
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Conversely, the court held that the State's fears of disruption
and physical violence if Hawkins used similar speech while on the
job were well founded. 55 In addition, the court maintained that the
warden of the Maryland House of Corrections did not have to wait
for an "actual eruption precipitated by Hawkins" to find grounds
for terminating him. 56 Thus, the court ruled that the Secretary's
conclusion-that Hawkins's termination did not violate his constitu-
tional rights-was correct.3 57
The dissent argued that because Hawkins's speech occurred
away from his job, was not about his job, and was not spoken by one
who could be identified with the job, it was protected by the First
Amendment, regardless of whether it was on a matter of public con-
cern.358 Finding that the speech was protected by the First Amend-
ment, the dissent claimed that the majority should have applied the
second prong of the Pickering test and weighed Hawkins's interest, as
a citizen, in engaging in free speech against " 'the interest of the
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public serv-
ices it performs through its employees.' ,,359 In this equation, the
dissent deemed the particular value of the speech to be irrele-
vant. 60 The dissent also argued that the State's interest should ex-
tend only to include the disruptive effect the speech actually caused
in the department, not potential effects that may occur in the
future.61
4. Analysis.-Hawkins's challenge to his discharge is compli-
cated for several reasons. First, the Supreme Court has never used
the Pickering test in a case resembling Hawkins-where a state dis-
charged a public employee for speech completely unrelated to his
employment and not spoken while at work. 62 Consequently, it is
unclear whether Pickering and its progeny were meant to extend to
such a case. 63 In addition, the Court has never expressly decided
whether "hate speech" falls under the shield of First Amendment
355. Id.
356. Id. at 639, 602 A.2d at 720.
357. Id., 602 A.2d at 721.
358. See id. at 641-46, 602 A.2d 721-24 (Bell, J., dissenting).
359. Id. at 646, 602 A.2d at 724 (Bell, J., dissenting) (quoting Pickering v. Board of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)).
360. Id. at 646-47, 602 A.2d at 724-25 (Bell, J., dissenting).
361. Id. at 648, 602 A.2d at 725 (Bell, J., dissenting).
362. See id. at 622, 628, 602 A.2d at 712, 715.




The Court of Appeals's reluctance to break new ground in cer-
tain areas of First Amendment jurisprudence attests to these com-
plications. The court avoided deciding whether the Pickering test
extended to the Hawkins facts, 65 and additionally, whether "hate
speech" is protected under the First Amendment. 66 Instead, it af-
firmed the legality of the Secretary's decision to discharge Hawkins,
using a method unsupported by either First Amendment case law or
doctrine.3 M
7
The court's decision is objectionable not because it refused to
extend Pickering or classify Hawkins's speech as unprotected, but be-
cause it failed to accept the consequences of these refusals: reversal
of the Secretary's decision and reinstatement of Hawkins. Indeed,
the factual differences between Hawkins and the applicable Supreme
Court cases may justify the court's abandonment of Pickering and its
two-prong test. Unlike the statements made in related Supreme
Court cases, Hawkins's comments were not employment-related or
spoken while on the job. The court, therefore, properly conducted
its analysis as if he were a member of the general public. Likewise,
the court should not be blamed for declining to add its voice to the
din surrounding protection of "hate speech, '3 68 or for following the
364. See Hawkins, 325 Md. at 647 n.5, 602 A.2d at 724 n.5 (Bell, J., dissenting), ques-
tioning whether the then-undecided case of R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992),
might provide insight into whether "hate speech" is protected speech. In R.A. V, the
Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional an ordinance under which the city of St.
Paul prosecuted a teenager for burning a cross inside the fenced yard of a black family.
The Court did not directly address the question of whether "hate speech" like Haw-
kins's is constitutionally protected. It did clarify, however, that state and local govern-
ments cannot promulgate statutes or ordinances that proscribe racially based "hate
speech." Id. at 2542. See infra note 368 for a discussion of the R.A. V. Court's configura-
tion of the fighting words doctrine. See generally TRIBE, supra note 168, at 849-56; Kent
Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech?, 42 RurTGERS L. REV. 287 (1990)
(discussing the advantages and disadvantages of protecting "hate speech" in light of the
different uses of language); Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating
Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431 (arguing that face-to-face racist insults are
the functional equivalent of fighting words and should not merit constitutional protec-
tion). For a discussion of whether the court could have characterized Hawkins's "hate
speech" as fighting words, see infra note 368.
365. See Hawkins, 325 Md. at 633, 602 A.2d at 718 (explaining that "[s]ome doubt
necessarily remains whether a literal application of the Pickering-Connick rule is the ap-
propriate analysis in the instant matter").
366. Id. at 637, 602 A.2d at 720 (explaining that if Hawkins's comments were pro-
tected by the First Amendment, they were only peripherally protected).
367. Id. at 639, 602 A.2d at 721.
368. Neither the Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals has directly decided
whether the First Amendment protects "hate speech." Hawkins, 325 Md. at 647 n.5, 602
A.2d at 724 n.5. The closest either court has come is denying constitutional protection
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Supreme Court's reluctance to restrict free expression. 69 Conse-
quently, the court's refusal to delegate Hawkins's speech to one of
the narrow classes of unprotected speech was prudent and
justified. 7T
The court's decision to limit the First Amendment protection of
Hawkins's speech, however, seems less justified. Generally, speech
falls either inside or outside the umbrella of First Amendment pro-
to "fighting words." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). The Supreme
Court in Chaplinshy defined fighting words as those words "which by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." Id. at 572. At first
glance, this definition seems to cover hate speech such as that uttered by Hawkins. Ar-
guably, the sole purpose of Hawkins's outburst was to injure the teller.
Since Chaplinsky, however, the Court has construed the fighting words doctrine very
narrowly, TRIBE, supra note 168, at 850, limiting it to words "which 'have a direct ten-
dency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark is ad-
dressed.'" Id. at 850 n.3 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573). This narrow
construction effectively eliminates from the doctrine those words "which by their very
utterance inflict injury." Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
The Court of Appeals has followed suit, stating in Downs v. State, 278 Md. 610, 366
A.2d 41 (1976), that "[i]n effect, 'fighting' words have been recognized as having some
social value and are punishable not on a 'per se' basis but only when there is a likelihood
of imminent disturbance." Id. at 615, 366 A.2d at 44. Thus, the fighting words doctrine
as it stands today apparently does not include hate speech unless it is spoken to a person
and in a setting in which it is likely to cause an imminent act of violence. Hawkins's
speech did not fall into this category. One could hardly expect the teller to react vio-
lently to Hawkins's words, given the setting.
Commentators have persuasively argued that hate speech-the only purpose of
which is to injure-should be considered the functional equivalent of fighting words,
and thus should not be included under the protection of the First Amendment. See, e.g.,
Lawrence, supra note 364. Lawrence argued that "[t]he experience of being called 'nig-
ger,' 'spic,' jap,' or 'kike,' is like receiving a slap in the face. The injury is instantane-
ous." Id. at 452. He also argued that women and minorities on the receiving end of
such words often are in no position to fight back. Id. at 452-54. Accordingly, he argued
that white men should not be the only persons to benefit from the fighting words doc-
trine. Id. at 454 & n.93.
Interestingly, the Court in R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) arguably ex-
panded the fighting words doctrine in the fashion advocated by Lawrence. The R.A. V.
Court emphasized that fighting words are excluded from the protection of the First
Amendment because "their content embodies a particularly intolerable (and socially un-
necessary) mode of expressing whatever idea the speaker wishes to convey." Id. at 2548-
49. As an example, the Court suggested that a state could proscribe all "threatening
words." Id. Thus, arguably a state or local government also could proscribe all words
spoken for the sole purpose of injuring another person. Or a court could include in the
definition of "fighting words" all words spoken with the intent to injure another person.
369. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that flag burning is ex-
pressive conduct protected under the First Amendment).
370. Classes of unprotected speech include fighting words, Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at
572, libelous utterances, Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), and obscenity,
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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tection;37 there is no in-between.3 72 The level of protection is not
determined by the value of the speech; all protected speech, regard-
less of its value, receives the same level of protection. 7 3 Moreover,
government can only interfere with protected speech if such inter-
ference is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.3 74
In Hawkins-presumably because the State's action could never
pass a compelling-state-interest test 375 -the court abandoned this
traditional method for reviewing state actions that interfere with
free speech. The court instead created a new test that based the
371. See generally TRIBE, supra note 168, at 928-40. Basically, all speech is protected
except for a few well-defined classes that the Supreme Court has determined to be "so
worthless as to be beyond the constitutional ken." Id. at 929.
372. See id. at 928-29. Recently, the Supreme Court has begun constructing a "multi-
level edifice with several intermediate categories of less-than-complete constitutional
protection for certain kinds of expression," id. at 930, including commercial speech,
near-obscene and offensive speech, non-obscene child pornography, defamation, and
perhaps public-employee speech. Id. The Court, however, has not formally repudiated
the pure two-level model of speech analysis which provides that speech either is fully
protected or completely unprotected. Id. at 938. As Tribe stressed, "within the sphere
of protected speech, the Supreme Court has ordinarily called all expression equal, label-
ing no individual or class of expression as more or less valuable than any other and
regarding all as deserving the same first amendment protection." Id. at 940.
373. See id. at 793, 942.
374. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978). Hawkins does not fit
squarely within the paradigm of cases where courts have applied the compelling-state-
interest test. In those cases, the courts have used the compelling-state-interest test to
determine whether statutes or regulations that restrict free speech are constitutional. In
public-employee speech cases like the instant case where there is no statute or regula-
tion involved, courts have generally relied on the Pickering-Connick test, described supra
text accompanying notes 318-337, to determine whether a state's action is constitu-
tional. The unique facts of this case, however, as discussed supra text accompanying
notes 292-313 and acknowledged by the court, see Hawkins, 325 Md. at 628, 602 A.2d at
715, render that test inappropriate to determine the constitutionality of the State's deci-
sion to discharge Hawkins. Arguably, the appropriate test is the one the court applied in
Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557 (10th Cir. 1989), described infra text accompanying
notes 380-387.
375. The court would have had to conduct a balancing test akin to the Pickering test to
determine whether the State's interests were compelling enough to justify its violation of
Hawkins's free speech rights. See Flanagan, 890 F.2d at 1564-65. This would have re-
quired the court to balance the interests of Hawkins, as a citizen, in expressing himself
freely against those of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the pub-
lic services it performs. See id. The test also would have required the court to consider
the actual effects that Hawkins's statements had on the functioning of the House of Cor-
rection. See id. at 1565. See also Hawkins, 325 Md. at 648, 602 A.2d at 725 (Bell, J.,
dissenting). The Hawkins court did neither. It never discussed Hawkins's interests in
expressing himself freely. Nor did it make any findings concerning the disruptive effect
Hawkins's actual speech had on the department. Instead, the court based its holding on
the character flaws revealed by Hawkins's speech and on the potential detrimental effect
they may have had on the department. Id. at 638, 602 A.2d at 720.
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level of protection on the value of the speech. 76 Because, in the
court's estimation, Hawkins's speech had little value, it applied
something akin to a rational basis test to determine whether the
State's action was constitutional.3 77 Using this approach, the court
found that "the State's apprehension of disruption and possible
physical violence at the House of Correction caused by Hawkins's
attitude [was] reasonably based, '3 78 and, therefore, that the Secre-
tary's discharge was constitutional.3 79 Presumably, if Hawkins's
speech had been more valuable, the court would have more care-
fully scrutinized the State's action.
The court could have avoided this unusual result by following
the approach the Tenth Circuit used in Flanagan v. Munger.3 80 Flana-
gan, like Hawkins, involved expression by public employees away
from and not involving work.38' In Flanagan, the chief of police in
Colorado Springs ordered three high-ranking police officers in his
department to remove all sexually explicit videos from a video store
that they partly owned. 8' The three officers sued, alleging a viola-
tion of their First Amendment rights.38 3
Noting that all analogous Supreme Court cases involved speech
occurring at or about work, the Tenth Circuit refused to extend the
public-concern test to nonverbal expression that did not occur at
work and was not about work.38 4 The court instead decided that the
376. The court did not expressly state that it was assessing the value of Hawkins's
speech. Rather, it described the relevant speech as being "near the periphery" of First
Amendment protection. Hawkins, 325 Md. at 621, 637, 602 A.2d at 712, 720. The court
also proclaimed that "any first amendment protection applicable to Hawkins's invective
is not great." Id. at 638. These statements make it clear that the court was according
less value and, therefore, less protection to Hawkins's speech than it would have to other
types of speech.
377. The court did not expressly state that it was applying a rational basis test to
determine whether the State's actions were justified. It did, however, proclaim that the
State's apprehension was "reasonably based." Id. at 638, 602 A.2d at 720. Moreover, it
did not require the State to prove that Hawkins's actual words would cause disruption or
disharmony. It instead only seemed to require the State to present a plausible descrip-
tion of how Hawkins's attitude, as revealed by the speech, might cause disruption or
violence in the future. Id. at 638-39, 602 A.2d at 720. Thus, the conclusion that the
court applied a rational basis test seems justified.
378. Id. at 638, 602 A.2d at 720.
379. Id. at 639, 602 A.2d at 721.
380. 890 F.2d 1557 (10th Cir. 1989). The Hawkins opinion discussed Flanagan, see
Hawkins, 325 Md. at 636, 602 A.2d at 719, but did not use its approach when deciding
the case.
381. Flanagan, 890 F.2d at 1562.
382. Id. at 1560-61.
383. Id. at 1561.
384. Id. at 1562.
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relevant speech was protected expression, and then applied the sec-
ond half of the Pickering test by balancing the employee's interest in
free speech against the employer's interest in the efficient function-
ing of the government.38 5 The Flanagan court concluded that the
Pickering balance tipped in favor of the officers, 3 6 stating:
The Pickering test balances the plaintiff's interest in engag-
ing in free speech, not the value of the speech itself....
Although plaintiffs' speech may not be as "valuable" as
political or social comment, we think that this type of off-
duty public employee speech must be "accorded the same
weight in absolute terms that would be accorded compara-
ble . . .expression by citizens who do not work for the
state.
3 8 7
Thus, the Tenth Circuit expressly rejected the value-determinative
approach that the Hawkins court used to decide whether public-em-
ployee expression occurring away from the workplace and not con-
cerning work is constitutionally protected.
Besides being contrary to basic First Amendment jurispru-
dence, there are several problems with the Maryland court's ap-
proach in Hawkins. First, using value as the determining factor in
the strictness of review leaves the task of assessing the value of the
speech to the court, based on each judge's own predilections.3 88 It
ignores the possibility that "[t]he words that the [c]ourt ... find...
unpalatable may be the stuff of everyday conversations in some, if
not many, of the innumerable subcultures that compose this Na-
tion."3 8 9 Our nation is filled with people "who think, act, and talk
differently from [the many members of the judiciary]." 9 Indeed,
the nation's diversity is one of its greatest assets. Allowingjudges to
assess the value of speech threatens this diversity. It interferes with
the ability to be different. It threatens to require conformity to the
majority.
Likewise, if courts decide on a case-by-case basis the level of
protection to afford specific speech, citizens will never be sure
whether any particular expressive act will find protection under the
First Amendment. 91 Consequently, people may hesitate to express
385. Id. at 1564-65.
386. Id. at 1565.
387. Id. at 1565-66.
388. See Hawkins, 325 Md. at 647 n.5, 602 A.2d at 724 n.5 (Bell, J., dissenting).
389. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 776 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
390. Id. at 775 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
391. TRIBE, supra note 168, at 793.
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themselves freely, a possibility contrary to the very ideal of the First
Amendment's protection of free speech. As a result, by introducing
a "chilling" element, the Hawkins court's decision could undermine
the free speech rights of all Marylanders.
5. Conclusion.-In Hawkins, the Court of Appeals held that the
state did not violate a public employee's constitutional right to free
speech by discharging him for making an ethnic slur while off duty
and out of uniform. To achieve this result, the court ignored tradi-
tional methods of reviewing First Amendment challenges to state
actions. It instead developed a new method for protecting-or lim-
iting the protection of-speech based solely upon its value. Unfor-
tunately, this new emphasis on value could severely limit the free
speech rights of all Maryland citizens.
ROBERT D. WING
E. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Plea Bargaining
In Williams v. State,392 the Court of Appeals defined the standard
for proving prejudice when a defendant claims that ineffective
assistance of counsel led him to refuse a plea offer."' 3 The court
adopted an "inference" standard that permits the post-conviction
court to infer from objective evidence that the defendant "may well"
have taken the plea had he been given more or better informa-
tion. 94 Although the Court of Appeals did not pinpoint a clear ba-
sis for this new standard, 9 5 it can be justified as a reasonable
extension of related Supreme Court precedent.3 96
1. The Case.-Robert Williams and Alton ("Pete") Grimes
were convicted of kidnapping and several other offenses. 9 Prior to
their conviction, the state offered to accept a guilty plea on one of
the lesser charges, assault with intent to maim, which would have
exposed them to a ten-year maximum penalty. 98 When counsel
discussed the plea offer with his clients, Grimes refused it and Wil-
392. 326 Md. 367, 605 A.2d 103 (1992).
393. See id. at 382, 605 A.2d at 110.
394. Id.
395. See infra text accompanying notes 431-446.
396. See infra text accompanying notes 409-422.
397. Williams, 326 Md. at 370, 605 A.2d at 104.
398. Id. at 371, 605 A.2d at 105. The record was silent as to whether the plea offer
was conditioned on being accepted by both defendants. Id. at 372, 605 A.2d at 105.
1993] 583
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
liams " 'indicated that he wanted to do what Mr. Grimes would.' ""
Grimes was ultimately sentenced to twenty years in prison.4 °° Wil-
liams, however, had a prior criminal record and therefore was sen-
tenced to twenty-five years imprisonment with no possibility of
parole.4 O
After his conviction, Williams filed for post-conviction relief,
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.40 2 One basis for his claim
was that his attorney had failed to inform him of the possibility of
receiving the twenty-five-year mandatory sentence.403 Williams ar-
gued that his attorney's failure to provide information prejudiced
him by preventing him from taking advantage of the ten-year plea
offer.40
4
The post-conviction court upheld Williams's claim,40 5 but the
Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that Williams had not
shown that he was prejudiced by the alleged error.40 6 The Court of
Appeals reversed the intermediate appellate court, however, deter-
mining that the prejudice requirement was satisfied because the evi-
dence supported an inference that Williams might have accepted the
plea if he had been provided with better advice.40 7 As relief, the
court gave Williams an opportunity to accept the ten-year plea
offer. 4 08
399. Id. (quoting the testimony of Williams's trial attorney at the post-conviction
hearing).
400. Id. at 370, 605 A.2d at 104.
401. Id. at 370 & n.3, 605 A.2d at 104 & n.3.
402. Id. at 371, 605 A.2d at 105.
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. Id. at 372, 605 A.2d at 105. The post-conviction court was unclear as to how
counsel's failure to tell Williams about the mandatory sentence of 25-years without pa-
role prejudiced Williams, but it did mention several factors: (1) the State agreed to a
ten-year plea offer; (2) counsel did not inform Williams about the potential mandatory
sentence in a manner that would have enabled him to assess the risks; and (3) Williams
took his counsel's advice and did not testify at trial. Id. at 372-73, 605 A.2d at 105-06.
406. Id. at 373, 605 A.2d at 106 (quoting the intermediate appellate court's unpub-
lished opinion). The Court of Special Appeals held that Williams must show that the
State offered him the plea separately from Grimes in order to prove prejudice. Id. Wil-
liams failed to show separate plea offers, and was, therefore, not entitled to relief. Id.
407. Id. at 382, 605 A.2d at 110. The court also held that the attorney's failure to
inform Williams of the possible mandatory 25-year sentence was "deficient conduct."
Id. at 379, 605 A.2d at 109.
408. Id. at 383, 605 A.2d at 111. The court noted that "[a] new trial is not the appro-




2. Legal Background.-In Strickland v. Washington,40 9  the
Supreme Court articulated a two-part test to be used in evaluating
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, a defendant must
show that "counsel's performance was deficient." 4 ' Second, the
defendant must prove that "the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense."4"' A defendant can establish prejudice if there is a
"reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional er-
rors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. "412
This "reasonable probability" standard represents a compro-
mise between two competing sets of interests: finality of decisions
in criminal cases, on one hand, and fairness of the process and the
reliability of the result, on the other.41 3 The Strickland Court de-
fined "reasonable probability" as "a probability sufficient to under-
mine confidence in the outcome. '4 14 This definition emphasizes the
importance of protecting fairness and the reliability of the trial re-
sult, but it nonetheless protects finality because a new trial can be
granted only if the attorney's error undermines confidence in the
result.
The Strickland Court further illustrated the significance of the
two sets of interests by rejecting two other proposed standards.
First, the Court disapproved a standard that would have required
defendants to show only that the error had "some conceivable effect
on the outcome of the proceeding. ' 41 5 The Court noted that every
error could meet this test, and, therefore, adopting it would destroy
finality. 4 16 Second, the Court rejected a "more likely than not"
standard because, although it served the important interest of final-
ity, it could not consistently assure a fair and reliable result.
4 17
In Hill v. Lockhart,4 18 the Supreme Court extended Strickland's
"reasonable probability" standard to cover claims involving ineffec-
409. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
410. Id. at 687. Deficient performance is established when "counsel's representation
[falls] below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688.
411. Id. at 687. The Strickland Court acknowledged the existence of prejudice only
when "counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
whose result is reliable." Id.
412. Id. at 694.
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. Id. at 693.
416. Id. (adding that "not every error that conceivably could have influenced the out-
come undermines the reliability of the result").
417. Id. at 693-94. As a result, "the standard [was] not quite appropriate." Id. at 694.
418. 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
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tive assistance of counsel in the plea process, as well as at trial.4 9 In
the plea-bargaining context, the first prong of the test-deficient
performance--remains the same;420 however, the second prong-
prejudice-requires that the attorney's deficient performance actu-
ally "affects the outcome of the plea process."142 ' The Hill Court
adapted the Strickland test to the plea-bargaining context and ruled
that a defendant must demonstrate "a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial."4 22 The Court's close adher-
ence to the Strickland test in the plea-bargaining context indicates
that the Court maintained its concern for protecting the interests of
fairness, reliability, and finality.
In Harris v. State,423 the Court of Appeals adopted the Strickland
standard.424 Five years later, in Bowers v. State,4 25 the court at-
tempted to define the "reasonable probability" standard more
clearly by equating it with the more-established "substantial possi-
bility" standard. 426 Although the Bowers court changed the title of
the test from "reasonable probability" to "substantial possibility," it
did not attempt to alter the substance of the Strickland standard or
end its application in Maryland. The court sought only to clarify the
meaning of the standard.42 7
419. See id. at 57-58.
420. Id. at 58-59.
421. Id. at 59.
422. Id.
423. 303 Md. 685, 496 A.2d 1074 (1985).
424. Id. at 695, 496 A.2d at 1079 ("We shall evaluate [the allegedly ineffective attor-
ney's] performance by applying the teachings of Strickland.").
425. 320 Md. 416, 578 A.2d 734 (1990).
426. According to the Bowers court, the "substantial possibility" standard "aptly de-
scribes the prejudice standard the Supreme Court adopted in Strickland." Id. at 427, 578
A.2d at 739. In Bowers, however, the Court of Appeals actually blurred the meaning of
the Strickland standard by likening it to the equally unclear "substantial possibility" stan-
dard, which was intended for use in the dissimilar context of newly-discovered-evidence
claims. See id. at 426-27, 578 A.2d at 738-39 (explaining the origin of the "substantial
possibility" test). The Supreme Court had previously explained that the interests in the
newly-discovered-evidence context are different from those in the ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel context. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). In a claim
of newly discovered evidence, the defendant has been convicted only after having been
given all the elements of a fair trial, while in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
the fairness of the process is called into question. Id. at 693-94. The Supreme Court,
therefore, rejected the more-likely-than-not standard, which is sometimes used for
newly-discovered-evidence claims. Id. at 693. Even though the Williams court did not
attempt to apply the more-likely-than-not standard, its application of the substantial-
possibility standard is confusing because that standard was created to balance interests
unrelated to the plea-bargaining process.
427. See Bowers, 320 Md. at 425-27, 578 A.2d at 738-39.
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3. The Court's Reasoning; Analysis.-Williams presented the
Court of Appeals with a claim that had never been considered by
either a Maryland court or the United States Supreme Court: that
the ineffective assistance of a defendant's counsel prejudiced him by
leading him to reject a favorable plea offer. Williams was able to
show strong evidence of prejudice because his twenty-five-year
mandatory sentence was significantly harsher than the ten-year plea
offer he could have accepted. The fifteen-year gap,4 28 however, was
not an automatic indication of prejudice.4 29 The main issue in Wil-
liams, therefore, was determining how much evidence Williams was
required to provide in order to show that he might have taken the
plea. To settle this question, the court adopted an "inference" stan-
dard that allowed Williams to establish prejudice by drawing an in-
ference from objective evidence that he might have taken the plea
offer. 4
30
a. The Inadequacy of the Court's Reasoning.-Despite the
ground-breaking nature of the decision, the Court of Appeals of-
fered little analysis to support its new "inference" standard. The
Williams court cited six cases from other states in support of the in-
ference standard, claiming that each case focused on an important
fact that supported an inference that the defendant would have
made a different decision had he received better advice.43 Only
Lloyd v. State,4 3 2 however, specifically discussed the "inference" stan-
dard. In Lloyd, the Georgia court required "at least an inference
from the evidence that the defendant would have accepted the offer
as made or something similar. ' 433 Lloyd herself did not satisfy the
inference standard because the evidence in the record actually sup-
ported the conclusion that she would not have taken the offered
plea.4 34 Lloyd fails to strongly support the inference standard for
two reasons: (1) it offers no example of what evidence may create
such an inference, and (2) it contains no analysis to justify its prefer-
ence for the inference standard.
428. The gap actually could have been more than 15 years because the 25-year sen-
tence was mandatory while the 10-year sentence was not. See Williams, 326 Md. at 371-
72, 605 A.2d at 105.
429. Id. at 379, 605 A.2d at 109 (holding that the gap between an offered plea agree-
ment and a mandatory sentence renders counsel's error "potentially prejudicial").
430. Id. at 382, 605 A.2d at 110.
431. Id. at 380-81, 605 A.2d at 109-10.
432. 373 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. 1988).
433. Id. at 3.
434. Id. ("Lloyd's remand hearing yielded ... the unmistakable conclusion that she
would not have accepted or even considered the offer to plead guilty ... ").
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Three of the six decisions discussed in Williams are actually con-
tradictory to the inference standard because they did not require
any evidence beyond the imposition of a harsh sentence at trial and
a defendant's self-serving claim that he would have taken the plea
had he been better advised. In Hanzelka v. State,435 a Texas court
found prejudice simply because Hanzelka would not have served jail
time if he had taken the plea.4 3 6 In addition, an Indiana court in
Lyles v. State4 3 7 held that Lyles was prejudiced because he received a
harsher sentence at trial than he could have been given according to
the proposed plea bargain. 438 Furthermore, in State v. Simmons, 4 39 a
North Carolina court accepted as sufficient evidence of prejudice
Simmons's claim that he would have taken the plea had he known of
it. 44 0 Neither of the final two cases, Curl v. State4 4 1 from Indiana,
and People v. Whitfield 44 2 from Illinois, even mention the prejudice
requirement.
The Court of Appeals also sought support for the inference
standard in two federal cases: Turner v. Tennessee4 4 ' and Lewandowski
v. Makel.444 The evidence standard required to establish prejudice
in Turner and Lewandowski, however, was clearly more stringent than
Maryland's inference standard. Each case required objective evi-
dence closely related to the plea-bargaining process. The Turner
court found "objective evidence in the record 'sufficient to under-
mine confidence in the outcome' " because the defendant re-
sponded to a two-year plea offer with a one-year counter-offer. 44 5
In Lewandowski, the objective evidence deemed satisfactory was the
defendant's previous guilty plea after he was fully advised of his
chances at trial. 446 The evidence standard in these two cases is sub-
stantially different from that in Williams, in which the court was satis-
fied by the fact that Williams accepted his counsel's advice not to
435. 682 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
436. Id. at 387.
437. 382 N.E.2d 991 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978).
438. Id. at 994.
439. 309 S.E.2d 493 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983).
440. Id. at 498 ("Simmons was clearly prejudiced by his attorney's failure to inform
him of the offer.").
441. 400 N.E.2d 775 (Ind. 1980). The Curl court refused to accept Curl's argument
that she was denied sufficient time to consider a plea offer as a basis for overturning her
conviction. Id. at 777.
442. 239 N.E.2d 850 (I1. 1968). The Whitfield court granted post-conviction relief
because the defendant was never personally informed of the plea offer. Id. at 852.
443. 858 F.2d 1201 (6th Cir. 1988).
444. 754 F. Supp. 1142 (W.D. Mich. 1990).
445. Turner, 858 F.2d at 1206-07 (quoting the district court opinion).
446. See Lewandowski, 754 F. Supp. at 1150.
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testify at his trial, a fact unrelated to the plea-bargaining process. In
using the federal cases as authority, the Court of Appeals apparently
disregarded the obvious factual differences between them and
Williams.
b. The Wisdom of the "Inference" Standard.-Instead of at-
tempting to harmonize most of the relevant case law with the infer-
ence standard, the Williams court could have supported its
conclusion more strongly by explaining the inference standard as a
logical extension of the prejudice requirement imposed by Strick-
land. Williams's "inference" standard balances fairness, reliability,
and finality in much the same way that Strickland's "reasonable
probability" standard does. This balance is further illustrated by
the standards the Williams court did not adopt.
First, the court declined to adopt the completely subjective
standard advocated by Williams,4 4 7 which would have required only
a "reasonable probability" that Williams would have accepted the
plea offer under the circumstances.448 This standard would have
destroyed the finality interest in judicial decisions because any de-
fendant, faced with a stricter sentence after rejecting a plea bargain
and being convicted at trial, could claim without dispute that she
would have taken the plea.4 49  Defendants could thus abuse the
standard and capitalize on attorney mistakes to achieve a more
447. Williams, 326 Md. at 382, 605 A.2d at 110. The court instead used an inference
drawn from "objective" evidence. Id.
448. See id. at 379, 605 A.2d at 109. Williams's view is supported by People v. Pollard,
282 Cal. Rptr. 588, 594 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), which did not require objective evidence to
prove the defendant's previous intentions. Williams also argued that he was sufficiently
prejudiced because his attorney's error "precluded him from making a knowing and
intelligent decision to accept the offer." Petitioner's Brief at 18, Williams (No. 55); see
also Williams, 326 Md. at 379, 605 A.2d at 109. Therefore, he maintained, the probability
that he would or would not have accepted the plea was irrelevant. Id. Williams's argu-
ment for prejudice based on his inability to make a knowledgeable decision is clearly not
supported by Strickland or Lockhart. In both cases the Court focused on the reliability of
the outcome rather than the sufficiency of the process; a primary goal of the prejudice
standard is to protect all reliable results regardless of deficiencies in the process. See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-92 (1984) (explaining that the prejudice
requirement exists because "[tihe purpose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of coun-
sel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the
outcome of the proceeding" (emphasis added)).
449. Williams argued that his longer sentence created a reasonable probability that he
would have taken the shorter plea offered to him. Williams, 326 Md. at 381-82, 605 A.2d
at 110. Because all defendants are indeed likely to take the shortest sentence, the rea-
sonable-probability requirement in Williams's proposed subjective standard would offer
little protection against self-serving, insincere claims. See id. at 380, 605 A.2d at 109.
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favorable result than if the attorneys had performed properly,4 50 re-
gardless of whether the mistakes actually caused prejudice.
Second, the court declined to adopt the standard advocated by
the State, which would have required defendants to produce purely
objective evidence establishing that they would have accepted their
plea offers had they been given better legal advice.4 5' The State
argued that without this evidence requirement, Williams could
prove prejudice based only upon his self-serving claim that he
would have taken the plea had he known about the possible
mandatory sentence.452 The State's proposed objective standard,
however, would have required substantial evidence of Williams's de-
cision-making process, which may have been impossible for him to
produce. Under this standard, even if Williams was indeed
prejudiced, he may not have been able to produce the necessary evi-
dence to prove it. Results from such a test would be unreliable and
possibly unfair.
The Williams court chose an intermediate standard in which ob-
jective facts must support an inference that, but for counsel's error,
there is a "substantial possibility" that the defendant would have
decided differently.45 This inference standard attempts to balance
fairness and reliability with finality in much the same way that the
Strickland Court did. The standard places primary importance on
fairness and reliability of the result by requiring only limited objec-
tive evidence about the defendant's intention to accept a plea.4 5 4
Yet the standard also protects the judiciary's interest in finality be-
cause the slight amount of evidence that is required screens out de-
fendants who claim that they were prejudiced when they clearly
were not.
4 55
450. Defendants could achieve better results in two ways. First, if the post-conviction
court gave them an opportunity to accept the plea bargain originally offered, defendants
can foreclose the uncertainty of achieving a better result at trial. Second, if the court
awarded them a new trial, they would have another chance at acquittal.
451. Williams, 326 Md. at 379, 605 A.2d at 109. The State's view was based on the two
federal cases that required objective evidence sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome of the plea process. See Turner v. Tennessee, 858 F.2d 1201, 1206-07 (6th Cir.
1988); Lewandowski v. Makel, 754 F. Supp. 1142, 1149-50 (W.D. Mich. 1990). See also
supra text accompanying notes 443-446.
452. See Brief of Respondent at 27-28, Williams (No. 55).
453. See Williams, 326 Md. at 381-82, 605 A.2d at 110. The inference standard is sup-
ported by Lloyd v. State, 373 S.E.2d 1, 3 (Ga. 1988). See supra text accompanying notes
432-434.
454. The court only required enough evidence to allow an inference that he "may
well" have taken the plea. Williams, 326 Md. at 381-82, 605 A.2d at 110.
455. Lloyd provides a good example of this screening. Although Lloyd was not in-
formed of the plea offer, the evidence in the record supported the conclusion that she
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c. The Future Effect of the "Inference" Standard.- Williams
clarified that the inference standard can be satisfied by two types of
evidence. First, evidence that the defendant was considering ac-
cepting a plea offer would clearly be sufficient.456 This type of evi-
dence, accepted in Turner and Lewandowski, would satisfy even the
most stringent objective-evidence standard proposed by the state of
Maryland and would, therefore, clearly satisfy the inference stan-
dard as well.4 57 Second, evidence may be sufficient even if it is unre-
lated to the plea process if it shows that the defendant valued his
counsel's advice. This second type of evidence was accepted in Wil-
liams, as the court found prejudice in Williams's failure to accept a
plea offer because he had previously taken his counsel's advice not
to testify at trial.458 While these two types of evidence are clear ex-
amples of what may satisfy the inference standard created in Wil-
liams, this list is not exhaustive. At present, however, the court has
not indicated what other types of evidence may qualify.
4. Conclusion.-The inference standard adopted by the Court
of Appeals in Williams, although inadequately supported in the opin-
ion, may be justified by the rationale the Supreme Court used in
Strickland. Both courts were concerned about protecting the inter-
ests of fairness, reliability, and finality. The exact scope of the stan-
dard in Maryland is unclear, however, and only future cases can
further define the limits of Maryland's inference standard for post-
conviction relief.
DAVID M. WYAND
would not have accepted either the offer or a lesser offer had she been informed. Lloyd,
373 S.E.2d at 3. Because no evidence supported an inference that she would have taken
the plea, Lloyd's claim of ineffective assistance was screened out.
456. See Williams, 326 Md. at 381, 605 A.2d at 110.
457. See id.
458. See id. at 382, 605 A.2d at 110.
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II. CONTRACTS
A. Medical Insurance: "Full-time Student" Status and Recovery of
Attorneys' Fees
In Collier v. MD-Individual Practice Ass'nl the Court of Appeals
answered two questions certified by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia on the issue of health insurance
contracts.' Finding in favor of the insured party, the court first held
that the term "full-time student" in an insurance policy was ambigu-
ous and could cover a student not meeting the college's standard for
full-time status.' The court then proceeded to deny recovery of at-
torneys' fees to the insured, despite the possible application of an
accepted Maryland rule permitting such recovery.4 The ruling on
attorneys' fees gives a solid indication that the court will be ex-
tremely reluctant to create additional exceptions to the American
rule on the recovery of attorneys' fees in the future.5
1. The Case.-Tom Collier, a nineteen-year-old student at
Montgomery College, was injured in September 1987 while playing
touch football, rendering him a quadriplegic.6 The cost of his treat-
ment at two hospitals in Washington, D.C., totaled more than
$286,000. 7 At the time of Collier's injury, his mother maintained a
health insurance policy with MD-Individual Practice Association,
Inc. (MD-IPA). s The policy extended coverage to any dependent
child between the age of nineteen and twenty-two who was a "full-
time student" at a recognized college, university or trade school.9
From the spring semester of 1987 through the time of his injury,
Collier's college had placed him on academic probation, allowing
him to register for only six credits per semester.'0 MD-IPA con-
1. 327 Md. 1, 607 A.2d 537 (1992).
2. See id. at 3, 607 A.2d at 538. This question was certified to the Court of Appeals
pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act. MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. §§ 12-601 to -609 (1989).
3. See Collier, 327 Md. at 3-10, 607 A.2d at 538-41.
4. See id. at 10-17, 607 A.2d at 541-45.
5. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
6. Collier, 327 Md. at 4, 607 A.2d at 538.
7. Washington Hosp. Ctr. Nat'l Rehabilitation Hosp. v. Collier, 947 F.2d 1498,
1500 (D.C. Cir. 1991), certified questions answered by Collier v. MD-Individual Practice






tended that Collier was not covered under the policy because he was
not a full-time student according to his college's definition, which
required twelve credits per semester."
The two hospitals "brought diversity actions in the District
Court for the District of Columbia against Collier and his mother,
both citizens of Maryland," for payment.' Collier answered and
also filed a "third-party action against MD-IPA seeking a declaratory
judgment respecting his coverage and recovery of his attorneys'
fees."" The district court found that the term "full-time student"
incorporated the college's definition and, therefore, was not ambig-
uous. 14 The court "granted MD-IPA's motion for summary judg-
ment on Collier's breach of contract count" and also entered
judgment against Collier in favor of the hospitals for more than
$286,000. 15
Collier filed an appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, after which MD-IPA and the hospi-
tals reached a settlement that fully satisfied the judgment against
Collier.' 6 The circuit court held that the settlement did not render
the appeal moot because Collier, in addition to seeking a declara-
tory judgment, also sought damages for breach of contract, of which
attorneys' fees were one component. 7 The court stated that the
attorneys' fees issue could not be addressed unless it was decided
that Collier would prevail on the breach-of-contract count.' 8
Because no firm precedent existed, the contract and the attor-
neys' fees issues could not clearly be decided under Maryland law. "9
Recognizing that both issues could have a significant impact on
Maryland law, the federal court certified two questions for the Mary-
land Court of Appeals:
[1] Does the term "full-time student," when used as a con-
dition of coverage in a health insurance policy, unambigu-
ously incorporate the criteria of the relevant educational
institution? [and 2] Under Maryland law, may an insured
covered by a health insurance policy recover, as an element







17. Id. at 1502.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1503-04.
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curs in order to compel coverage, where the policy does
not expressly provide for such recovery and the insurer de-
nied coverage in good faith?20
The Maryland Court of Appeals, in a unanimous opinion writ-
ten by Judge Rodowsky, found that the term "full-time student" was
ambiguous and answered the first certified question in the nega-
tive.21 Proceeding to the second question, the court held that attor-
neys' fees could not be recovered, 2 leaving the United States Court
of Appeals to affirm the judgment of the district court.
2. Legal Background.-
a. Ambiguity in Insurance Contracts.-The Court of Appeals has
noted that "Maryland does not follow the rule, adopted in many ju-
risdictions, that an insurance policy is to be construed most strongly
against the insurer."' 2' Generally, insurance policies are to be con-
strued in the same manner as any other contract.2 4 The court will
look to the intention of the parties, as determined by "the character
of the contract, its purpose, and the facts and circumstances of the
parties at the time of execution."25 Words are accorded the "ordi-
nary and accepted meanings" that a "reasonably prudent layper-
son" would attach to them.2 6
A term in a contract is found to be ambiguous as a matter of law
if the language "is 'general' and may suggest two meanings to a rea-
sonably prudent layperson."-27 Extrinsic evidence-for example,
common industry practices and terminologies-should be consulted
20. Id. The Maryland Court of Appeals was instructed to answer the second ques-
tion only if it answered the first question in the negative, holding that the contract term
was ambiguous. Id. at 1503. If the court were to find the term unambiguous, then the
federal court would affirm the summary judgment in favor of MD-IPA, and the attor-
neys' fees issue would not be reached. Id. at 1504.
21. Collier, 327 Md. at 10, 607 A.2d at 541.
22. Id. at 17, 607 A.2d at 545.
23. Cheney v. Bell Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 315 Md. 761, 766-67, 556 A.2d 1135, 1138
(1989).
24. Id.
25. Pacific Indem. Co. v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 302 Md. 383, 388, 488 A.2d
486, 488 (1985). But see 42 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 283 (1982):
[I]t seems doubtful whether the rule of [Maryland] is necessarily in conflict with
the general rule of construction in favor of the insured, as the latter is under-
stood, applied, and stated, since the general rule is employed only in case of
ambiguity or uncertainty when the intention of the parties cannot be deter-
mined by the application of the ordinary, or other, rules of construction.
Id. at 359 (footnotes omitted).
26. Pacific Indem., 302 Md. at 388, 488 A.2d at 488.
27. Id. at 389, 488 A.2d at 489.
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to resolve any ambiguities.2" If the extrinsic evidence produces a
factual dispute, the meaning of the term is a question for a jury.29
Finally, if the ambiguity remains after considering the extrinsic evi-
dence, the term ordinarily will be construed against the party re-
sponsible for drafting the contract.5 0
b. Recovery of Attorneys' Fees.-The common practice in the
United States is that the prevailing party in a lawsuit cannot recover
attorneys' fees. 3 ' This policy, called the American rule,3 2 "has been
part of the jurisprudence of this country for nearly 200 years."33
The rule is founded upon the deregulation of the legal profession 4
and reasons of public policy.35 Although Maryland generally fol-
lows the American rule, the courts have developed an exception that
permits an insured to recover attorneys' fees if he or she succeeds in
obtaining a declaratory judgment on the issue of coverage, 36 regard-
less of who brought the action.3 7
The reasoning behind the Maryland exception to the American
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See Mutual, Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co. v. Vollmer, 306 Md. 243, 251, 508
A.2d 130, 134 (1986).
31. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975); see
also Collier, 327 Md. at 13, 607 A.2d at 542-43. The prevailing party can recover other
basic court costs. Id.
32. This is in contrast to the English rule, which awards attorneys' fees to the victori-
ous litigant. See Phyllis A. Monroe, Comment, Financial Barriers to Litigation: Attorney Fees
and the Problem of Legal Access, 46 ALB. L. REV. 148, 150-54 (1981), for a discussion of the
English rule and its rejection in the United States.
33. Collier, 327 Md. at 13, 607 A.2d at 543.
34. Id. at 13-14, 607 A.2d at 543 (citingJohn Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the Ameri-
can Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 9, 9 (1984)). Initially, fee
shifting was a part of a broader system of regulation of fees. Id. Once fees were allowed
to be determined by the market, the fee shifting component also disappeared. Id.
35. See Young v. Redman, 128 Cal. Rptr. 86 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
The American Rule is based upon the philosophy that "one should not be pe-
nalized for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit, and that the poor might
be unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the
penalty for losing included the fees of their opponents' counsel." Other factors
supporting the rule against fee shifting include the difficulties of proof inherent
in litigating the question of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees, and the
possibility of a threat being posed to the principle of independent advocacy by
having the earnings of the attorney flow from the pen of the judge before
whom he argues.
Id. at 91-92 (citations omitted).
36. See Collier, 327 Md. at 12, 607 A.2d at 542.
37. See, e.g., Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co. v. Electro Enters., Inc., 287 Md. 641, 415
A.2d 278 (1980) (declaratory judgment brought by liability insurer); Government Em-
ployees Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 270 Md. 11, 310 A.2d 49 (1973) (declaratory judgment
brought by insured).
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rule for actions involving liability insurance is unclear .3  In Cohen v.
American Home Assurance Co. ,9 the court suggested two theories sup-
porting the exception: authorized expenditure and contract dam-
ages.4" While the authorized-expenditure theory represents an
agreement between the parties to pay the prevailing party's fees, 4'
the contract theory essentially endorses a benefit-of-the-bargain the-
ory without the restriction of the American rule. 2 If an insured has
contracted to have her attorneys' fees paid in the defense of a claim,
the insured would effectively be denied that right under the contract
if the insurer were able to force the insured into a declaratory judg-
ment proceeding and not be compelled to cover the insured's attor-
neys' fees in that action as well.43
In addition to a benefit-of-the-bargain contract theory, some
courts, including the court in Collier, have recognized that attorneys'
fees in liability insurance cases may be generally viewed as foresee-
able consequential damages arising from the breach of the con-
tract.44 The general rule for the recovery of consequential damages
is that "damages are recoverable only for those injuries that the de-
fendant had reason to foresee as a probable result of his breach
when the contract was made."14 5 The focus is on reasonable foresee-
ability, not actual foresight. 46 This general rule was formulated in
38. See Collier, 327 Md. at 14, 607 A.2d at 543. In Collier, the court admitted that
"[t]he legal theory supporting this rule remains unrefined." Id. (citing Continental Cas-
ualty Co. v. Board of Educ., 302 Md. 516, 537, 489 A.2d 536, 547 (1985)).
39. 255 Md. 334, 258 A.2d 225 (1969).
40. See id. at 363, 258 A.2d at 239.
41. The authorized-expenditure theory is based on an insurer's promise "to reim-
burse the insured for expenses incurred at the insurer's request." Collier, 327 Md. at 14,
607 A.2d at 543. This theory was not addressed in Collier. See id.
42. Collier, 327 Md. at 14-15, 607 A.2d at 543.
43. See id.; Olympic S.S. Co. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 673, 681 (Wash. 1991)
("[A]n award of fees is required in any legal action where the insurer compels the in-
sured to assume the burden of legal action, to obtain the full benefit of his insurance
contract, regardless of whether the insurer's duty to defend is at issue."); Hayseeds, Inc.
v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 352 S.E.2d 73, 79-80 (W. Va. 1986) ("[W]e consider it
of little importance whether an insurer contests an insured's claim in good or bad faith.
In either case, the insured is out of his consequential damages and attorney's fees. To
impose upon the insured the cost of compelling his insurer to honor its contractual
obligation is effectively to deny him the benefit of his bargain."); Hedgecock v. Stewart
Title Guar. Co., 676 P.2d 1208, 1211 (Colo. App. 1983) ("An award of attorney fees
merely restores plaintiff to the position she would have occupied had the company
honored its contract of insurance in the first instance.").
44. See Collier, 327 Md. at 13, 607 A.2d at 543. See also Olympic, 811 P.2d at 681
(claiming that avoidance of legal fees is a major reason for purchasing insurance
policies).
45. 5 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1007, at 70 (1964).
46. Id. § 1009, at 77.
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the landmark English case of Hadley v. Baxendale :17
Where two parties have made a contract which one of them
has broken, the damages which the other party ought to
receive in respect of such breach of contract should be such
as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising
naturally, i.e. according to the usual course of things, from
such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be
supposed to have been in the contemplation of both par-
ties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable
result of the breach of it.4 8
Based on this theory, it follows that if the contemplation of litigation
to decide the issue of breach was reasonably foreseeable as a result
of one party's nonperformance, then attorneys' fees for such an ac-
tion should be awarded. Although it may be questionable whether
attorneys' fees flow from the breach of a contract, the American rule
has evolved as a restriction on general contract law that damages
which are foreseeable are generally recoverable. 49
3. The Court's Reasoning.-
a. Ambiguity in Insurance Contracts.-Recognizing that the in-
surer did not provide its own definition of "full-time student" in the
insurance contract, the court first found that there was no existing
rule of Maryland law incorporating the relevant school's criteria as
the definition of that term.50 The court next addressed the question
of "what is the customary and normal meaning of 'full time student'
in the context of a group health insurance policy."'"
The court stated that one factor to be used in determining the
ordinary and accepted meaning of an undefined contract term is the
purpose of the contract.52 Considering other states' decisions on
similar matters, the court found that the purpose of this type of con-
tract is " 'to provide coverage for the student who would not be ex-
pected to have access to group health insurance coverage of his
own.' "" Applying a reasonable person standard to determine nor-
mal meaning, the court found that this purpose weighed against any
construction that would result in individuals "moving in or out of a
47. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
48. Id. at 151.
49. See Collier, 327 Md. at 13, 607 A.2d at 543.
50. Id. at 6, 607 A.2d at 539.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 7, 607 A.2d at 539 (quoting Society of N.Y. Hosp. v. Malsky, 382 N.Y.S.2d
433, 437 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.), aff'd, 390 N.Y.S.2d 512 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (per curiam)).
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covered person status because of fluctuations from time to time in
course scheduling. '54
For this reason, the court found that the term "full-time stu-
dent" was susceptible to at least two reasonable interpretations and,
consequently, was ambiguous. 5 In support of its conclusion, the
court advanced several hypotheticals in which "lay persons" might
reasonably conclude that students were covered despite the fact that
their courseloads did not satisfy the respective institution's require-
ments for full-time status.5 6 For example, students whose extracur-
ricular activities or medical conditions preclude them from carrying
the institution's required number of credits for full-time status
might reasonably be considered to be covered by a parent's health
insurance because the dependent's " 'primary daily occupation was
that of a student.' "5' The court also recognized that the term "full-
time student" had been found to be ambiguous in several other
jurisdictions. 58
After concluding that the term was ambiguous, the Collier court
examined extrinsic evidence to resolve the dispute. The only extrin-
sic evidence, however, was that Montgomery College had a twelve-
credit criterion for full-time status. 59 The court held that this evi-
dence was insufficient as a matter of law to resolve the ambiguity,
because it merely confirmed the existence of competing reasonable
constructions. 60 For these reasons, the court answered the first cer-
tified question-whether "full-time student" is to be defined by "the
criteria of the relevant educational institution"--in the negative.6'
b. Recovery of Attorneys' Fees.-Because the second certified
question was framed solely as a matter of contract damages,62 the
court refrained from deciding this issue on a theory of liability re-
54. Id., 607 A.2d at 540.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 7-8, 607 A.2d at 540.
57. Id. (quoting Massey v. Board of Trustees, 500 So. 2d 864, 866 (La. App. 1986),
cert. denied, 501 So. 2d 775 (La. 1987)).
58. Collier, 327 Md. at 8-10, 607 A.2d at 540. See, e.g., Massey, 500 So. 2d at 866
(finding "full-time student" in a health insurance policy to be ambiguous). Perhaps
more importantly, the Collier court stated that it was unable to find any decision where a
court had incorporated a school's definition of "full-time student" into a health insur-
ance policy "to the exclusion of any other construction." Collier, 327 Md. at 8, 607 A.2d
at 540.
59. See Collier, 327 Md. at 10, 607 A.2d at 541.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See supra text accompanying note 20 for the full text of the second question.
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suiting from collateral litigation.6" Instead, the court addressed di-
rectly whether the costs and expenses of litigation, aside from
ordinary court costs, were recoverable in actions for damages. 64
The court first warned that as a general rule such costs and expenses
were not recoverable.6 5
Although the court recognized that under Maryland law coun-
sel fees may be recovered by an insured who obtains a declaratory
judgment that a liability policy provides coverage, 66 it refused to ex-
tend the logic of that line of cases to include declaratory judgment
actions concerning health insurance policies. 67 The court stated
that the underlying theory of the liability insurance cases permitting
recovery is anomalous and in direct conflict with the American rule
that the costs awarded to a prevailing party do not generally include
counsel fees. 68 Finding the American rule firmly entrenched in
Maryland jurisprudence, the court rejected arguments by Collier to
extend those decisions.69
The court also acknowledged, but rejected, substantial out-of-
state authority that permitted recovery of counsel fees under a fore-
seeable-consequential-damages theory.7" Although the recovery of
these damages could be permitted by contractual provision or stat-
ute,7 ' the court refused to abrogate the American rule on its own
initiative. 7' For these reasons, the court answered the second certi-
63. An exception to the general rule in Maryland that costs and expenses of litiga-
tion, other than the usual and ordinary court costs, are not recoverable in an action for
damages has been recognized "where the wrongful acts of the defendant involved the
plaintiff in litigation with others, or placed him in such relations with others as make it
necessary to incur expense to protect his interest." McGaw v. Acker, Merrall & Condit
Co., 111 Md. 153, 160, 73 A. 731, 734 (1909). The McGaw court held that these "costs
and expense[s] should be treated as the legal consequences of the original wrongful
act." Id. The Collier court stated that the fees incurred by Collier in defense of the
hospitals' claims might arguably fall within this rule, but refused to address that issue
because the language of the certified question was limited to "contract damages." Col-
lier, 327 Md. at 11 n.l, 607 A.2d at 542 n.1.
64. Collier, 327 Md. at 12-13, 607 A.2d at 542-43.
65. Id. at 11, 607 A.2d at 542.
66. See supra notes 36-49 and accompanying text.
67. Collier, 327 Md. at 17, 607 A.2d at 544-45.
68. Id., 607 A.2d at 544.
69, See id., 607 A.2d at 544-45 ("To extend that exception to health insurers, who
breach their contracts by failure to pay covered benefits, will only compound the
anomaly.").
70. Id. at 15-16, 607 A.2d at 542-44. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
71. Id. at 11-12, 607 A.2d at 542 (noting the lack of any contractual, statutory rule
provision on which Collier could rest his claim to attorneys' fees).
72. id. at 17, 607 A.2d at 545.
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fled question in the negative as well.73
4. Analysis.-
a. Ambiguity in Insurance Contracts.-Prior to Collier, Maryland
courts had never been asked to construe the term "full-time stu-
dent." For this reason, the court could have reached its interpreta-
tion in either of two ways. The court could have found the term to
be ambiguous and, according to Maryland law, construed it against
the drafter-in this case, the insurer. 4 In fact, several authorities
cited in Collier found the definition of "full-time student" to be am-
biguous and found coverage for the insured. 75 Alternatively, the
court could have found the term to be unambiguous, but inter-
preted it to encompass Collier's particular situation. For example,
an Illinois court, in Margie Bridals, Inc. v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance
Co. ,76 held that the term "envisions a person's enrollment in an aca-
demic institution and attendance at classes on a substantial basis.
Full-time ordinarily signifies the normal or standard period of time
spent in a named activity." 77
Although the Collier court chose the former approach,78 the
choice is of little practical consequence. Under either approach, the
relevant school's criteria would not be incorporated into the mean-
ing of "full-time student," and the answer to the first certified ques-
tion would be no. Two further considerations limit the significance
of the choice of construction. First, the Collier holding is limited to
the specific term "full-time student" as used in health insurance
contracts. This issue, which had never come before the Maryland
courts prior to Collier, might well never arise again after Collier. Sec-
ond, insurance companies are free (and likely) to avoid the full im-
pact of this decision by expressly defining "full-time student" in new
73. Id.
74. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
75. Collier, 327 Md. at 1, 6-10, 607 A.2d at 539-41. See, e.g., Swint v. Protective Life
Ins. Co., 779 F. Supp. 532, 538 n.6 (S.D. Ala. 1991) (stating that the term "full-time
student" is ambiguous); Massey v. Board of Trustees, 500 So. 2d 864, 866 (La. App.
1986) (awarding coverage for a student who took only nine credit hours instead of the
twelve required for full-time status); Society of N.Y. Hosp. v. Malsky, 382 N.Y.S.2d 433,
436-37 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.) (finding that a "full-time student" could include someone en-
rolled in either high school or college and therefore should be interpreted against the
insurer), aff'd, 390 N.Y.S.2d 512 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (per curiam).
76. 379 N.E.2d 62 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
77. Id. at 65; see also Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Cassady, 496 So. 2d 875, 877 (Fla.
App. 1986) (quoting Margie Bridals); Colonial Life Ins. Co. v. Hazelton, 711 S.W.2d 305,
306 (Tex. App. 1986) (citing Margie Bridals).
78. Collier, 327 Md. at 7, 607 A.2d at 540 (" '[Flull-time student' is ambiguous, in
that it suggests two or more meanings to reasonable laypersons").
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policies.79 Given the judicial tendency to construe ambiguous con-
tractual terms against the drafter, ° there is certainly sufficient in-
centive for the insurers to be more explicit as to the meaning of
terms in their policies. Contracts with fewer ambiguities would be
advantageous to both the parties and the court system.
b. Recovery of Attorneys' Fees.-Unlike the interpretation of the
contract term, the court's holding on the recovery of attorneys' fees
may represent a significant turning point in Maryland law. The Col-
lier court noted that the recovery of attorneys' fees in declaratory
judgment actions concerning coverage under liability insurance
contracts was an exception to the American rule.8' Nevertheless,
the court refused to extend the logic of that exception to permit
recovery of attorneys' fees in actions arising out of other insurance
contracts.82 The court's reasoning focused on a view of the Mary-
land exception as an anomaly, inconsistent with the American
rule.83 A complete analysis of the court's reasoning must encom-
pass the following issues: (1) the soundness of the theory and rea-
soning in the Maryland declaratory-judgment exception,
(2) whether this exception could rightly be extended to health insur-
ance cases, such as Collier, on the basis of its underlying theory and
facts, and (3) whether extension of the exception to Collier would be
appropriate in light of the American rule.
Rather than distinguishing the cases to which the Maryland de-
claratory-judgment exception apply from the present case,84 the
79. This would eliminate the need for a legal construction and save both parties the
burden of litigation.
80. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. Furthermore, fee-shifting can be done
legislatively. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical
Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 663-65 (discussing how, in particular types of litigation,
one side has the inherent advantage of superior resources, and how legislation has al-
lowed recovery for attorneys' fees to aid the weaker side).
81. Collier, 327 Md. at 13, 607 A.2d at 542-43.
82. Id. at 17, 607 A.2d at 544-45.
83. Id. at 14, 607 A.2d at 543.
84. The cases through which the Maryland exception developed involved insurance
policies that expressly included an obligation to defend the insured in suits potentially
covered by the policy. See, e.g., Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co. v. Electro Enters., Inc., 287
Md. 641, 415 A.2d 278 (1980) (obligation under aircraft liability insurance policy to pay
insured's defense costs). Substantial authority exists to support the argument that to
compel an insured to pay for litigation costs arising from a coverage dispute is effectively
to deny the insured the benefit of the contract. See 7C JOHN A. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE
LAW AND PRACTICE § 4691 (Walter F. Berdal ed., 1979):
[T]he insured has a contract right to have actions against him defended by the
insurer, at its expense. If the insurer can force him into a declaratory judgment
proceeding, and, even though it loses in such action, compel him to bear the
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court interpreted the reasoning supporting those decisions broadly.
The court recognized that those decisions could be supported by
general contract law regarding the recovery of consequential
damages .85
As a general rule, consequential damages are recoverable if the
injuries suffered by the non-breaching party are reasonably foresee-
able.86 Logic supports the position that, in many contract cases, liti-
gation to compel performance is reasonably foreseeable.8 7 Despite
this foreseeability, there remains substantial authority prohibiting
recovery of litigation expenses in breach of contract actions. For
example, Professor Corbin asserted that "[iut seems rather far-
fetched to say that the insurer has promised to pay the loss and has
also promised to pay the loss [e.g., attorneys' fees] caused by his
failure to pay the loss. By such a process, any contract can be re-
solved into an infinite number of promises. '" 8 8 The problem with
this view is that it does not adequately address the issue of foresee-
ability of a lawsuit regarding coverage. Furthermore, Professor
Corbin failed to list some of the additional promises that might
comprise such an infinity. Several courts have also held that fees are
not recoverable in such actions.8 ' Unfortunately, it is not clear
whether the courts in these decisions are focusing on contract the-
ory or merely applying the American rule to all litigation. It appears
that these courts are doing the latter.°°
Assuming that the reasoning in the cases that developed the
Maryland exception is sound, Collier's argument to extend the ex-
ception to health insurance cases is compelling. There can be no
doubt that litigation expenses are foreseeable in insurance cases
expense of such litigation, the insured is actually no better off financially than if
he had never had the contract right mentioned above.
Id. at 283. There is no express obligation under health insurance policies to pay defense
costs. Thus, the Collier court could have distinguished general health insurance policies
from liability agreements on the lack of an express promise to defend the former.
85. Collier, 327 Md. at 13, 607 A.2d at 543.
86. See 5 CORBIN, supra note 45, § 1007, at 70.
87. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
88. 5 CORBIN, supra note 45, § 1010, at 80-81.
89. See, e.g., Murphy v. O'Donnell, 63 A.2d 340, 342 (D.C. 1948) (refusing to include
attorneys' fees as damages in a landlord-tenant dispute without fraudulent behavior);
McGaw v. Acker, Merrall & Condit Co., 111 Md. 153, 160, 73 A. 731, 734 (1909) (stating
the general rule against recovery of attorneys' fees unless the wrong action forced the
plaintiffs into litigation with a third party).
90. Murphy, 63 A.2d at 342 (citing "[tihe general rule"); McGaw, Ill Md. at 160, 73
A. at 734 (same).
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such as Collier. Given the size of many medical bills, 9 ' health insur-
ers must expect litigation to arise upon the nonpayment of a claim.
It necessarily follows that costs of litigation between the parties of
the contract are reasonably foreseeable and do indeed flow from the
breach itself. In addition, Collier convincingly noted factual similar-
ities to the liability insurance cases in that the health insurer's prom-
ise to pay benefits directly to third parties (the hospitals) is
equivalent to a liability insurer's promise to pay third parties to
whom the insured is liable.92
Possibly having too much respect for the American rule,9" the
court in Collier refused to cut further into the doctrine by extending
the declaratory judgment exception to the present case.94 There is
certainly sufficient authority supporting the American rule that the
court could rightly uphold it without invoking too much criticism.
Although an argument could be made that an extension of the
Maryland exception to health insurance policies would have mini-
mal impact upon the American rule, such an extension based on
general contract and damages theory could be justified in almost any
contract action. The court recognized this potential problem in Col-
lier when it stated that such an extension "would probably mark the
elimination of the American rule as to contract actions against insur-
ers generally and leave in doubt the efficacy of the American rule as
to other types of contracts."9 5 Because the legal theory behind the
Maryland exception is so general, it could be applied logically in any
contract action, bringing a slow death to the American rule in this
area.
Despite theoretical similarities, Collier is still factually distin-
guishable from the line of cases that comprise the Maryland excep-
tion. The court chose to limit the exception to the facts of the
liability insurance cases; however, in so doing, the court sanctioned
a significant inconsistency in Maryland law. There is no practical
reason why health insurers and liability insurers should be subjected
91. In this case the medical cost was $286,000. Washington Hosp. Ctr. Nat'l Reha-
bilitation Hosp. v. Collier, 947 F.2d 1498, 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1991), certified questions an-
swered by Collier v. MD-Individual Practice Ass'n, Inc., 327 Md. 1, 607 A.2d 537 (1992).
92. Collier, 327 Md. at 12-13, 607 A.2d at 542. MD-IPA argued that the rule is distin-
guishable since it provides "first-party coverage." Id. at 13.
93. For a harsh criticism of the American rule, see, e.g., Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Reim-
bursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CAL. L. REV. 792, 794 (1966) (referring to
the American rule as "a festering cancer in the body of our law without whose excision
our society will not be great").
94. Collier, 327 Md. at 17, 607 A.2d at 544-45.
95. Id., 607 A.2d at 544.
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to different fee-recovery laws. 96 Policy considerations do not differ
among these two groups. Ironically, in trying not to "compound
the anomaly," the Collier court has, in effect, done worse by simply
creating another anomaly.
The Collier decision gives a clear impression of how the current
Court of Appeals will address the recovery of attorneys' fees in the
future.97 While the decision neither expands nor contracts Mary-
land law on this issue, it draws a line indicating that exceptions to
the American rule will be kept within limits. Aside from the
problems of inconsistency in Maryland law as described above, the
reasoning of the court is sound and should not be overly criti-
cized.98 The main opponents to this judgment will be those who
simply oppose the American rule altogether, but that debate in-
volves a completely separate analysis that is not detailed here.
5. Conclusion.-In finding that the term "full-time student," as
used in insurance policies, does not unambiguously incorporate the
relevant school's criteria, the Court of Appeals rendered an appro-
priate decision that will have little effect on Maryland law. By con-
trast, the court's decision to uphold the American rule regarding
recovery of attorneys' fees indicates a willingness to restrict the ex-
ceptions to that rule. The practical effect of that decision remains
unclear, but the court's adherence to the American rule is a strong
indication that recovery of attorneys' fees in other areas is unlikely,
absent legislative action.
MICHAEL J. KRESSLEIN
96. The best argument in favor of different treatment is that liability insurance con-
tracts involve a duty to defend, while health insurance contracts do not. See supra note
84. Although MD-IPA advanced this argument, the court recognized no such distinc-
tion, relying instead on the American rule and the "anomalous" characterization of the
Maryland liability exception. Furthermore, on the issue of consequential damages, such
litigation expenses may be reasonably foreseeable regardless of the type of contract and
whether there is an express promise to defend.
97. Judge Rodowsky has expressed concern in the past about how recovery for attor-
neys' fees should be limited. See St. Luke Evangelical Lutheran Church, Inc. v. Smith,
318 Md. 337, 568 A.2d 35 (1990). The majority, in a four-to-three decision, held that
the jury, when calculating an award of punitive damages, may consider attorneys' fees
incurred by the victorious defamation plaintiff. Id. at 353-54, 568 A.2d at 43. Judge
Rodowsky dissented, warning that this decision, while under the majority's reasoning an
attempt to more accurately measure punitive damages, was in reality an award of attor-
neys' fees as compensatory damages and thus an unjustified exception to the American
rule. Id. at 363-64, 568 A.2d at 47-48 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting).
98. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247-71 (1975)
(disallowing recovery for attorneys' fees, because this would infringe upon the power of
Congress to make exceptions to the American rule).
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III. CRIMINAL LAW
A. Reckless Endangerment: Deterring the Creation of Risk
In Minor v. State,' the Court of Appeals held that under Mary-
land's recently enacted reckless endangerment statute,2 a defend-
ant's conduct must be evaluated objectively to determine whether it
is "reckless." '3 The court further concluded in this first interpreta-
tion that the statute criminalizes reckless behavior regardless of
whether harm actually occurs.4
In Minor, the court clarified the reach of the reckless endanger-
ment statute and confirmed the statute's public policy goal of deter-
ring the unnecessary creation of dangerous situations.5 Moreover,
by ruling that the recklessness of the defendant should be evaluated
objectively, the court merged the concepts of recklessness and gross
negligence under Maryland criminal law.6 Although the court
found support for its conclusion in the interpretations of similar
statutes in other jurisdictions,7 it could have drawn support from the
statute's legislative history and other interpretations of "reckless-
ness" in Maryland law.
1. The Case.-In the early hours of December 13, 1989, the po-
lice arrived at Nelson Minor's residence to discover that Nelson's
older brother, Kenneth, had been fatally shot through the mouth.8
This was the result of a day's worth of alcohol and drug use that
culminated in a game of "Russian Roulette."9 According to Minor,
he and his brother had been drinking together most of the day and
1. 326 Md. 436, 605 A.2d 138 (1992).
2. The statute reads: "Any person who recklessly engages in conduct that creates a
substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to another person is guilty of the
misdemeanor of reckless endangerment and on conviction is subject to a fine not ex-
ceeding $5,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 5 years or both." MD. ANN. CODE art.
27, § 120(a) (1992).
3. Minor, 326 Md. at 443, 605 A.2d at 141. The court rejected Minor's argument
that a determination of "recklessness" depends on a subjective weighing of the danger
of the situation at hand. Id.
4. Id. at 442, 605 A.2d at 141.
5. See id. After its analysis of the statute's legislative history, the Court of Special
Appeals concluded that the law's primary purpose was "to deter crime before injury or
death occurs." Minor v. State, 85 Md. App. 305, 315-16, 583 A.2d 1102, 1106-07
(1991), aff'd, 326 Md. 436, 605 A.2d 138 (1992).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 59-62.
7. See Minor, 326 Md. at 442- 43, 605 A.2d at 141.
8. Id. at 437-38, 605 A.2d at 138.
9. Id. at 438, 605 A.2d at 139.
605
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continued drinking that night, in addition to using cocaine and her-
oin.10 Noticing Minor's pump shotgun on the living room table,
they began to discuss playing a game of Russian Roulette.11 Minor
told his brother that they could not actually play Russian Roulette
with the shotgun because it did not have a barrel, and once a bullet
was loaded in the chamber, the gun was sure to fire. 1 2 Despite this
statement, Minor said that his brother responded, " '[y]ou know
that I will do it,' " and asked for the gun.'" Deciding to call his
brother's bluff, Minor handed him the shotgun and dared him to
play first in their game of Russian Roulette.' 4 To Minor's surprise,
his brother put the gun to his head, pulled the trigger, and fatally
shot himself.15
When the police arrived, Minor explained the events preceding
his brother's death. Minor asserted his belief that his brother was
bluffing when he asked for the gun. 16 Minor further stated that he
thought his brother, who knew the gun was loaded and ready to fire,
would simply hand it back to him.' 7
After a trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Minor was
convicted of reckless endangerment and given a four-year sus-
pended sentence.' 8 Minor appealed his conviction to the Court of
Special Appeals on two separate grounds. First, he argued that he
should not have been convicted because he did not perceive a sub-
stantial risk of death or injury, and thus lacked the requisite mens
rea.'9 Second, he argued that his actions did not create the risk that
led to his brother's death.20 Minor asserted that his brother created
the risk by his independent act of putting the gun to his head.2 ' The
Court of Special Appeals, however, affirmed Minor's conviction, rul-
ing that a defendant's disregard of a substantial risk, even if the
chances of harm were low, was sufficient for conviction under the
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. Rather than saying that a shotgun does not have a "barrel," Minor and the
court must have meant to state that a shotgun does not have a cylinder with multiple







18. Id. at 437, 605 A.2d at 138.
19. Minor v. State, 85 Md. App. 305, 313, 583 A.2d 1102, 1105 (1991), aff'd, 326
Md. 436, 605 A.2d 138 (1992).
20. Id., 583 A.2d at 1106.
21. Id.
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22statute. The court noted that the offense of reckless endanger-
ment "is not dependent upon intent."'23 The Court of Appeals
granted certiorari to consider an "important issue of public signifi-
cance"-how to properly interpret the recently enacted statute.24
2. Legal Background.-
a. Maryland.-Reckless endangerment, a statutory misde-
meanor, was first enacted by the Maryland legislature in 1989.25 It
has no counterpart in the common law.26 The statute is targeted at
a range of conduct that, while clearly dangerous, is not deemed
criminal until an actual injury results. 27 According to the Senate Ju-
dicial Proceedings Committee, the statute " 'prohibits conduct
which, while not criminal under current law, creates a substantial
risk that a criminal act will result.' "28 The Committee recognized
that prior to the statute's enactment "individuals who recklessly
[shot] firearms without criminal intent near roads or buildings
[could not] be prosecuted.... "29
In its first years of enforcement, the statute has been used in
two ways. First, the statute has been invoked as the principal charge
to punish reckless acts. In some instances, it has been directed at
conduct that apparently did not otherwise constitute a criminal of-
fense. For example, a prostitute was charged under the statute
when she continued to practice her trade, even though she was
22. See id. at 319, 583 A.2d at 1108-09. The intermediate appellate court wrote that
"even though [Minor] believed that [his brother] was 'bullshitting' him and would not
pull the trigger, [Minor] was aware that his conduct, handing the loaded shotgun to [his
brother] following the foregoing conversation, might cause death or serious bodily in-
jury." Id.
23. Id. at 316, 583 A.2d at 1107.
24. Minor, 326 Md. at 440, 605 A.2d at 140.
25. See 1989 Md. Laws 3011 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 120 (1992)).
26. See Minor, 85 Md. App. at 314, 583 A.2d at 1106 (quoting Bill Analysis, H.B.
1448, Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, 1989 (Floor Report) ("This bill prohibits
conduct . . .not criminal under current law.")).
27. Id.
28. See id. (quoting the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee Floor Report).
29. Id.
30. For example, two youths were charged with reckless endangerment for throwing
rocks, beer bottles, bricks and pieces of wood at passing cars from the side of a roadway
and from a bridge. No traveler was seriously injured, but some suffered minor cuts and
21 vehicles were damaged. See Debbie M. Price, 2 Plead Guilty in '89 Rock-Throwing: Re-
peated Beltway Incidents just Something to Do,' Youth Says, WASH. POST, June 1, 1990, at C4.
Similarly, the State charged the owner of three rottweilers with reckless endangerment
when he left a fence around his property in disrepair, thereby allowing the dogs to es-
cape. The dogs subsequently mauled a seven-year old girl. Dog Owner Sentenced in Girl's
Mauling, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 1992, at B2.
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aware that she carried the AIDS-causing HIV virus."'
Second, the statute has been used to supplement other charges,
some of which may involve the more difficult requirement of prov-
ing mens rea.3 2 For instance, the statute was used to prosecute two
women who left their children alone in a Baltimore apartment while
natural gas poured out of unlit oven burners.3 " The police rescued
the children uninjured after receiving a complaint of a gas smell.34
The women were subsequently charged with attempted murder,
child neglect, child abuse, and reckless endangerment.3 5
b. Other Jurisdictions and the Model Penal Code.-Many other juris-
dictions have enacted reckless endangerment statutes.3 6 The Mary-
land statute appears to be modeled closely after the New York
statute, which has virtually identical language. 37 Both statutes seek
to punish individuals who "recklessly engage[] in conduct" that
"creates a substantial risk" of serious physical injury or death.38
Given an opportunity to decide whether the term "recklessly"
should be interpreted from an objective or a subjective viewpoint,
the New York Court of Appeals determined that New York's statute
required an objective assessment of the risk produced by a defend-
ant's conduct. 39  The defendant's subjective intentions were
31. Prostitution Suspect with HIV Released, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 1991, at C5.
32. In a recent case, a husband, who was arguing with his wife, kicked the ladder on
which she was standing. His wife died from the injuries sustained in her fall. He was
charged with voluntary manslaughter and reckless endangerment. Charge in Wife 's Death,
WASH. PosT, June 20, 1992, at D3. In another case, a caucasian male chased an African
American into the path of an oncoming truck, which struck and nearly killed him. The
defendant was convicted of assault, racial harassment, and reckless endangerment. Bal-
timore Man Convicted in Racial Harassment Case, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 1991, at D2.




36. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-24 (1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 12-5 (Smith-Hurd
1979); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.070 (Baldwin 1991); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2705
(1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-103 (1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1025 (1974);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.050 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992). For a discussion of the
differences between some of these statutes, see Minor v. State, 85 Md. App. 305, 314
n.2, 583 A.2d 1102, 1106 n.2 (1991), aft'd, 326 Md. 436, 605 A.2d 138 (1992).
37. New York divides its reckless endangerment statute into two degrees. A defend-
ant is guilty of reckless endangerment in the first degree when he creates a grave risk of
death to another person. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.25 (McKinney 1992). Reckless endan-
germent in the second degree applies when a defendant creates a risk of serious physical
injury to another person. Id. § 120.20.
38. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 120(a) (1992); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 120.25.
39. See People v. Davis, 526 N.E.2d 20, 21-22 (N.Y. 1988). The Davis court also




The genesis of many reckless endangerment statutes was the
Model Penal Code's (MPC) codification of the offense in 1981. 4 1
While the MPC version bears some similarities to the Maryland stat-
ute, it differs in its express requirement that a defendant must have
"consciously disregard[ed] a substantial and unjustifiable risk."'42 The
term "consciously" suggests that a defendant must subjectively per-
ceive that a risk is substantial and must then disregard that risk. Mi-
nor presented the Court of Appeals with an opportunity to settle the
conflict over whether the crime of reckless endangerment requires a
subjective or an objective determination of a defendant's actions.
3. The Court's Reasoning; Analysis.-In Minor, the court reached
two important conclusions regarding Maryland's reckless endanger-
ment statute. First, a defendant's conduct should be evaluated from
an objective viewpoint in determining whether it is "reckless." '43
Second, the State can prosecute a defendant for the creation of a
substantial risk whether or not harm occurs. 44 Each conclusion as-
sures that the statute's public policy goal of deterring unnecessary
risks is effectuated.
a. An Objective Determination of Recklessness.-In Minor, the de-
fendant argued that the MPC supported the conclusion that, in or-
der to be found guilty, he had to subjectively perceive a substantial
risk and consciously disregard it.45 The Court of Appeals, however,
committed even when the defendant's actions are directed against a particular individ-
ual." Id. at 24. In contrast, the Model Penal Code's (MPC) codification of reckless en-
dangerment indicates an intent to protect groups of people from reckless acts. See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2 (1980).
40. See Davis, 526 N.E.2d at 22.
41. The MPC codification reads:
A person commits a misdemeanor if he recklessly engages in conduct which
places or may place another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.
Recklessness and damage shall be presumed where a person knowingly points a
firearm at or in the direction of another, whether or not the actor believed the
firearm to be loaded.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2 (1980). The codification sought to replace haphazard cov-
erage of acts such as throwing objects at common carriers, dropping objects from
bridges, shooting at airplanes, and placing obstructions on railroad tracks, with a com-
prehensive scheme. Id. cmt. 1.
42. Id. § 2.02(2)(c) (defining "recklessly").
43. Minor, 326 Md. at 443, 605 A.2d at 141. The court rejected Minor's argument
that the applicability of the term "reckless" depended on his own weighing of the dan-
ger of the situation at hand. Id.
44. Id. at 442, 605 A.2d at 141.
45. Id. at 440-41, 605 A.2d at 140.
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quickly rejected Minor's argument, noting that "neither the Model
Penal Code itself, nor its definition of 'reckless' . . . has been
adopted in Maryland." 46 Instead, the court decided that an objec-
tive assessment of Minor's conduct was appropriate, based exclu-
sively on the interpretations of similar statutes in other
jurisdictions.4 7 The Maryland court primarily relied on the analysis
of the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Davis.48 The Davis
court ruled that "[r]eckless endangerment.., is defined in terms of
the risk produced by the defendant's conduct, not intent.""9 In ac-
cordance with Davis, the Minor court concluded that "[t]he test is
whether the appellant's misconduct, viewed objectively, was so reck-
less as to ... create the substantial risk that the statute was designed
to punish."5 0 Applying that principle to the facts of Minor, the court
examined the totality of the evidence surrounding the death of Ken-
neth Minor 5 to determine whether his brother's actions were "so
reckless as to constitute a gross departure from the standard of con-
duct that a law abiding person would observe."'5 2 Due to the abun-
dance of evidence indicating reckless conduct, the court affirmed
the conviction.53
The Court of Appeals could have found further support for its
conclusion in the legislative history of the reckless endangerment
statute and from other existing statutes. The legislative history of
Maryland's reckless endangerment statute contains a direct refer-
ence to Maryland's reckless driving statute.54 The Floor Report of
the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee stated, "[l]ike [the reck-
less driving statute], this bill seeks to deter crime before injury or
death occurs. ' 55 Based on this reference, the term "reckless" in the
reckless endangerment statute can be reasonably expected to be
46. See id. at 442 n.1, 605 A.2d at 141 n.1.
47. Id. at 442-43, 605 A.2d at 141.
48. 526 N.E.2d 20 (N.Y. 1988).
49. Id. at 22.
50. Minor, 326 Md. at 443, 605 A.2d at 141.
51. Id. The court enumerated the circumstances it considered important: the de-
fendant handed over the gun, loaded and ready to fire; the two men were intoxicated;
the victim had expressed his intent to shoot himself; and the defendant dared his
brother to shoot himself. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 142, 605 A.2d at 444.
54. See MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 21-901.1(a) (1992).
55. See Minor v. State, 85 Md. App. 305, 314, 583 A.2d 1102, 1106 (1991) (quoting




used in the same way as in the reckless driving statute." The deter-
mination of recklessness under the reckless driving statute may be
made from an objective viewpoint, because a defendant can be con-
victed if his driving indicates disregard for persons or property. 7
Similarly, the reckless boating and reckless flying statutes provide
for objective determinations of defendants' conduct.58
The Minor opinion also reflects the continued merging of the
standards for recklessness and gross negligence under Maryland
law. Indeed, recklessness and gross negligence-both of which may
be evaluated from an objective viewpoint 59 -already are commin-
gled in the law of manslaughter. In Clay v. State,60 the Court of Ap-
peals adopted as a test for gross negligence in manslaughter
whether the conduct of the defendant, considering all the factors of
the case, was such that it amounted to a wanton or reckless disregard
for human life. 61 The Clay court considered Clay's actions objec-
tively in determining whether the gross negligence standard may
have been met.62 The Minor holding thus reflects consistency in the
interpretation of the term "reckless" under Maryland law.
b. Criminalizing the Creation of Risk.-Relying on fundamental
principles of statutory construction, the Court of Appeals concluded
in Minor that actual harm was not a prerequisite to prosecution
56. Had the legislature intended a subjective interpretation of the term reckless, it
probably would have expressly stated this intention. This argument was discussed in the
State's brief to the Court of Appeals. See Brief of Respondent at 4-5, Minor (No. 8).
57. The reckless driving statute reads as follows: "A person is guilty of reckless driv-
ing if he drives a motor vehicle: (1) In wanton or willful disregard for the safety of
persons or property; or (2) In a manner that indicates a wanton or willful disregard for the
safety of persons or property." MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 21-901.1(a) (1992) (empha-
sis added).
58. The reckless boating statute implies the same objective analysis: "[i]t shall be
unlawful for any person to operate any boat ... in a reckless manner, or in such a manner
that may endanger the person or property of others .. " MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 21
(1992) (emphasis added). Similarly, the reckless flying statute states: "(a) Conduct pro-
hibited.-A person may not operate any aircraft in this State . . . (2) [i]n a careless or
reckless manner that endangers the life or property of another. (b) [In the
d]etermination of... reckless operation ... the standards required by federal law gov-
erning aeronautics for safe operation of aircraft shall be considered." MD. CODE ANN.,
TRANSP. § 5-1006 (1977).
59. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAw 234 (1986) (noting,
however, that if an objective standard is used, courts usually require that the defendant's
conduct create a greater degree of risk than that necessary for ordinary tort negligence).
60. 211 Md. 577, 128 A.2d 634 (1957).




under the statute." s The court believed that the plain meaning of
the statute demonstrated an intent "to punish, as criminal, reckless
conduct which created a substantial risk of death or serious physical
injury to another person."' It added that "[i]t is the reckless con-
duct and not the harm caused by the conduct, if any, which the statute
intended to criminalize. ' 65
In his appeal, Minor agreed that creation of a risk of harm was
the central inquiry under the statute.66 He argued, however, that it
was his brother who created the risk by taking the gun and placing it
to his head.67 Thus, he argued that his action of handing over the
gun did not create any risk that his brother would indeed kill him-
self.68 The court never directly addressed the issue of causation.
Rather, the court presumed that Minor's conduct created the risk of
harm and directly proceeded to the issue of whether the determina-
tion of recklessness was to be made objectively or subjectively. 69
Thus, Minor makes clear that a defendant can be convicted of
endangering another person even if no harm occurs. Applying this
reasoning, the Minor outcome would have been the same even if
Kenneth Minor had not shot himself, but instead had reported Nel-
son Minor's actions to the police and brought charges against him.7 °
In fact, there have been numerous prosecutions under the reckless
endangerment statute in which no harm occurred. In one such
63. Minor, 326 Md. at 442, 605 A.2d at 141. The court relied on the language of the
statute itself. Id. at 441, 605 A.2d at 140. When interpreting statutory language, "the
words of the statute must ordinarily be given their natural and usual meaning in the
context of the legislative purpose and objective in enacting the statute." Id. at 441-42,
605 A.2d at 140.
In this case the court failed to expressly consider the legislative history that was
available from the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals or the briefs of the parties.
Dismissing the legislative history as "sparse," the court concluded that the purpose of
the statute is "readily evident" from its plain language. Id. at 442, 605 A.2d at 141. Had
the Minor court looked further into the legislative purposes underlying § 120(a), how-
ever, it could have found additional reinforcement for its decision. See Minor v. State, 85
Md. App. 305, 314, 583 A.2d 1102, 1106 (1991) (quoting from the Senate Judicial Pro-
ceedings Committee), aff'd, 326 Md. 436, 605 A.2d 138 (1992).
64. Minor, 326 Md. at 442, 605 A.2d at 141.
65. Id. (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 441, 605 A.2d at 140.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 445, 605 A.2d at 142 (Bell, J., dissenting) (criticizing this presumption
as "focus[ing] on the wrong issue").
70. Of course, the incident probably would never have been reported. In his dissent,
Judge Bell emphasized that such a scenario is absurd because there would not have been
a real danger, merely an opportunity for danger that went unfulfilled. See id. at 448, 605
A.2d at 144 (Bell, J., dissenting).
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prosecution, a woman who ran an unlicensed day-care facility was
charged with reckless endangerment after she left five children unat-
tended in her locked house while she took her own daughter to a
doctor's appointment.7 A neighbor called the father of one of the
children who had been left in the home, and he in turn called the
fire department. 72 Firemen broke into the house and found the chil-
dren unharmed. 73 In another case, a nurse stole morphine-based
medications from a storage area and replaced them with a different
drug. 74 The tampering was detected before the wrong drugs were
administered to a patient-and thus no harm ensued. 75 The nurse
was subsequently charged with reckless endangerment. 76
Further support for the lack of a requirement for harm comes
from the same case on which the Minor court relied to determine the
appropriateness of an objective standard for recklessness. In People
v. Davis,77 the New York court ruled that the reckless endangerment
statute seeks "to prevent the risk created by the actor's conduct, not
a particular outcome .... The risk of injury alone sustains prosecu-
tion."' 78 Therefore, the New York reckless endangerment statute
does not require the occurrence of injury. The Minor court clearly
agreed.
Significantly, the Minor court opted for a broad interpretation
of the "creation of risk" that will justify prosecution under the stat-
ute. The court's interpretation of "creation of risk" includes behav-
ior that encourages and facilitates another person's actions which
could foreseeably result in death or injury.79 Indeed, Nelson Mi-
nor's conduct alone would not have resulted in injury without his
brother's act of pulling the trigger.8 °
71. Care Provider Charged With Endangerment, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1991, at C4.
72. Id.
73. Id.




77. 526 N.E.2d 20 (N.Y. 1988).
78. Id. at 21.
79. See Minor, 326 Md. at 447, 605 A.2d at 143 (Bell, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 445, 605 A.2d at 142 (Bell,J., dissenting). The court, however, did not give
a detailed analysis of the element of causation, thus failing to give practitioners much
guidance. In this respect, Minor is an unusual case of reckless endangerment. There is
no question that causation may be interpreted quite broadly under the statute; it re-
quires analysis of the surrounding circumstances. The only other case of reckless en-
dangerment that required the free-willed participation of the victim was Commonwealth
v. Penn Valley Resorts, Inc., 494 A.2d 1139 (Pa. Super. 1985). In that case, Penn Val-
ley's president, aware of the victim's inebriated condition, grabbed the keys from the
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In his dissent, Judge Bell chided the majority for overlooking
the issue of causation,8 ' and accused the court of defining "creation
of risk" too broadly.8 2 In his view, Minor's actions did not, by them-
selves, endanger his brother."3 Indeed, he argued, the risk of injury
was created solely by the independent actions of the victim.8 4 As
such, Judge Bell believed that the actions of the defendant were too
remote to subject him to punishment under the statute.8 5
Judge Bell, however, apparently disregarded the surrounding
circumstances in this case. While it is true that handing a loaded
gun to another adult is not necessarily dangerous, the preceding
conversation and the intoxication of the victim change the picture
dramatically. When Minor handed the shotgun to his brother de-
spite their conversation, he created a situation whereby harm was
reasonably foreseeable. Had Minor not handed the gun to his
brother and had he dropped the subject of Russian Roulette, it
seems highly unlikely that the victim would have gotten up, taken
the gun, and committed suicide.
4. Conclusion.-In its first interpretation of the reckless endan-
germent statute, the Court of Appeals held that the recklessness of a
defendant's conduct should be evaluated objectively and that the
subjective intent of a defendant is irrelevant. It thus applied the
more appropriate standard to achieve the statute's public policy
goal. Society's interest in deterring unnecessary risks should not
depend on how dangerous a particular defendant considers her con-
duct to be. The Minor court further clarified that if a defendant ap-
pears to have recklessly disregarded a risk-whether by her own
actions or by encouraging someone else in circumstances where
harm is likely to occur-she will be held accountable.
ANDREW W. BAGLEY
victim's friends and handed them to him, in effect encouraging him to drive home. See
id. at 1144-45. When the driver suffered a fatal accident, the court found sufficient cau-
sation to charge Penn Valley with the creation of an unreasonable risk. Id. at 1145.
In his dissent, Judge Bell tried to distinguish Penn Valley by arguing that the encour-
agement given by Penn Valley's president in that case did not exist in Minor. Minor, 326
Md. at 446, 605 A.2d at 143 (Bell, J., dissenting). The facts of Minor, however, refute
that argument. Minor actively took the gun, handed it to his brother and dared him to
play Russian Roulette. Id. at 438, 605 A.2d at 139.
81. Minor, 326 Md. at 445, 605 A.2d at 142 (Bell, J., dissenting). Judge Bell wrote,
"[in my opinion, the issue of causation is not only pivotal, but dispositive." Id.
82. Id. at 447, 605 A.2d at 143 (Bell, J., dissenting).





B. Refining the Common Law of Accessory After the Fact
In State v. Hawkins,86 the Court of Appeals determined the ap-
propriate remedy when a trial court's erroneous instructions led a
jury to return two mutually exclusive convictions for which a de-
fendant was subsequently sentenced.87 The common law dictated
that a defendant could not be guilty as both a principal and an ac-
cessory after the fact for the same substantive offense.88 In light of
this principle, the Court of Appeals vacated Hawkins's accessory-
after-the-fact conviction and affirmed his murder conviction.89 In so
doing, the court decided that Maryland common law would no
longer retain the principle that an accessory-after-the-fact convic-
tion is irreconcilably inconsistent with a conviction for the substan-
tive offense.90 The Hawkins court sought to prevent a defendant
from walking away "unscathed" if the conviction for the substantive
crime was overturned on appeal.9' The court concluded that soci-
ety's interest in preventing such an outcome justified the change in
the law.
92
Nevertheless, Hawkins expressed concern with the possibility of
disproportionally punishing individual defendants.9 3 The court be-
lieved that it would be unfair to punish more severely than other
involved parties a defendant who assisted his accomplices in evading
justice if that conduct was part of the overall criminal transaction. 94
Accordingly, the Hawkins court concluded that although a guilty ver-
dict for an accessory-after-the-fact count may stand with a guilty ver-
dict for the substantive offense, a separate sentence may not be
imposed on the accessory conviction unless the defendant's convic-
tion for the principal crime is reversed on appeal.9 5 Such a sentenc-
ing procedure appropriately balances society's interest in punishing
reprehensible behavior with defendants' interests in receiving
sentences that are not disproportionate to their culpability.
86. 326 Md. 270, 604 A.2d 489 (1992).
87. See id. at 279, 604 A.2d at 494.
88. See Sheppard v. State, 312 Md. 118, 122 n.2, 538 A.2d 773, 775 n.2 (1988); Os-
borne v. State, 304 Md. 323, 327 n.3, 499 A.2d 170, 172 n.3 (1985). See infra note 115
and accompanying text.
89. Hawkins, 326 Md. at 291, 604 A.2d at 500.
90. Id. at 295, 604 A.2d at 502.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 294, 604 A.2d at 501.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 295, 604 A.2d at 502.
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1. The Case.-On January 20, 1989, Dana Hawkins and three
others checked into a motel room in Joppa, Maryland.96 The group
spent the night engaging in drug use and sexual activities.9 7 On the
following day, one of the four, Dell Noble, was found strangled to
death. 8 Hawkins was subsequently charged both as a principal and
an accessory after the fact to that homicide.99
The trial court's instructions to the jury failed to direct the jury
to ignore the charge of accessory after the fact if it found Hawkins
guilty of murder. 0 By returning guilty verdicts for both charges,
the jury indicated that it was convinced that Hawkins aided and
abetted in the commission of the murder,' and that later she as-
sisted in the disposal of evidence. 0 2 Hawkins was sentenced con-
currently to a term of life with all but fifteen years suspended for the
murder conviction, and life with all but ten years suspended for ac-
cessoryship after the fact.' 0 3
The Court of Special Appeals reversed the trial court's judg-
ment,1 0 4 concluding that convictions for murder and accessory after
the fact were irreconcilable and could not stand together. 10 5 There-
fore, the court vacated the convictions on both counts and re-
manded for a new trial.' 0 6 At the State's request, the Court of
96. Petitioner/Cross-Respondent's Brief at 3, Hawkins (No. 82).
97. Hawkins v. State, 87 Md. App. 195, 198, 589 A.2d 524, 525 (1991), rev'd, 326
Md. 270, 604 A.2d 489 (1992).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Hawkins, 326 Md. at 289, 604 A.2d at 499. The trial court's instruction to the
jury regarding the elements of the offense was identical to the instruction suggested by
the Maryland State Bar. Id. at 287, 604 A.2d at 498.
101. Hawkins was convicted of felony-murder in the first degree. Id. at 273, 604 A.2d
at 491. When a felony is jointly committed, each felon is liable for those deaths caused
by the other felons that were a natural and probable consequence of the crime. See 2
LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 59, § 7.5(c). This follows from applying the coconspirator
rule to the felony-murder situation. Under this rule, all conspirators are liable for the
foreseeable offenses committed by other members of the conspiracy. See People v.
Friedman, 205 N.Y. 161 (1912).
102. An accessory after the fact is one who, with knowledge of the other's guilt, ren-
ders assistance to a felon in the effort to hinder his detection, arrest, trial or punishment.
Hawkins, 326 Md. at 281, 604 A.2d at 495.
103. Id. at 273, 604 A.2d at 491. Aside from the question of inconsistent verdicts, the
trial court clearly imposed an illegal sentence on the accessoryship conviction. The
maximum penalty for accessory after the fact is five years incarceration. Osborne v.
State, 304 Md. 323, 337, 499 A.2d 170, 177 (1985). The life sentence imposed by the
court, therefore, would have fallen regardless of the court's decision on inconsistency.
104. Hawkins v. State, 87 Md. App. 195, 204, 589 A.2d 524, 528 (1991), rev'd, 326
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Appeals granted a writ of certiorari to review the intermediate ap-
pellate court's determination. 107
2. Legal Background.-At common law, as well as under present
Maryland law, a person can be guilty of a felony in four capacities:
as a principal in the first degree, a principal in the second degree, an
accessory before the fact, or an accessory after the fact.' 8o An acces-
sory after the fact "is one who, with knowledge of the other's guilt,
renders assistance to a felon in the effort to hinder his detection,
arrest, trial or punishment."' 0 9 Maryland is one of the few states
that has retained the common law doctrine of accessory after the
fact in virtually the same form it existed in the eighteenth
century." 10
It is generally recognized that three elements must be found for
an alleged wrongdoer to qualify as an accessory after the fact. 111
First, a felony must have been committed prior to the accessory-
ship." 2 Second, the accessory must be aware of the commission of
the felony."' And third, the accessory must personally act so as to
help or assist the felon in avoiding apprehension, detection, or
arrest for the crime."l 4 Commentators have suggested the presence
of a fourth requirement-the accessory may not be a principal in
either degree in the commission of the felony."15
The Court of Appeals recognized this fourth element in Shep-
107. Hawkins, 326 Md. at 274, 604 A.2d at 492. Hawkins filed a cross petition alleging
that a mistrial should have been declared after two officers testifying for the State ut-
tered the word "polygraph." Id. at 274, 604 A.2d at 491. The court held that the use of
the word did not require a mistrial for two reasons. First, the witnesses' use of that word
was inadvertent and without nefarious intent. Id. at 277, 604 A.2d at 493. Second,
neither witness stated that Hawkins had taken a polygraph test or had expressed her
willingness or unwillingness to do so. Id. at 278, 604 A.2d at 492. Accordingly, the
court upheld the trial court's determination that Hawkins suffered no prejudice. Id. at
279, 604 A.2d at 494.
108. See Osborne v. State, 304 Md. 323, 326, 499 A.2d 170, 171 (1985).
109. State v. Ward, 284 Md. 189, 197, 396 A.2d 1041, 1047 (1978), overruled by Lewis
v. State, 285 Md. 705, 404 A.2d 1073 (1979).
110. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *37 ("An accessory after a fact may
be, where a person, knowing a felony to have been committed, receives, relieves, com-
forts, or assists a felon.").




115. See ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAw 748-49 (3d ed.
1982); RICHARD GILBERT & CHARLES MOYLAN, JR., MARYLAND CRIMINAL LAW: PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 21.4-2 (1983).
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pard v. State" 6 and Osborne v. State." 17 Additionally, even Maryland
authority that does not expressly recognize this element does not
claim that a person may be both a principal and an accessory after
the fact for the same felony." 8 Although the Maryland courts have
never offered a rationale for this rule, other jurisdictions have rea-
soned that the intent required to be an accessory and the intent re-
quired to be a principal are mutually exclusive." 19
In People v. Prado,'2 ° a California Court of Appeal explained the
prohibition against convicting a defendant of both a substantive
crime and accessoryship after the fact to that crime. The court
stated:
[W]hen an accused is convicted [as an accessory,] ... which
necessarily requires that a principal have committed a spe-
cific completed felony and that he knowingly aided that
principal with intent that the principal escape arrest, he
cannot be convicted as a principal in that completed felony.
His state of mind-the intent required to be an accessory after the
fact--excludes that intent and state of mind required to be a princi-
pal. The requisite intent to be a principal in a robbery is to
permanently deprive the owner of his property. Thus, this
is a totally different and distinct state of mind from that of
the accused whose intent is to aid the robber to escape.
These are mutually exclusive states of mind and give rise to
mutually exclusive offenses.'21
The Michigan Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in
People v. Hartford.'2 2 The Hartford court reasoned that an accessory
after the fact decides to assist the principal only after the felony has
been committed.' 2  Accordingly, because it is impossible for one
involved as a principal not to have known of the crime until after its
completion, the intent to commit the substantive felony and the ac-
cessoryship after the fact to that felony are mutually exclusive.' 2
4
116. 312 Md. 118, 122 n.2, 538 A.2d 773, 775 n.2 (1988).
117. 304 Md. 323, 327 n.3, 499 A,2d 170, 172 (1985).
118. See Sheppard, 312 Md. at 122 n.2, 538 A.2d at 773; Osborne, 304 Md. at 321, 499
A.2d at 170; McClain v. State, 10 Md. App. 106, 268 A.2d 572 (1970).
119. See Martinez v. People, 444 P.2d 641, 643 (Colo. 1968); State v. Townsend, 439
P.2d 70, 72 (Kan. 1968); Crosby v. State, 175 So. 180 (Miss. 1937); People v. Galbo, 112
N.E. 1041, 1045 (N.Y. 1916); People v. Chadwick, 25 P. 734, 738 (Utah 1891).
120. 136 Cal. Rptr. 521 (Cal. App. 1977).
121. Id. at 524 (emphasis added).
122. 406 N.W.2d 276 (Mich. App. 1987).




Courts have embraced this rule because allowing principals to
be convicted and sentenced as accessories after the fact could lead
to illogical results. For example, a defendant who actually commit-
ted a murder by pulling the trigger could receive a punishment less
severe then an accomplice who provided the gun and destroyed it
after the murder.'" 5 Such an outcome is possible in jurisdictions
that have abolished the distinction between accessories before the
fact and principals.' 26 In such states, both defendants could be con-
victed and receive the same sentence for the murder. Additionally,
the defendant who destroyed the gun could be convicted and sen-
tenced on the accessory-after-the-fact charge. Moreover, in virtually
every jurisdiction, the culpability of an accessory after the fact is
considered to be substantially different from that of a principal. 127
This may reflect an intent to punish as accessories after the fact only
those persons who have had no part in causing the felony itself.12 8
The justification for the modern treatment of accessoryship af-
ter the fact also parallels the common-law justification for not ex-
cepting accessories after the fact from the benefit of clergy.'1 9 As
noted by William Blackstone, accessoryship after the fact "is always
an offense of a different species of guilt, principally tending to evade
the public justice."' °3 0 In a discussion of the modern treatment of
accessoryship after the fact, Professors LaFave and Scott wrote:
This development whereby the accessory after the fact
is dealt with in a distinct way is a most appropriate one and
does not conflict at all with the modern tendency to abolish
the distinctions between principals in the first degree, prin-
125. See id. at 279.
126. See id. at 278.
127. See LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 59, § 66, at 522, 524.
128. See PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 115, at 765.
129. At common law, an accessory after the fact received the same punishment as the
principal. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 110, at *39. Distinctions, however, were main-
tained between accessories and principals in part because accessories after the fact were
allowed the benefit of clergy whereas principals were not. Id. The benefit of clergy was
a common-law defense that originated in the clergy's insistence that it was not amenable
to the secular courts for any crime. See WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF
THE CROWN ch. 33 (8th ed. 1788). Upon successfully asserting the defense, those de-
fendants who qualified to be admitted into the clergy-those who could read-were
turned over to the ecclesiastical courts, which handed down much more lenient
sentences than did the secular courts. Id., ch. 44, § 1. Parliament used the benefit of
clergy as a means of distinguishing one crime from another, and excluded the benefit
where criminal policy demanded harsher punishment. See Osborne v. State, 304 Md.
323, 335, 499 A.2d 170, 171 (1985). This defense, however, always remained for acces-
sories after the fact. See id.
130. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 110, at *40.
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cipals in the second degree, and accessories before the fact.
The latter three types of offenders have all played a part in
the commission of the crime and are quite appropriately
held accountable for its commission. The accessory after
the fact, on the other hand, had no part in causing the
crime; his offense is instead that of interfering with the
processes ofjustice and is best dealt with in those terms.'"'
This conceptual distinction between accessories after the fact
and other offenders further supports the view that the crime of ac-
cessory after the fact should reach only those defendants who have
not participated in the substantive felony, but instead have ob-
structed justice. The Hawkins court, however, determined that
neither the mutually-exclusive-intent argument nor the culpability
argument prevented it from revising the common law and establish-
ing that an accessory after the fact may be a principal in the substan-
tive offense. ' 32
3. The Court's Reasoning; Analysis.-In Hawkins, the Court of Ap-
peals characterized the rule that one cannot be convicted as both a
principal and an accessory after the fact to the same crime as a
"troublesome element"'133 of the common law. Accordingly, the
court removed from the accessoryship offense the common-law re-
quirement that an accessory after the fact not be a principal in the
substantive offense. 134 The court was unmoved by the various con-
cerns expressed regarding the mutually exclusive intents involved in
committing a substantive crime and participating in later evasion of
justice. 3 5
Logically, it is possible for a person to harbor the intents to
commit both crimes. Knowledge of, and participation in, a substan-
tive felony does not preclude a person from harboring the intent to
assist a fellow perpetrator in avoiding apprehension; the absence of
the accessory after the fact during the commission of the substantive
crime need not be required. 36 Moreover, the court emphasized
that the evidence in a particular case could support guilty verdicts
for both crimes. 137
131. LAFAVE & ScOr-r, supra note 59, at 524.
132. Hawkins, 326 Md. at 294, 604 A.2d at 501.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 294, 604 A.2d at 501.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 285, 604 A.2d at 497.
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The court illustrated its disagreement with the common-law re-
quirement with the following scenario:
John Doe is charged with the commission of a felony and
with being an accessory after the fact to that felony. The
jury determines that he is guilty of the substantive fel-
ony. . . . [I]t does not return a verdict on the accessory
offense.' 3 8 On appeal, the appellate court, called upon to
review the sufficiency of the evidence, finds that it was in-
sufficient to sustain the conviction, and reverses the judg-
ment for that reason. The problem is that if there is no
verdict on the accessory after the fact charge, the appellate
court cannot simply remand for sentencing.13 9
To prevent such an outLome, the Hawkins court abrogated the com-
mon-law prohibition against allowing principals to be convicted as
accessories after the fact to the same crime.' 40
The court recognized, however, that although this change in
the common law furthered society's interest in preventing wrongdo-
ers from escaping punishment, "at the same time [it] impinges ad-
versely on a defendant's entitlement to justice."' 4' The court
declared as "a matter of public policy in accord with fundamental
fairness"142 that the penalty for the accessoryship conviction can be
imposed only if the judgment entered on the conviction of the sub-
stantive felony is reversed on appeal. 41 Under these circumstances,
the case may be remanded to the trial court for sentencing on the
accessory-after-the-fact charge."4 4
The court found support for its prohibition on separate
sentences in the doctrine of merger, "under which the imposition of
separate sentences is ordinarily barred when a conviction of one of-
fense merges . . . into the conviction of another offense."' 45 Of-
138. Prior to the change in the law announced in Hawkins, the proper jury instruction
was to state that if the jury found the defendant guilty of the substantive felony, the jury
should not reach the question of whether the defendant was guilty of the offense of
accessory after the fact. Id. at 289, 604 A.2d at 499. The court noted that in Hawkins's
trial, the judge failed to issue such an instruction. Id.
139. Id. at 293, 604 A.2d at 501.
140. Id. at 294, 604 A.2d at 501.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 295, 604 A.2d at 501-02.
144. Id., 604 A.2d at 502.
145. Id. at 294, 604 A.2d at 501. Courts sometimes hold that defendants may not be
convicted of related crimes because one crime "merges" into the other. Such holdings
represent a construction of legislative intent that convictions for both crimes should not
be permitted. See United States v. Amos, 556 F.2d 899, 901 (8th Cir. 1977). Legisla-
tures are regarded as having intended to merge two crimes-and to bar conviction for
1993] 621
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
fenses typically merge when each crime requires proof of facts
common to both.' 46 The crime of accessory after the fact, however,
is separate and distinct from any substantive offense. It shares no
common facts with a substantive offense and therefore cannot
merge with such an offense. Both situations, however, share the at-
tribute that absent an expressed prohibition, a defendant could be
sentenced inordinately for involvement in a single criminal event.
As the court indicated, in both cases, fundamental fairness dictates
that a sentence should be imposed only for the more serious of the
interconnected crimes. 147
4. Conclusion.-In Hawkins, the Court of Appeals remedied
what it regarded as a flaw in the common law of accessoryship by
abolishing the doctrine that an accessory after the fact may not be a
principal in the same substantive crime. Henceforth, it will no
longer be possible for a defendant to walk away "unscathed" if his
conviction as a principal is reversed on appeal. The sentencing pro-
cedure implemented by the court strikes the appropriate balance be-
tween society's interest in punishing reprehensible behavior and the
defendant's right to fundamental fairness.
JEFFREY M. GILLERAN
C. The Absence of Double Jeopardy in Multiple Convictions for Procuring
a Single Act of Arson
In Richmond v. State,'48 the Court of Appeals found no violation
of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment for convict-
ing and sentencing a defendant for three counts of procuring arson
when a fire set in one apartment spread and burned three units in
the same building.' 49 The court determined that each apartment
was a separate "dwelling house" for purposes of Maryland's arson
both-unless each crime requires proof of facts that the other does not. This means that
usually there can be no conviction for both a greater offense and a lesser one. Id.
146. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 505 (1978) ("Whether the
material element, mental element, or both, constitute a portion of the same element
required for another crime and the proof of these elements arise from identical circum-
stances which would prove either of the two offenses, the offense requiring the lesser
degree or amount of proof or elements will be deemed included in the one requiring the
most and will merge therewith.")
147. Hawkins, 326 Md. at 295, 604 A.2d at 502.
148. 326 Md. 257, 604 A.2d 483 (1992).
149. Id. at 269, 604 A.2d at 489. The Fifth Amendment provides, in pertinent part:
"nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
622 [VOL. 52:605
CRIMINAL LAW
statute. 50 Therefore, each apartment that burned constituted a
separate offense and merited its own sentence, even though only
one fire was set.' 5 ' The court further concluded that setting a fire
with reckless and wanton disregard for the consequences satisfied
the wilful and malicious intent requirement of the arson statute. 152
Accordingly, Richmond did not have to actually intend to burn each
apartment for the convictions to stand.1 5 3
The Richmond court's decision is consistent with both Maryland
law and arson's common-law origins, which hold that the perpetra-
tor of a burning is responsible for "the natural and probable conse-
quences of his voluntary acts."' 5 4 Richmond also comports with
Maryland decisions involving other criminal offenses in which the
prosecution is based on the number of victims rather than the entire
criminal transaction.' 5 5 Such a rule prevents individuals who injure
or endanger multiple victims from escaping punishment commensu-
rate with their heightened degree of culpability.' 56
1. The Case.-On February 5, 1987, a fire broke out at an
apartment building in Temple Hills.' 5 7  At 3:00 a.m., Martha
Gobert, a tenant in the building, awoke to the sound of breaking
glass.' 5 8 Gobert realized that her curtains were on fire and alerted
her neighbors. a5 9  The fire spread, burning two adjacent
apartments. '
60
150. Richmond, 326 Md. at 265, 604 A.2d at 487. The arson statute provides:
[a]ny person who wilfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or causes to be
burned or who aids, counsels or procures the burning of any dwelling house, or
any kitchen, shop, barn, stable or other outhouse that is parcel thereof, or be-
longing to or adjoining thereto, whether the property of himself, or of another,
shall be guilty of arson, and upon conviction thereof, be sentenced to the peni-
tentiary for not more than thirty years.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 6 (1992).
151. Richmond, 326 Md. at 269, 604 A.2d at 489.
152. Id. at 268, 604 A.2d at 489.
153. See id.
154. See, e.g., A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES 1015-16 (The Publisher's Editorial
Staff eds., 7th ed. 1967); Campbell v. State, 325 Md. 488, 507, 601 A.2d 667, 676
(1992); State v. Jenkins, 307 Md. 501, 514, 515 A.2d 465, 471 (1986); Abney v. State,
244 Md. 444, 449, 223 A.2d 792, 795 (1966).
155. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 311 Md. 426, 436, 535 A.2d 485, 490 (1988) (finding a
defendant, guilty of terrorizing a number of people with a handgun, to be more culpable
than a defendant who terrorizes only one victim).
156. See Richmond, 326 Md. at 268, 604 A.2d at 489; Brown, 311 Md. at 436, 535 A.2d
at 490.
157. Richmond, 326 Md. at 259, 604 A.2d at 484.
158. Brief and Appendix of Appellee at 2, Richmond (No. 91-59).
159. Id.
160. Richmond, 326 Md. at 259, 604 A.2d at 484.
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Subsequent investigation revealed that Guy Richmond,
Gobert's former coworker, had enlisted three people to set fire to
her apartment.' 6 ' Richmond's act was in retaliation for a work-re-
lated incident in which complaints by Gobert had led to Richmond's
suspension.' 62 At a bench trial in the Circuit Court for Prince
George's County, Richmond was convicted of three separate counts
of procuring the burning of the dwelling place of another. 163 The
trial court sentenced Richmond to fifteen years of imprisonment on
each count, all terms to run consecutively. 164
Richmond appealed to the Court of Special Appeals on various
grounds, but failed to assert a double jeopardy claim.' 65 The appel-
late court affirmed the convictions and sentences in an unreported
opinion. 166 Richmond subsequently requested post-conviction re-
lief based on his contention that his lawyer's failure to assert a
double jeopardy claim denied him effective assistance of counsel. 167
Before argument was heard by the Court of Special Appeals, how-
ever, the Court of Appeals granted a writ of certiorari on its own
motion in order to determine the double jeopardy issue. 168 After a




a. Arson.-(1) The Common Law.-At common law, arson was
defined as the willful and malicious burning of the dwelling house of
another. 70 The mens rea requirement was satisfied if the fire was set
with reckless and wanton disregard for the consequences.'71 In ad-
dition, it was presumed that a person intended the natural and prob-
161. Id.
162. Id. at 259-60, 604 A.2d at 484.
163. Id. at 260, 604 A.2d at 484. See supra note 150 (setting out Maryland's arson
statute).





169. Id. at 269, 604 A.2d at 489.
170. See, e.g., PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 115, at 274; 3 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHAR-
TON'S CRIMINAL LAw § 345, at 265 (14th ed. 1980).
171. See DeBettencourt v. State, 48 Md. App. 522, 532, 428 A.2d 479, 485, cert. denied,
290 Md. 713 (1981). See also PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 115, at 276-77 ("In brief, the
state of mind which constitutes guilt of common-law arson, assuming the other elements
of the crime are present and there are no circumstances of justification, excuse or miti-
gation, is either an intent to burn the dwelling of another, or an act done under such
circumstances that there is obviously a plain and strong likelihood of such a burning.").
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able consequences of her acts.' 72
The common-law requirement that the burning be of a dwelling
house has been held to signify that arson is a crime against habita-
tion rather than property.' 73 Residency was the primary factor used
to determine whether a structure was a dwelling. 174
(2) Maryland Law.-Maryland followed the common-law defi-
nition in its codification of arson.' 75 By legislative act in 1809, the
common-law offense of arson was to carry a punishment of death or
twenty years in prison. 76 In 1904, the legislature added to the com-
mon-law offense of arson the burning of one's own dwelling with
intent to injure or defraud.' 7 7 Finally, in 1929, the Maryland legisla-
ture codified the definition of arson that is currently in use.17 8 The
arson statute expanded the common-law definition by increasing the
list of property covered and making it an offense to procure, coun-
sel, or aid a burning. 179
The term "dwelling house" is not defined by statute, and thus
its common-law meaning has been used by Maryland courts.' 80 The
Court of Special Appeals in Poffv. State'' held that the test for what
constitutes a dwelling house is whether the place is used "regularly as
a place to sleep."' 8 2 In applying this test in Herbert v. State,' 83 the
court found that a single motel room could be a dwelling house.' 84
In Jones v. State,'85 a burglary case, the Court of Special Appeals
used the "place to sleep" test and determined that the use of a
building for other purposes does not prevent it from being a dwell-
172. A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES, supra note 154, at 1015-16.
173. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 115, at 274-75.
174. Id.
175. DeBettencourt, 48 Md. App. at 523-24, 428 A.2d at 481.
176. Act of 1809, ch. 138, § 5, 1809 Md. Laws 461.
177. Act of 1904, ch. 267, § 6, 1904 Md. Laws 481.
178. Act of 1929, ch. 255, § 6, 1929 Md. Laws 773 provides:
Any person who wilfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or causes to be
burned or who aids, counsels or procures the burning of any dwelling house, or
any kitchen, shop, barn, stable or other outhouse that is parcel thereof, or be-
longing to or adjoining thereto, whether the property of himself or of another,
shall be guilty of arson, and upon conviction thereof, be sentenced to the peni-
tentiary for not less than two nor more than twenty years.
Id.
179. DeBettencourt, 48 Md. App. at 523-24, 428 A.2d at 480-81.
180. See id.
181. 4 Md. App. 186, 241 A.2d 898 (1968).
182. Id. at 189, 241 A.2d at 900 (emphasis added).
183. 31 Md. App. 48, 354 A.2d 449 (1976).
184. Id. at 52, 354 A.2d at 451.
185. 2 Md. App. 356, 234 A.2d 625 (1967).
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ing house.'8 6 In Smith v. State,' 87 the court further explained that
"use of one part of the building as a dwelling gives the character of a
dwelling house to the entire building if there is internal communica-
tion between the part used for dwelling purposes and the part used
for other purposes." 188
b. Double Jeopardy.-The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment provides that no person "shall . . . be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."'8 9 This
provision protects against a second prosection for the same offense
after acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after con-
viction, and multiple punishments for the same offense.' 90 The last
of these protections was at issue in Richmond.' 9 '
The prohibition against multiple punishments may become a
consideration when different statutes punish the same conduct, or
when one statute provides for multiple "units of prosecution" for
the "same criminal transaction."' 92 The Court of Appeals in Ran-
dall Book Corp. v. State ,' determined that in the latter situation, any
conflict that arises should be resolved by examining the legislative
intent.194 Thus, the court held that in a statute prohibiting the dis-
play of obscene material, "the legislature intended the unit of prose-
cution to be each separate magazine, film, book, or other similar
item."'19
5
The multiple-punishment problem also arose in Smith v.
State.196 In Smith, the defendant burned a building in which part was
used as a restaurant, and part was used as a dwelling. 97 The State
contended that because the building contained both a dwelling and
a shop, two counts of arson were appropriate.' 98 Smith was subse-
quently charged with two counts of arson.' 99 The Court of Special
186. Id. at 360 n.i, 234 A.2d at 627 n.1.
187. 31 Md. App. 106, 355 A.2d 527 (1976).
188. Id. at 115, 355 A.2d at 533.
189. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969) (hold-
ing that the Double Jeopardy Clause applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment).
190. Randall Book Corp. v. State, 316 Md. 315, 323, 558 A.2d 715, 719 (1989).
191. Richmond, 326 Md. at 259, 604 A.2d at 484.
192. Randall Book Corp., 316 Md. at 324, 558 A.2d at 720.
193. 316 Md. 315, 558 A.2d 715 (1989).
194. Id. at 324, 558 A.2d at 720 ("The key, of course, is legislative intent.").
195. Id. at 328, 558 A.2d at 722.
196. 31 Md. App. 106, 355 A.2d 527 (1976).
197. Id. at 114, 355 A.2d at 532.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 113, 355 A.2d at 532.
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Appeals held that the burning of both the shop and dwelling within
a single building constituted only one offense because the separate
areas were not separate dwellings. 2 0 Thus, the Smith court con-
cluded that the defendant was "twice put in jeopardy" by two con-
victions for only one arson offense. 20 1
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Richmond, the Court of Appeals
recognized that if the arson statute did not provide for multiple con-
victions for one act of setting fire, then Richmond had been subject
to double jeopardy.20 2 To determine whether multiple convictions
could stand, the court looked at the legislative intent behind the ar-
son statute.20 3 The court concluded that the unit of prosecution
provided by the statute-a dwelling-would dictate whether multi-
ple convictions were appropriate. 20 4 The court reasoned that the
legislature had predominantly adopted the common-law definition
of arson.20 5 Applying a "commonsensical" analysis of the statutory
language, the Court of Appeals concluded that the legislature in-
tended that "any dwelling house" would constitute a unit of
prosecution . 2 0 6
The court noted that "any dwelling house" was not defined by
statute;20 7 therefore, it was proper to consider the common-law
meaning. 20 8 At common law, arson was an offense against habita-
tion, rather than property. 2° 9 That is, occupancy, not ownership,
was the object of protection.2 0 The Richmond court also noted
Blackstone's exhortation that a tenant's dwelling was his property
during his leasehold.2 1 '
The dual applicability of the definition of "dwelling house" to
the common-law offenses of both arson and burglary allowed the
Richmond court to look to authority refined in the context of burglary
cases.2 12 For purposes of burglary, the court pointed out that Black-
stone considered "[a] chamber in a college or an inn of court as the
200. Id. at 115, 355. A.2d at 533.
201. Id. at 115-16, 355 A.2d at 533.
202. See Richmond, 326 Md. at 261, 604 A.2d at 485.
203. See id.
204. See id. at 264-65, 604 A.2d at 487.
205. Id. at 263, 604 A.2d at 486.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 263-64, 604 A.2d at 486.
209. Id. at 264, 604 A.2d at 487.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 487. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 110, at *221-22.
212. See PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 115, at 280.
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'mansion-house of the owner.' "213 Based on these common-law
tenets, the court concluded that each apartment was a separate
dwelling.21 4
The Richmond court further explained that its interpretation was
consistent with both the wording of the statute and related case law
in Maryland. 21 5 Relying on Brown v. State,2 t 6 the court noted the
significance of the word "any" before "dwelling house. '2 1 7 Brown
involved a statute that prohibited the use of a handgun during a
crime of violence. 2 8 The question in Brown was whether the statute
allowed multiple convictions when several victims were shot in the
course of a robbery. 2 ' 9 The statute prohibited the use of a handgun
"in the commission of any felony or any crime of violence. 220 The
Brown court interpreted "any" to mean "every," and concluded that
multiple convictions could stand.2 2 ' The Richmond court adopted
this reasoning, holding that "any" meant "every dwelling house"
burned.22
In addition, the court rejected Richmond's contention that the
mens rea required for arson was the intent to burn every apartment
that caught fire.2 2 ' The court explained that "setting a fire with
reckless and wanton disregard for the consequences satisfies the wil-
ful and malicious requirement of [the arson statute]. 224
The court distinguished Richmond from Smith, where the Court
of Special Appeals held that the use of one part of the building as a
dwelling gives the entire building the character of a single dwell-
ing. 225 The Richmond court noted that in Smith there was internal
communication between the part used as a dwelling and the part
used as a restaurant. 22 6 Moreover, the same person's interests were
involved in both parts of the building.227 The apartments in Rich-
213. Richmond, 326 Md. at 266, 604 A.2d at 487 (quoting 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note
110, at *225).
214. Id. at 265, 604 A.2d at 487.
215. Id.
216. 311 Md. 426, 535 A.2d 485 (1988).
217. Richmond, 326 Md. at 266, 604 A.2d at 487.
218. Brown, 311 Md. at 428, 535 A.2d at 486.
219. Id. at 430, 535 A.2d at 487.
220. Id. at 435, 535 A.2d at 489.
221. Id. at 435-36, 535 A.2d at 489-90.
222. Richmond, 326 Md. at 265, 604 A.2d at 487.
223. Id. at 267, 604 A.2d 488.
224. Id. at 268, 604 A.2d at 489.
225. Id. at 266-67, 604 A.2d at 488. See supra notes 196-201 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Smith.




mond, in contrast, were separate units inhabited by different ten-
ants. 2 Therefore, "each apartment burning was a separate offense
of arson," and the three convictions and sentences did not violate
the Double Jeopardy Clause. 29
4. Analysis.-The Court of Appeals's decision in Richmond is
consistent with Maryland law and supports the notion that criminal
punishment should be commensurate with culpability.2 30 Maryland
cases have consistently held that the different property units enu-
merated in the burglary and arson statutes may be housed in the
same building.23' It would have been highly contradictory for the
court to allow motel rooms housed in the same building to consti-
tute separate dwellings for burglary purposes,23 2 but then hold that
multiple apartment units in a building qualify as only a single dwell-
ing for a charge of arson. It may be argued that burglary requires
separate actions of breaking for each dwelling,2 33 and is, therefore,
distinguishable from Richmond's single act of procuring arson.
This distinction, however, is overcome by the fact that the mens rea
requirement for arson-wilful and malicious burning-takes into ac-
count the natural consequences that may stem from a single action,
thereby satisfying the intent element of each offense.234
Richmond also reflects the gravity with which arson has tradition-
ally been viewed by the legislature. The first codified sentence for
228. Id.
229. Id. at 269, 604 A.2d at 489. Additionally, the Richmond court noted that the rule
of lenity, which would dictate ruling in favor of the defendant in the light of any ambigu-
ity, did not apply. Id. The court reiterated that it was clear that the legislature intended
the unit of prosection to be each dwelling burned. Id. Therefore, no ambiguity existed,
and the rule of lenity could not be invoked. Id.
230. See Brown v. State, 311 Md. 426, 436, 535 A.2d 485, 490 (1988).
231. See Herbert v. State, 31 Md. App. 48, 52, 354 A.2d 449, 451 (1976) ("Not every
room of a multiple unit 'dwelling house' need be classified as a dwelling.... But, having
proven one room of the motel to be a dwelling house, the State may not then designate
another room a storehouse without further proof.");Jones v. State, 2 Md. App. 356, 234
A.2d 625 (1967) (holding that part of a building constitutes a dwelling even though the
other part is a club); cf. Bane v. State, 327 Md. 305, 316, 609 A.2d 313, 319 (1992)
(" 'The subsequent breaking and entering and theft of other apartments within the
house, although done in succession, would each constitute a separate offense.' " (quot-
ing Ingram v. State, 224 S.E.2d 527, 529 (Ga. App. 1976))).
232. See supra text accompanying notes 181-184.
233. See Jones, 2 Md. App. at 359, 234 A.2d at 627 (noting that proof of a breaking is
an essential element in the crime of burglary).
234. See Richmond, 326 Md. at 268, 604 A.2d at 488-89; Campbell v. State, 325 Md.
488, 507, 601 A.2d 667, 676 (1992); State v. Jenkins, 307 Md. 501, 514, 515 A.2d 465,
471 (1986); Abney v. State, 244 Md. 444, 449, 223 A.2d 792, 795 (1966).
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arson in Maryland was twenty years in the penitentiary or death. 23 5
Presently, the maximum punishment for arson is thirty years.23 6 As
the Richmond decision confirms, it is unlikely that the legislature in-
tended to limit the punishment for the burning of an indefinite
number of apartments to thirty years when burning a single home at
one time was a capital offense.
If the court had ruled that an entire apartment building consti-
tuted only one dwelling for purposes of the arson statute, absurd
results could follow. An individual could burn down a building con-
taining hundreds of units, harming hundreds of separate families,
and receive the same punishment as someone who burns a single
house. Deterrence would be greatly reduced, allowing the would-be
arsonist to disregard the lives and property of the other residents in
a multi-unit apartment building. Furthermore, by looking closely at
the unit of prosecution, the Court of Appeals has prevented
criminals from using the "one criminal transaction" argument to
abuse the Double Jeopardy Clause protections.
5. Conclusion.-The Richmond court held that convicting a de-
fendant of a separate count of arson for each apartment burned in a
single building by a single fire does not violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause. s7 The Court of Appeals determined that each apartment in
a building constitutes a separate dwelling house for purposes of
Maryland's arson statute.23 8 This ruling comports with both com-
mon-law and Maryland precedent. Richmond is also in accord with
the notion that punishment should be commensurate with criminal
responsibility and the seriousness of the crime. 23 9
MELISSA L. MENKEL
D. The Intent Requirement for First Degree Murder
In State v. Raines,24 ° the Court of Appeals addressed two distinct
issues involving the requirement of "intent to kill" in first degree
murder cases. 241' First, the court expanded the rule that allows the
trier of fact to infer intent when the defendant directed a deadly
235. Act of 1809, ch. 138, § 5, 1809 Md. Laws 461.
236. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 6 (1992).
237. Richmond, 326 Md. at 269, 604 A.2d at 489.
238. Id. at 265, 604 A.2d at 487.
239. See Brown v. State, 311 Md. 426, 436, 535 A.2d 485, 490 (1988).
240. 326 Md. 582, 606 A.2d 265, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 390 (1992).
241. See id. at 588, 606 A.2d at 267-68.
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weapon at a vital part of the victim's body.242 In so doing, the court
relaxed the evidentiary burden required to establish an intent to kill,
and blurred the distinction between "depraved heart" second de-
gree murder and first degree murder.243
Second, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed that individualized
mens rea was required to establish accomplice liability for first degree
murder.2 4 4 In order to convict a defendant as a principal in the sec-
ond degree for a murder not committed in furtherance of another
felony, the State must still prove that he knowingly aided or mani-
fested approval of the crime. 2"5 This may be accomplished by the
mere presence of the party at the scene of the crime, if for the pur-
pose of assisting or encouraging the perpetrator.246 In the case of
first degree murder, an accomplice must possess, or at least be
aware of, the perpetrator's intent to kill.247 In the aftermath of
Raines, mere knowledge of an impending criminal act, without
knowledge of a specific intent to kill, will not suffice to establish ac-
complice liability in cases of first degree murder.
1. The Case.-On the morning of January 7, 1990, Lawrence
Bentley borrowed his father's pistol and joined his friend, Ronald
Raines.248 After drinking beer together at several bars, the pair de-
cided to take a drive.24 9 Raines, the passenger, grabbed the pistol
and fired at a passing automobile.250 In addition, Raines fired shots
into the house of an acquaintance, and through the window of a
242. Id. at 592, 606 A.2d at 269-70 (concluding that evidence of a shattered window
supported the trial judge's findings that Raines deliberately aimed and fired a pistol at
the victim's head).
243. Second degree murder is defined as "the killing of another person without legal
justification, excuse, or mitigation, and with either the intent to kill or the intent to inflict
grievous bodily harm. Unlike first degree murder, second degree murder does not re-
quire premeditation or deliberation." Banks v. State, 92 Md. App. 422, 439, 608 A.2d
1249, 1257 (1992) (citations omitted).
By contrast, " 'Depraved heart' murder does not require any specific intent to kill
or injure .. " Robinson v. State, 307 Md. 738, 743, 517 A.2d 94, 96 (1986). Rather, it
"involves ... the deliberate perpetration of a knowingly dangerous act with reckless and
wanton unconcern and indifference as to whether anyone is harmed or not." Id. at 744,
517 A.2d at 97.
244. See Raines, 326 Md. at 594-99, 606 A.2d at 271-73.
245. Id. at 599, 606 A.2d at 273.
246. Id. at 596, 606 A.2d at 271.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 585, 606 A.2d at 266.
249. Id.
250. Id.; Joint Record Abstract at E13, Raines (No. 103) (reprinting the unreported




Later in the evening, while passing a tractor-trailer on the high-
way, Raines announced his intention to shoot at the truck's tires. 52
Raines then fired the pistol, and the bullet shattered the truck
driver's window, striking Cynthia Southern in the head.253 She died
shortly thereafter.254
Raines was later arrested, and after having denied traveling on
the highway the evening of the shooting, admitted, "I lied. I shot
the driver. I know I did it, but I don't remember doing it."'25 5 In
interviews with the police, Raines said that Bentley had given him
the pistol. 2 56 He recalled pointing the gun upward, intending to
shoot both the tires and the top of the truck. 57 A detective who had
investigated the scene of the crime, however, noted that none of the
tires were deflated.258
The other defendant, Bentley, offered slightly conflicting testi-
mony after his arrest. Bentley said that he had taken the pistol from
Raines at one of the bars and placed it in his truck. 25 '9 Raines, how-
ever, found the gun and shortly thereafter announced his intention
to shoot the tractor-trailer's tires. 260 Bentley said, further, that after
hearing shots and seeing the tractor-trailer pull off to the side of the
road, he had wanted to stop. 26 ' According to Bentley, Raines first
said, "[N]o, '[i]t just went through the glass and through the
cab.' "262 Later, Bentley testified that he had lied in his initial ac-
count; that in fact, Raines had said that he shot between two
trucks.263
Raines and Bentley were tried without a jury in the Circuit
Court for Baltimore County.2 64 Both defendants were convicted of
251. Raines, 326 Md. at 585, 606 A.2d at 266.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 585-86, 606 A.2d at 266. It was stipulated that the bullet that killed
Cynthia Southern was fired from Raines's gun. Id. at 586, 606 A.2d at 266.
254. Id. at 585, 606 A.2d at 266.
255. Id. at 586, 606 A.2d at 266.
256. Id., 606 A.2d at 266-67.
257. Id., 606 A.2d at 267.
258. Id., 606 A.2d at 266.
259. Id., 606 A.2d at 267.
260. Id. at 586-87, 606 A.2d at 267.
261. Id. at 587, 606 A.2d at 267.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 584, 587, 606 A.2d at 266-67.
632 [VOL. 52:605
CRIMINAL LAW
first degree murder 265 and the use of a handgun in the commission
of a crime of violence. 266 Raines was convicted as a principal in the
first degree and Bentley as a principal in the second degree. 67 The
trial judge found that Raines had directed the pistol at the tractor-
trailer window intentionally, deliberately, and with premedita-
tion. 26 8 He also found that Bentley was a participant in the murder
and could be convicted as a principal in the second degree, even
without prior knowledge that Raines was going to shoot at the trac-
tor-trailer window.26 9
The Court of Special Appeals reversed both first degree mur-
der convictions, holding that there was insufficient evidence to
prove intent to kill.2 70 The court believed that the facts in Raines
paralleled a classic example of depraved heart killing-the shooting
of a rifle into a passing passenger train or automobile. 271 Thus, the
court concluded that sufficient evidence was adduced at trial to sup-
port a conviction of "depraved heart" second degree murder, 272
and ordered entry of guilty verdicts to second degree murder for
both defendants.2 73
The Court of Appeals granted a writ of certiorari and affirmed
in part and reversed in part.274 The court held that there was suffi-
cient physical evidence adduced at trial to conclude that Raines de-
liberately aimed the pistol at the victim's window. 2 75 Because an
intent to kill may be inferred when a deadly weapon is directed at a
vital body part, the court further concluded that the trial judge's
265. First degree murder is defined as "[aill murder which shall be perpetrated by
means of poison, or lying in wait, or by any kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated
killing .. " MD. ANN. CODE. art. 27, § 407 (1992).
266. Raines, 326 Md. at 587, 606 A.2d at 267.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 587, 606 A.2d at 267. In an oral opinion, the trial judge said,
Now, in this case, I don't just have his statement that he rolled the window
down and he put the gun out and shot. I have the physical evidence as to where he
shot by where the bullet ended up.
Clearly, he aimed right at the driver's window, and he aimed in the
driver's window in such a way that he was bound to hit the driver of the vehicle,
from the position where the bullet entered the victim's neck behind her left ear.
Id. at 587-88, 606 A.2d at 267 (quoting the trial judge) (emphasis added).
269. Id. at 587, 606 A.2d at 267.
270. See id. at 588, 606 A.2d at 267 (referring to the Court of Special Appeals's unre-
ported opinion).
271. Id. at 592, 606 A.2d at 269-70. See GILBERT & MOYLAN, supra note 115, § 1.6-3, at
21.
272. See Raines, 326 Md. at 588, 606 A.2d at 267-68.
273. See id.
274. Id. at 599, 606 A.2d at 273.
275. Id. at 589-90, 592, 606 A.2d at 268-70.
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finding that Raines had deliberately aimed at the victim was not
"clearly erroneous. '276 With respect to Bentley, the court held that
the evidence failed to establish an intent to kill, or even a belief that
his companion possessed such an intent.2 77 The court did, however,
affirm Bentley's second degree murder conviction.278
3. Legal Background.-
a. First and Second Degree Murder.-Although Maryland divides
murder into two statutory degrees, it retains the common-law defini-
tion of the crime as "the unlawful killing of a human being with mal-
ice aforethought. ' 279 In order to convict a defendant of murder in
either degree, the State must establish one of four culpable states of
mind: intent to kill; intent to inflict grievous bodily harm; intent to
commit the underlying crime in a felony-murder; or a reckless indif-
ference to the value of human life, also known as a "depraved
heart. ' 28 0 When the State establishes that a felonious homicide was
committed with malice, it is presumed to be murder in the second
degree.28' Conduct that evinces "depraved heart" recklessness will
suffice to establish second degree murder. 2  In Robinson v. State,283
however, the Court of Appeals explained that "depraved heart"
murder must be based on a general recklessness, and not reckless-
ness directed at any particular person.284
In order for a homicide to be elevated to first degree murder,
the State must establish that it was "wilful, deliberate, and premedi-
tated."'2 85 In Tichnell v. State,2 8 6 the Court of Appeals defined "wil-
276. Id. at 593, 606 A.2d at 270.
277. Id. at 599, 606 A.2d at 273.
278. Id.
279. See, e.g., Chisley v. State, 202 Md. 87, 104, 95 A.2d 577, 585 (1953). See also
PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 115, at 57-60.
280. See Robinson v. State, 307 Md. 738, 743-44, 517 A.2d 94, 97 (1986); Brown v.
State, 90 Md. App. 220, 227, 600 A.2d 1126, 1129 (1992).
281. See Chisley, 202 Md. at 104-05, 95 A.2d at 585. Malice is defined in this context as
"the intentional doing of a wrongful act to another without legal excuse or justification."
Id. at 105, 95 A.2d at 585.
282. See Cirincione v. State, 75 Md. App. 166, 171-72, 540 A.2d 1151, 1154 (1988).
See generally PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 115, at 59-60 (discussing one who shoots into
an occupied train or automobile regardless of the consequences). Depraved heart cul-
pability can be characterized as "the deliberate perpetration of a knowingly dangerous
act with reckless and wanton unconcern and indifference as to whether anyone is
harmed or not." Robinson, 307 Md. at 744, 517 A.2d at 97.
283. 307 Md. 738, 517 A.2d 94 (1986).
284. Id. at 743, 517 A.2d at 97.
285. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 407 (1992); Chisley, 202 Md. at 105, 95 A.2d at 585.
286. 287 Md. 695, 415 A.2d 830 (1980).
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ful" as a specific purpose and intent to kill.287 To be "deliberate,"
moreover, "there must be a full and conscious knowledge of the
purpose to kill."' 288 For the act to be "premeditated," "the design
to kill must have preceded the killing by an appreciable length of
time, that is, time enough to be deliberate. 28 9
In Smith v. State,29 ° the Court of Special Appeals explained that
when legally sufficient evidence exists to establish an intent to kill, it
is also sufficient to establish that such intent was wilful, deliberate
and premeditated.291 In other words, adequate proof of intent to
kill may alone establish the mens rea of first degree murder.292
b. Inferring Intent to Kill.-Because intent is subjective, it may
be inferred from the established facts of the case.293 The trier of
fact may examine the defendant's acts, conduct, and words,29 4 as
well as the circumstances surrounding the crime.295 For example,
the conscious selection and use of a deadly weapon is a circum-
stance that reflects a design to kill.296
Because the law presumes that an individual intends the "natu-
ral and probable consequences" of his or her conduct, Maryland has
long recognized that intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a
deadly weapon directed at a vital body part.297 On its face, it is un-
clear whether the words "directed at" require evidence to show that
287. Id. at 717-18, 415 A.2d at 842.
288. Id. at 717, 415 A.2d at 842.
289. Id. at 717-18, 415 A.2d at 842.
290. 41 Md. App. 277, 398 A.2d 426 (1979).
291. Id. at 283, 398 A.2d at 431.
292. Id.
293. See Davis v. State, 204 Md. 44, 51-52, 102 A.2d 816, 819-20 (1954).
294. Taylor v. State, 238 Md. 424, 433, 209 A.2d 595, 600 (1965).
295. See State v. Earp, 319 Md. 156, 167, 571 A.2d 1227, 1232-33 (1990).
296. See Davis, 204 Md. at 51-52, 102 A.2d at 819-20.
297. See id. at 51, 102 A.2d at 819; State v. Jenkins, 307 Md. 501, 504, 515 A.2d 465,
466 (1986) (upholding a conviction for assault with intent to murder where the intent
was inferred from a gunshot to the hip); Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 719, 415 A.2d
830, 843 (1980) (holding that the jury could have inferred intent to kill from gunshots to
the back of the victim's head and elsewhere); Taylor, 238 Md. at 433, 209 A.2d at 600
(finding that an intent to kill was properly inferred from a gunshot to the chest); Chisley
v. State, 202 Md. 87, 108-09, 95 A.2d 577, 586-87 (1953) (finding that an intent to kill
was properly inferred from gunshots to the head and abdomen); Smith v. State, 41 Md.
App. 277, 281, 398 A.2d 426, 430 (1979) (holding that intent to kill was properly in-
ferred from a shotgun blast to chest). See also Earp, 319 Md. at 167, 571 A.2d at 1233
(ruling that the trial judge's inference-that the defendant intended to inflict serious
bodily harm by knifing the victim in the back-was not sufficient to support a conviction
for second degree murder); but see Davis, 204 Md. at 52, 102 A.2d at 820 (finding that,
from a gunshot that grazed the victim's chest and other evidence, the jury could have
reasonably inferred either an intent to kill or merely an intent to maim).
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the weapon was purposefully aimed at its target, or if they refer
merely to the positioning and use of the weapon, even when the act
of aiming is a disputed question of fact.
Although the manner in which the inference is applied is left
exclusively to the trier of fact, the cases suggest that other relevant
evidence is taken into account to determine whether the weapon was
purposefully directed toward a vital part of the victim's body. 298
Such evidence tended to reveal whether the attack arose from a
provocation or conflict, 299 and whether the weapon appeared to
have been deliberately aimed. ° ° In such cases, it is a small inferen-
tial step for a trier of fact to conclude that the defendant possessed
an intent to kill.
c. Standard of Review.-The degree to which witnesses and
other evidence are credited, and whether such evidence gives rise to
an inference of an intent to kill, are questions that fall exclusively
within the province of the trier of fact.3 0 ' On appellate review, the
test used to determine the sufficiency of evidence is "whether the
evidence shows directly or supports a rational inference of the facts
to be proved. ' 0 2 InJackson v. Virginia,3 °3 the Supreme Court held
that the relevant question was not whether the reviewing court
would have reached the same conclusion as the trial court.30 4
Rather, the inquiry should focus on "whether, after viewing the evi-
dence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
298. See, e.g., Earp, 319 Md. at 159-60, 165, 571 A.2d at 1229, 1232-33 (describing a
stabbing that occurred during a fist fight and after the defendant told the victim that he
would "take a piece of [him]"); Ferrell v. State, 304 Md. 679, 682, 500 A.2d 1050, 1052
(1985) (describing a shooting that followed a drug-related dispute); Smith, 41 Md. App.
at 279, 398 A.2d at 429 (describing a shooting that occurred after the victim kidded the
defendant about "being so ugly that his wife could not be blamed for divorcing him").
299. See, e.g., Davis, 204 Md. at 51-52, 102 A.2d at 819-20.
300. See, e.g., Ferrell, 304 Md. at 682, 500 A.2d at 1052 (describing the defendant as
having aimed the pistol with both hands before firing); Earp, 319 Md. at 160, 571 A.2d at
1229 ("[The victim] felt a punch in his back, and looking over his shoulder saw a knife
handle protruding from his back. He felt the knife being pulled down and saw it being
withdrawn. [The defendant] then lunged at [the victim] a second time."). But see Davis,
204 Md. 52, 102 A.2d at 820 (noting that, though the bullet grazed the victim in the
chest, a jury could have found that the defendant aimed at the ground in an attempt to
frighten the victim away).
301. See Raines, 326 Md. at 590-91, 606 A.2d at 268-69; McMillian v. State, 325 Md.
272, 290, 600 A.2d 430, 439 (1992); Taylor, 238 Md. at 433, 209 A.2d at 600 ("[T]he
determination of an accused's intention is, in the first instance, for the trial judge, when
sitting without a jury ... ").
302. Wilson v. State, 319 Md. 530, 535, 573 A.2d 831, 834 (1990).
303. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
304. Id. at 318-19.
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trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. 3 °5 In Maryland, the Court of Appeals
explicitly recognized the Jackson standard in McMillian v. State.s06
Consequently, on review, a trial court's judgment should not be set
aside unless "clearly erroneous. 3 0 7
A conviction based upon circumstantial evidence alone is only
proper when the circumstances cannot be reconciled with "any rea-
sonable hypothesis of innocence. "308 In West v. State,30 9 the Court
of Appeals explained that " '[i]f the circumstances make one infer-
encejust as reasonable as the other, we must give the defendant the
benefit of the conclusion that would mitigate his guilt.' ,310 Like
other findings of fact, however, the trial court's assessment of alter-
native hypotheses should not be reversed unless clearly
erroneous. 
3 1 1
d. Accomplice Liability.-An accomplice is defined as one who
"knowingly, voluntarily, and with common interest with the princi-
pal offender, participates in the commission of a crime either as
principal or as accessory before the fact."-3 1 2 Accomplice liability at-
taches to one who does not perform the actus reus of a crime, but
who nonetheless shares responsibility for either the planned crimi-
nal act or acts incidental to the principal offense. 1 3 If incidental to
the principal offense, the prosecution must establish that the act was
committed in furtherance of, or escaping from, that offense."a 4
A principal in the second degree, as distinguished from an ac-
cessory before the fact, must be either actually or constructively
present at the moment the criminal act was committed and aid,
counsel, command, or encourage another to commit a crime. 1 5 In
order to establish that a defendant "aided, counseled, commanded
305. Id. at 319.
306. 325 Md. 272, 289-90, 600 A.2d 430, 438-39 (1992).
307. See West v. State, 312 Md. 197, 207, 539 A.2d 231, 235-36 (1988).
308. Id. at 211-12, 539 A.2d at 238.
309. 312 Md. 197, 539 A.2d 231 (1988).
310. Id. at 211, 539 A.2d at 237 (quoting People v. Galho, 112 N.E. 1041, 1044 (N.Y.
1916)).
311. See id. at 207, 539 A.2d at 236 ("[M]indful that in reviewing this matter the judg-
ment of the circuit court will not be set aside on the evidence unless clearly erroneous[,]
* . .we must consider whether the inference that West was the purse snatcher is ade-
quately supported by the evidence.").
312. Watson v. State, 208 Md. 210, 216, 117 A.2d 549, 552 (1955).
313. See Sheppard v. State, 312 Md. 118, 122, 538 A.2d 773, 775 (1988).
314. Id. at 123, 538 A.2d at 775.
315. See State v. Hawkins, 326 Md. 270, 280-81, 604 A.2d 489, 495 (1992); see PERKINS
& BOYCE, supra note 115, at 722-45.
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or encouraged" the principal offender, the State must prove that the
defendant either contributed actual aid or manifested approval in
such a way that it "operated on the mind of the perpetrator.''16
With respect to cases where the crime committed was incidental
to another, the Court of Appeals held in Sheppard v. State3 17 that two
or more defendants who participate in a criminal act are not only
liable for the underlying offense, but also for any other crimes that
are committed in furtherance of the original act.318 In such cases, a
principal in the second degree need not harbor any intent to kill."1 9
In Sheppard, for example, the defendant and several companions
committed armed robbery.3 20 Although Sheppard was already in
police custody when his companions shot at police officers during
their escape, the court held that he could still be found guilty of
assault with intent to murder.3 2 1
In instances where the crime charged is unrelated to an under-
lying offense, the Court of Appeals concluded that a principal in the
second degree must either possess the requisite intent, or manifest
approval of the criminal act.3 22 A party who is merely standing by at
the scene of the crime will be held to be a principal in the second
degree if he or she is there for the purpose of aiding or encouraging
the perpetrator. 23 In cases where no actual aid is contributed, an
accomplice's approval or encouragement must "operate[] on the
mind of the perpetrator. "324 Conversely, even a party who contrib-
utes actual aid cannot be convicted as an accomplice without mens
rea.3 25 Thus, accomplice liability will not attach to a bystander who
neither knows nor has reason to know of the perpetrator's intent to
kill.3 26 In Watson v. State,3 27 the defendant was accused of drowning
a newborn infant in a tub of water.328 The murder was witnessed by
316. Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309, 331-32, 396 A.2d 1054, 1068 (1979).
317. 312 Md. 118, 538 A.2d 773 (1988).
318. Id. at 121-22, 538 A.2d at 774.
319. See id. at 121-23, 538 A.2d at 774-75.
320. Id. at 120-21, 538 A.2d at 774.
321. Id. at 121, 538 A.2d at 774.
322. See Watson v. State, 208 Md. 210, 219, 117 A.2d 549, 553 (1955) (holding that
one who merely witnesses a crime and makes no objection is not liable as an accom-
plice); Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309, 332, 396 A.2d 1054, 1068 (1979) (holding that crimi-
nal intent is necessary to be guilty as a principal in the second degree).
323. Pope, 284 Md. at 332, 396 A.2d at 1068 (1979).
324. Id. at 331, 396 A.2d at 1068.
325. Id. at 332, 396 A.2d at 1068.
326. Id.
327. 208 Md. 210, 117 A.2d 549 (1955).
328. Id. at 213-15, 117 A.2d at 550-51.
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a neighbor, who was summoned to assist in the childbirth. 29 Wat-
son accused the neighbor of being an accomplice to the murder,
3 3 0
as she failed to object or notify the police.33 '
Because the defendant could not be convicted by the uncorrob-
orated testimony of an accomplice, the Watson court addressed the
issue of the neighbor's criminal liability.3 2 The court concluded
that she could not be held accountable as an accomplice, reasoning
that "[t]o be an accomplice a person must participate in the commis-
sion of a crime knowingly, voluntarily, and with common criminal
intent with the principal offender, or must in some way advocate or
encourage the commission of the crime."3 3 3 The court could find
no evidence that the neighbor had intended to aid or encourage the
murder, and concluded that she could not be liable as an
accomplice.33 "
More recently, the Court of Appeals in Pope v. State 3 15 similarly
concluded that to be guilty as a principal in the second degree of an
offense unrelated to any other, the accused must either possess the
requisite criminal intent, or have knowledge that the perpetrator
harbored such an intent.3 3 6 In Pope, a mother and her child had
been the house-guests of the defendant for three days.3 37 Over the
course of that time, Pope observed the mother grow mentally unsta-
ble.33 8 In the last of several delusional episodes, the mother became
convinced that her son was possessed by the devil, and proceeded to
brutally beat him to death.339
Pope did nothing to intervene, and later lied to the police about
the incident.3 40 Quoting Professor Rollin Perkins, the court ex-
plained that " 'it is the abettor's state of mind rather than the state
of mind of the perpetrator which determines the abettor's guilt or
innocence.' ",341 The court then concluded that Pope neither aided,
329. Id. at 214, 117 A.2d at 550.
330. Id. at 216, 117 A.2d at 552.
331. Id. at 219, 117 A.2d at 553.
332. Id. at 217-20, 117 A.2d at 552-54.
333. Id. at 219, 117 A.2d at 553.
334. Id. at 219-20, 117 A.2d at 553.
335. 284 Md. 309, 396 A.2d 1054 (1979).
336. Id. at 332, 396 A.2d at 1068.
337. Id. at 313-15, 396 A.2d at 1058-59.
338. See id.
339. Id. at 315, 396 A.2d at 1059.
340. See id. at 315-16, 396 A.2d at 1059-60.




counseled, commanded, nor encouraged the mother.3 42 Rather, she
simply "witnessed a terrible event." 343
In sum, the State is relieved of its burden to establish the ac-
complice's intent to kill when the crime was committed in further-
ance of another underlying offense. When the crime was committed
independent of any other, however, the State's burden to establish
either an intent to kill or knowledge that the perpetrator possessed
such an intent remains.3 44
3. The Court's Reasoning.-Writing for the Court of Appeals,
Judge Karwacki concluded that the trial court's finding that Raines
had intentionally and deliberately aimed the pistol at the victim was
not "clearly erroneous. '3" 5 Emphasizing the trial court's exclusive
right to assess the credibility of witnesses, the court held that there
was sufficient evidence to find that Raines aimed the pistol at the
victim's window. 346 As a result, the trial court was free to avail itself
of the "well established" rule that "intent to kill may be inferred
from the use of a deadly weapon directed at a vital part of the
human body. ' 3 47
The court distinguished the facts in Raines from the Court of
Special Appeals's example of "depraved heart" murder.348 It ex-
plained that when one shoots in the general direction of a passing
car or passenger train, it is uncertain whether a person will be in the
path of the bullet.3 49 By contrast, Raines knew that someone was
behind the driver's window and, by aiming at the window, the court
could infer that he fired the gun with an intent to kill. 35" The Court
of Special Appeals, consequently, was ordered to affirm Raines's ini-
tial conviction of first degree murder.35" '
With respect to Bentley, the Court of Appeals held that he
could not be a principal in the second degree unless he possessed
the requisite criminal intent.3 52 The court determined that there
was no evidence from which the trial court could conclude that
Bentley harbored an intent to kill or even a belief that his compan-
342. Id.
343. Id. at 332-33, 396 A.2d at 1068.
344. See id. at 331-32, 396 A.2d at 1068.
345. Raines, 326 Md. at 593, 606 A.2d at 270.
346. Id. at 592-93, 606 A.2d at 269-70.
347. Id. at 591, 606 A.2d at 269.
348. See id. at 592, 606 A.2d at 269-70.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 592-93, 606 A.2d at 270.




ion had such an intent.3 5 3 Because the Court of Special Appeals
concluded that Bentley's knowledge and actions revealed a "de-
praved heart" state of mind, and because that determination was
not challenged by Bentley, the Court of Appeals affirmed his convic-
tion of second degree murder.354
4. Analysis.-
a. Expanding the Inference of Intent to Kill.-In Raines, the Court
of Appeals first addressed the question of whether the evidence ad-
duced at trial was sufficient to establish Raines's intent to kill.3 55
Barring clearly erroneous findings of fact, the court reaffirmed the
trial court's exclusive right to draw reasonable inferences from es-
tablished facts.3 56 More importantly, it significantly expanded the
rule that an intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a deadly
weapon directed at a vital part of the body.
Although Maryland courts have applied this inference in nu-
merous cases to establish intent for the crimes of first degree mur-
der and assault with intent to murder, 5 7 apparently none have
relied upon it to decide a case in which the victim was unknown to
the defendant or otherwise chosen at random. In prior cases, the
facts have disclosed some connection between the defendant and
the victim. 3 5 8 As a result, it was a small inferential step for the court
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. See id. at 588-89, 606 A.2d at 268.
356. Id. at 591, 606 A.2d at 269.
357. See, e.g., Glenn v. State, 68 Md. App. 379, 411, 511 A.2d 1110, 1127 (1986) (find-
ing, in an assault-with-intent-to-murder case, that the requisite intent to kill "may be
inferred from the directing of a dangerous weapon at a vital part of the human
anatomy").
358. See, e.g., Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 701, 415 A.2d 830, 834 (1980) (inferring
an intent to kill where the defendant shot a deputy sheriff seven times after being caught
breaking into a surplus store); Smith v. State, 41 Md. App. 277, 278-79, 398 A.2d 426,
428 (inferring an intent to kill where the defendant shot the victim in the chest with a
shotgun after the victim mocked him about his wife leaving him); Brooks v. State, 38 Md.
App. 550, 551, 381 A.2d 718, 720 (1978) (inferring an intent to kill where, after a scuf-
fle, the defendant went to his car, retrieved his shotgun, and twice shot at the victim
while he was attempting to run away);Jones v. State, 37 Md. App. 511, 515-16, 378 A.2d
9, 11-12 (1977) (inferring an intent to kill where the defendant stabbed his "girlfriend"
six times after being heard saying, "Get up bitch, get up bitch, or I will kill you."); Evans
v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 646, 349 A.2d 300, 307 (1975) (inferring an intent to kill
where the defendant stabbed the victim several times after a "pattern of angry and vio-
lent confrontations"); Johnson v. State, 18 Md. App. 541, 542-43, 308 A.2d 404, 405
(1973) (inferring an intent to kill where the defendant stabbed the victim three times in
the abdomen after the victim attempted to stop an assault against his mother in her
bedroom); Coit v. State, 7 Md. App. 70, 71, 253 A.2d 526, 527 (1969) (inferring an
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to conclude, considering all of the circumstances, that the defendant
intended to kill the victim.
The defendant in Raines, however, selected Cynthia Southern's
truck at random.3 59 This fact does not preclude the possibility that
Raines intended to kill an unknown victim. However, because the
trial court's inquiry into Raines's intentions was limited to scant
physical evidence and statements made by Raines and Bentley about
intending to shoot the tires and the top of the truck,3 60 the trial
court was compelled to expand the scope of the inference to an un-
precedented extent.
The Court of Special Appeals had reversed Raines's conviction
of first degree murder on the grounds that "movement of the target,
poor marksmanship, and alcohol ... [could] all explain the bullet's
final resting place."' 36 ' The Court of Appeals, however, rejected this
assertion by referring to the established rule that "under proper cir-
cumstances, an intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a
deadly weapon directed at a vital part of the human body." '62 The
court then proceeded to draw analogies to Smith v. State363 and Fer-
rell v. State.364 In Smith, an inference of an intent to kill was drawn
from the defendant's having fired a sawed-off shotgun at point-
blank range into the victim's chest.3 65 In Ferrell, the same inference
was drawn from the fact that the defendant aimed a gun in dim light
and shot both victims above the torso.3 6 6 Similarly, the Raines court
reasoned that Raines directed his gun at the driver's window, and
from that the trial judge could reasonably find that he had aimed at
the driver.3 67
intent to kill where the defendant slashed the victim about the head and face with a
straight razor during a bar fight).
359. Raines, 326 Md. at 585, 606 A.2d at 266 (describing the defendant passing the
victim's tractor-trailer while routinely driving on the highway); Joint Record Abstract at
E7, Raines (No. 103) (reprinting the trial judge's oral opinion that "when you shoot at
the driver's window, you know somebody is behind the driver's window, even with the
reflection in the glass at night, [even though] you can't see exactly who it is" (emphasis
added)); id. at E 14 (reprinting the unpublished opinion of the Court of Special Appeals,
which described the defendants' selection of a victim as merely, "[t]hey spotted a tractor
trailer on the Beltway travelling in the same direction").
360. See Raines, 326 Md. at 587-88, 606 A.2d at 267.
361. Id. at 590, 606 A.2d at 268.
362. Id. at 591, 606 A.2d at 269.
363. 41 Md. App. 277, 398 A.2d 426 (1979).
364. 304 Md. 679, 500 A.2d 1050 (1985).
365. See Smith, 41 Md. App. at 281, 398 A.2d at 430.
366. See Ferrell, 304 Md. at 684, 500 A.2d at 1053.
367. Raines, 326 Md. at 593, 606 A.2d at 270.
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It is important to note, however, that the rule permitting the
inference of an intent to kill presumes that the weapon was purpose-
fully directed toward its target.3 68 In a feat of circular reasoning, the
Court of Appeals explained that the bullet had shattered the driver's
window because Raines had aimed his pistol.3 6 9 That Raines had
aimed his pistol was established by the fact that the bullet had shat-
tered the driver's window.37 0 The court used similar reasoning to
distinguish the facts in Raines from the Court of Special Appeals's
example of a "depraved heart" murder.3 1  The fact that Raines
"deliberately" aimed at the window negated the "general reckless-
ness" required for "depraved heart" murder,3 72 but this too was es-
tablished only by the path of the bullet.373
The cases that the Court of Appeals relied upon are clearly dis-
tinguishable from Raines. In Smith, the defendant fired a shotgun
point-blank at a man who had earlier mocked him. 74 In Ferrell, the
defendant aimed a pistol with both hands, shooting one victim be-
tween the eyes and another in the neck.3 7 5 From the circumstances
of these cases, it was a small inferential step to conclude that the
shots were deliberately aimed at the victims. In Raines, by contrast,
there were no other facts that rationally connected the defendant to
the particular victim. 3
76
By concluding that the State failed to meet its evidentiary bur-
den of proving intent, the Court of Special Appeals unquestionably
substituted its findings of fact for those of the trial court.3 7 7 Be-
cause the original finding was not clearly erroneous, the Court of
Appeals was correct in its ultimate conclusion. Nevertheless, by re-
lying on Smith and Ferrell, the Raines court considerably expanded
the scope of the rule that an intent to kill may be inferred by the use
368. See id. at 592-93, 606 A.2d at 270 ("Raines's actions in directing the gun at the
window . . . permitted an inference that Raines shot the gun with the intent to kill.").
369. Id. at 592, 606 A.2d at 269 ("This evidence supported the trial court's finding
that Raines aimed and fired the pistol at the victim's head.").
370. Id. at 592-93, 606 A.2d at 270.
371. See id.
372. See Robinson v. State, 307 Md. 738, 743, 517 A.2d 94, 97 (1986) (" '[D]epraved
heart' murder must be based on general recklessness .. .not directed at any particular
person.").
373. See Raines, 326 Md. at 592-93, 606 A.2d at 269-70 (explaining that the evidence
of the window shattering on the driver's side of the truck supported the finding that
Raines aimed and fired the pistol at the driver's head).
374. Smith v. State, 41 Md. App. 277, 279, 398 A.2d 426, 429 (1979).
375. Ferrell v. State, 304 Md. 679, 682, 500 A.2d 1050, 1052 (1985).
376. See Raines, 326 Md. at 599, 606 A.2d at 273.
377. See id. at 590-91, 606 A.2d at 273.
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of a deadly weapon aimed at a vital body part."' In its decision, the
court ignored the trial judge's finding that by "[a]iming at the tires
on this size truck, there is no way you could possibly misfire and
blow out the driver's window of the vehicle." '379 This statement re-
flected a consideration of facts beyond those necessary to infer an
intent to kill from the use of a deadly weapon directed at a vital part
of the victim's body. Had the Court of Appeals availed itself of this
statement in its reasoning, it could have limited the scope of its
holding.
The impact of this decision may be far-reaching. As random
acts of violence occur with increasing frequency,38 0 so too will the
question of whether defendants deliberately aimed deadly weapons
at particular victims. In the aftermath of Raines, a trier of fact could
conceivably draw an inference of an intent to kill based solely on the
eventual path of the bullet. Now, in a case in which a gunman shot
at a moving train and killed a passenger at random, a trier of fact
could infer a specific intent to kill that individual passenger merely
because the bullet passed from the gun, through the train, and into
the victim.
As a practical result, the Court of Appeals has diminished the
State's burden of proving an intent to kill beyond a reasonable
doubt in cases of random shootings. In so doing, the court has ele-
vated what otherwise would be a second degree "depraved heart"
killing to first degree murder.
b. Clarifying the Intent Requirement for Principals in the Second De-
gree.-In Raines, the Court of Appeals also addressed the question of
whether, at a minimum, a principal in the second degree must be
aware of the perpetrator's intent to kill to be convicted of first de-
gree murder. 38' The court definitively ruled that for Bentley to be
convicted as a principal in the second degree to first degree murder,
he must either have harbored an intent to kill or known that Raines
harbored such specific intent.3 2
On appeal, the State asserted that Bentley's conduct should be
378. Id. at 592, 606 A.2d at 268-69.
379. Joint Record Abstract at E7, Raines (No. 103).
380. See Ralph Blumenthal, Bystanders Increasingly in Cross-Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31,
1992, at BI (reporting that random crowd attacks increased in New York City from 0 in
1977 and 1978 to 48 in 1988, and those killed and wounded from gunfire increased
2.5% from 1991 to 1992).
381. Raines, 326 Md. at 594, 599, 606 A.2d at 271, 273.
382. Id. at 599, 606 A.2d at 273.
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viewed within the legal framework enunciated in Sheppard v. State,383
arguing that Bentley had aided in the underlying offense of shooting
at the truck. 84 Further, it maintained that because the actual killing
was committed pursuant to the original design, the existence of
Bentley's intent to kill was irrelevant.3 8 5 This had been the view of
the trial judge, who stated that Bentley could be convicted as a prin-
cipal in the second degree "provided he is a participant in the act,
and in fact, he can be convicted whether he knew the Defendant,
Ronald Raines, was going to shoot at the window or not." 6
The Court of Appeals refused to accept Sheppard as applicable,
however, explaining that nothing in the record supported a finding
that Raines shot the victim in furtherance of another criminal act
that the two had jointly undertaken.3 87 Consequently, the Raines
court was left with the question of whether to view Bentley's con-
duct within the established rule of Watson and Pope,388 or to expand
Sheppard's scope to include offenses that were not committed in fur-
therance of any other crime.3 8 9
Although irresponsible, the defendants in Watson and Pope were
essentially bystanders who failed to intervene in the criminal con-
duct of another.3 9 ° Similarly, Bentley failed to object to or report
Raines's previous shootings, prevent Raines from retaking his pistol
383. 312 Md. 118, 538 A.2d 773 (1988); see Brief of Petitioner at 17-18, Raines (No.
103) (arguing that the murder of Southern was committed pursuant to an underlying
offense, namely the contemplated action of shooting at the truck). Sheppard held that
two or more defendants who participate in a criminal act are not only liable for the
underlying offense, but for any other crimes that are committed in furtherance of, or
escape from, the original act. Sheppard, 312 Md. at 123, 538 A.2d at 775.
384. Brief of Petitioner at 17, Raines (No. 103). The State did not, however, specify
whether the contemplated action of shooting at the truck alone amounted to felony. If
the State contemplated the crime of assault with intent to murder, see MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 12 (1991), one necessary element would be specific intent to kill. See Glenn v.
State, 68 Md. App. 379, 388, 511 A.2d 1110, 1115 (1986). This, of course, would lead
the court back to the initial inquiry of whether Bentley "intended" to kill the victim.
385. "The intended murder of Southern was done in pursuance of the contemplated
action of shooting at the tractor trailer, and therefore, Bentley is equally responsible
with Raines for first degree murder, even if Bentley did not personally have the intent to
kill." Brief of Petitioner at 17, Raines (No. 103).
386. See Raines, 326 Md. at 593, 606 A.2d at 269-70.
387. Id. at 599, 606 A.2d at 273.
388. See supra notes 322-344 and accompanying text.
389. See supra notes 317-321 and accompanying text.
390. See Watson v. State, 208 Md. 210, 219, 117 A.2d 549, 553 (1955) ("[T]he fact
that a person witnesses a crime and makes no objection to its commission and does not
notify the police does not make him an accomplice."); Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309, 332-
33, 396 A.2d 1054, 1068 (1979) (determining that Pope "neither actually aided the
mother in the acts of abuse nor did she counsel, command or encourage her," but
merely that "Pope 'witnessed a terrible event' ").
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from the truck, or react to Raines's announced intention to shoot at
the truck's tires.39 ' Moreover, like the defendant in Pope, Bentley
not only failed to notify the police, but lied when asked about the
murder. 9 2
The key element that distinguishes Watson and Pope from Shep-
pard is not the defendant's place in the chain of causation. Rather, it
is the absence of an underlying criminal design.393 In Sheppard, the
defendant and two others committed armed robbery, and the aggra-
vated assault was committed in furtherance of that crime.3 9" Re-
moval of the intent requirement in such cases is justified only
because the incidental crime is a foreseeable consequence of the
pre-existing criminal design.3 95 The Court of Appeals correctly re-
fused to invent such a design purely for the purpose of relieving the
State of its burden of proving intent.3 96
Although he was exonerated of deliberately "aiding" the crime,
Bentley nevertheless took affirmative steps that made the crime pos-
sible. It was Bentley who supplied the gun, and it was he who main-
tained a steady speed and direction in the moments preceding
Cynthia Southern's murder. 97 While the State could neither estab-
lish Bentley's purpose to kill or knowledge of Raines's intent, Bent-
ley's actions were inextricably linked in the chain of causation to
Southern's death. 98 Nevertheless, the court correctly held that an
act, regardless of its causal connection to an offense, will not be-
come criminal if committed without mens rea.3 99
In the final analysis, Raines upholds the principal that even clear
"[a]id or encouragement to another who is actually perpetrating a
felony will not make the aider or encourager guilty of the crime if it
is rendered without mens rea." 40 0 To require less than intent to kill
391. See Raines, 326 Md. at 585-88, 606 A.2d at 266-67.
392. Id. at 587, 606 A.2d at 267. See Pope, 284 Md. at 316, 396 A.2d at 1060.
393. See Raines, 326 Md. at 598, 606 A.2d at 272.
394. Sheppard v. State, 312 Md. 118, 119-22, 538 A.2d 773, 774-75 (1988).
395. See Raines, 326 Md. at 598, 606 A.2d at 272 ("Because the assaults were deter-
mined by the jury to have been in furtherance of the commission of the armed robbery
and the escape therefrom, Sheppard was properly convicted of those aggravated assaults
notwithstanding the absence of any evidence that he intended to kill the police
officers.").
396. See id. at 599, 606 A.2d at 273.
397. Id. at 587, 606 A.2d at 267 (explaining that Bentley continued to pass the tractor-
trailer after Raines announced that he was going to shoot at its tires).
398. See id.
399. Id. at 596, 606 A.2d at 271-72.
400. See Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309, 332-33, 396 A.2d 1054, 1068 (1979) (quoting
PERKINS, supra note 341, at 662-63.
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would potentially transform bystanders, blameworthy though they
may be, into murderers.
5. Conclusion.-In Raines, the Court of Appeals made two im-
portant rulings affecting the intent required for first degree murder.
First, the court expanded the rule that intent to kill may be inferred
by the use of a deadly weapon directed at a vital part of the victim's
body. By permitting such an inference to be drawn from the path of
the bullet alone, the court diluted the intent requirement for first
degree murder. In so doing, it blurred the line between first degree
murder and "depraved heart" second degree murder.
Second, the court clarified the mens rea required to convict a
principal in the second degree of first degree murder. In the after-
math of Raines, a defendant must be shown to have either possessed
an intent to kill, or at least had knowledge that the perpetrator har-
bored such an intent. The court correctly refused to invent an un-
derlying crime purely to eliminate the State's burden of establishing




A. Attorney-Client Privilege and Fee Arrangement Information
In re Criminal Investigation No. 1/242Q' presented the Court of
Appeals with the question of whether fee arrangement information
is protected from a grand jury subpoena by the attorney-client privi-
lege.2 The court denied protection in light of the "overwhelming
weight of authority" in the federal courts requiring attorneys to dis-
close their clients' payment records in similar situations.3 The
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct governing attorney-client
confidentiality4 were ruled inapplicable because the rule of confi-
dentiality does not apply when evidence is sought from an attorney
through compulsion of law.5 Furthermore, the court determined
that fee information is not protected by either the Fifth Amend-
ment's self-incrimination clause6 or the Sixth Amendment's right to
counsel.7
In his dissent, Judge Bell acknowledged that the court's opinion
was well supported in the federal circuits, but raised several policy-
based concerns.' Judge Bell argued that the majority failed to con-
sider the original purpose of the attorney-client privilege.9 He
maintained that requiring attorneys to become, in effect, chief wit-
nesses against their own clients would have a detrimental, chilling
effect on the attorney-client relationship.' 0
1. 326 Md. 1, 602 A.2d 1220 (1992).
2. Id. at 6, 602 A.2d at 1222.
3. See id. at 7, 602 A.2d at 1222.
4. See MD. R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.6 (1992).
5. See Criminal Investigation No. 1/242Q, 326 Md. at 4-5, 602 A.2d at 1221-22. See
MD. R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.6(b)(4) ("A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary ... to comply with these Rules, a court order or
other law.").
6. See Criminal Investigation No. 1/242Q, 326 Md. at 12, 602 A.2d at 1225. The Fifth
Amendment states in relevant part that "[n]o ...person shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
7. See Criminal Investigation No. 1/242Q, 326 Md. at 12-13, 602 A.2d at 1225-26.
The Sixth Amendment states in relevant part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right.., to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.
8. See Criminal Investigation No. 1/242Q, 326 Md. at 15, 602 A.2d at 1227 (Bell, J.,
dissenting).
9. See id. at 15-16, 602 A.2d at 1226-27 (Bell, J., dissenting).
10. See id. at 17-24, 602 A.2d at 1228-31 (Bell, J., dissenting). The dissent warned
ominously that "this decision may be the beginning of the demise of the attorney-client
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1. The Case.-In 1990, the Maryland Attorney General's office
undertook a "net worth" investigation of known and suspected drug
dealers in an attempt to curb violations of state income tax laws."
Investigators sought to demonstrate the existence of unreported in-
come from narcotics profits by recording large expenditures of
money. 12 One such expenditure was frequently attorneys' fees.
On December 3, 1990, the grand jury for Anne Arundel County
issued a subpoena duces tecum to attorney William Murphy, Jr., de-
manding fee payment records regarding legal services rendered to
two of his former clients.'" Murphy filed a motion to quash the sub-
poena, arguing that the information was protected by attorney-cli-
ent confidentiality and privilege.' 4
The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County acknowledged that
the attorney-client privilege does not generally protect fee informa-
tion,' 5 but it interpreted the Maryland Rules of Professional Con-
duct as having "enlarged the general principle of confidentiality" in
Maryland. 6 Consequently, the court granted the motion to
quash.' 7 The State, representing the grand jury, appealed the trial
court's ruling.'" Prior to consideration by the Court of Special Ap-
peals, the Court of Appeals granted certiorari.' 9
2. Legal Background.-
a. The Baird Exceptions.-Baird v. Koerner,20 decided by the
Ninth Circuit in 1960, is often acknowledged to be the seminal fed-
eral opinion on the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to
client identity and fee information. 2' Alva Baird was a tax lawyer
with a number of clients who had understated their income to the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS).2 2 After reviewing the situation,
Baird forwarded the owed amount to the IRS-without disclosing
relationship and, hence, privilege in this State." Id. at 23, 602 A.2d at 1231 (Bell, J.,
dissenting).




15. Id. at 3-4, 602 A.2d at 1221.
16. Id. at 4, 602 A.2d at 1221.
17. See id. at 3-4, 602 A.2d at 1221.
18. Id. at 4, 602 A.2d at 1221.
19. Id.
20. 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).
21. See Steven Goode, Identity, Fees, and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 59 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 307, 320 (1991).
22. Baird, 279 F.2d at 626.
1993] 649
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 52:648
the names of the taxpayers. 23 In response, the IRS issued a sub-
poena requiring Baird to reveal his clients' identities. 24 Baird re-
fused, claiming that the information was privileged.25  The trial
court held Baird in contempt for failure to disclose the identities.26
The Ninth Circuit, however, upheld Baird's objection to the
subpoena.27
Courts have interpreted Baird as establishing as many as three
distinct exceptions28 to the accepted principle that a client's identity
and fee information are generally not protected by the attorney-cli-
ent privilege.2 ' First, a lawyer may not disclose information that
would lead to the incrimination of a client in the very crime for
which the client sought legal advice."0 Second, information is privi-
leged if it represents the "last link" in a chain of evidence that would
incriminate a client.3 And finally, revealing fee information is
barred if it would ultimately cause disclosure of the substance of a
23. See id.
24. See id. at 627.
25. See id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 635.
28. See Goode, supra note 21, at 322.
29. See Baird, 279 F.2d at 633. See also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe,
781 F.2d 238, 247 (2d Cir.) ("We consistently have held that, absent special circum-
stances, client identity and fee information are not privileged."), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1108 (1986); United States v. Liebman, 742 F.2d 807, 809 (3d Cir. 1984) ("It is well
established that 'absent unusual circumstances the identity of the client does not come
within the attorney-client privilege.' "); In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Under Seal), 774
F.2d 624, 628 (4th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he attorney-client privilege normally does not extend
to the payment of attorney's fees and expenses."), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F.2d 1026, 1027 (5th Cir. 1982) ("We have long
recognized the general rule that matters involving the payment of fees and the identity
of clients are not generally privileged."); In re GrandJury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723
F.2d 447, 451 (6th Cir. 1983) ("The federal forum is unanimously in accord with the
general rule that the identity of a client is, with limited exceptions, not within the protec-
tive ambit of the attorney-client privilege."), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1246 (1984); In re Wit-
nesses Before Special March 1980 Grand Jury, 729 F.2d 489, 491 (7th Cir. 1984) ("The
general rule is well established that information regarding a client's fees is not protected
by the attorney-client privilege because the payment of fees is not a confidential commu-
nication between the attorney and client."); Tornay v. United States, 840 F.2d 1424,
1426 (9th Cir. 1988) ("We have said repeatedly... that fee information generally is not
privileged."); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (Anderson), 906 F.2d 1485, 1488 (10th Cir.
1990) ("It is well recognized in every circuit, including our own, that the identity of an
attorney's client and the source of payment for legal fees are not normally protected by
the attorney-client privilege."); In re GrandJury Proceedings 88-9 (MIA), 899 F.2d 1039,
1044 (11 th Cir. 1990) ("IT]his circuit has consistently held that information concerning
payment of attorney's fees is not generally privileged.").
30. See, e.g., United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir. 1977).
31. See, e.g., Pavlick, 680 F.2d at 1027.
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"confidential communication '3 for which the client has a "legiti-
mate expectation of privacy." 33
(1) Legal Advice.-The first of the "Baird exceptions" to the
general rule of disclosure involves cases where the information
sought would lead to implicating a client in the very matter for
which he or she obtained legal advice.3 4 For example, in Tillotson v.
Boughner,33 the trial court had found an attorney in contempt for
refusing to disclose the identity of his client.36 The attorney had
delivered a cashier's check to the IRS on behalf of his client, but had
maintained that his client's identity was protected by attorney-client
privilege.3 7 Acknowledging Baird, the Seventh Circuit agreed with
the attorney, explaining that such a revelation "would lead ulti-
mately to disclosure of the taxpayer's motive for seeking legal ad-
vice" in that very case.38 Subsequent courts have made it clear,
however, that the legal-advice exception is inapplicable when the
privilege would allow on-going crime or fraud to continue, 9 or
when the information is subpoenaed as part of a separate
investigation.4 °
(2) Last Link.-The second Baird exception was "largely for-
mulated by the Fifth Circuit"'" in United States v. Jones4 2 and In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick).43 In Jones, six attorneys were subpoe-
naed by a federal grand jury investigating possible income tax viola-
tions by persons recently convicted or arrested for marijuana
32. See, e.g., Anderson, 906 F.2d at 1491.
33. In re Michaelson, 511 F.2d 882, 889 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975).
34. See Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F.2d at 452; Tillotson v. Boughner,
350 F.2d 663, 666 (7th Cir. 1965); In re Grand Jury Witness (Salas), 695 F.2d 359, 361
(9th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum (Marger/Merenbach), 695
F.2d 363, 365 (9th Cir. 1982).
35. 350 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1965).
36. Id. at 664.
37. See id.
38. Id. at 666.
39. See In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F.2d 447, 452 (6th Cir. 1983)
("[T]he legal advice exception may be defeated through a prima facie showing that the
legal representation was secured in furtherance of present or intended continuing ille-
gality ....").
40. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (Anderson), 906 F.2d 1485, 1489 (10th Cir.
1990) (limiting the exception to cases in which "the client sought legal advice about the
very activity for which the fee information is sought" (emphasis added)).
41. See id.
42. 517 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1975).
43. 680 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1982).
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offenses.4 4 The attorneys were all directed to disclose information
regarding their clients, which, for the most part, they did.45 The
attorneys, however, asserted attorney-client privilege and refused to
furnish the identities of third parties who might have provided bond
money, or paid attorneys' fees for the known clients. 46 The Jones
court upheld the attorneys' claim because "so much of the sub-
stance of the communications [was] already in the government's
possession that additional disclosures would yield substantially pro-
bative links in an existing chain of inculpatory events or
transactions."4 7
According to Jones and Pavlick, the attorney-client privilege pro-
tects any information that represents the "last link" 48-- or at least a
"substantially probative link" 4 9-in a chain of incriminating evi-
dence. 50 Some courts have applied this last-link exception only to
cases where the identity of the client is unknown.5 The last-link
exception as interpreted by Jones and Pavlick, however, has been the
object of extensive criticism in recent years, 52 eventually being ex-
pressly rejected in at least two circuits, 53 and implicitly in several
others.54
44. Jones, 517 F.2d at 668.
45. See id. at 669.
46. See id.
47. Id. at 674.
48. Pavlick, 680 F.2d at 1027.
49. Jones, 517 F.2d at 674.
50. Id. Jones included in this exception information other than "the client's verbal
communication," which is "not normally privileged." Id.
51. See In re Slaughter, 694 F.2d 1258, 1259 (11th Cir. 1982) ("The present case
clearly does not fall within the [last link] exception .... The identities of attorney and
clients are already known by the grand jury."); Pavlick, 680 F.2d at 1027 (limiting the
exception to cases involving "the disclosure of the client's identity by his attorney").
52. See, e.g., Goode, supra note 21, at 328-29.
53. See In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F.2d 447, 453-54 (6th Cir.
1983) ("Upon careful consideration this Court concludes that, although language exists
in Baird to support viability of PavlicA's 'last link' exception, the exception is simply not
grounded upon the preservation of confidential communications and hence not justifiable
to support the attorney-client privilege."), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1246 (1984); In re Grand
Jury Subpoenas (Anderson), 906 F.2d 1485, 1492 (10th Cir. 1990) ("We believe that the
confidential communication exception represents a more disciplined interpretation of
Baird than does the Fifth Circuit's last link exception. Thus, we reject the last link excep-
tion to the extent it has deviated from the holding of Baird.").
54. See Anderson, 906 F.2d at 1490. In In re Shargel, 742 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1984), the
Second Circuit adhered to prior decisions recognizing that the purpose of the attorney-
client privilege is to enable attorneys to provide informed legal advice by encouraging
full disclosure by clients. Id. at 64. The court concluded that requiring attorneys to
disclose the source of fees does not impair their ability to provide such advice, and de-
nied protection to evidence indicating payment of one person's legal fees by another.
Id. at 64-65. In United States v. Liebman, 742 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1984), the Third Circuit
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(3) Confidential Communications.-The third exception, protec-
tion of confidential communications, is the "current favorite" in fed-
eral courts.55 Under this exception, any information that would lead
to the disclosure of confidential communications between a client
and his attorney is privileged.56 Recently, federal courts have
tended to interpret Baird as establishing a single confidential-com-
munications exception,57 thereby rejecting the legal-advice and last-
link exceptions.5" Furthermore, the majority of courts today inter-
pret the "confidential communications" exception narrowly, insist-
refused to apply the last-link exception, stating that the exception "appears to go further
in sustaining the [attorney-client] privilege than we were willing to accept in [In re Grand
Jury Empanelled February 14, 1978 (Markowitz), 603 F.2d 469 (3d Cir. 1979)]." Lieb-
man, 742 F.2d at 810 n.2. The Liebman court did not rely on the last-link exception
because it found that there had been a protected communication. Id. The Ninth Circuit
implicitly rejected the last-link exception in In re Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591 (9th Cir.
1983), when it held that "[flee arrangements usually fall outside the scope of the [attor-
ney-client] privilege simply because such information ordinarily reveals no confidential
professional communication between attorney and client, and not because such informa-
tion may not be incriminating." Id. at 593.
55. See Goode, supra note 21, at 326 & n.138.
56. See NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900, 905 (4th Cir. 1965) ("The privilege may be
recognized when so much of the actual communication has already been disclosed that
identification of the client amounts to disclosure of a confidential communication."); In
re Witnesses Before Special March 1980 Grand Jury, 729 F.2d 489, 492 (7th Cir. 1984)
("In deciding the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to fee information, this
circuit has consistently focused its analysis on whether the information would disclose
confidential communications between the attorney and client."); Tornay v. United
States, 840 F.2d 1424, 1428 (9th Cir. 1988) ("A careful reading of Baird, and close ex-
amination of subsequent cases, indicates that Baird applies only when it is shown that,
because of exceptional circumstances, disclosure of the client's identity or the existence
of a fee arrangement would reveal information that is tantamount to a confidential pro-
fessional communication.").
57. See Special March 1980 Grand Jury, 729 F.2d at 494 ("While the exception is often
discussed in terms of whether the information would incriminate the client, the excep-
tion is better understood in terms of confidential communications. The client's identity
or fee arrangements may be privileged where so much is already known that the identity
or fees would reveal the client's confidential communication .. "); In re Grand Jury
Subpoenas (Hirsch), 803 F.2d 493, 497 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Baird held that the attorney
could not be compelled to reveal any information regarding the person who employed
him because, under the facts of that case, the client's identify was in substance a confi-
dential communication in the professional relationship between the client and the attor-
ney."); Tornay, 840 F.2d at 1428 ("A careful reading of Baird, and a close examination of
subsequent cases, indicates that Baird applies only when it is shown that, because of
exceptional circumstances, disclosure of the client's identity or the existence of a fee
arrangement would reveal information that is tantamount to a confidential professional
communication." (footnote omitted)); Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d at 593.
58. See Daniel J. Capra, Deterring the Formation of the Attorney-Client Relationship: Disclo-
sure of Client Identity, Payment of Fees, and Communications by Fiduciaries, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 235, 248 (1990) ("Recently, both the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have
recharacterized the last link doctrine so that it is coextensive with the [confidential] com-
munication rationale of the privilege."); Goode, supra note 21, at 326 ("[T]he last link
1993] 653
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
ing that only a disclosure regarding the subject matter of a client's
problem is protected. 59
b. Self-Incrimination and the Right to Counsel.-The Supreme
Court has declined to construe the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimi-
nation protection broadly enough to include attorney-client privi-
lege.6" The Court has made clear that the Fifth Amendment only
protects against "compelled testimonial self-incrimination, "61 and
cannot be invoked generally as a protection of "personal privacy." 62
As noted by the Court in Fisher v. United States,63 requiring an attor-
ney to produce general information about the attorney-client rela-
tionship "would not 'compel' the [client] to do anything-and
certainly would not compel him to be a 'witness' against himself."'
The Supreme Court has also rejected the argument that forcing
an attorney to disclose confidential information to a grand jury vio-
lates the client's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Unless such a
disclosure creates an "actual conflict ' 65 between the attorney and
client after formal criminal proceedings have been initiated, 66 sev-
eral circuits have made it clear that the Sixth Amendment will not
automatically prohibit grand jury testimony by the attorney. 67 In
exception has been reinterpreted so that it more closely resembles the '[confidential]
communication' exception.").
59. See Goode, supra note 21, at 331 ("Narrower in scope than the last link and legal
advice exceptions, the [confidential] communication exception produces an easy rejec-
tion of most privilege claims. Rarely do courts find that revelation of client identity or
fee information is equivalent to discussing the substance of a confidential
communication.").
60. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401 (1976) ("We cannot cut the Fifth
Amendment completely loose from the moorings of its language, and make it serve as a
general protector of privacy-a word not mentioned in its text and a concept directly
addressed in the Fourth Amendment."); United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 233 n.7
(1975) ("The purpose of the relevant part of the Fifth Amendment is to prevent com-
pelled self-incrimination, not [to protect] private information.").
61. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 399.
62. Id.
63. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
64. Id. at 397.
65. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena for Attorney Representing Criminal Defendant
Reyes-Requena, 913 F.2d 1118, 1130 (5th Cir. 1990) ("Only a showing of actual con-
flict, rather than mere speculative assertions, may overcome the concrete 'obligation of
every person to appear and give his evidence before the grand jury.' " (citing United
States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1973))), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1581 (1991).
66. See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 111 S. Ct. 2204, 2208-09 (1991).
67. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Matter (Special Grand Jury Narcotics) (Under Seal), 926
F.2d 348, 351 (4th Cir. 1991); In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Under Seal), 774 F.2d 624,
627-28 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986); Reyes-Requena, 913 F.2d at
1130; In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (Anderson), 906 F.2d 1485, 1494 (10th Cir. 1990).
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fact, the only time a circuit court has quashed a grand jury subpoena
for fee arrangement information on Sixth Amendment grounds was
in In re Grand Jury Matters,68 an unusual case in which the timing of
the subpoenas suggested harassment as a primary motive.69
3. The Court's Reasoning; Analysis.-
a. Attorney-Client Confidentiality Versus Privilege.-Because the
trial court erroneously based its decision on Rule 1.6 of the Mary-
land Rules of Professional Conduct,70 the Court of Appeals in Crimi-
nal Investigation No. 1/242Q first ruled that the general attorney-
client confidentiality rule was not applicable in judicial proceed-
ings.7' This finding is supported by the introductory statement in
the Rules, which explains that "these Rules are not intended to gov-
ern or affect judicial application of either the attorney-client or work
product privilege."72 The court found that the only applicable doc-
trine was the attorney-client privilege, 3 which in Maryland is guar-
anteed by statute."
Supported by strong federal case law against protecting fee ar-
rangement information,75 the Court of Appeals next ruled that such
information is merely collateral to the fiduciary aspect of the attor-
ney-client relationship.76 The court asserted that payment of a fee
was a "normal and expected incident" of the attorney-client rela-
tionship.77 Thus, the court stated that fee disclosure "should not
chill the attorney-client relationship significantly more than the act
of requiring payment of the fee." 78 Despite the privilege's vital and
historic role in America's legal system, the Court of Appeals de-
clared that the attorney-client privilege is "not absolute."
79
68. 751 F.2d 13 (lst Cir. 1984).
69. See id. at 19.
70. See Criminal Investigation No. 1/242Q, 326 Md. at 4, 602 A.2d at 1221.
71. See id. at 5, 602 A.2d at 1222. Even the dissent agreed that Rule 1.6 does not
apply in the context of a judicial subpoena duces tecum. Id. at 13, 602 A.2d at 1226
(Bell, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 4, 602 A.2d at 1221 (citing the prefatory materials to the Maryland Rules of
Professional Conduct).
73. Id. at 5-6, 602 A.2d at 1222.
74. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 9-108 (1980).
75. See Criminal Investigation No. 1/242Q, 326 Md. at 7, 602 A.2d at 1223 (listing a
string of supporting cases).
76. Id. at 7, 602 A.2d at 1223.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 11, 602 A.2d at 1225.
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Judge Bell, however, insisted that the majoiity's ruling mini-
mized the impact that fee information disclosure would likely have
on the attorney-client relationship,"0 and ignored the primary pur-
pose of the attorney-client privilege, which is to increase communi-
cation between clients and lawyers. 8 ' Judge Bell predicted that
compelling attorneys to testify against their own clients would have
a chilling effect on existing attorney-client relationships, as well as on
potential clients seeking private counsel.8 2
Several commentators have expressed concerns similar to those
held by Judge Bell.8 3 Unfortunately, as one commentator noted,
"the question whether leaving fee arrangements wholly unprotected
would inevitably deter individuals from seeking legal counsel is not
susceptible to empirical testing."8s 4 The commentator argued, how-
ever, that:
[flew targets of grand jury investigations are likely to
forego counsel simply out of fear that the prosecution will
try to ascertain how much they are paying in legal fees.
Even those who conclude that such information could be
used as evidence of tax evasion or unexplained wealth in-
dicative of other criminality are not likely to renounce legal
counsel entirely. They may purchase less expensive legal
advice and, in that sense, be deprived of counsel of their
choice. But the [Sixth Amendment] right to counsel does
not include the right to hire any lawyer at any price without
80. Id. at 20, 602 A.2d at 1229 (Bell, J., dissenting) ("Stress and strain on the attor-
ney-client relationship undoubtedly will result."); see also In re Grand Jury Investigation
(Sturgis), 412 F. Supp. 943, 946 (E.D. Pa. 1976) ("The very presence of the attorney in
the grand jury room, even if only to assert valid privileges, can raise doubts in the cli-
ent's mind as to his lawyer's unfettered devotion to the client's interests and thus impair
or at least impinge upon the attorney-client relationship."). Cf. MD. R. PROF. CONDUCT
1.6 (1992) cmt. ("[T]o the extent a lawyer is required or permitted to disclose a client's
purpose, the client will be inhibited from revealing facts which would enable the lawyer
to counsel against a wrongful course of action. The public is better protected if full and
open communication by the client is encouraged than if it is inhibited.").
81. See Criminal Investigation No. 1/242Q, 326 Md. at 17, 602 A.2d at 1228 (Bell, J.,
dissenting).
82. See id. at 18-19, 602 A.2d at 1228 (Bell,J., dissenting). See also Goode, supra note
21, at 314 ("In analyzing attorney-client privilege issues, therefore, courts must be sensi-
tive not only to the effect of their decisions on the willingness of existing clients to con-
fide in their lawyers but also on the willingness of potential clients to become clients.").
83. See Goode, supra note 21, at 349-55; Capra, supra note 58, at 237; Robert B. Ellis,
Attorney Subpoenas: The Dilemma Over A Preliminary Showing Requirement, U. ILL. L. REv. 137,
139 (1991) (suggesting that attorney subpoenas "undermin[e] a client's confidence that
information in the hands of an attorney is free from the grasp of the prosecutors").




It is perhaps true, as Judge Bell warned, that, "as instances of
fee information being subpoenaed become more and more fre-
quent, counsel will find it necessary to advise potential clients" at
the outset that their fee arrangements might possibly be used
against them in a future state investigation." The dissent's warn-
ing, however, that "this decision may be the beginning of the de-
mise of the attorney-client relationship, '8 7 appears somewhat
overstated.88
b. Baird Distinguished.-The party asserting a privilege natu-
rally has the burden of proving its relevance. 89 In Criminal Investiga-
tion No. 1/242Q, the Court of Appeals found that the attorney's
evidence failed to qualify for any of the "Baird exceptions" to the
general rule of disclosure.90 First, the legal-advice exception was
inapplicable because the attorney's original case had been termi-
nated and the requested information was part of a separate investi-
gation.9 Second, the last-link exception did not apply because the
client's identity was already known, and therefore, disclosure would
not supply the " 'last link' leading to indictment."92 Finally, the
court explained that the fee payment was a "nonassertive act which
was not intended to communicate information" 93 and disclosed
nothing about the advice sought, thus failing to qualify for the confi-
dential-communications exception. 94 The fact that the fee informa-
tion may be incriminating to the client was declared irrelevant by
the Maryland court.95 Moreover, finding that none of the three
traditional Baird exceptions applied to this case, the court lacked the
opportunity to decide "which, if any, of the identified 'exceptions'
[it] should adopt" in more questionable circumstances.96
85. Id. See also Tornay v. United States, 840 F.2d 1424, 1429 (9th Cir. 1988).
86. Criminal Investigation No. 1/242Q, 326 Md. at 19-20, 602 A.2d at 1229 (Bell, J.,
dissenting).
87. Id. at 23, 602 A.2d at 1231 (Bell, J., dissenting).
88. See Goode, supra note 21, at 355 ("Requiring lawyers to disclose [fee] informa-
tion is not likely to deter many potential clients from seeking legal advice ....").
89. See In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F.2d 447, 454 (6th Cir. 1983)
("[T]he burden of establishing the existence of the privilege rests with the person assert-
ing the privilege .. "), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1246 (1984).
90. See Criminal Investigation No. 1/242Q, 326 Md. at 10, 602 A.2d at 1224.
91. Id. at 8, 602 A.2d at 1223.
92. Id. at 9, 602 A.2d at 1223.






4. Conclusion.-The Criminal Investigation No. 1/242Q court
adopted the position on fee information held by nearly every federal
circuit today-that absent extraordinary circumstances, attorneys
can be compelled to reveal such information, even if the informa-
tion is incriminating to their clients. Unfortunately, this case did not
offer the Court of Appeals an opportunity to clarify how Maryland
courts should apply the traditional "Baird exceptions" to the general
rule of disclosure. In dissent, Judge Bell warned that the majority's
ruling ignored the purpose of the attorney-client privilege, namely,
to enable accused persons to confide in a lawyer of their choice with-
out fear that confidential and potentially incriminating disclosures
would be subsequently used against them. The majority rejected
such arguments, however, and upheld the right of grand juries in
Maryland to subpoena information about attorneys' fee
arrangements.
M. TIMOTHY DOLE
B. The Exigent Circumstances Doctrine in Maryland: Adherence to a
More Stringent Standard
In McMillian v. State,97 the Court of Appeals considered the ad-
missibility of evidence seized during a consent search preceded by a
warrantless entry.98 In finding that exigent circumstances did not
justify the search,99 the Court of Appeals reaffirmed that a warrant-
less search cannot be justified by the threatened destruction of evi-
dence unless police know that seizable evidence is present and
reasonably believe that destruction of the evidence is imminent.'00
The court also concluded that evidence seized during consent
searches that are preceded by illegal police conduct will not be ad-
mitted unless two distinct hurdles are cleared.' 0 ' A trial court must
not only decide whether the consent was voluntary under the total-
ity of the circumstances, 0 2 but also whether the consent " 'was suffi-
ciently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful
invasion.' "103 Evidence that fails this second test will be inadmissi-
97. 325 Md. 272, 600 A.2d 430 (1992).
98. See id. at 275, 600 A.2d at 431.
99. Id. at 284, 600 A.2d at 436.
100. See id. at 282-84, 600 A.2d at 435-36.
101. See id. at 288-89, 600 A.2d at 438.
102. Id. at 288, 600 A.2d at 438.
103. Id. at 288-89, 600 A.2d at 438 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
486 (1963)).
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ble as "fruit of the poisonous tree." ' 4 Although the application of
this doctrine to consent searches may provide some criminal de-
fendants with an opportunity to argue that evidence should be sup-
pressed, the impact of the court's two-prong test will depend on the
willingness of judges to conclude that a voluntary consent was
tainted by police misconduct-a ruling that many judges may be re-
luctant to make.105
1. The Case.-Robert McMillian was the manager of the Foxes
and Vixens Club, a "private social club" in Baltimore.10 6 After hear-
ing from a "reliable source" that someone at the Club was selling
drugs, police officerJames Rood began covert surveillance.1 °7 Dur-
ing the next several hours Officer Rood observed twenty or thirty
suspected drug transactions. 108 Rood also observed McMillian di-
recting people to the door of the Club.' 0 9 Fellow police officers ar-
rested three individuals seen leaving the Club, two of whom were in
104. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486 (explaining that a defendant's response to federal
agents, who had entered his home without probable cause and arrested him, was "not
sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion"). See
generally Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939) (noting that once an illegal
search is established "the trial judge must give opportunity, however closely confined, to
the accused to prove that a substantial portion of the case against him was afruit of the
poisonous tree" (emphasis added)).
105. The Court of Special Appeals declared that "[t]o conclude that a consent is vol-
untary, but then to find that it is tainted due to illegal police conduct and therefore
invalid, seems to us to be incongruous." McMillian v. State, 85 Md. App. 367, 383, 584
A.2d 88, 96 (1991), rev'd, 325 Md. 272, 600 A.2d 430 (1992).
106. McMillian, 325 Md. at 275, 600 A.2d at 431-32. At the suppression hearing,
Officer Rood described the Club as a "social club that sells liquor" without a liquor
license. Id. at 275 n. 1, 600 A.2d at 432 n. 1. He also explained that a person need not be
a member to enter, and that McMillian was not acquainted with many of the people who
came to the Club. Id. at 275-76 n.l, 600 A.2d at 432 n.1.
The McMillian court assumed that the Club was private. It could be argued, how-
ever, that the Club was open to the public, and therefore the entry was not a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. In Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463
(1985), undercover police officers entered a bookstore and purchased obscene
magazines. Id. at 465. The Supreme Court held that the officers' act of "entering the
bookstore and examining the wares that were intentionally exposed to all who frequent
the business did not infringe upon a legitimate expectation of privacy and hence did not
constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 469. See also
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("What a person knowingly exposes to
the public .. .is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.").
107. McMillian, 325 Md. at 276, 600 A.2d at 432. Officer Rood observed the Club from a
construction trailer 50 to 60feet away, and maintained radio contact with other officers who were not
within sight of the Club. Id.
108. Id. Bypassers would hand money to someone just inside the door of the Club
and receive a small object in exchange. Id.
109. Id. at 277, 600 A.2d at 432.
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possession of cocaine.11 0
As the surveillance continued, the officers discussed what their
next step should be. Officer Rood was concerned that both the
dealers and the drugs would be gone before the police could obtain
a search warrant."' At approximately 5:50 p.m., Rood ended his
surveillance and returned to the police station to meet with other
officers involved in the investigation." 2 The officers decided that
they would enter the Club without a warrant and request consent to
search." t 3 If consent was not forthcoming, the police planned to
"secure" the premises and detain those inside while they sought a
warrant' 4 -a process they estimated would take between three and
five hours." 5
At 7:05 p.m., police entered the Club against McMillian's objec-
tion," 6 and twenty to twenty-five people were frisked for weap-
ons. '17 After a brief discussion with Officer Rood, McMillian signed
a form consenting to a search of the Club."' During his conversa-
tion with McMillian, Rood described what he had seen outside and
told McMillian that he was suspected of involvement with drug traf-
ficking. "' Rood also informed McMillian of his plan to secure the
premises if McMillian did not consent, and explained that a judge
110. Id. at 276-77, 600 A.2d at 432.
111. Id. at 277-78, 600 A.2d at 433.
112. Id. at 278, 600 A.2d at 433.
113. Id.
114. Id. Absent consent, the police could lawfully secure the Club in anticipation of a
warrant only under exigent circumstances. See Spiering v. State, 58 Md. App. 1, 10, 472
A.2d 83, 88 (1984). In Spiering, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that evidence
seized after police "impounded" the premises would not be admitted unless the State
was able to "remove the taint of the illegal entry by establishing either consent or some
exigent circumstances that will authorize the intrusion." Id. at 10, 472 A.2d at 88. Thus,
in the absence of either exigent circumstances or consent, the police officers in McMil-
lian could not lawfully remain in the Club while they sought a warrant. By threatening to
do so, they threatened McMillian with a false claim of lawful authority, and such claims
have been held to be powerful evidence that consent was coerced. See Bumpers v. North
Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-50 (1968) (finding that a police officer's claimed authority
under a warrant to search a home is colorably lawful coercion, and consequently, incon-
sistent with consent).
115. See Brief of Respondent/Cross-Petitioner at 24-25, McMillian (No. 13).
116. McMillian, 325 Md. at 278, 600 A.2d at 433. An officer entered the Club by
attempting to slip in behind a patron. Id. The door was opened by McMillian, who
began yelling "police" as he tried to shut the door and bar the officer's entry. Id.
117. Id. at 279, 600 A.2d at 433.
118. Id. The form stated that McMillian was aware of his right to refuse, and that





"might or might not" grant a search warrant. 120
After the search of the Club produced fifty-nine glassine bags of
cocaine, 12' McMillian and two other men were arrested. 22 The trial
judge denied McMillian's motion to suppress the cocaine.123 A jury
subsequently convicted him of conspiring to distribute cocaine, as
well as maintaining a building as a common nuisance. 124 The Court
of Special Appeals affirmed the convictions, 2 5 and the Court of Ap-
peals granted certiorari to consider whether the evidence should
have been suppressed.' 26
2. Legal Background.-
a. The Threatened Destruction of Evidence.--(1) Supreme Court Pre-
cedent.-The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
requires that searches and seizures be reasonable. 27 It is often said
that searches conducted without a warrant are unreasonable per se,
"subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions."' 128 These exceptions include those embodied in the
exigent circumstances doctrine, which serves as an umbrella for sev-
eral emergency situations. 129 While the Supreme Court has long
recognized that the threatened destruction of evidence may be one
120. Id.
121. Id. at 279, 600 A.2d at 433.
122. Id. at 280, 600 A.2d at 434.
123. See id. at 279-80, 600 A.2d at 434. The trial judge concluded that the warrantless
entry was justified by exigent circumstances and that McMillian had voluntarily con-
sented to the search. See id.
124. Id. at 280, 600 A.2d at 434.
125. See McMillian v. State, 85 Md. App. 367, 584 A.2d 88 (1991).
126. See McMillian, 325 Md. at 275, 600 A.2d at 431. McMillian also argued that the
evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, but the Court of Appeals disagreed.
See id. at 289, 293, 600 A.2d at 438, 440. The court noted that the proper standard for
review was "'whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the pros-
ecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Id. at 289-90, 600 A.2d at 438-39 (quoting Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).
127. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV. "The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated ..... Id.
128. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). One commentator has sug-
gested, however, that the exceptions are now so numerous that they threaten to swallow
the rule. See Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the
Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473, 500-03 (1991).
129. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1942) (holding that a firefighter's
warrantless entry into a burning building was justified by exigent circumstances).
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of those emergencies, 3 ° the circumstances that justify this particu-
lar exception have never been well delineated. 3 1
In People v. Blasius, 1 2 the Supreme Court of Michigan observed
that the United States Supreme Court has "suggested four varying
indicia of exigent circumstances: (1) the threatened destruction or
removal of evidence, (2) the imminent threat of destruction of evi-
dence, (3) evidence in the process of destruction, and (4) a 'realistic
expectation' that evidence might be destroyed."'3 3 In the five deci-
sions in which the United States Supreme Court has touched upon
the issue most directly,' 3 4 only one--Schmerber v. California '3 1 -up-
held a warrantless search based on the threatened destruction of ev-
idence.1 3 6 But the facts of Schmerber were unique: the evidence at
issue was a driver's blood alcohol content, and the evidence was cer-
tain to dissipate unless the police took action.13 7
(2) Conflict Among the Federal Courts.-The Supreme Court's
lack of guidance on the scope of the exigent circumstances excep-
tion has resulted in a remarkable degree of disarray, 3 8 causing the
130. The Supreme Court recognized that the threatened destruction of evidence may
constitute exigent circumstances in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
131. See People v. Blasius, 459 N.W.2d 906, 910 (Mich. 1990) ("[T]he precise con-
tours of the exigent circumstances exception remain hazy.").
132. 459 N.W.2d 906 (Mich. 1990).
133. Id. at 912. In making that observation, the Michigan Supreme Court examined,
inter alia: Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970) ("The goods ultimately seized were
not in the process of destruction . . . [n]or were they about to be removed from the
jurisdiction."); United States v.Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52 (1951) ("There was no question
of ... imminent destruction, removal, or concealment of the property intended to be
seized."); MacDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948) ("Nor was the property
in the process of destruction .. "); and Johnson, 333 U.S. at 115 ("No evidence or
contraband was threatened with removal or destruction .. ").
While Vale is the Supreme Court's most frequently referenced decision on this issue,
lower courts have declined to take its pivotal language at face value. See 2 WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 6.5(b), at 656-58 (2d ed. 1987) (discussing Vale, and noting
that lower courts are inclined to state the exception in broader terms).
134. See Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
(1966); United States v.Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S.
451 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1947).
135. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
136. See id. at 770-71.
137. See id. The Schmerber Court warned that "[i]t bears repeating, however, that we
reach this judgment only on the facts of the present record." Id. at 772.
138. See People v. Blasius, 459 N.W.2d 906, 912-13 (Mich. 1990) (noting confusion
surrounding the exigent circumstances doctrine). See also Barbara Salken, Balancing Exi-
gency and Privacy in Warrantless Searches to Prevent Destruction of Evidence: The Need for a Rule,
39 HASTINGS L.J. 283, 300-02 (1988).
Professor Salken suggested that the federal circuit courts differ sharply on two
points. "The first is the nature of the threat, whether it is genuine and imminent or
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ground rules of the war on drugs-and the Fourth Amendment
rights of defendants-to vary widely among the federal circuits t3 9
The circuits differ in both the language they use, and the outcomes
they reach in unreasonable search cases. 140  Professor Barbara
Salken has suggested that there is a deeper difference between the
circuits-simply put, some courts are more willing than others to
scrutinize police conduct. 4 '
The federal circuits do agree that exigent circumstances will not
be found unless police have probable cause to believe that seizable
evidence is present."4 2 Beyond this point lies semantic chaos. Most
decisions hold that the circumstances must also support a reason-
able belief that the evidence "may be destroyed,"'143 "will be de-
stroyed," 144 or "would probably be destroyed"' 145 before a warrant
can be obtained. The Sixth and D.C. Circuits have held that there
must be an "objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the de-
struction of the evidence is imminent." 146 Other decisions speak of
a "compelling necessity for immediate action,'' 4 7 or require the
state to show that the entry was "necessary" to prevent the destruc-
tion of evidence. 14' The Fourth Circuit has candidly observed that
merely speculative. The second is whether the threat, although genuine, was foresee-
able or otherwise avoidable." Id. Although Professor Salken's analysis is insightful,
some circuits have changed their position dramatically since her article was published.
Compare United States v. Timberlake, 896 F.2d 592 (D.C. Cir. 1990) with United States v.
Johnson, 561 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977) and Salken, supra, at
311-12 (discussing the exigent circumstances doctrine in the D.C. Circuit).
139. See Salken, supra note 138, at 300-20 (exploring the circuit courts' views of de-
struction of evidence as justification for warrantless searches).
140. See id.
141. See id. at 310-11 (noting that some decisions accept police allegations of emer-
gency circumstances without critical evaluation of the factual basis for the claims, and
without considering whether the police might have avoided the need for a warrantless
entry). See generally Lyle Denniston, Restrictions on Use of Force in DWI Case Upheld, THE
SUN (Baltimore), Dec. 3, 1991, at 1OA ("A brief, unexplained Supreme Court order yes-
terday made it appear that police now have less authority than they have had for a quar-
ter-century to use force to get blood samples from drunken-driving suspects.");
Hammer v. Gross, 932 F.2d 842 (9th Cir.) (holding that a blood test taken under Schmer-
ber could lead to civil liability under § 1983 if the force used by police to extract the
blood was not objectively reasonable), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 582 (1991).
142. See, e.g., United States v. Halliman, 923 F.2d 873, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United
States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262, 268 (3d Cir. 1973).
143. United States v. Young, 909 F.2d 442, 446 (11 th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Rivera, 825 F.2d 152, 156 (7th Cir. 1987).
144. Rubin, 474 F.2d at 268.
145. United States v. Radka, 904 F.2d 357, 362 (6th Cir. 1990).
146. Halliman, 923 F.2d at 878 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. Sangineto-Miranda,
859 F.2d 1501, 1512 (6th Cir. 1988).
147. United States v. Almonte, 952 F.2d 20, 22 (1st Cir. 1991).
148. See, e.g., United States v. Lindsey, 877 F.2d 777, 780-81 (9th Cir. 1989).
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"there is no precise formula, since emergency circumstances will
vary from case to case and the inherent necessities of the situation
must be scrutinized."'' 49
The Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Rivera,'50 how-
ever, demonstrates that the difference between the circuits is more
than mere semantics. Rivera, a suspected drug courier, was seen
leaving a hotel room carrying a bag that was later proved to contain
cocaine. 151 After Rivera was arrested, federal agents returned to the
room, where they heard radio or television noises from within.' 5 2
The agents entered without a warrant and seized three suitcases.'
The room was otherwise empty and unoccupied.' 5 4 The Seventh
Circuit concluded that "it was not unreasonable [for agents] to fear
that a fourth or fifth conspirator might be inside the room, ready to
destroy the evidence if his or her compatriots did not return as
planned."' 55 The court further declared that the officers "reason-
ably feared [the] imminent destruction of the evidence."' t5 6 Given
that federal agents had nothing more than a mere suspicion that
someone might be in the room, those statements seem dubious, and
other circuits have reached a different result under similar
circumstances. 5
7
Despite the differences in the language used and outcomes
reached, there is a second point on which several of the federal cir-
cuits agree-the test for exigent circumstances is objective.'58
These circuits do not consider what the police officers actually be-
lieved, but rather what an experienced officer would have believed
under the same or similar circumstances. 59
149. United States v. Reed, 935 F.2d 641, 642 (4th Cir. 1991).
150. 825 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1987).





156. Id. at 156-57.
157. In United States v. Lynch, 934 F.2d 1226 (11th Cir. 1991), the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that "[t]he police in this case simply assumed that Lynch and Digaralomo
would grow suspicious if they did not hear from their coconspirators. Such speculation,
without any factual support, will not suffice to overcome the warrant requirement." Id.
at 1233. See also United States v. Timberlake, 896 F.2d 592, 596-97 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(holding that exigent circumstances did not exist when an undercover police officer
thought he smelled PCP coming from an apartment, and officers knew that people were
in the apartment because the door was slightly ajar).
158. See Salken, supra note 138, at 303 (noting that the First, Third, and Fourth Cir-
cuits apply an objective test).




(3) Maryland Precedent.-In Stackhouse v. State, 6 ' the Court of
Appeals adopted a strict approach to exigent circumstances. There,
police officers entered the home of James Stackhouse armed with
two warrants for his arrest, and found him hiding in the attic.1 6 '
Immediately following the arrest, police searched the entire attic
and recovered a shotgun barrel.' 62 In appealing his convictions for
armed robbery and burglary, 163 Stackhouse argued that the warrant-
less search was not justified by exigent circumstances. 64 The State
responded by arguing that exigent circumstances did exist because
police officers feared that Stackhouse's foster sister would destroy
any evidence in the house before they could return with a
warrant.
65
In reversing the convictions,' 6 6 the Court of Appeals stressed
that "[t]he meaning of exigency implies urgency, immediacy, and
compelling need."' 67 According to Stackhouse, the threatened de-
struction of evidence will not constitute exigent circumstances un-
less police officers know that seizable evidence is present, and
reasonably believe that a strong likelihood exists that destruction of
the evidence is imminent.' 68 The court held that the State had
failed on both grounds.' 69 In reaching that conclusion, the court's
reasoning suggested that the Maryland test is not an objective one-
the court focused on what the officers actually believed at the time of
their entry. '
70
160. 298 Md. 203, 468 A.2d 333 (1983).
161. Id. at 207-08, 468 A.2d at 336.
162. Id. at 208, 468 A.2d at 336.
163. Id. at 206, 468 A.2d at 335.
164. See id. at 218-19, 468 A.2d at 341. Stackhouse also argued that the scope of the
search went beyond that permitted as a search incident to arrest, and the Court of Ap-
peals agreed. Id. at 217-18, 468 A.2d at 341.
165. See id. at 218-19, 468 A.2d at 341-42. The woman had previously lied to the
arresting officers about Stackhouse's identity and his presence in the house. Id. at 219,
468 A.2d at 341-42.
166. Id. at 222, 468 A.2d at 343.
167. Id. at 212, 468 A.2d at 338.
168. See id. at 213-14, 468 A.2d at 339.
169. See id. at 219-21, 468 A.2d at 341-43.
170. See id. at 220-21, 468 A.2d at 342-43. The State presented no evidence that the
officers actually feared the destruction of evidence at the time the search was conducted.
Id.
The view that the Stackhouse test is subjective has strong support in Buie v. State,
320 Md. 696, 580 A.2d 167 (1990). The issue in Buie was whether a "protective sweep"
of Buie's basement was justified because officers had a "reasonable, articulable suspi-
cion" that a man wanted for armed robbery was hiding there. Id. at 699, 580 A.2d at
169. Although the Court of Appeals was divided in Buie, both the plurality and dissent-
ing opinions support the view that the test in Stackhouse is subjective. Although a three-
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In Shuman v. State,"" however, the Court of Special Appeals ex-
panded upon Stackhouse. Police responding to a domestic argument
were told that Shuman had hidden a revolver in a guitar case, which
the police subsequently searched. 7 2 Although the presence of a re-
volver and the potential for physical violence may have constituted
exigent circumstances, 17 3 the Court of Special Appeals concluded
that any exigency had ceased once Shuman had been detained and
police discovered that the guitar case was locked. 17  Under these
circumstances, the court concluded that there was no immediate
danger, and the guitar case could not be searched without a
warrant. 175
b. Consent Searches Following Illegal Police Conduct.-
(1) Generally.-The list of established exceptions to the war-
rant requirement also includes searches conducted pursuant to valid
consent.176 In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,177 the Supreme Court held
that the appropriate test is whether the consent "was in fact volunta-
rily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or im-
plied." 17 1 Whether or not consent was voluntary is a "question of
fact" 179 to be determined from "the totality of the circum-
stances."'8 0 Both state and federal courts have identified numerous
factors relevant to that determination,18 including prior illegal con-
judge plurality held that the test in Buie was objective, id at 703, 580 A.2d at 170, the
plurality opinion noted that Stackhouse supported the opposite view. Id. at 701, 580 A.2d
at 169. The three dissenting judges expressed strong discomfort with the plurality's
objective test. Id. at 706, 580 A.2d at 172 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
171. 83 Md. App 319, 574 A.2d 345 (1989).
172. See id. at 321-22, 574 A.2d at 346-47.
173. See id. at 324, 574 A.2d at 348.
174. Id. at 323-24, 574 A.2d at 347-48.
175. Id. at 324-25, 574 A.2d at 348.
176. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
177. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
178. Id. at 248-49. In so holding, the Court rejected the view that consent to a search
was a "waiver" of constitutional rights, and therefore subject to the level of protection
that the Court provided for confessions under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 235-45.
179. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227.
180. Id. at 249.
181. In Schneckloth, the Supreme Court suggested that "evidence of minimal school-
ing, low intelligence, and the lack of any effective warnings to a person of his rights"
should be included within the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 248. One commenta-
tor has pointed out that Maryland decisions reviewing consent searches have identified
not only factors tending to show coercion-intimidation, or the invalid claim of lawful
authority by police-but also factors tending to show voluntariness. This includes coop-
eration with the police, or the defendant's belief that incriminating evidence would not
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duct by the police.'l 2
In cases where a consent search is preceded by police miscon-
duct, lower courts have disagreed about the test to be applied.183
The conflict has centered on the application of the Supreme Court's
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, which holds that evidence
derived indirectly from a constitutional violation should be sup-
pressed unless that evidence has been obtained by means "suffi-
ciently distinguishable [from the violation] to be purged of the
primary taint."' 181 In the case of consent searches preceded by po-
lice misconduct, the question to consider is whether consent "was
sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the un-
lawful invasion," 185 or whether police obtained the consent by ex-
ploiting their preceding illegal acts. 186
In Brown v. Illinois,'87 the Supreme Court identified three fac-
tors relevant to that analysis: (1) the "temporal proximity" of the
illegality and the evidence; (2) the presence of intervening circum-
stances; and (3) the "purpose and flagrancy of the official miscon-
duct."' 8 Although the federal circuits have routinely applied the
Brown factors to consent searches preceded by police misconduct,' 89
they have differed somewhat in how they conduct their analysis.
Some decisions suggest that there is a single test applicable, and the
factors enumerated in Brown are considered in the course of decid-
ing whether the consent was voluntary under the circumstances.' 90
In his influential treatise on search and seizure, however, Professor
Wayne Lafave argued that there are two distinct tests, each of which
is handled differently.' 9 ' Courts following Lafave's approach must
be found. See David Carey, Consent Searches and Voluntariness: An Analysis of Maryland Cases,
19.2 LAw F. 27 (1990).
182. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 507-08 (1983) (holding that illegally detaining
a suspect rendered a subsequent search of his luggage improper). See also State v. Wil-
son, 279 Md. 189, 202-04, 367 A.2d 1223, 1231-32 (1977).
183. See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 133, § 8.2(d), at 189-90.
184. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963).
185. Id. at 486.
186. See id. at 488.
187. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
188, Id. at 603-04.
189. See United States v. Pierre, 932 F.2d 377, 390-91 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Campbell, 920 F.2d 793, 797-98 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Montilla, 928 F.2d
583, 586-87 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. McCraw, 920 F.2d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Timberlake, 896 F.2d 592, 595 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States v.
George, 883 F.2d 1407, 1415-16 (9th Cir. 1989).
190. See, e.g., United States v. Bradley, 922 F.2d 1290, 1296 (6th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Buchanan, 904 F.2d 349, 355-56 (6th Cir. 1990).
191. See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 133, § 8.2(d), at 189-91.
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consider separately whether the consent was voluntary, and whether
the consent was untainted by police misconduct. 9 2 The evidence
will not be admitted unless it clears both hurdles.'
(2) Maryland Precedent.-The Court of Appeals has long held
that a consent to search may be valid despite police misconduct.' 94
In Armwood v. State, ' 95 the Court of Appeals observed that it is "well-
established" in Maryland that evidence obtained following an illegal
arrest may still be admissible, provided that the accused "voluntarily
consented to the search."' 96 Armwood, however, was decided more
than a decade before the Supreme Court's rulings in either
Schneckloth or Brown, and neither the Court of Appeals nor the Court
of Special Appeals had considered how the factors enumerated in
Brown should be applied when an alleged consent to search was pre-
ceded by police misconduct. 1
9 7
3. The Court's Reasoning; Analysis.-In denying McMillian's mo-
tion to suppress the cocaine seized during the search of the Club,
the trial judge found: (1) the warrantless entry was justified by exi-
gent circumstances, and (2) McMillian had voluntarily consented to
the search.' 9 ' Although the Court of Special Appeals concluded
that the warrantless entry was illegal,' 99 the intermediate appellate
court nonetheless held that McMillian's consent was voluntary
under the totality of the circumstances. 20 0 The Court of Appeals
granted certiorari to consider both issues.2 0 '
a. Exigent Circumstances.-After carefully scrutinizing the con-
duct of the police, the Court of Appeals reached three conclusions.
First, the court reasoned that no exigent circumstances could have
192. See United States v. George, 883 F.2d 1407, 1415-16 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding
that whether consent was voluntarily given was "only a threshold requirement").
193. Id. at 1416.
194. See, e.g., Payne v. State, 207 Md. 51, 54, 113 A.2d 93, 94 (1955) (explaining that
an illegal arrest does not necessarily mean that the subsequent search was unlawful).
195. 229 Md. 565, 185 A.2d 357 (1963).
196. Id. at 569, 185 A.2d at 358.
197. Prior to McMillian, the only decision by the Court of Appeals in which the Brown
test had been applied was Ferguson v. State, 301 Md. 542, 483 A.2d 1255 (1984). The
issue in Ferguson, however, was whether an extrajudicial identification was tainted by an
illegal arrest. Id. at 549, 483 A.2d at 1258.
198. See McMilian, 325 Md. at 279-80, 600 A.2d at 434.
199. See McMillian v. State, 85 Md. App. 367, 387, 584 A.2d 88, 98, rev'd, 325 Md.
272, 600 A.2d 430 (1992).
200. See id. at 388, 584 A.2d at 98.
201. See McMillian, 325 Md. at 280, 600 A.2d at 434.
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existed prior to the station house meeting."' Had the police be-
lieved that the imminent destruction of the evidence was likely, the
officer in charge would not have convened the stationhouse meet-
ing, effectively removing all officers from the surveillance operation
at the Club. Second, the court noted that any exigencies that might
have existed prior to the meeting had lapsed during the hour that
police were gone from the scene.213 Finally, because the police had
failed to maintain their surveillance and did not resume their obser-
vations before entering the Club, the court concluded that the po-
lice could not have known at the time of entry that there was
seizable evidence inside. 20 4 This last conclusion leaves the Court of
Appeals as one of the few courts-perhaps the only court-that re-
quires more than probable cause before police may invoke the exi-
gent circumstances exception.2 °5 Whether or not McMillian's
holding is "prudent" or "reasonable" is ultimately a question of
how one balances the public need for effective law enforcement and
the privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment.
McMillian presented the Court of Appeals with an opportunity
to limit or modify Stackhouse, and the State strongly urged the court
to do so.20 6 The State proposed an objective test that would be sat-
isfied if officers had probable cause to believe (1) that seizable evi-
dence was present, and (2) that the evidence would be destroyed if
they did not enter the premises immediately.20 7 The court, how-
ever, reaffirmed Stackhouse and emphasized once again that in Mary-
land the exigent circumstances doctrine requires an " 'immediate,
urgent, and compelling need for police action.' "208
202. See id. at 283, 600 A.2d at 435.
203. See id. at 283-84, 600 A.2d at 435-36. The Fourth Circuit reached a similar con-
clusion in United States v. Campbell, 945 F.2d 713, 715 (4th Cir. 1991) (concluding that
the fact that police delayed one hour before making their entry did not support a finding
of exigent circumstances).
204. See McMillian, 325 Md. at 283-84, 600 A.2d at 435-36. The court's conclusion
was strengthened by Officer Rood's observation of a half-hour suspension in the sus-
pected drug trafficking activity, during which police surmised that the supply of drugs
had run out. Brief of Respondent/Cross Petitioner at 24, McMillian (No. 13). Had the
police officers entered the Club just moments after the transactions resumed, the Court
of Appeals might well have agreed that exigent circumstances existed.
205. Neither McMillian nor Stackhouse expressly stated that actual knowledge is re-
quired. Thus, it remains to be seen whether something less than actual knowledge, but
more than probable cause, would suffice to satisfy the court.
206. See Brief of Respondent/Cross Petitioner at 25-29, McMillian (No. 13).
207. Id. at 28. In Maryland, the probable cause standard is satisfied by showing that a
"fair probability" of criminal activity existed. See Malcolm v. State, 314 Md. 221, 233,
550 A.2d 670, 676 (1988).
208. McMillian, 325 Md. at 283, 600 A.2d at 435 (quoting Stackhouse v. State, 298
Md. 203, 216, 468 A.2d 333, 340 (1983)).
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Whether the Stackhouse test is objective or subjective remains
uncertain. McMillian's analysis of the police officer's conduct makes
it clear that the Court of Appeals would have found the search ille-
gal under either approach. 20 9 There are important reasons, how-
ever, why a subjective test may be more appropriate. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly stressed that the purpose of the exclusionary
rule is the deterrence of "lawless conduct" by police officers.21
That purpose-and the privacy interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment-would be better served by a subjective test. A test
based on what the officers actually believed would compel them to
engage in self-scrutiny before they act, while insuring that an entry
"executed in the most cynical bad faith" would not be permitted.2 '
b. Consent Searches.-In concluding that McMillian's consent
was "as solid as the Rock of Gibralter, 2 1 2 the Court of Special Ap-
peals rejected Professor Lafave's view that the Brown attenuation-of-
the-taint analysis should be conducted separately from the test for
voluntary consent.21 3 Instead, the intermediate appellate court held
that the only issue was whether the consent was voluntary under the
circumstances.2 14 The factors enumerated in Brown, the court con-
cluded, should be considered in making that determination. 215
The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that the Court of
Special Appeals had "improperly usurped the trial court's role of
weighing the effect that the illegal police entry of the Club had on
McMillian's consent to the search.- 2 1 6 After recognizing that "the
209. The testimony indicated that officers did believe that exigent circumstances ex-
isted, id. at 277-78, 600 A.2d at 432-33, but the court concluded that the officers' beliefs
were not reasonable under the circumstances. Id. at 283-84, 600 A.2d at 435-36.
210. See, e.g., Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599 (1975) (explaining that the purpose
of the exclusionary rule is to deter unconstitutional searches). In United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897 (1984), the Court suggested that deterrence was the only rationale underly-
ing the exclusionary rule. Id. at 918-21.
211. See Buie v. State, 320 Md. 696, 706, 580 A.2d 167, 172 (1990) (Atkins,J., dissent-
ing). A subjective test also ensures that the prosecution will not attempt to manufacture
exigent circumstances as an after-the-fact excuse, which appears to be precisely what
happened in Stackhouse. There, the testimony of the police officer who conducted the
search made no mention of the possibility that evidence might be destroyed. Stackhouse
v. State, 298 Md. 203, 220-21, 468 A.2d 333, 342-43 (1983). The Court of Appeals
concluded that the officer appeared to have acted solely on the belief that evidence of
crime might be found in the attic. Id.
212. McMillian v. State, 85 Md. App. 367, 388, 584 A.2d 88, 99 (1991), rev'd, 325 Md.
272, 600 A.2d 430 (1992).
213. See id. at 383, 584 A.2d at 96.
214. Id. at 385-86, 584 A.2d at 96-97.
215. See id.
216. McMillian, 325 Md. at 288, 600 A.2d at 438.
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trial court's finding of fact is not to be set aside unless clearly erro-
neous,"217 the Court of Appeals pointed out that the trial judge had
mistakenly concluded that the entry of the Club was legal, and
therefore had failed to weigh the illegal entry in reaching his conclu-
sion that the consent was voluntary.2 18
The adoption of Professor Lafave's two-prong test may make a
small but important difference to some criminal defendants. A trial
court's determination that consent was voluntary is treated as a
question of fact, and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is
clearly erroneous. 2 9 Although the Court of Appeals has yet to con-
sider the issue,12 0 it is unlikely that a trial judge's application of the
Brown taint analysis will be given the same weight on appellate re-
view. As the court suggested in Riddick v. State:22 1
[W]hen we determine the application of a constitutional
right... we defer to the trial judge with respect to his find-
ings of facts which are disputed, if his findings are not
clearly erroneous. But we do not defer to him with respect
to his constitutionally based conclusions reached on those
facts. Rather, we make our own independent constitutional
appraisal. 22
Whether McMillian will alter a trial judge's decision to deny a mo-
tion to suppress is questionable. But by separating the Brown analy-
sis from the question of voluntariness, the court may have shifted a
small amount of power from the trial courts to appellate courts, and
given some defendants a new argument to raise on appeal.
The success of that argument will ultimately depend on the will-
ingness of appellate judges to find that an otherwise voluntary con-
sent was tainted by unlawful police conduct.22 3 Where the federal
217. Id. at 285, 600 A.2d at 436.
218. Id. at 288, 600 A.2d at 438.
219. Id. at 285, 600 A.2d at 436. See also Gamble v. State, 318 Md. 120, 128-29, 567
A.2d 95, 99-100 (1989) (holding that the trial court was not clearly erroneous in its
factual determination).
220. The McMillian court should have conducted the Brown taint analysis itself, rather
than remanding that issue to the trial judge. In Brown, the Supreme Court declined to
remand the case for further factual findings, noting instead that "[allthough the Illinois
courts failed to undertake the inquiry mandated by Wong Sun . . . the trial resulted in a
record of amply sufficient detail and depth from which the determination may be made."
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 (1975). The same was true of the record in
McMillian.
221. 319 Md. 180, 571 A.2d 1239 (1990).
222. Id. at 201-02, 571 A.2d at 1249.
223. The decision of the Court of Special Appeals suggests that some of its members
will be extremely reluctant to reach such conclusions. See McMillian v. State, 85 Md.
App. 367, 383, 584 A.2d 88, 96 (1991) ("To conclude that a consent is voluntary, but
19931
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 52:648
circuits have reached that conclusion, most of the cases involved a
consent search preceded by an illegal arrest; 224 a result that is not
surprising. The third and most important of the Brown factors fo-
cuses on the "flagrancy" of the police misconduct,22 5 and the poten-
tial for coercion is seemingly at its greatest when the liberty of a
person is unlawfully restrained.
4. Conclusion.-In McMillian, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed
its unique view of the exigent circumstances doctrine adopted ear-
lier in Stackhouse. The court also held that when a consent to search
is preceded by police misconduct, the evidence seized will not be
admitted unless the trial court concludes that the consent was both
voluntary under the circumstances and untainted by police miscon-
duct. By taking this position, the court maintained its place among
those courts that most closely scrutinize police conduct before per-
mitting an exception to the warrant requirement.226 Whether
McMillian's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence can expect a long life
depends upon the willingness of the Supreme Court to fully address
the scope of the exigent circumstances doctrine and consent
searches.
STEPHEN J. PASKEY
then to find that it is tainted due to illegal police conduct and therefore invalid, seems to
us to be incongruous."), rev'd, 325 Md. 272, 600 A.2d 430 (1992).
224. See United States v. Richardson, 949 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Campbell, 920 F.2d 793 (1 th Cir. 1991); United States v. McGraw, 920 F.2d 224 (4th
Cir. 1990); United States v. George, 883 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1989). Cf. United States v.
Buchanan, 904 F.2d 349 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding that consent was tainted by illegal en-
try); United States v. Pierre, 932 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding the search of a suit-
case illegal).
225. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975).
226. See Ott v. State, 325 Md. 206, 600 A.2d 111 (1992). In Ott, the police department
failed to remove an outstanding warrant from its computer system after the warrant was
served. Id. at 211, 600 A.2d at 113. Ott was later arrested on the basis of that warrant
during a routine investigation, and was found to be in possession of cocaine. Id. at 210,
600 A.2d at 112-13. The Court of Appeals observed that while the arresting officer did
not know that the warrant was no longer valid, and acted in good faith, the Sheriff's
Department did know that the warrant was outdated, and that knowledge could be im-
puted to the officer. See id. at 219, 600 A.2d at 117. The court concluded that because
the State had produced no evidence to show that the department's failure to clear the
warrant from the computer was reasonable, the State had failed to meet its burden
under the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule, and the evidence should have
been suppressed. See id. at 222-23, 600 A.2d at 119.
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V. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A. The Scope of the Maryland Environmental Standing Act
In Medical Waste Associates, Inc. v. Maryland Waste Coalition, Inc.,'
the Court of Appeals held that the Maryland Environmental Stand-
ing Act (MESA) 2 does not relax common-law standing requirements
for an organization seeking judicial review of an administrative
agency decision.3 By comparing the language of the statute with
similar environmental standing statutes in other jurisdictions, the
court found that MESA does not ordinarily grant standing to an or-
ganization requesting a review of agency decision making that
would not otherwise have standing under common-law principles.4
Although the court's holding limits the scope of MESA, the ultimate
result reached by the court is logically consistent with the legislative
purpose of the Act.5 The holding of the case, however, will limit
third-party standing under MESA to those instances in which state
officers or agencies fail either to perform nondiscretionary ministe-
rial duties imposed upon them by law or to enforce environmental
quality standards.6
1. The Case.-On September 8, 1989, the Maryland Depart-
ment of the Environment (DOE) issued air quality control and re-
fuse disposal permits authorizing Medical Waste Associates (MWA)
to construct a medical waste incinerator in Baltimore City.7 The
Maryland Waste Coalition (Coalition), an environmental interest
group, filed two separate actions in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City to request judicial review of the DOE's decision. 8 First, the Co-
alition filed a complaint under section 9-263 of the Environment Ar-
1. 327 Md. 596, 612 A.2d 241 (1992).
2. MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. §§ 1-501 to -508 (1989).
3. See Medical Waste, 327 Md. at 622, 612 A.2d at 254.
4. See id. MESA grants standing to challenge an action established under the statute
to any "person," including "any resident of the State of Maryland, any corporation in-
corporated under the laws of the State of Maryland, or any partnership, organization,
association, or legal entity doing business in the State." MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. § I -
501 (1989) (emphasis added).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 72-73.
6. See MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. § 1-503(b) (1989).
7. Medical Waste, 327 Md. at 598-99, 612 A.2d at 242. After conducting 11 public
hearings on the issuance of several permits, the DOE issued an air quality control permit
and a refuse disposal permit to MWA authorizing construction of a medical waste incin-




ticle,9 calling for the court to vacate the permits on the ground that
their issuance was "unreasonable and not necessary for the protec-
tion of the public health or comfort."' 0 In the second action, the
Coalition argued that the DOE's decision was "an abuse of discre-
tion, clearly erroneous, and lacked substantial evidence"" under
the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act (APA).t 2 The DOE and
MWA filed motions to dismiss both actions, arguing that the court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction under both section 9-263'3 and
the APA. 14 The DOE and MWA also alleged that the Coalition
lacked standing to protest the agency action.1
5
The circuit court dismissed both claims, holding that the issu-
ance of the refuse disposal permit was not an "order" under section
9-263. 16 The circuit court also agreed with the DOE and MWA that
9. MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 9-263 (1987).
10. Medical Waste, 327 Md. at 600, 612 A.2d at 243. Section 9-263 provides:
Any ... person dissatisfied with any order, rule, or regulation of the Secretary
under this subtitle may commence . . .an action in the circuit court for any
county to vacate and set aside the order, rule or regulation on the ground that
the order, rule or regulation is unlawful or unreasonable, or that the order is
not necessary for the protection of the public health or comfort ....
MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 9-263 (1987).
11. See Joint Record Extract of Appellant at E-39, Maryland Waste Coalition, Inc. v.
Maryland Dep't of the Env't, 84 Md. App. 544, 581 A.2d 60 (1990) (No. 89-1829) (argu-
ing that the Department abused its discretion by refusing to grant the Coalition an adju-
dicatory hearing to present evidence regarding the environmental effects of the
operation of the medical waste incinerator).
12. The APA provides in relevant part: "A party who is aggrieved by the final deci-
sion in a contested case is entitled to judicial review of the decision as provided in this
section." MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-215 (1984). This action was an appeal
under the rule that provides for review of "any final action of an administrative agency
by a court where such review is specially authorized by statute ...." MD. R. Bl.
13. Medical Waste, 327 Md. at 600, 612 A.2d at 243. See MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 9-
263 (1987) (providing that judicial review is available only when a "[p]erson [is] dissatis-
fied with any order, rule, or regulation ... [issued] under this subtitle").
14. Medical Waste, 327 Md. at 600-01, 612 A.2d at 243. The APA requires a final
agency decision be a "contested case" in order to entitle a party to judicial review. See
MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 10-215 (1984). MWA and the DOE argued that because
the administrative proceedings were legislative in nature, they were not "contested
cases" authorizing judicial review under the APA. Medical Waste, 327 Md. at 601, 612
A.2d at 243.
15. Medical Waste, 327 Md. at 601, 612 A.2d at 243-44. MWA and the DOE argued
that because the Coalition did not have a property interest "separate and distinct from
that of its members" it lacked standing to challenge the issuance of the permits. Id.
16. See id., 612 A.2d at 244. The Court of Appeals noted that judicial review under
§ 9-263 did not apply to the air quality control permit because it was issued under Subti-
tle 4 of the Environment Article; § 9-263 judicial review is applicable only to orders,
rules or regulations issued under Subtitle 2. The refuse disposal permit was issued




the administrative proceedings were legislative in nature, rather
than "contested cases" authorizing judicial review under the APA., 7
In the alternative, the circuit court held that the Coalition lacked
standing to bring a cause of action under either section 9-263 or the
APA. 18
The Coalition appealed both cases, arguing that the court had
subject matter jurisdiction under both section 9-263 and the APA to
hear the cases, 19 and urging the court to adopt the less stringent
federal position on environmental standing. 20 The Coalition ar-
gued, however, that regardless of which environmental standing po-
sition the court adopted, the Coalition had standing under current
Maryland law to obtain judicial review of the agency decision. 2 1 The
Court of Special Appeals upheld the circuit court's denial ofjudicial
review with respect to both subject matter jurisdiction under section
9-263 and standing under Maryland common law; 22 nevertheless,
the court vacated and remanded the circuit court's judgment for a
determination of whether the Coalition could maintain standing
under MESA.23 The Court of Appeals interceded and granted certi-
orari to settle the issue of whether the Coalition had standing to
challenge the issuance of the permits.24
2. Legal Background.-
a. Federal Environmental Standing.-The 1970s witnessed a spec-
tacular growth in federal environmental regulation. 25 Access to fed-
17. See Medical Waste, 327 Md. at 601, 612 A.2d at 244.
18. See id.
19. Id. at 601-02, 612 A.2d at 244.
20. Id. at 602, 612 A.2d at 244. The Coalition argued that federal courts permit an
environmental group to
seek protection of aesthetic, conservational and recreational interests on behalf
of its members if it can show: "(1) its members would otherwise have standing
to sue in their own right; (2) the interests the organization seeks to protect are
germane to the organization's purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor
the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in a
lawsuit."
Id. at 602 n.3, 612 A.2d at 244 n.3 (quoting Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 608 F. Supp. 440, 445 (D. Md. 1985)).
21. See id. at 602, 612 A.2d at 244.
22. Maryland Waste Coalition, Inc. v. Maryland Dep't of the Env't, 84 Md. App. 544,
554, 556, 581 A.2d 60, 64, 65 (1990), rev'd sub nom. Medical Waste Assocs., Inc. v. Mary-
land Waste Coalition, Inc., 327 Md. 596, 612 A.2d 241 (1992).
23. Id. at 561, 581 A.2d at 68.
24. See Medical Waste, 327 Md. at 604, 612 A.2d at 245.
25. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, LAW, SCIENCE AND
POLICY 1023 (1992) (noting that because of the unprecedented growth of environmental
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eral courts, however, continued to be limited by prudential and
constitutional restrictions on standing. The limitations found in Ar-
ticle III of the United States Constitution provide that a federal
court has jurisdiction only over a "case" or "controversy. "2 6 The
Supreme Court has held that plaintiffs must allege a "personal stake
in the outcome" in order to comply with this provision. 27 Specifi-
cally, federal standards dictate that plaintiffs must show that the
challenged action will cause them an actual or threatened injury-in-
fact, that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and
that the injury is redressable by judicial action.2 8 Additionally, the
prudential limitation on standing requires the alleged injury to be
within the "zone of interests" entitled to protection under the stat-
ute alleged to have been violated.2 9
The landmark case of Sierra Club v. Mortons ° represented the
first application of federal standing requirements to an environmen-
tal matter.3 In Sierra Club, the Court stated that although an alleged
injury to "[a]esthetic and environmental well-being" could consti-
tute an injury-in-fact, the alleged injury must "be more than an in-
jury to a cognizable interest."'3 2 Because the Sierra Club sued to
protect a cognizable interest in the environment without alleging
that any of its members would be injured, the organization did not
meet the injury-in-fact standing requirement."3 The Court noted
regulations, the 1970s became known as "the environmental decade"); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 4331(a) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (the National Environmental Policy Act). Enacted in
1970, the Act represented "the continuing policy of the Federal Government ... to use
all practicable means and measures .... to create and maintain conditions under which
man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic and
other requirements of present and future generations of Americans." Id. § 4331 (a).
26. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
27. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
28. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
29. See id. at 475. But see PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 25, at 727 (noting that Congress
would be able to eliminate this prudential limitation by granting standing to all parties
who meet the three constitutional standing requirements).
30. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
31. In Sierra Club, the Court relied on the two-prong test established in Association
of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). In Data
Processing, the Court held that a person has standing to challenge a federal agency action
if that person could demonstrate that the alleged injury had caused that person an "in-
jury-in-fact" and was arguably within the "zone of interests" to be protected or regu-
lated by the statute the agency allegedly violated. Id. at 153.
32. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734-35.
33. See id. at 735-36 (holding that the Sierra Club did not meet the "injury-in-fact"
test because it sued only as a "representative of the public" and did not allege that any
of its members would be injured by the development of the ski resort under dispute).
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that "a mere 'interest in a problem,' no matter how longstanding
the interest and no matter how qualified the organization is in evalu-
ating the problem, is not sufficient by itself to render the organiza-
tion 'adversely affected' or 'aggrieved' . . . .,,13 Federal courts
continue to apply the Sierra Club standing test in environmental
cases.
s5
b. Environmental Standing in Other Jurisdictions.-In the early
1970s, several states enacted legislation that relaxed standing re-
quirements and granted private citizens and organizations greater
access to the courts for environmental lawsuits.36 Michigan became
the first state to use legislation to expand the scope of standing for
citizens with environmental concerns when the state legislature en-
acted the Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970.3 7 The
Act enables any person to sue for declaratory and equitable relief
against either a private person or public agency for the protection of
the environment.3 8 Furthermore, the Act expressly provides for ju-
dicial review of administrative agency decisions. 39
The Connecticut legislature soon followed Michigan's lead by
enacting the Connecticut Environmental Protection Act of 1971
34. Id. at 739.
35. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990) (holding that
although alleged aesthetic and environmental concerns are proper bases to claim an
injury-in-fact, there must also be an allegation of an injury-in-fact to be an "aggrieved
party" under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act and the injury must be within
the "zone of interests" sought to be protected by the APA); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 73-74 (1978) (stating that aesthetic and environ-
mental harm satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement, and the zone of interest require-
ment may be satisfied by claiming a violation of an environmental statute).
36. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 116B.01-.13 (West 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 22a-1 to -27e (West 1985).
37. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 691-1201 to -1205 (West 1987). See also Ray v.
Mason County Drain Comm'r, 224 N.W.2d 883, 887 (Mich. 1975) (noting that the Mich-
igan Environmental Protection Act has served as a model for other states' environmental
legislation).
38. See MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691-1202(1) (West 1987). See also Eyde v. State,
225 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Mich. 1975) (noting that the Michigan Environmental Protection Act
"creates an independent cause of action, granting standing to private individuals to
maintain actions .. .against anyone for the protection of [the] environment").
39. See MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1205 (West 1987), which provides:
Whenever administrative, licensing or other proceedings, and judicial review
thereof are available by law .... any person ... [or] organization [may] inter-
vene as a party on the filing of a pleading asserting that the proceeding or
action for judicial review involves conduct which has, or which is likely to have,
the effect of polluting, impairing or destroying the air, water, or other natural
resources or the public trust therein.
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(CEPA).4 ° The Connecticut statute provides standing for actions in-
volving conduct that is "reasonably likely" to threaten the environ-
ment.4 The Connecticut Superior Court has interpreted CEPA to
cover environmental challenges to state-issued permits.4" In the
same year, the Minnesota state legislature granted standing to per-
sons and organizations contesting administrative decisions on envi-
ronmental grounds by passing the Minnesota Environmental Rights
Act of 1971. 4 3
c. Maryland Environmental Standing.-In 1973, the General As-
sembly joined the trend of increasing citizen participation in envi-
ronmental litigation4 4 by enacting the Maryland Environmental
40. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-1 to -27e (West 1985).
41. The Connecticut statute provides:
In any administrative, licensing or other proceeding, and in judicial review
thereof made available by law ... [an] organization... may intervene as a party
on the filing of a verified pleading asserting that the proceeding or action for
judicial review involves conduct which has, or which is reasonably likely to
have, the effect of unreasonably polluting, impairing or destroying the public
trust in the air, water or other natural resources of the state.
Id. § 22a-19. See Red Hill Coalition, Inc. v. Conservation Comm'n, 563 A.2d 1339, 1341
(Conn. 1989) (a person who intervenes in an administrative proceeding under § 22a-19
has standing to appeal for the limited purpose of raising environmental issues). See also
R. Jay Molleur, CEPA Update: Manchester Environmental Coalition v. Stockton, 14 CONN. L.
REV. 695, 704 (1982) (noting that the Connecticut court held that CEPA clearly "confers
standing upon 'any person' to sue 'any person' " for protection of the environment).
42. See Connecticut Conservation Ass'n v. Bridgeport Zoning Comm'n, No. CV 91-
0285129, 1991 WL 303649, at * I (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 30, 1991) (holding that a party
had standing to challenge, on environmental grounds, the granting of applications for
site plan approval and a coastal area management permit authorizing the construction of
a retail shopping center in Bridgeport).
43. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 1 16B.10 (West 1987) which provides that an organization
with Minnesota residents as members may
maintain a civil action in the district court for declaratory or equitable relief
against the state or any agency or instrumentality thereof where the nature of
the action is a challenge to an environmental quality standard, limitation, rule,
order, license, stipulation agreement, or permit promulgated or issued by the
state ....
Id. See also County of Freeborn v. Bryson, 210 N.W.2d 290, 295-96 (Minn. 1973) (hold-
ing the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act authorizes judicial review to protect the
natural resources of the state from "any conduct" which has a "material adverse effect
on the environment").
44. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.412 (West 1986) (stating that any "citizen of the
state may maintain an action for injunctive relief against . . . [a]ny person ]or] govern-
mental agency . . . to enjoin such persons . . . from violating any laws, rules or regula-
tions for the protection of the air, water, and other natural resources of the state"); IND.
CODE ANN. § 13-6-1-1 (Burns 1990) (stating that "a citizen of Indiana ... may bring an
action for declaratory and equitable relief in the name of the state against an individual,
... a company, a corporation, . . . or other legal entity . . . for the protection of the
environment of Indiana from significant pollution, impairment, or destruction").
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Policy Act (MEPA). a5 MEPA, however, restricted citizen involve-
ment in environmental matters by maintaining certain traditional
constraints such as common-law standing requirements. 46 Conse-
quently, an organization attempting to protect environmental inter-
ests under Maryland law was still required to have a "property
interest of its own-separate and distinct from that of its individual
members." 47 In addition, an organization seeking to redress a pub-
lic wrong was required to allege that it had suffered "some special
damage from such wrong differing in character and kind from that
suffered by the general public."
48
The enactment of the Maryland Environmental Standing Act in
1978 slightly liberalized common-law standing requirements. 49
Although MESA relaxes standing requirements in certain environ-
mental matters, its scope is considerably narrower than that of envi-
ronmental standing statutes in other jurisdictions.5" MESA
provides that common-law standing is relaxed only in cases where a
state official failed either to perform a nondiscretionary ministerial
duty required by law or to enforce an environmental quality
standard.5 i
3. The Court's Reasoning.-Prior to its decision in Medical Waste,
the Court of Appeals had not addressed the scope of standing under
MESA.52 The court was, therefore, forced to rely on the Act's legis-
lative history and a comparison of its language with that of standing
statutes in other jurisdictions.5 3 The Court of Appeals sought the
answers to two questions: (1) whether section 9-263 of the Environ-
ment Article, or alternatively, the APA, authorized judicial review of
45. See MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. §§ 1-301 to -305 (1989). The Maryland Environ-
mental Policy Act declared that "[e]ach person has a fundamental and inalienable right
to a healthful environment." Id. § 1-302(d).
46. See Leatherbury v. Gaylord Fuel Corp., 276 Md. 367, 380-81, 347 A.2d 826, 834
(1975) (noting that the General Assembly did not intend to create new or enlarged ac-
tionable rights under MEPA and that its provisions were to be carried out by state agen-
cies only).
47. Citizens Planning & Housing Ass'n v. County Executive, 273 Md. 333, 345, 329
A.2d 681, 687-88 (1974).
48. Weinberg v. Kracke, 189 Md. 275, 280, 55 A.2d 797, 799 (1947).
49. See Act of May 29, 1978, ch. 838, 1978 Md. Laws 2434 (codified at MD. CODE
ANN., NAT. RES. §§ 1-501 to -508 (1989)).
50. See Kim R. Siegert, Comment, The 1978 Maryland Environmental Standing Act, 8 U.
BALT. L. REV. 411, 422 (1979) (finding MESA, in comparison, "substantially more re-
strictive in scope").
51. See MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. § 1-503(b) (1989).
52. Medical Waste, 327 Md. at 614, 612 A.2d at 250.
53. Id. at 618, 612 A.2d at 252.
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the agency decision to issue the permits;54 and (2) whether the Coa-
lition had standing to bring the actions under Maryland law. 55 This
second question involved a determination of whether the Coalition
met either common-law standing requirements, as reflected in the
APA, or the more liberalized standing requirements set forth in
MESA.56
The court first addressed 57 the issue of whether the Coalition
could seek judicial review under either of the two relevant stat-
utes.58 To resolve the question of whether judicial review was au-
thorized under section 9-263, the court considered whether the
administrative agency's grant of the refuse disposal permit consti-
tuted an "order." 59 Because its issuance was pursuant to a final
agency decision adjudicating the "rights and responsibilities of the
parties," the Medical Waste court held that the permit was indeed an
"order," and, therefore, judicial review under section 9-263 was
authorized .6
With regard to judicial review under the APA, the Coalition
could challenge the agency decision to issue the permits only if the
agency decision was rendered in a "contested case. '"61 The Mary-
54. Id. at 606, 612 A.2d at 246.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 611, 614, 612 A.2d at 248, 250.
57. Before addressing substantive issues, the court initially determined that the
Court of Special Appeals did not abuse its discretion by raising sua sponte the issue of
standing under MESA. The court asserted that Maryland appellate courts have discre-
tion to consider an issue not raised at the trial level. See id. at 605, 612 A.2d at 246; see
also Crown Oil & Wax Co. of Va. v. Glen, 320 Md. 546, 561, 578 A.2d 1184, 1191 (1990)
(concluding that even if an argument raised an issue for the first time on appeal, the
court has discretion under Md. R. 8-131(a) to consider it). The court also noted that the
standing issue was raised at the trial court and MESA was simply another basis to sup-
port that argument. See Medical Waste, 327 Md. at 605, 612 A.2d at 246.
58. Medical Waste, 327 Md. at 606, 612 A.2d at 246. The court noted that because
neither party addressed whether the judicial review provisions of the APA superseded
those of § 9-263, it would analyze judicial review under both. The court remarked, how-
ever, that the APA appears to have superseded § 9-263 "at least with respect to 'orders'
issued by the Secretary." Id. at 607 n.7, 612 A.2d at 247 n.7.
59. Id. at 607, 612 A.2d at 246-47. The refuse disposal permit was the only permit
subject to judicial review under § 9-263. Id.
60. Id. The court noted that in adjudicatory proceedings, the terms "order" and
"decision" are normally interchangeable. Id.; see MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-214
(1984) ("A final decision or order . . .").
61. The APA provides that "[a] party who is aggrieved by the final decision in a
contested case is entitled to judicial review of the decision as provided in this section."
MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-215 (1984).
The Court initially noted that APA provisions apply to the Department of the Envi-
ronment. Medical Waste, 327 Md. at 608, 612 A.2d at 247; see Sugarloaf Citizens Ass'n v.
Northeast Md. Waste Disposal Auth., 323 Md. 641, 653, 594 A.2d 1115, 1120-21 (1991)
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land Code defines a "contested case" as "the grant, denial, renewal,
revocation, suspension, or amendment of a license that is required
by law to be determined only after an opportunity for an agency
hearing."' 62 Relying on this language, the court concluded that the
issuance of both permits involved contested cases for purposes of
judicial review under the APA. 63 In so concluding, the court noted
that the agency held the required public hearings before deciding to
issue the air quality control and refuse disposal permits.'
After determining that the present dispute fell within the judi-
cial review provisions of section 9-263 and the APA,65 the Medical
Waste court turned to the question of whether the Coalition met the
common-law standing requirement in the APA-being an "ag-
grieved party."' 66 The court reasoned that although the Coalition's
participation in the administrative proceedings made it a party to
the action, 67 the group had neither a separate and distinct property
interest from that of its members nor an injury different in character
and kind from that of the general public.68 The Coalition, there-
fore, was not an "aggrieved party" and lacked common-law standing
to properly challenge the agency's issuance of the permits. 69
Lastly, the court addressed the question of whether the Coali-
(holding that the Department of the Environment "constitutes a State agency to which
the provisions of the APA are fully applicable").
62. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-201(c)(2) (1984). The State Government Ar-
ticle defines a license as "all or any part of permission that.., is in any form, including
a permit." Id. § 10-201(d)(3)(iv).
63. See Medical Waste, 327 Md. at 609-10, 612 A.2d at 247-48. Before issuing an air
quality control permit, the DOE is required to "[p]rovide the opportunity for a public
hearing in the county in which the proposed source will be located." MD. CODE ANN.,
ENVIR. § 2-404(b) (1987). Likewise, prior to the issuance of a refuse disposal permit,
the DOE must "hold a public hearing on the application." Id. § 9-209(a).
64. Medical Waste, 327 Md. at 608, 612 A.2d at 247.
65. Id. at 607, 611, 612 A.2d at 246-47, 248.
66. See id. at 611, 612 A.2d at 248. The term "aggrieved party" distinguishes be-
tween parties who may seek judicial review and those who may not. Id. at 611 n.9, 612
A.2d at 248 n.9. The Court of Appeals previously noted that being an "aggrieved" party
under the APA mirrors the common-law standing principles that must be satisfied
before a party may obtain judicial review of an administrative decision. See Bryniarski v.
Montgomery County Bd. of Appeals, 247 Md. 137, 143-46, 230 A.2d 289, 294-95
(1966). Common-law standing requirements also apply under § 9-263 because a "dis-
satisfied" party, as defined therein, essentially is an "aggrieved" party. Medical Waste,
327 Md. at 611 n.9, 612 A.2d at 248-49 n.9.
67. Medical Waste, 327 Md. at 611, 612 A.2d at 249. The Coalition was present at the
administrative proceedings and offered testimony opposing the incinerator. Id. at 612,
612 A.2d at 249.
68. See id. at 612-14, 612 A.2d at 249-50.
69. See id. at 614, 612 A.2d at 250.
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tion could maintain standing under MESA. 7' Because the Coalition
did not seek judicial review pursuant to any specific standing provi-
sion of MESA, the court directed its inquiry to whether MESA gen-
erally relaxed common-law standing requirements for organizations
challenging final administrative agency decisions regarding environ-
mental matters. 7' The court began with an analysis of the legislative
policy and intent underlying MESA. The policy declared in MESA
provides that:
[T]he natural resources and the scenic beauty of the State
of Maryland are in danger of irreparable harm occasioned
by the use and exploitation of the physical environment...
[and] the courts of the State of Maryland are an appropri-
ate forum for seeking the protection of the environment
and .. .an unreasonably strict procedural definition of
"standing to sue" in environmental matters is not in the
public interest. 71
Consistent with this policy, the statute confers standing in certain
actions "regardless of whether [a plaintiff] possesses a special inter-
est different from that possessed generally by the residents of Mary-
land, or whether substantial personal or property damage to [that
plaintiff] is threatened.173 However, MESA expressly relaxes these
common-law standing requirements only in limited situations. No-
tably absent from MESA is a provision authorizing judicial review of
an administrative agency decision.7 4
Because the legislative history did not provide the court with
sufficient insight into whether MESA implicitly provided standing to
the Medical Waste plaintiff,75 the court evaluated MESA in relation to
70. See id.
71. Id. at 617-18, 612 A.2d at 252.
72. MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. § 1-502 (1989).
73. Id. § 1-503(a)(3).
74. See MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. § 1-503(a) (1989). The specific actions in which
MESA provides standing are as follows:
[any person given standing by subsection (a) may bring and maintain an action
for mandamus or equitable relief, including declaratory relief against any of-
ficer or agency of the State or political subdivision for failure on the part of the
officer or agency of the State or political subdivision to perform a nondiscre-
tionary ministerial duty imposed upon them under an environmental statute,
.. rule, regulation or order, or for their failure to enforce an applicable envi-
ronmental quality standard ....
Id. § 1-503(b).
75. See Medical Waste, 327 Md. at 618, 612 A.2d at 252 (noting that "the available
Maryland legislative history sheds little light on the intent of the General Assembly" to
relax common-law standing beyond the express provisions of the statute).
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similar environmental standing statutes in other jurisdictions.7"
First, the court decided that the General Assembly's unwillingness
to include a distinct provision for judicial review of administrative
agency decisions "strongly indicates" that it did not intend to grant
standing to an organization that does not meet common-law stand-
ing requirements.77 Although the court acknowledged that some
language in MESA alludes to broadened standing requirements, the
court found that those requirements apply only in the limited cases
the statute "specifically set[s] forth."7 8 To further support the posi-
tion that MESA does not provide standing to the Coalition, the
court quoted statutory language indicating that MESA cannot create
a new substantive cause of action or confer standing when the con-
tested activity is "in compliance with . . . [a] lawful, current per-
mit." 70  In conclusion, the Medical Waste court stated that "a
comparison of MESA with the environmental standing acts of other
states confirms the view that MESA does not broaden standing re-
quirements in actions for direct judicial review of administrative
proceedings. "so
In a final attempt to gain standing, the Coalition urged the
court to forego Maryland's traditional position and adopt the more
lax federal standing requirements. 8 1 Federal standards would have
allowed the Coalition to acquire judicial review of the agency deci-
sion by alleging that one of its members would be injured by the
incinerator's construction."2 The Medical Waste court, however, re-
76. See id. at 618-20, 612 A.2d at 252-53. See also supra notes 36-43 and accompany-
ing text.
77. Medical Waste, 327 Md. at 620, 612 A.2d at 253.
78. Id. at 621, 612 A.2d at 253-54; MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. § 1-504(d) (1989)
(providing in relevant part: "this subtitle does not broaden, except as specifically set
forth, the rights of intervention of persons in administrative hearings and in appeals
from the hearings").
79. Medical Waste, 327 Md. at 620, 612 A.2d at 253. MESA provides that
relief may not be granted in any action filed under this subtitle with respect to
any defendant who shows that the condition, activity, or failure complained of
is under and in compliance with ... [a] lawful, current permit or order of an agency
of the State ... authorized to issue the permit or order ....
MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. § 1-504(f)(1) (1989) (emphasis added). MESA also cautions
that "[t]his subtitle may not be construed to create or authorize any new substantive
cause of action or theory of recovery not now recognized by the courts of this state.
Id. § 1-504(a).
80. Medical Waste, 327 Md. at 618, 612 A.2d at 252.
81. See id. at 623, 612 A.2d at 254.
82. See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text. The federal standing rule is differ-
ent from Maryland's standing requirements. The federal position permits an organiza-
tion to sue on behalf of its members if they allege to have suffered, or will suffer, an
injury-in-fact. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963) (noting that a representa-
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fused to adopt the federal position and asserted that the General
Assembly clearly established that common-law standing require-
ments should be relaxed only in limited circumstances under
MESA. s" The court ended its analysis by stating that, absent legisla-
tive authorization, "it would be inappropriate.., to expand, beyond
that set forth in MESA, organizational standing in judicial actions
concerning environmental matters.""
4. Analysis.-The Medical Waste decision relaxes standing in en-
vironmental actions where a state officer, agency or political subdivi-
sion allegedly fails either to perform a nondiscretionary ministerial
duty or to enforce an environmental protection quality standard. 85
For example, if an environmental quality standard were being en-
forced by a state agency after the incinerator at issue became opera-
tional, MESA would provide an organization with standing to sue.8 6
The court's holding, however, clearly indicates that MESA's future
use will be expressly limited to the specific provisions of the statute.
Although the court's interpretation places strict limits on
MESA's applicability, the court's analysis is consistent with the Gen-
eral Assembly's intent.87 MESA was designed to relax standing re-
quirements to ensure compliance with environmental laws and
regulations, yet its drafters placed limits on its scope due to con-
cerns that MESA would initiate "an influx of frivolous suits, cause
inevitable long-term delays in industrial and economic projects, im-
pair the powers and effectiveness of administrative boards and agen-
cies, and weaken the authority of the state political subdivisions to
tive organization may represent its injured members in an action for judicial review).
Maryland standing requirements, however, permit organizational standing only if the
organization can show it has a property interest separate and distinct from its members.
See Weinberg v. Kracke, 189 Md. 275, 280, 55 A.2d 797, 799 (1947) ("In situations
where the complainant is seeking to redress a public wrong, he has no standing in court
unless he has also suffered some special damage from such wrong differing in character
and kind from that suffered by the general public."); see also Joint Record Extract of
Appellant at E-70 to -71, Maryland Waste Coalition, Inc. v. Maryland Dep't of the Env't,
84 Md. App. 544, 581 A.2d 60 (1990) (No. 89-1829) (affidavit of Mary Rosso alleging
that she will suffer an injury from the construction of the medical waste incinerator).
83. Medical Waste, 327 Md. at 623, 612 A.2d at 254. The court has noted that "com-
mon law principles should not be changed contrary to the public policy of the State set
forth by the General Assembly of Maryland." Kelly v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 304 Md. 124,
141, 497 A.2d 1143, 1151 (1985).
84. Medical Waste, 327 Md. at 623, 612 A.2d at 255.
85. MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. § 1-503(b) (1989).
86. See Reply Brief of Petitioner, Cross-Respondent at 8, Medical Waste (No. 90-163).
87. See supra text accompanying notes 72-73.
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issue building permits." 88 The court's holding, therefore, ensures
that the compromise on standing remains intact.
The court's analysis is also supported by the language of the
Maryland statute; MESA expressly places a stronger preference on
upholding common-law standing requirements than environmental
standing statutes in other jurisdictions.8 9 For example, MESA pro-
tects defendants who are acting pursuant to a state-issued permit or
court order, whereas other jurisdictions do not.9" This comparison
of statutory language provides ample support for the court's conclu-
sion that the legislature did not intend to relax common-law stand-
ing when an organization challenges an environmental action
authorized by a state agency.
Although the court's holding may be consistent with MESA's
legislative intent, the interpretation denies organizations access to
the judicial system, effectively preventing them from guarding
against future environmental threats in a number of situations. The
court's apparent unwillingness to interfere in environmental agency
determinations may be soundly based in the fear that relaxed stand-
ing requirements could reach far beyond environmental matters and
open the floodgates to lawsuits on a host of administrative deci-
sions, thereby reducing the effectiveness of administrative agency
determinations. 9' What the court fails to consider, however, is that
administrative agencies may now have less incentive to consider
carefully all possible environmental problems and alternatives
before issuing decisions, absent any real threat of judicial review.92
A policy concern that the Medical Waste court did not address is
the diminished effectiveness of public interest groups. Because an
organization cannot sue in Maryland on behalf of its members un-
less it has a separate and distinct property interest, the court's inter-
pretation of MESA may prevent potentially viable lawsuits involving
vital environmental issues from being litigated. Some cases may
88. Siegert, supra note 50, at 418 (noting that these procedural safeguards were insti-
tuted after persistent lobbying from business interests who strongly opposed relaxed
standing requirements in environmental matters).
89. See id. at 426.
90. Compare MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. § 1-504(f)(1)(i) (1989) with MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 691.1203(a) (West 1987) and MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.10 (West 1987).
91. See Reply Brief of Petitioner, Cross-Respondent at 14, Medical Waste (No. 90-
163).
92. See Daniel K. Slone, The Michigan Environmental Protection Act: Bringing Citizen-Initi-
ated Environmental Suits into the 1980's, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 271, 312 (1985) (noting that
Michigan's Environmental Protection Act encourages administrative agencies to thor-
oughly consider all consequences and alternatives before issuing decisions because pri-
vate plaintiffs may seek judicial review of those decisions).
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never be instituted in court simply because individual members do
not have the economic or legal resources to bring those suits on
their own behalf.93 The court's holding effectively defeats one of
the main purposes of environmental organizations: to seek legal re-
dress on behalf of citizens who may be threatened with environmen-
tal injury.
5. Conclusion.-On balance, the Court of Appeals's decision,
which limits MESA's scope to those actions specifically enumerated
in the statute, has not frustrated the central purpose of MESA. At
the same time, however, the decision hampers Maryland environ-
mental interest groups from gaining access to the courts to protect
the environment, and frustrates the courts' ability to assist these
groups in protecting the environment from potential devastation
before actual damage has occurred.
KIMBERLY C. STRASSER
93. See Save a Valuable Environment v. City of Bothell, 576 P.2d 401, 404 (Wash.
1978) (noting that a party "may be unable to afford the cost of challenging the action
himself [and a] class suit may be too cumbersome. An association ... of persons with a
common interest can then be the simplest vehicle for undertaking the task . . ."). The
Court of Special Appeals also remarked that the legislature has "recognized that the
establishment of organizations and associations represent the only economically viable
means of pursuing this involvement." Maryland Waste Coalition, Inc. v. Maryland Dep't
of the Env't, 84 Md. App. 544, 561, 581 A.2d 60, 68 (1990), rev'd sub nom. Medical Waste
Assocs., Inc. v. Maryland Waste Coalition, Inc., 327 Md. 596, 612 A.2d 241 (1992).
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VI. EVIDENCE
A. Confidential Records: Balancing Privacy Against Impeachment
In Zaal v. State,' the Court of Appeals held that a defendant ac-
cused of sexual abuse had the right to review the educational
records of his accuser for the purpose of investigating her credibil-
ity.2 The court found that the appropriate method of review of con-
fidential records must be determined by weighing such factors as
the victim's need for privacy, the defendant's need to inspect, and
the nature of the information sought.3 The court rejected an appli-
cation of the federal standard of in camera review of sensitive or con-
fidential records, stating that in camera review was not always the
best option.4 In so doing, the Zaal court held that when the defend-
ant's need to inspect the records outweighs the victim's right of pri-
vacy, the defendant should be permitted access to the records either
directly or through an expanded in camera review.5
This ruling will have a profound effect in cases where criminal
defendants seek to impeach the credibility of witnesses by using sen-
sitive records to which they have gained access. The Zaal decision
permits judges wide latitude in balancing the relevant factors and in
determining how records should be reviewed. Ultimately, the deci-
sion grants judges tremendous discretion to determine the privacy
rights of witnesses in criminal prosecutions.
1. The Case.-Iwan Zaal was charged with sexually abusing his
twelve-year-old granddaughter.6 His granddaughter claimed that
Zaal fondled her inappropriately.7 She stated that Zaal placed her
on top of him and she felt something go into her vagina,8 and fur-
ther claimed that her grandfather forced her to touch his penis. 9 In
response, Zaal stated that it was his granddaughter who had acted
inappropriately, placing his hand between her legs and touching
him while stating, "I did it for my daddy" and "[n]ow my father can
1. 326 Md. 54, 602 A.2d 1247 (1992).
2. Id. at 87, 602 A.2d at 1263.
3. See id.
4. Id. at 86, 602 A.2d at 1263.
5. Id. at 87, 602 A.2d at 1263.






get you."'" At trial, Zaal also asserted that he and his son had a
poor relationship."
Prior to trial, Zaal subpoenaed the school records of his grand-
daughter.' 2 The Montgomery County Board of Education moved
for a protective order under Maryland regulations that protect
school records.' 3 At a hearing on the motion, Zaal maintained that
the records were necessary for him to effectively cross-examine his
granddaughter.' 4 He argued that because he denied her allega-
tions, the case would turn on the issue of her credibility.' 5 He con-
tended that his granddaughter had an emotional disability that
might bear on her ability to "observe and relate" and, therefore, he
should be able to investigate her motivations, bias, and reputation
for veracity. ' 6
The trial court conducted an in camera review of the records and
granted the school board's motion for a protective order.' 7 In so
ruling, the trial court found that there was nothing in the records
that related to the granddaughter's truthfulness and nothing that
would be relevant for impeachment purposes.' 8  Zaal appealed,
claiming that the trial court had violated his rights to confrontation,
compulsory process, due process, and effective assistance of counsel
under both the United States and Maryland Constitutions. 9
The Court of Special Appeals, basing its decision on the
10. Id. at 61-62, 602 A.2d at 1250.
11. Id. at 62, 602 A.2d at 1250. Evidence was presented at trial that Zaal's son had
threatened to "get [petitioner] one way or the other." Id.
12. Id., 602 A.2d at 1251.
13. Id. The Maryland regulations provide, in relevant part:
A. A local school system or educational institution may disclose person-
ally identifiable information from the education records of a student without
the written consent of the parent or guardians of the student or the eligible
student, if the disclosure is: ...
(9) To comply with a judicial order or lawfully issued subpoena ....
B. This regulation may not be construed to require or preclude disclo-
sure of any personally identifiable information from the educational records of
a student by a local school system or educational institution to the parties set
forth in § A, above.
COMAR § 13A.08.02.20A & B.
14. See Zaal, 326 Md. at 62, 602 A.2d at 1251.
15. See id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 63, 602 A.2d at 1251.
18. Id.
19. See Zaal v. State, 85 Md. App. 430, 437, 584 A.2d 119, 122 (1991), rev'd, 326 Md.
54, 602 A.2d 1247 (1992).
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Supreme Court's decision in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie," rejected Zaal's
claims. The court held that a trial court does not abuse its discre-
tion when it conducts an in camera review and determines that a pro-
tective order is appropriate. 2' Following that decision, the Court of
Appeals granted certiorari to consider the issue of Zaal's right to
access his granddaughter's school records.
2. The Federal Standard: Pennsylvania v. Ritchie.-In Ritchie,
the Court was asked to determine whether Ritchie, accused of sexu-
ally abusing his daughter, should be permitted to view investigative
files compiled by Children and Youth Services (CYS). 22 Ritchie had
subpoenaed CYS for the records of an investigation pertaining to
his daughter's present charges against him, as well as the records of
a previous investigation stemming from an anonymous report that
his children were being abused. 2 1 CYS refused to disclose the re-
ports, claiming that they were privileged under a Pennsylvania stat-
ute preventing disclosure of child abuse reports absent certain
enumerated exceptions. 24 The trial court, without reviewing the en-
tire file, denied Ritchie's motion to enforce the subpoena, and he
was subsequently convicted.25
The Supreme Court analyzed Ritchie's appeal on due process
grounds,26 attempting to balance the public interest in protecting
child abuse information with a defendant's right to obtain material
evidence from the government.27 The Court found that although
the public interest in protecting information on child abuse was
strong, such an interest will not always prevent disclosure of infor-
mation, especially when a trial court determines that the informa-
20. 480 U.S. 39 (1987) (holding that the right to confrontation is a trial right only
and evaluating a criminal defendant's right to review sensitive information under the
Due Process Clause).
21. See Zaal, 85 Md. App. at 447, 584 A.2d at 127.
22. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 39.
23. Id. at 43.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 44-45.
26. The Court rejected Ritchie's argument that nondisclosure violated his right to
confrontation by asserting that the right to confrontation is a trial right designed to
provide for proper cross-examination that does not affect pretrial discovery. Id. at 53.
The Court held that Ritchie's constitutional arguments had typically been analyzed in
light of the right to due process. Id. at 56.
27. According to the Court, " 'Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the pro-
ceeding would have been different.' " Id. at 57 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473
U.S. 667, 682 (1985)).
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tion is material to the defense. 8 Consequently, the Court held that
the file should be reviewed to determine if it contained information
that was material to Ritchie's case.29
The Ritchie Court rejected a broad view of the method by which
the records should be made available, explaining that the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court
apparently concluded that whenever a defendant alleges
that protected evidence might be material, the appropriate
method of assessing this claim is to grant full access to the
disputed information, regardless of the State's interest in
confidentiality. We cannot agree. A defendant's right to
discover exculpatory evidence does not include the un-
supervised authority to search through the Common-
wealth's files.
30
The Court held, however, that Ritchie's interest in a fair trial could
be properly protected through in camera review. 31 This form of re-
view would eventually grant Ritchie access to material evidence while
safeguarding the State's interest in protecting its child abuse
information.32
The Ritchie decision thereby established in camera review as the
proper method for reviewing confidential records. While this ap-
proach has been accepted in a majority of jurisdictions, 3 some
28. See id. at 57-58.
29. See id. at 58.
30. Id. at 59.
31. Id. at 60. The Court explained that denying the defendant the benefit of an "ad-
vocate's eye" did not grant excessive discretion to the trial court because the defendant
would still be free to request specific information in the files from the court. The
Supreme Court also clarified that throughout the trial process, the court would be obli-
gated to disclose information that, although previously deemed immaterial by the court,
had become material due to the nature of the trial. Id.
32. See id. Assessing the magnitude of the State's interest, the Court found:
To allow full disclosure to defense counsel in this type of case would sacrifice
unnecessarily the Commonwealth's compelling interest in protecting its child-
abuse information .... A child's feelings of vulnerability and guilt and his or
her unwillingness to come forward are particularly acute when the abuser is a
parent. It therefore is essential that the child have a state-designated person to
whom he may turn, and to do so with the assurance of confidentiality. Relatives
and neighbors who suspect abuse also will be more willing to come forward if
they know that their identities will be protected.
Id.
33. See Zaal, 326 Md. at 85 n.14, 602 A.2d at 126 n.14. See, e.g., State v. Gagne, 612
A.2d 899 (N.H. 1992); In re Robert H., 509 A.2d 475 (Conn. 1986); State v. Perry, 552
A.2d 545 (Me. 1989); State v. Paradee, 403 N.W.2d 640 (Minn. 1987); People v.
Barkauskas, 497 N.E.2d 1183 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (following the standard of in camera
review outlined in Ritchie).
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states have chosen not to accept such a limited method of review.3 4
These contrary decisions often have been based on state constitu-
tions that arguably afford a defendant greater rights of confronta-
tion and compulsory process than does the United States
Constitution. 3
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In holding that in camera review is
not always the proper choice for providing a defendant with access
to confidential information, the Maryland court distinguished the
privacy interests in Zaal from those in Ritchie. The court found that
the interest in confidentiality in student records was not as great as
the need to prevent disclosure of child abuse records.36 In Ritchie,
the right to confidentiality was grounded in the strong public policy
34. See Commonwealth v. Stockhammer, 570 N.E.2d 992 (Mass. 1991); Common-
wealth v. Lloyd, 567 A.2d 1357 (Pa. 1989); Commonwealth v. Miller, 582 A.2d 4 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1990) (deciding not to apply Ritchie and granting wider disclosure than that
provided by in camera review).
35. See, e.g., Miller, 582 A.2d at 7 (holding that the accused's right under the confron-
tation clause and compulsory process clause of the state constitution had been violated
when his counsel was not given access to reports compiled on a rape victim by a rape
crisis center).
It has further been asserted that it is improper for judges to take on the role of
advocate when reviewing records in camera and that other options should be pursued.
See Stockhammer, 570 N.E.2d at 1001, in which the court stated:
The Federal standard requiring only an in camera review by the trial judge of
privileged records requested by the defendant rests on the assumptions that
trial judges can temporarily and effectively assume the role of advocate when
examining such records; and that the interests of the State and complainant in
the confidentiality of the records cannot adequately be protected in any other
way. Neither assumption withstands close scrutiny.
36. See Zaal, 326 Md. at 76, 602 A.2d at 1258. In coming to this conclusion, the
court underwent a thorough analysis of the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act of
1974 (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1988), and Maryland's implementing regulations,
found in COMAR § 13A.08.02.20. Because Maryland law under § 13A.08.02.20 incor-
porates the goals of FERPA, the court applied decisions on the privacy right granted
under FERPA in analyzing those to be granted under the Maryland law. See Zaal, 326
Md. at 68-71, 602 A.2d at 1254-56. See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(2) (1988) (limiting
federal education funding to only those institutions conforming to federal guidelines
regarding the confidentiality of school records).
The court found that FERPA, and therefore § 13A.08.02.20, was established to pre-
vent schools from haphazardly disclosing private information and provided parents and
students with an avenue for reviewing school records to ensure that they contained no
inappropriate information. See Zaal, 326 Md. at 70, 602 A.2d at 1255. In this light,
" '[tihe underlying purpose of FERPA was not to grant individual students a right to
privacy or access to educational records .... ' " Id. at 71, 602 A.2d at 1255 (quoting
Smith v. Duquesne Univ., 612 F. Supp. 72, 80 (W.D. Pa. 1985)). Further, FERPA in no
way prevents disclosure of student records if there exists a genuine need for the infor-
mation. See Rios v. Read, 73 F.R.D. 589 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (permitting the release of stu-
dent records in a class action suit brought by bilingual parents who claimed the records
were needed to establish inadequate services to bilingual students).
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in favor of protecting sources reporting child abuse.3 7 The privacy
interest in student records, addressed by the Zaal court, did not
carry the same weight.3 8 The Zaal court found that the heightened
interest in protecting child abuse records brought the Ritchie Court
to decide that "a trial court, at least temporarily, could assume the
role of advocate and, upon a review of records, assess, sufficiently
accurately to protect the interests of the State and the accused,
whether those records ought to be disclosed to the defense. ' '3 9 In
contrast, the Zaal court found that where privacy interests were not
so pervasive, the Supreme Court had provided defendants with
greater access to information than that provided through in camera
40review.
The Zaal court also found that Maryland had followed this
trend and provided access to defendants when privacy concerns did
not outweigh the defendant's need for the information. In Carr v.
State,41 the Court of Appeals had held that a criminal defendant had
the right to obtain and use the written statements of the State's wit-
nesses for purposes of impeachment.42 In Leonard v. State,43 the
Court of Special Appeals had followed similar reasoning in holding
that an accused had a right to see a crucial prosecution witness's
written statement, emphasizing that impeachment may be accom-
plished through statements that are more than mere flat contradic-
37. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987).
38. See Zaal, 326 Md. at 76, 602 A.2d at 1258. The court also looked to Maryland
statutes on disclosure of child abuse records and held that the fact that Maryland law
made it a criminal offense to disclose child abuse investigative records gave further
credence to the higher standard of privacy to be given to child abuse records, as op-
posed to school records. See id. at 76 n.10, 602 A.2d at 1258 n.10.
39. Id. at 77, 602 A.2d at 1258.
40. See id. The court cited Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), and Dennis
v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966), to support its assertion that greater access was
given to records when privacy was not overriding. InJencks, the Supreme Court held
that a defendant was entitled to view FBI records pertaining to an investigation of his
activities, despite the FBI's interest in keeping its sources secret. The Court stated:
Because only the defense is adequately equipped to determine the effective use
for purpose[s] of discrediting the Governments's witnesses and thereby fur-
thering the accused's defense, the defense must initially be entitled to see them
to determine what use may be made of them. Justice requires no less. The
practice of producing government documents to the trial judge for his determi-
nation of relevancy and materiality, without hearing the accused, is
disapproved.
Jencks, 353 U.S. at 668-69.
41. 284 Md. 455, 397 A.2d 606 (1979).
42. See id. at 472-73, 397 A.2d at 615.
43. 46 Md. App. 631, 421 A.2d 85 (1980).
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tions." The Leonard court stated:
[S]ubtle aspects of potential inconsistency, intrinsically
subjective, have to be viewed from the defendant's per-
spective, and can be properly weighed only by defense
counsel .... The court cannot be expected to view in the
same context as defense counsel these more latent and
subtle gaps or differences; nor should it purport to do so.45
The Zaal court enumerated several factors that should be con-
sidered in determining a defendant's right to, and the form of, ac-
cess to confidential records. The court stated that the nature of the
charges are important, and that to override a privacy interest "some
relationship must be shown between the charges, the information
sought, and the likelihood that relevant information will be obtained
as a result of reviewing the records."46 Another factor deemed im-
portant is the nature of the issue before the court. If the issue is one
of identity, educational records would become irrelevant.47 If the
issue involves a request for specific information that can easily be
determined, there would be little need for direct access, and in cam-
era review would be adequate.4" Where, on the other hand, the is-
sue is one of the credibility of the witness, the court found that the
State may be required to give the accused direct access to relevant
records.49
The defendant's right of access, however, must be balanced
against the privacy interests of those whose records are sought.50
The Zaal court recognized that "the victim's educational future
could be compromised by the petitioner questioning her extensively
about her educational records."'" In this light, in camera review
would be more favorable. However, the court found that there are
options available other than the limited choice between in camera re-
view, which may deprive the defendant of adequate access, and full
disclosure of the records, which may deny the victim's privacy
44. See id. at 638, 421 A.2d at 89.
45. Id. at 638-39, 421 A.2d at 89. The Zaal court recognized that Carr and Leonard
were distinguishable in that none of the witnesses in those cases had a right to privacy in
their statements. See Zaal, 326 Md. at 81, 602 A.2d at 1260. Nonetheless, the court
found them to be significant to the issue at hand. See id.
46. Zaal, 326 Md. at 82, 602 A.2d at 1261.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. Id. After evaluating these factors, the court found that Zaal had established his
need to review the records. See id. at 83, 602 A.2d 1262.
50. See id.




The Zaal court found that the doubts raised in Carr and Leonard
regarding the propriety of judicial review of evidence for the de-
fendant's benefit indicated a need to search for alternatives to in
camera review.5" With this in mind, the court addressed the alterna-
tives considered by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in
Commonwealth v. Stockhammer.5 4 The court noted that in camera review
could be expanded to allow counsel for both parties to be present. 55
In addition, counsel could be permitted to review records in their
capacity as officers of the courts. 56 These alternatives would pro-
vide a defendant with the benefit of having review performed by an
"advocate's eye," while sheltering the interests of the victim from
undue compromise.57
Thus, the court held that when a defendant sought sensitive
records for the purpose of determining a witness's credibility, a trial
judge should weigh the established need for the documents, the
right to privacy, the nature of the information sought, and interests
in judicial economy to determine the appropriate method of re-
view.5" The court further held that in the instant case, controlled
access-either through expanded in camera review or through re-
lease to both counsel as officers of the court, followed by a hearing
on admissibility-was proper.59
52. Id. In reaching its conclusion, the court considered the opinion of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Stockhammer, 570 N.E.2d 992
(Mass. 1991), in which the court rejected the standard set forth in Ritchie in favor of
other procedures. The Stockhammer court stated that in camera review was not always the
best means of protecting the interests of both parties. Id. at 1002. The Stockhammer
court expressed the concern that it was the defense, not the judge, who could best deter-
mine what evidence may be useful. Id. at 1001. Judges, therefore, could use their broad
discretion to shape a procedure for review that would best address the competing inter-
ests of both parties. Id. at 1002.
53. See Zaal, 326 Md. at 84, 602 A.2d at 1262.
54. 570 N.E.2d 992 (Mass. 1991). See Zaal, 326 Md. at 84-85, 602 A.2d at 1262-63
(quoting Stockhammer's alternative proposals).
55. See Zaal, 326 Md. at 86, 602 A.2d at 1263.
56. See id.
57. The victim could be protected by the issuance of a court order restricting disclo-
sure of information contained in the records. See id. at 87, 602 A.2d at 1263. The Zaal
court further clarified that, after such a review by counsel was conducted, a hearing
would be held on the admissibility and relevance of evidence the defense wished to
utilize. See id.
58. See id., 602 A.2d at 1264. The court emphasized that when a court decides to
conduct an in camera review without the presence of counsel "the court's review is not to
determine whether, and, if so, what, is 'directly admissible;' rather, it is to exclude from
the parties' review material that could not, in anyone's imagination, properly be used in




4. Analysis.-The Zaal court's holding is significant for several
reasons. Before rejecting strict adherence to in camera review, the
court came to the conclusion that school records do not carry a
strong privacy interest. 60 While it may be true that the Family Edu-
cation Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), the law underlying disclo-
sure rules in this area, did not intend to give individual privacy
rights to students,6' the court's emphasis on the statutory interpre-
tation of FERPA and Maryland's implementing regulations found in
Title 13A of COMAR,62 used to reach this conclusion, is misguided.
The court failed to realize that a strong public interest in protecting
school records need not originate from the policies outlined in
these statutes.
In Ritchie, the Supreme Court gave strong deference to the
need to protect child abuse records because of its desire to protect
the confidences of those persons, both victims and concerned citi-
zens, who reported abuse.63 This same interest is present in Zaal.
By creating the possibility that student records may be subject to full
disclosure to a criminal defendant, there is the potential that stu-
dents may choose not to be honest and forthcoming with school
teachers, principals, and counselors for fear of having to face scru-
tiny of their records, as well as public scrutiny in court.6 4 For young
children reporting sexual abuse, this new fear is added to the appre-
hensions they may already have about reporting such abuse. While
school records may not inherently carry with them a strong individ-
ual right to privacy, 65 the circumstances surrounding their disclo-
sure should be given greater consideration in determining the level
of confidentiality to be attached. In this light, the distinction made
by the Zaal court between the privacy interests present in Ritchie and
those in Zaal may not be as compelling as the court suggested.66
By holding that Ritchie should not always be the model stan-
dard, Zaal grants judges broad discretion to weigh the relevant fac-
tors and determine which procedure for disclosure is appropriate.
For defense counsel, this decision is advantageous because it sug-
60. See id. at 76, 602 A.2d at 1258.
61. See Rios v. Read, 73 F.R.D. 589, 598 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (emphasizing that FERPA
in no way establishes a school-student privilege).
62. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1988); COMAR § 13A.08.02.20. The Zaal court ex-
plained that "to discern the purpose of the [COMAR] regulation, it is necessary to de-
termine the purpose of the federal statute." Zaal, 326 Md. at 70, 602 A.2d at 1255.
63. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987).
64. See Zaal, 326 Md. at 82, 602 A.2d at 1261.
65. See id. at 71, 602 A.2d at 1256.
66. See id. at 81, 602 A.2d at 1260.
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gests that even a minor connection between the issue of credibility
and the information in the records may lead to increased access if
the judge can be convinced that privacy concerns are not overrid-
ing.67 For prosecutors, it creates a strong impetus to emphasize the
strong individual or public interest in the confidential nature of the
records being sought. The Zaal court appeared to disfavor in camera
review because it was apprehensive about a judge's ability to deter-
mine what evidence is favorable to the defendant's case. Thus, it is
likely that only the strongest of privacy interests will be given the
protection afforded by in camera review.
It is clear that the court was particularly concerned with the idea
that ajudge may not be the proper authority to determine what sub-
tle pieces of evidence may be valuable to the accused.68 While a
genuine concern, the court's emphasis is misplaced. As the
Supreme Court pointed out in Ritchie, the judge's temporary role as
advocate during in camera review does not provide the judge with
unchecked power.69 The Ritchie court emphasized:
If a defendant is aware of specific information contained in
the file .... he is free to request it directly from the court,
and argue in favor of its materiality. Moreover, the duty to
disclose is ongoing; information that may be deemed im-
material upon original examination may become important
as the proceedings progress, and the court would be obli-
gated to release information material to the fairness of the
trial.70
Additionally, the judge's determination regarding what evidence is
material to the defendant is still subject to judicial review.71 The
Zaal court, however, was not comfortable with these checks on the
67. It was this concern, that mere assertions of relevance may permit wider disclo-
sure, that brought the Supreme Court of Minnesota to follow the standard of in camera
review that was later to be set forth in Ritchie. See State v. Paradee, 403 N.W.2d 640, 642
(Minn. 1987) (rejecting the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's decision in Ritchie to pro-
vide full disclosure to the defendant on the grounds that this was "an approach which in
effect allows defense counsel easy access to various types of privileged and confidential
records simply by asserting that the records might contain material relevant to the
defense").
68. See Zaal, 326 Md. at 86, 602 A.2d at 1263. The Supreme Court apparently
shared this concern. See Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 874-85 (1966) (holding
that the defendant was entitled to view grand jury testimony and that in camera review
was inappropriate). The Dennis Court explained that "[in our adversary system, it is
enough for judges to judge. The determination of what may be useful to the defense
can properly and effectively be made only by an advocate." Id. at 875.
69. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987).
70. Id.
71. See Paradee, 403 N.E.2d at 642.
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trial judge's role as advocate. Consequently, the court chose to err
on the side of providing greater access to the accused.
Nevertheless, the Zaal court properly recognized that the rela-
tive balancing of privacy rights with a defendant's legitimate right of
access to material evidence may not always produce the same out-
come. While courts following Ritchie adhere to in camera review
whenever privacy interests must be balanced with a criminal defend-
ant's interest in obtaining relevant evidence,7 3 Zaal provides Mary-
land courts with the flexibility to acknowledge that the two interests
may not be so equal as to require such limited review. In some cir-
cumstances, an accused's right to fully defend himself may greatly
outweigh any interest in confidentiality.7 ' The Zaal decision grants
Maryland courts the capability to address such circumstances
equitably.
5. Conclusion.-In Zaal, the Court of Appeals rejected a strict
application of the federal standard of in camera review when deter-
mining the materiality of sensitive records. 75 In so doing, Zaal al-
lows courts to seek other alternatives that may better address the
defendant's need to have a fair review of the records. While the Zaal
decision does not create a bright line rule enabling practitioners to
predict a court's ruling on the form of review of sensitive records
used for impeachment purposes, it does outline the factors that the
court deems relevant to such a determination. 76 These factors sug-
gest a strong emphasis by the court on the defendant's right to have
the benefit of advocate review of sensitive records.
TERI KAUFMAN
B. A Troublesome Expansion of the Admissibility of "Other Crimes"
Evidence and Limitation of Discovery
In State v. Brown,77 the Court of Appeals held that evidence of
"other crimes" that has "special relevance" to a contested issue in a
case may properly be admitted, despite Maryland's general rule ex-
72. See Zaal, 326 Md. at 87, 602 A.2d at 1264.
73. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (holding that the defendant's right
to confrontation was paramount to the interest of the State in protecting the confidenti-
ality of records of juvenile offenders).
75. See Zaal, 326 Md. at 86, 602 A.2d at 1263.
76. See id. at 87, 602 A.2d at 1264.
77. 327 Md. 81, 607 A.2d 923 (1992).
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cluding such evidence. 78 The court also held that the State is not
required to disclose statements concerning other crimes when made
by a defendant to an undercover agent. 79 By treating the two issues
as separate and independent questions, the Brown court fashioned a
rule whereby certain other-crimes evidence is admissible, but not
discoverable. In reaching its decision, the court failed to recognize
the unfair position in which many Maryland defendants will find
themselves as a result of the rule.
1. The Case.-On February 17, 1988, Special Agent Kenneth
Johnson of the Drug Enforcement Administration and paid-inform-
ant Reginald Gray purchased an ounce of cocaine at the Brooks
Court Apartments in Annapolis, Maryland.8" The purchase was part
of an ongoing investigation of drug activity in the area that had re-
cently focused on the defendant, Shirley Mitchell Brown."' Testi-
mony at Brown's trial indicated that on the day in question, Gray
spoke to Brown about the price of cocaine while Special AgentJohn-
son waited in the car.8 2 Gray then returned to Johnson and told
him, per Brown's request, to move the car further away from where
Brown was standing. 3 During that time, Johnson saw Brown speak
with another man who went into an apartment and later emerged
with the cocaine. 84 The man delivered it to Johnson in exchange for
the purchase price.8 5 A local police officer, Detective Todd Young,
watched the transaction from nearby and provided testimony at trial
corroborating this information.8 6
Young also testified at Brown's trial regarding a second under-
cover purchase involving Brown, which occurred approximately
three weeks later on March 7.87 At that time, Brown, again working
through an informant, explained to Young: " 'It's not that you're
not okay, I just don't deal with anybody new.' "88 This testimony, as
78. Id. at 86-87, 607 A.2d at 925.
79. Id. at 94-95, 607 A.2d at 929. The court stated that it "can find no reason to
compel the State to produce a statement voluntarily made to an undercover officer dur-
ing a drug transaction merely because it occurred after the crime for which the defend-
ant was charged." Id. at 95, 607 A.2d at 929.
80. Id. at 84, 607 A.2d at 924.
81. See id. at 83, 607 A.2d at 924.





87. See id. at 84-85, 607 A.2d at 924-25.
88. Id. at 85, 607 A.2d at 924-25.
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well as Brown's conviction record from the March 7 transaction, was
admitted into evidence at the trial for the February 17 offense for
the purpose of establishing Brown's identity.89
Brown was convicted of both distribution and conspiracy to dis-
tribute cocaine.9" The Court of Special Appeals reversed the con-
viction, holding that Brown's statement to Detective Young was
discoverable under Maryland Rule 4-263(b)(2), and the State's fail-
ure to disclose it prior to trial was grounds for a mistrial.9 ' Addi-
tionally, the intermediate appellate court found that the trial judge
had abused his discretion when he admitted evidence of the March 7
transaction because its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative
value .9
2
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals, but for significantly different reasons.9 3 The Court of
Appeals based its decision solely on the improper admission of the
conviction record.94 The court found that the trial court's admis-
sion of Brown's statement was proper because it "had special rele-
vance to a contested issue in the case, was not introduced simply to
prove criminal character, and had probative force that substantially
outweighed its potential for unfair prejudice."95 Moreover, the
court declared that Young's testimony regarding the events of
March 7 was necessary for the jury to understand the significance of
the statement. 96 Finally, based on the policy reasons behind Rule 4-
263, 7 and previous judicial interpretations of the rule, 98 the court
held that Brown's statement was not discoverable because it was
made to an undercover state agent during the commission of a
89. Id., 607 A.2d at 925.
90. Id. at 83, 607 A.2d at 924.
91. See Brown v. State, 85 Md. App. 523, 532-33, 584 A.2d 164, 169-70 (1991), aff'd,
327 Md. 81, 607 A.2d 923 (1992).
92. See id. at 537, 584 A.2d at 171.
93. Brown, 327 Md. at 87, 607 A.2d at 926.
94. Id. at 89-90, 607 A.2d at 927. The court noted that the conviction record might
have caused the jury to give more weight to Young's testimony, or indicated to the jury
that the judge believed Brown used drugs regularly. See id. The prejudicial effect of the
record, therefore, outweighed its probative value, and the court could not rule that its
admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 90, 607 A.2d at 927.
95. Id. at 86-87, 607 A.2d at 925.
96. Id. at 89, 607 A.2d at 926-27.
97. Rule 4-263 was originally designed "to force the defendant to file certain mo-
tions before trial, including a motion to suppress an unlawfully obtained statement,"
White v. State, 300 Md. 719, 734, 481 A.2d 201, 208 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1062
(1985). See also infra text accompanying note 131.
98. See Bailey v. State, 303 Md. 650, 496 A.2d 665 (1985);Jennings v. State, 303 Md.





a. "Other Crimes" Evidence.-Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)
states: "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible
to prove the character of a person in order to show action in con-
formity therewith."' ' 0 One noted commentator has stated that the
"other crimes" rule is based upon the belief that the state should
not be allowed to suggest that the defendant is more likely to have
committed the crime for which he is on trial simply because he has
committed other crimes. 10 The Court of Appeals has asserted that
"few principles of American criminal jurisprudence [are] more uni-
versally accepted."'0 2 In fact, the court recently reaffirmed the need
for an "unremitting appreciation of the significant potential for un-
fair prejudice that is likely to accompany the admission of other bad
acts evidence,""' and concluded that the exclusionary approach ad-
vances that end.' 0 4 As the court acknowledged, a policy of general
admission of other-crimes evidence would create an " 'almost insur-
mountable' " prejudice against the defendant.'0 5 Furthermore, it
could surprise the defendant unfairly, requiring him to answer for
his past actions without adequate preparation.' 0 6 Finally, the gen-
eral admission of other-crimes evidence would bring in a host of
collateral issues that would unnecessarily complicate the trial.' 0 7
The dangers associated with the admission of "other crimes"
evidence are numerous,i08 but exceptions have developed that en-
able courts to admit evidence that is relevant to the direct proof that
a defendant committed a crime, rather than the indirect proof offered
by a showing of criminal character.i °9 The Court of Appeals out-
99. Brown, 327 Md. at 91-95, 607 A.2d at 928-29.
100. FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
101. See I JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 190 (4th ed. 1992).
102. See Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468, 473, 386 A.2d 757, 761 (1978).
103. Harris v. State, 324 Md. 490, 499-500, 597 A.2d 956, 961 (1991).
104. Id. at 500, 597 A.2d at 961.
105. Id. at 495-96, 597 A.2d at 959 (quotingJulius Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Simi-
lar Fact Evidence: England, 46 HARV. L. REV. 954, 957-58 (1933)). One study "found that
jurors in criminal cases involving similar charges and similar evidence convicted 27 per-
cent more often when informed of a prior conviction." Rand K. Shotwell, Comment,
Exclusion of Prior Acquittals: An Attack on the Prosecutor's Delight, 21 UCLA L. REV. 892, 910
(1974).
106. But see Blake v. State, 15 Md. App. 674, 681, 292 A.2d 780, 783 (1972) (holding
that nondisclosure did not impair an accused's ability to defend).
107. See Harris, 324 Md. at 496, 597 A.2d at 959.
108. See supra notes 102-106 and accompanying text.
109. See Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468, 473, 368 A.2d 757, 761 (1978).
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lined these exceptions in Ross v. State:"l 0
[E]vidence of other crimes may be admitted when it tends
to establish (1) motive, (2) intent, (3) absence of mistake,
(4) a common scheme or plan embracing the commission
of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of
one tends to establish the other, and (5) the identity of the
person charged with the commission of a crime on trial."'
As the Ross court noted, however, this list of exceptions is not ex-
haustive."12 It is instead "an open-ended list always capable of ex-
pansion wherever a clear instance of relevance might arise that
somehow fails to fit neatly into one of the pigeonholes."' '
The development of exceptions has been described as a "Prose-
cutor's Delight" by many who fear that it is too easy to link evidence
of prior acts to one of the above-mentioned propositions. " 4 Quali-
fication as an exception, however, is only the first step in getting
other-crimes evidence admitted. The evidence must also be judged
to have probative value that outweighs its prejudicial effect.' This
judgment is a matter of discretion for the trial court." 6 But the po-
tential for harm to the defendant mandates that the trial judge exer-
cise "rigid scrutiny" in making a determination on admissibility." 7
Taking these concerns into account, the following rule has evolved
in Maryland:
[E]vidence of other bad acts is generally not admissible [ex-
cept] for those instances in which the evidence 1) has spe-
cial relevance, i.e. is substantially relevant to some
contested issue in the case and is not offered simply to
prove criminal character, and 2) has probative force that
substantially outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice
118
110. 276 Md. 664, 350 A.2d 680 (1976).
111. Id. at 669-70, 350 A.2d at 684.
112. The court pointed out that "[a]dditional exceptions have also been recognized."
Id. at 670, 350 A.2d at 684.
113. Anaweck v. State, 63 Md. App. 239, 257, 492 A.2d 658, 667 (1985). See also
Harris v. State, 324 Md. 490, 497-98, 597 A.2d 956, 960 (1991) (recognizing that the list
of commonly cited exceptions to the exclusionary rule is not exclusive).
114. See Shotwell, supra note 105, at 896.
115. See, e.g., Harris, 324 Md. at 500, 597 A.2d at 961. See generally FED. R. Evio. 403
("[E]vidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice .... ).
116. See State v. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630, 635, 552 A.2d 896, 898 (1989).
117. Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 671, 350 A.2d 680, 685 (1976).
118. Harris, 324 Md. at 500, 597 A.2d at 961. In addition, the Court of Appeals has,
in some cases, pointed out the importance of comparing the necessity for "other
crimes" evidence against the strength of the prosecution's case. This additional evalua-
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b. Discovery of Statements Under Rule 4-263(b)(2).-Also at issue
in Brown was Maryland Rule 4-263(b)(2), which provides:
Upon request of the defendant, the State's Attorney shall:
(2) Statements of the Defendant.-As to all statements
made by the defendant to a State agent that the State in-
tends to use at a hearing or trial, furnish to the defendant
... (A) a copy of each written or recorded statement, and
(B) the substance of each oral statement and a copy of all
reports of each oral statement. I9
Unfortunately, Rule 4-263 had never been judicially interpreted in
connection with "other crimes" evidence prior to Brown.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-
a. "Other Crimes" Evidence.-The Brown court began by ad-
dressing the admissibility of the "other crimes" evidence, 2 ' finding
that Brown's statement to Detective Young on March 7 was substan-
tially relevant to the way in which Brown typically sold drugs, and
particularly to how he acted during the February 17 transaction.121
The Court of Special Appeals held that the evidence was inadmissi-
ble because it did not establish a modus operandi unique to the de-
fendant. 122 The Court of Appeals agreed, acknowledging "that
Brown's use of a 'runner'... was not ' "so unusual and distinctive as to
be like a signature" ' and earmark the crime as the handiwork of the
accused."'12' Evidence of modus operandi is used to identify the
criminal actor by showing that he or she was involved in another
crime so similar to the one charged that the same person must have
tion, however, is usually considered to have taken place in satisfying the requirement
that the other-crimes evidence be relevant to a contested issue. See, e.g., Faulkner, 314
Md. at 635, 552 A.2d at 898 (ruling that the final step includes evaluating the probative
value of the evidence as well as the State's need for the evidence to prove their case).
119. MD. R. 4-263(b)(2).
120. The court held the admission of the conviction record to be reversible error,
summarily explaining that its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value. See
Brown, 327 Md. at 89-90, 607 A.2d at 927.
121. See id. at 89, 607 A.2d at 926.
122. See Brown v. State, 85 Md. App. 523, 537, 584 A.2d. 164, 171 (1991), aff'd, 327
Md. 81, 607 A.2d 933 (1992).
123. Brown, 327 Md. at 87, 607 A.2d at 925-26 (quoting State v. Faulkner, 314 Md.
630, 638, 552 A.2d 896, 900 (1989) (quoting McKnight v. State, 280 Md. 604, 613, 375
A.2d 551, 556 (1977) (quoting EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EvIDENCE § 190, at
479 (2d ed. 1972)))).
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committed both. 24 An often-cited exception to the rule against
other-crimes evidence, modus operandi requires evidence that is
unique. 12 Brown's use of a "runner," however, was not unique in
the context of this crime. Moreover, because Brown's identity was
not a contested issue, other-crimes evidence to prove identity, even
if sufficient to establish a modus operandi, was not admissible in this
case.126 As the court noted, "Were this the only ground of admissi-
bility, the 'other crimes' evidence could not be admitted."'' 27
The regularly-cited exceptions to the rule are not, however, the
only grounds for admission. Although approximately ninety-five
percent of admissible "other crimes" evidence falls into one of the
categories identified in Ross, "It]he decisive criterion nonetheless re-
mains substantial relevance itself, not merely a convenient but coin-
cidental identification with one of its familiar illustrative
examples."'' 21 In Brown, the court rationalized its decision by ex-
plaining that the statement went beyond indicating that Brown par-
ticipated in another similar crime, but constituted "an admission
about the manner in which he acts when carrying on his drug busi-
ness." 129 It was therefore substantially relevant to the instant trans-
action, as well as the March 7 transaction.13 0
b. Discovery of Statements Under Rule 4-263(b)(2).-In reaching
the discovery issue, the court reviewed the history of interpretation
of Rule 4-263 and its predecessors, and concluded that the Rule's
primary purpose is to make discoverable statements made by de-
fendants that may have been unlawfully obtained.13 ' Relying pri-
marily onJennings v. State, 132 the court ruled that because statements
made to an undercover officer during a crime could not have been
obtained unlawfully, they are not discoverable under Rule 4-263. 13
4. Analysis.-The Brown court's ruling on the admissibility of
the "other crimes" evidence adhered to the rule in Maryland. How-
ever, the court's decision regarding the discoverability of certain
124. See generally Faulkner, 314 Md. at 638-39, 552 A.2d at 900 (discussing the modus
operandi exception).
125. See id. at 639, 552 A.2d at 900.
126. See Brown, 327 Md. at 87, 607 A.2d at 925-26.
127. Id., 607 A.2d at 926.
128. Anaweck v. State, 63 Md. App. 239, 257, 492 A.2d 658, 667 (1985).
129. Brown, 327 Md. at 88, 607 A.2d at 926.
130. Id. at 89, 607 A.2d at 926.
131. See id. at 91-94, 607 A.2d at 928-29.
132. 303 Md. 72, 492 A.2d 295 (1985).
133. Brown, 327 Md. at 94, 607 A.2d at 929.
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categories of "other crimes" evidence significantly undermines the
aim of the rule: to preserve fairness in the courtroom. The court
reached this troublesome result only by treating the issues as two
unrelated questions.
As the court pointed out in Harris v. State,' 4 "other crimes"
evidence must be substantially relevant to a contested issue in the
case to be admitted at trial.'3 5 In Brown, it was uncontested that the
defendant was at the scene of the crime on February 17, but the
degree to which he participated in the crime, if at all, was unclear.
For example, Special Agent Johnson did not speak with Brown re-
garding the deal, nor was there any evidence that Brown was di-
rectly involved in any way with delivery or payment.' 36 This lack of
evidence of direct involvement created uncertainty. Brown's state-
ment to Detective Young was offered to explain the lack of direct
contact with Johnson. The statement indicated that Brown was act-
ing in accordance with his general method of dealing with new cus-
tomers, and tended to prove that he was indeed a participant in the
February 17 transaction.1 37 As the rule prohibiting other-crimes ev-
idence demands, the statement had "relevancy ... beyond any im-
proper suggestion that Brown has a criminal propensity, or that
since he dealt drugs on another occasion, he is more likely to have
done so in the case charged."' 13 ' Thus, the Court of Appeals
deemed the statement properly admitted by the trial court, 13 9 and
turned to the question of its discoverability.
The discoverability of a statement that is evidence of other
crimes had never before been specifically addressed in Maryland,
but earlier opinions made clear the importance of avoiding surprise
in conjunction with the presentation of other-crimes evidence. For
example, in Ross v. State, 4 ' the Court of Appeals acknowledged that
a defendant who had not been made aware in advance that evidence
of other criminal acts would be used against him could not be prop-
erly prepared to defend himself. 4 ' This principle was also recog-
134. 324 Md. 490, 597 A.2d 956 (1991).
135. Id. at 500, 597 A.2d at 961.
136. Brown, 327 Md. at 84, 607 A.2d at 924.
137. See id. at 86, 607 A.2d at 925. The court noted the State's identification of the
contested issue as the defendant's participation in the crime, but never directly identi-
fied it as such in its own analysis. See id.
138. Id. at 88, 607 A.2d at 926.
139. The court did not discuss the probative value and potential prejudicial effect of
the statement because it addressed the admissibility of the evidence only to correct the
intermediate court's specific holding. See id. at 87-88, 607 A.2d at 926.
140. 276 Md. 664, 350 A.2d 680 (1976).
141. See id. at 669, 350 A.2d at 684.
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nized in Worthen v. State,142 where the Court of Special Appeals
indicated that the defendant had suffered an injustice when he was
denied a continuance to investigate prior crimes alleged against
him. 143 Finally, in Harris v. State,' 44 the Court of Appeals noted that
one of the dangers traditionally associated with other-crimes evi-
dence has been the element of surprise, where the defendant is
compelled, "at a moment's notice, to answer charges concerning the
whole of his past life.' 1 45 The Harris court admitted that this con-
cern "may have been somewhat alleviated by current disclosure and
discovery procedures in criminal cases."' 46 The practical effect of
the decision in Brown, however, is to resurrect the need for such a
concern.
By declaring that the State was not required to disclose the
statement prior to its use at trial, the court effectively created a situ-
ation in which the State may use other-crimes evidence to the severe
disadvantage of the defendant. Because a statement, made at a time
completely separate from the instant crime, may be used against the
accused without notice, a defendant is likely to be unfairly surprised
and unable to effectively defend himself.
The court reached its decision on this issue by significantly mis-
construing its holding inJennings v. State.147 Contrary to the Brown
court's reading of Jennings, the fact that the defendant's statements
were not unlawfully obtained was not the basis of the earlier court's
decision against discoverability. 14 InJennings, the State, after indi-
cating in a discovery response that it knew of no statements by the
defendant that might be used at trial, introduced evidence of Jen-
nings's conversation with an undercover agent about the price of
drugs sold during the transaction for which he was standing trial., 49
The Court of Appeals held that the State was not required under
Rule 4-263 to disclose those statements prior to trial.' 50
Jennings's statements, however, differed from Brown's in two
fundamental ways. First, Jennings's statements were made during
142. 41 Md. App. 20, 399 A.2d 272 (1979).
143. See id. at 43, 399 A.2d at 284.
144. 324 Md. 490, 597 A.2d 956 (1991).
145. Id. at 496, 597 A.2d at 959 (quoting Stone, supra note 105, at 957-58).
146. Id.
147. 303 Md. 72, 492 A.2d 295 (1985).
148. SeeJennings, 303 Md. at 83, 492 A.2d at 300 (acknowledging the importance of
the defendant's surprise at the use of his statements against him).
149. See id. at 74-75, 492 A.2d at 296.
150. Id. at 85-86, 492 A.2d at 302.
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the commission of the crime for which he was on trial.' 5 ' Second,
his statements, unlike Brown's, constituted part of the crime it-
self.' 52 In short, the statements at issue inJennings were not really
"other crimes" evidence.
Similarly, Jennings could hardly claim to have been surprised
and unfairly disadvantaged by the presentation at trial of statements
that actually constituted the crime charged. Brown's predicament is
clearly distinguishable. As the Court of Special Appeals pointed
out, "[Brown's] statement was an extraneous remark made at the
conclusion of a sale of cocaine conducted almost three weeks after
the alleged transaction for which [he] was on trial."'' 5 3 In no way
should he have been expected to anticipate this evidence at trial and
prepare to defend against it.
In Brown, however, the Court of Appeals did not connect the
"other crimes" issue to the discovery issue. Rather, the court
seemed to operate under the assumption that once evidence of
other crimes is deemed admissible, it is no longer deserving of spe-
cial consideration. This may not be a sound assumption. A decision
to admit other-crimes evidence does not mean the evidence is not
prejudicial; it means only that, in the interest of ascertaining the
truth, it has been judged important enough to be admitted despite
its prejudicial effect. Defendants are most in need of protection
from the unfair prejudice associated with "other crimes" evidence
when such evidence is presented at trial without notice. In fact, the
Federal Rules of Evidence have recently been amended to reflect
this need. Rule 404(b) now mandates that "upon request by the
accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable
notice in advance of trial . . . of the general nature of any [other-
crimes] evidence it intends to introduce at trial." ' 14 In this way, de-
fendants are given the chance to prepare for their defenses more
adequately.
The Court of Appeals, however, could "find no reason to com-
pel the State to produce a statement" like Brown's. 155 Given the
opportunity to fashion a rule that would give defendants a chance to
better defend themselves against the unfair prejudice caused by
"other crimes" evidence, the court elected to separate the discovery
151. See id. at 74, 492 A.2d at 296.
152. See id.
153. Brown v. State, 85 Md. App. 523, 532, 584 A.2d 164, 169 (1991), aff'd, 327 Md.
81, 607 A.2d 933 (1992).
154. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
155. Brown, 327 Md. at 95, 607 A.2d at 929.
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and evidence issues in the case, ignoring the effect such a ruling will
have on defendants confronted with other-crimes evidence in the
future. As theJennings court pointed out earlier, the question ulti-
mately revolves around policy concerns.156 The Brown court chose a
policy that disregards the principles underlying the general rule of
excluding "other crimes" evidence, thereby diluting the protections
the rule seeks to insure.
5. Conclusion.-In Brown, the Court of Appeals ignored the
reasons for the special treatment normally given to "other crimes"
evidence and misinterpreted its holding inJennings v. State. Conse-
quently, the court has created a rule whereby evidence of other
crimes is not subject to discovery if it is in the form of a statement
made to an undercover officer during any crime. The ruling will
strip many Maryland criminal defendants of the protections they de-
serve with regard to this particularly prejudicial type of evidence.
KIMBERLY L. LIMBRICK
C. The Discretionary Power to Exclude Evidence: The Business Records
Exception & the "Trustworthiness" Factor
In Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Armstrong,157 two former Bethlehem
Steel employees suffering from asbestosis sued several manufactur-
ers and suppliers of asbestos-containing insulation in a products lia-
bility action.' 58  When the defendants sought admission of a
potentially exculpatory piece of evidence, namely a favorable asbes-
tos exposure report, the trial judge excluded it because of its "unre-
liability."' 59 On appeal, the Court of Appeals took a fresh look at
Maryland's business records exception to the hearsay rule, provided
some guidance to trial court judges for its application, and created a
presumption of trustworthiness for business records that meet the
exception's technical requirements. 60
1. The Case.-Respondents Othello Armstrong and Forrest
Wood' 6' originally brought suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
156. SeeJennings, 303 Md. at 84, 492 A.2d at 301.
157. 326 Md. 107, 604 A.2d 47, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 204 (1992).
158. See id. at 111, 604 A.2d at 49.
159. See id. at 112, 604 A.2d at 49.
160. Id. at 116, 604 A.2d at 51.
161. During both the trial and first appeal, two other workers were involved in this
suit as plaintiffs. Neither was involved at the Court of Appeals level because the jury
found that they did not suffer from asbestosis. See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Armstrong, 87
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City against Owens-Illinois, Owens-Coming Fiberglas and Eagle-
Picher Industries, among others, as the manufacturers, installers,
and suppliers of asbestos products, under theories of negligence
and strict liability in tort. 16 2 Only Owens-Illinois was involved on
appeal because Owens-Coming settled and Eagle-Picher's appeal
was stayed after it filed for bankruptcy. 63 Both Armstrong and
Wood claimed to have been exposed to heavy clouds of asbestos
dust from asbestos-containing insulation that was in use at Bethle-
hem Steel shipyards during their employment there."6 Armstrong
had worked there from 1942 to 1963 as both a laborer and a welder;
Wood had worked there from 1941 to 1975 as a rigger.' 65 They
alleged that this exposure had caused them to contract asbestosis. ,66
At trial, Owens-Illinois attempted to offer into evidence an as-
bestos exposure study conducted by a Bethlehem Steel industrial
health engineer in 1969.67 The report described three air samples
"represent[ing] the actual amount of asbestos exposure that [was]
claimed by the plaintiffs."' 68 Owens-Illinois claimed that if the re-
port was admitted, it would show that "no measurable amount of
asbestos fibers [was] detected."'' 69 The trial court recognized that
the report met the technical requirements of the business records
exception; but, in an exercise ofjudicial discretion, the court found
that the report lacked sufficient reliability to be admitted.'
70
The Court of Special Appeals concurred with the trial judge's
finding. 17' The appellate court gave a number of reasons for this
result: (1) "[t]he investigation and report were not required by
law"; (2) the report appeared to be a one-time occurrence; (3)
"there was nothing to show that [the study was] a necessary compo-
nent of the daily operation of [the] business"; (4) the motive behind
creating the report was questionable; and (5) "[t]he report lacked
Md. App. 699, 732, 591 A.2d 544, 559 (199 1), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 326 Md. 107,
604 A.2d 47, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 204 (1992).
162. Armstrong, 326 Md. at 111, 604 A.2d at 49.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 110-11, 604 A.2d at 48-49.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 118, 604 A.2d at 52.
167. See id. at 112, 604 A.2d at 49.
168. Petitioner's Brief at 10, Armstrong (No. 77-1991).
169. Armstrong, 326 Md. at 112, 604 A.2d at 49.
170. See id.
171. See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Armstrong, 87 Md. App. 699, 713, 591 A.2d 544, 550




specificity in the description of the controls in the investigation."' 7
In sum, the Court of Special Appeals found that these factors
weighed against admittance either because they indicated the inher-
ent unreliability of the report, or alternatively, because they indi-
cated that the asbestos report was not a "business record" at all.
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to address, among other
things, the business records exception in Maryland. v3
2. Legal Background.-In Maryland, hearsay is defined as a writ-
ten or oral statement, or assertive nonverbal conduct, 17 4 "made
somewhere other than from the witness stand before the trier of fact
at the trial in progress,"'' 75 which is offered at the trial in progress as
proof of the matter asserted within the statement or conduct.' 7 6
The Supreme Court, in Chambers v. Mississippi,' 77 explained:
The hearsay rule ... is based on experience and grounded
in the notion that untrustworthy evidence should not be
presented to the triers of fact. Out-of-court statements are
traditionally excluded because they lack the conventional
indicia of reliability: they are usually not made under oath
or other circumstances that impress the speaker with the
solemnity of his statements; the declarant's word is not
subject to cross-examination; and he is not available in or-
der that his demeanor and credibility may be assessed by
the jury. A number of exceptions have developed over the
years to allow admission of hearsay statements made under
circumstances that tend to assure reliability and thereby
compensate for the absence of the oath and opportunity
for cross-examination. 178
The business records exception 79 is one category of hearsay
172. Id. at 712, 591 A.2d at 550. The study was found not to be a "necessary compo-
nent of ... daily operation" because Bethlehem Steel did not appear to depend on the
accuracy of the information contained in the report. See id.
173. See Armstrong, 326 Md. at 112, 604 A.2d at 49.
174. See LYNN McLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 801.3 (1st ed. 1987).
175. Id. § 801.2, at 273.
176. See id. § 801.1.
177. 410 U.S. 284 (1972).
178. Id. at 298-99 (citation omitted). For a complete account of the history of the
hearsay rule, see 2 STRONG, supra note 101, § 244; McLAIN, supra note 174, § 801.1, at
269.
179. The authorities are consistent in finding that the present day business records
exception is an outgrowth of the common-law "shopbook rule." See State v. Garlick, 313
Md. 209, 216, 545 A.2d 27, 30 (1988); Robert E. Powell, Admissibility of Hospital Records
Into Evidence, 21 MD. L. REV. 22, 30 (1961). See also 2 STRONG, supra note 101, § 285
(discussing the evolution of the business records exception). This rule was created by
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that is admissible because it has proven to be "especially relia-
ble."18 ° The exception is based on the notion that "insincerity will
be minimized, because the business will want accurate records to
rely on and errors are likely to be caught by others in or out of the
business."' At its core, the exception maintains this notion of reli-
ability.1 82 The reliability of such records allegedly derives from the
fact that the records are made in the "regular course" of business,
and it is the "regular course" of the business to rely on such
records. 1 3
At present, "Maryland's rules of evidence are not codified;
rather, they are found in common-law decisions, legislative enact-
the courts to overcome the problems of evidence facing merchants when testifying about
their accounts. Powell, supra, at 30. Its creation allowed merchants' accounts to be ad-
mitted into evidence if they could meet a set of strict requirements. Though the require-
ments varied among jurisdictions, some requirements were that "the books bear an
honest appearance," and "each transaction not exceed a certain limited value." See 2
STRONG, supra note 101, § 285. Others included:
the entries be regularly made at or about the time of the transaction and as a
part of the routine of the business .... the party using the book not have had a
clerk.... the party filed a "supplemental oath" to the justness of each account,
• . . witnesses testify from their experience in dealing with the party that the
books are honest.... the books be used only to prove open accounts for goods
and services furnished the defendant .... and . other proof be made of the
actual delivery of some of the goods.
Id. These requirements made its application difficult, and subsequent legislation sought
to liberalize the terms for admissibility. See Burroughs Int'l Co. v. Datronics Eng'rs, Inc.,
254 Md. 327, 347, 255 A.2d 341, 350 (1969) (referring to the Maryland statute currently
codified at MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 10-101 (1989) (regarding the admissi-
bility of business records)).
180. See McLAIN, supra note 174, § 803.1, at 340 ("[E]ach such 'hearsay exception' has
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness which negate or minimize one or more of
the hearsay dangers .... ").
181. Id. § 803(6).1, at 380.
182. See Garlick, 313 Md. at 216, 545 A.2d at 30.
183. See generally 2 STRONG, supra note 101, § 286 (explaining "regularly kept
records"). The current business records exception in Maryland is located at § 10-10 1 of
the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, which states:
(a) Definition of "business. "-"Business" includes business, profession, and
occupation of every kind.
(b) Admissibility.-A writing or record made in the regular course of busi-
ness as a memorandum or record of an act, transaction, occurrence, or event is
admissible to prove the act, transaction, occurrence, or event.
(c) Time of making records.-The practice of the business must be to make
such written records of its acts at the time they are done or within a reasonable
time afterwards.
(d) Lack of knowledge of maker.-The lack of personal knowledge of the
maker of the written notice may be shown to affect the weight of the evidence
but not its admissibility.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 10-101 (1989).
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ments, and court rules."' 8 4 Therefore, in order to fully appreciate
the intricacies of the business records exception, it is essential to
review the case law surrounding its application. The most influen-
tial decision, for purposes of this analysis, was that of the Supreme
Court in Palmer v. Hoffman, Is5 which helped define the role of the
trial judge in determining the "trustworthiness" of a business rec-
ord offered as evidence.
18 6
In Palmer, a train engineer gave his statement about a train acci-
dent in which he was involved, to both a railroad representative and
a state representative.8 7 Though the engineer had since died, his
statement was offered into evidence at trial.' 88 The Supreme Court
found that the engineer's statement was not made "in the regular
course of business." 89 Some authorities have interpreted this deci-
sion to mean that the report was inadmissible because it was not the
railroad's business to make such reports, 190 but according to
McCormick,
the most reasonable reading of [Palmer] is that it did not
create a blanket rule of exclusion for accident reports or
similar records kept by businesses. Rather, it recognized a
discretionary power in the trial court to exclude evidence
which meets the letter of the business records exception,
but which, under the circumstances appears to lack the reli-
ability business records are assumed ordinarily to have.'
The current federal rule 92 incorporates Palmer through express lan-
184. Frank M. Carpenter, Jr., Note, Admissibility of Refusal to Submit to a Breathalyzer Test,
51 MD. L. REV. 701, 704 (1992). (Editor's note: Maryland is currently in the process of codifying
its evidence rules.)
185. 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
186. See infra notes 187-193 and accompanying text.
187. Palmer, 318 U.S. at 111.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. " '[R]egular course' of business must find its meaning in the inherent nature of
the business in question and in the methods systematically employed for the conduct of
the business as a business." Id. at 115. See also JOSEPH F. MURPHY, JR., MARYLAND EvI-
DENCE HANDBOOK § 804(A) (1989) ("The train wreck report might be 'prepared in the
ordinary course of business,' but it is certainly not in the railroad's ordinary course of
business to have train wrecks."); 4 DAVID W. LoUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER,
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 447, at 670 & n.20 (1980) ("A reasonable reading of Palmer is that
it adopted a per se rule for accident reports .
191. 2 STRONG, supra note 101, § 288.
192. The Federal Rules define a "business record" as
[a] memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts,
events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from
information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a
regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that
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guage giving the trial court discretion to refuse to admit evidence
based on the circumstances.19 3
This discretionary power had never been explicitly recognized
in Maryland. Indications that the trial court should retain some
form of discretionary power have existed since as early as 1966,
when in Weishaar v. Canestrale,194 the Court of Appeals upheld the
exclusion of evidence' 95 because the "circumstances indicate[d] an
enhanced motive for insincerity."'196 However, the first mention of
Palmer in Maryland was not until the 1978 decision, Pratt v. State.'9 7
In that case, the Court of Special Appeals noted that in other juris-
dictions "the trial court possesses discretionary power to exclude
reports which appear to be unreliable even though they satisfy the
letter of the business record exception," while in Maryland no such
flexibility existed.' 9 8 The court did not reach the issue, however, as
it decided the case on other grounds.' 99 It was not until 1988, when
the Court of Appeals gave tacit approval to the Palmer holding in
business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compila-
tion, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness,
unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation
indicate lack of trustworthiness.
FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
193. See McLAIN, supra note 174, § 803(6).2, at 389-90.
[Federal Rule of Evidence] 803(6) also provides a safety valve: a record other-
wise qualified will be inadmissible as a business record if "the source of infor-
mation or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of
trustworthiness." . . . [This clause was] intended to allow the court to exclude
self-serving records made in anticipation of litigation, as well as other records
which lack circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.
Id. (footnotes omitted). The Palmer decision led to the adoption of this clause. See 4
LoUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 190, § 447, at 668.
194. 241 Md. 676, 217 A.2d 525 (1966).
195. See id. at 686, 217 A.2d at 531 (upholding the trial court's exclusion of a bill from
the owner-bailor to the bailee offered by the bailee to prove the value of cargo destroyed
in an accident).
196. McLAIN, supra note 174, § 803(6).1, at 382. The Court of Special Appeals has
commented extensively about the need for reassurances with regard to evidentiary busi-
ness documents. See Fuget v. State, 70 Md. App. 643, 653-54, 522 A.2d 1371, 1376
(1987) (upholding trial judge's use of discretion in finding that a diagnosis in a hospital
record was "made in the normal course of business"); Kline v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
N.A., 43 Md. App. 133, 145, 403 A.2d 395, 401 (1979) (noting that circumstantial evi-
dence can be utilized by a trial judge to determine if a record was made in "the regular
course of business"); Thomas v. Owens, 28 Md. App. 442, 447, 346 A.2d 662, 665
(1975) (requiring records to meet "the test of necessity and circumstantial guaranty of
trustworthiness" (internal quotations omitted)).
197. 39 Md. App. 442, 456 n.13, 387 A.2d 779, 788 n.13 (1978), aff'don other grounds,
284 Md. 516, 398 A.2d 421 (1979).
198. Id. at 456, 387 A.2d at 787-88.
199. See id., 387 A.2d at 788.
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State v. Garlick,2"' that this discretionary power began to emerge af-
firmatively in Maryland.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-Owens-Illinois contended that once
a record met the requirements of the business records exception, it
was automatically admissible, unless the Sixth Amendment Con-
frontation Clause was implicated.20 1 This logic dictated that since
the trial judge found that the Bethlehem Steel report met the re-
quirements of the exception, the study should have been admit-
ted.2 °2 The Court of Appeals disagreed.20 Relying heavily on
Palmer v. Hoffman,2 4 the court held that the "trial judge has discre-
tion to exclude a document that meets the technical requirements of
a business record when the objecting party persuades the judge that
the document lacks the degree of reliability and trustworthiness that
business records are ordinarily assumed to possess. ' 20 5 Thus, once
a record meets the requirements of a business record, a presump-
tion of trustworthiness attaches, and the objecting party bears a
"heavy burden" to show otherwise. 20 6
In reaching this conclusion, the court cited only one Maryland
decision dealing with the business records exception, the 1911 case
of Marine Bank v. Stirling. °7 In Marine Bank, a bank ledger, which
would have otherwise qualified under the business records excep-
tion, was deemed inadmissible by the trial judge because it was too
uncertain and too unreliable. 20 ' The Armstrong court used the hold-
ing in Marine Bank to demonstrate "that, in some instances, business
records may be excluded if established to be unreliable or
untrustworthy."
20 9
The court also used the Federal Rules of Evidence to support
200. 313 Md. 209, 224-25, 545 A.2d 27, 34 (1988).
201. Armstrong, 326 Md. at 112, 604 A.2d at 49. See McLAIN, supra note 174,
§ 803(6). 1, at 377 ("[W]here the face of the writing indicates unreliability, the confron-
tation right precludes its admission against a criminal defendant without producing the
declarant for cross-examination at trial, if he or she is available.").
202. See Armstrong, 326 Md. at 112, 604 A.2d at 49.
203. See id
204. 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
205. Armstrong, 326 Md. at 112-13, 604 A.2d at 49-50.
206. See id. at 116, 604 A.2d at 51.
207. 115 Md. 90, 80 A. 736 (1911).
208. See id. at 102-03, 80 A. at 739-40. The court held that "under such circum-
stances as are shown in this case there is too much indicating the uncertainty and unreli-
ability of this ledger account to permit it to be used as evidence per se, or even in
connection with the testimony of the witnesses." Id. at 103, 80 A. at 740.
209. Armstrong, 326 Md. at 114, 604 A.2d at 50.
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its holding.2"' The Federal Rules explicitly recognize an authority
vested in the trial judge to exclude evidence that lacks reliability and
trustworthiness in both the business records exception, Rule 803(6),
and the public records exception, Rule 803(8).21
Citing the reasoning in Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc.,212 the
Court of Appeals also used Maryland's public records exception, by
analogy, to clarify the business records exception.21 3 In Ellsworth,
the court construed the public records exception set forth in Federal
Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C). 214 Relying significantly on the Fourth
Circuit's opinion in Ellis v. International Playtex, Inc. ,2t5 the Ellsworth
court found that while a presumption of reliability exists for public
records,2 1 6 the record should be deemed inadmissible if factors are
shown to exist that significantly draw this presumption into ques-
tion2 17 The burden of proving unreliability was held to be on the
party opposing admission.218
The Armstrong court then outlined some of the possible factors
that can be used by the trial judge to determine whether to exclude
a record that meets the letter of the exception.21 9 Those factors in-
clude: (1) "the purpose [of the record] and any possible motive to
falsify"; 220 (2) "how routine or non-routine the record is and how
much reliance the business places on the record for business pur-
poses" ;212 and (3) if "the record contains opinions and conclu-
sions," the validity, speculative nature, and need for interpretation
or cross-examination of such opinions.222
In applying these factors to the dust-study report, the Armstrong
court found seven reasons for not admitting the study,223 the major-
ity of which fell into the third category mentioned above. Those
reasons were: (1) the study represented a singular, and perhaps ir-
regular, request; (2) there existed a possible reluctance on the part
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. 303 Md. 581, 495 A.2d 348 (1985). For a brief discussion of Ellsworth's impact
on Maryland evidence law, see MURPHY, supra note 190, § 804(D).
213. See Armstrong, 326 Md. at 114-15, 604 A.2d at 50.
214. See Ellsworth, 303 Md. at 606-09, 495 A.2d at 360-62.
215. 745 F.2d 292 (4th Cir. 1984).
216. See Ellsworth, 303 Md. at 610, 495 A.2d at 363.
217. See id. at 607, 495 A.2d at 361.
218. See id.
219. See Armstrong, 326 Md. at 115, 604 A.2d at 50-51.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 115, 604 A.2d at 51.
222. Id.
223. See id. at 115-16, 604 A.2d at 51.
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of the reporter to reveal the severity of the asbestos concentrations;
(3) the timing of the study did not adequately coincide with the em-
ployment of Armstrong and Wood; (4) the report failed to state
what products were being used at the time of the study; (5) the re-
port did not state the conditions under which the study was con-
ducted; (6) no information on the products' asbestos content was
given in the study; and (7) the report lacked "specificity as to the
[study's] methodology. "224
4. Analysis.-The Court of Appeals took no revolutionary
steps in Armstrong. While it is arguably true that the court expanded
trial judges' discretionary power in this area, it seems to be a proper
and necessary expansion in light of the rationale underlying the
hearsay rule.225 In addition, it is an exercise of discretion that many
other jurisdictions have already recognized in their formulation of
the business records exception. 2 26
What is troubling is the lengths to which the court went to "cre-
ate" this discretionary power. For instance, the court's reliance on
Marine Bank is severely misplaced. 27 In Marine Bank, the bank
ledger was not excluded through an exercise of judicial discretion;
rather, the court found explicitly that the checks to be entered into
the bank ledger "were ... not entered in due course of business or
contemporaneously with the transactions. ' ' 2 2' Therefore, the
ledger was excluded because it failed to meet the technical require-
ments of the business records exception itself.2 29
The Armstrong court had much less attenuated avenues available
in both Maryland statutory and case law at its disposal to reach its
result. First, the prior statutory enactments of the business records
exception contained clauses that stated, "[a]ll other circumstances
of the making of such writing or record . . .including lack of per-
224. See id. Armstrong left Bethlehem Steel six years before the study, and Wood
began working there 28 years before the study. Id.
225. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. See also McLAIN, supra note 174,
§ 801.1 (discussing the rationale behind the hearsay rule).
226. See, e.g., Gee v. Timiner, 56 Cal. Rptr. 211, 216 (Cal. 1967) (construing the trust-
worthiness clause); Mahoney v. Minsky, 188 A.2d 161, 166 (N.J. 1963) (construing the
trustworthiness clause); Henderson v. Zubik, 136 A.2d 124, 126 (Pa. 1957) (interpreting
the legislative intent to give discretion). See also 2 GREGORY P. JOSEPH & STEPHEN A.
SALTZBURG, EVIDENCE IN AMERICA: THE FEDERAL RULES IN THE STATES, 181-88 (1990) (a
compilation of state rules).
227. See supra notes 207-208 and accompanying text.
228. Marine Bank v. Stirling, 115 Md. 90, 102-03, 80 A. 736, 740 (1911).
229. See MCLAIN, supra note 174, § 803(6).1, at 381 (discussing the requirements re-
garding "the regular practice of the business" and the "timeliness" of entry).
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sonal knowledge by the entrant or maker may be shown to affect the
weight, but not the admissibility thereof."'2  The present statute,
section 10-101, lacks the "[a]ll other circumstances" portion, and
only retains this weight, as opposed to admissibility, mandate with
regard to section 10-101(d)-"lack of personal knowledge of the
maker of the written notice. ' ' 23 ' These omissions clearly opened the
door for the court to invoke a high level of discretionary power.
Also at the court's disposal were the aforementioned earlier de-
cisions discussing the business records exception, including those
demonstrating a retention of the court's discretionary power.23 2 In
addition, there exists a considerable line of authority in Maryland
dealing with the business records exception which recognizes that a
business record must meet a "circumstantial guarantee of trustwor-
thiness" in order to be admitted.23 3
It is unlikely that the court's decision will make it more difficult
to exclude a record that satisfies the technical requirements of sec-
tion 10-101. At the same time, it is unlikely to be any easier, in light
of the "heavy burden" mandated by the Court of Appeals, to ex-
clude such evidence.23 4 It is an exercise of "[s]ound policy and sen-
sible administration" to admit evidence that meets the requirements
of the exception absent a showing by the opposing party of underly-
ing trustworthiness.235
Nor does it seem likely that trial courts will abuse this discre-
tion, as similar discretionary power already exists to exclude evi-
dence based on relevancy.23 6 Although the trial courts have
exercised this discretion often, the appellate courts rarely find any
abuse.2 3 7 Additionally, the court wisely noted that the study may
have been admitted if witnesses were called to remove the suspi-
cions of untrustworthiness. 3 8
230. MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 59 (1957).
231. See supra note 183.
232. See supra notes 194-200 and accompanying text.
233. See Burroughs Int'l Co. v. Datronics Eng'rs, Inc., 254 Md. 327, 348, 255 A.2d
341, 351 (1969); Smith v. Jones, 236 Md. 305, 309, 203 A.2d 865, 867-68 (1964); Mor-
row v. State, 190 Md. 559, 562, 59 A.2d 325, 326 (1948); Thomas v. Owens, 28 Md.
App. 442, 447-48, 346 A.2d 662, 665 (1975); Hyman v. State, 4 Md. App. 636, 641, 244
A.2d 616, 618 (1968). See also McLAIN, supra note 174, § 803(6).1, at 381 ("But the
evidence will be excluded if circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness are lacking.").
234. See Armstrong, 326 Md. at 116, 604 A.2d at 51.
235. See LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 190, § 447.
236. See McLAIN, supra note 174, § 403.1.
237. See id. § 403.1, at 300.
238. See Armstrong, 326 Md. at 116, 604 A.2d at 51. See also LouISELL & MUELLER, supra
note 190, § 447, at 678 ("[T]he risk of prejudice arising from any untrustworthiness ...
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5. Conclusion.-In Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, the Court of Ap-
peals strengthened the integrity of the hearsay rule. By providing
for this discretionary power, trial courts will now have the authority
to prevent the introduction of information that the hearsay rule
sought explicitly to exclude.139 The Court of Appeals has effectively
utilized its authority in a way to "enhance the discovery of the truth
and the fair administration of justice. "240
EVAN S. STOLOVE
is clearly reduced if the party against whom it is offered can cross-examine those
persons.").
239. See Note, Admissibility of Records Kept in the Regular Course of Business-Uniform Busi-
ness Records as Evidence Act, 24 MINN. L. REV. 958, 960-61 (1940) (explaining how the
provisions of the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act "leaves to the discretion of
the trial court the question whether 'the sources of information, method and time of
preparation were such as to justify its admission.' ").
240. McLAIN, supra note 174, § 102.1.
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VII. FAMILY LAW
A. Judicial Discretion in Child Support Awards for Affluent Parties
In Voishan v. Palma,' a case of first impression, the Court of Ap-
peals addressed section 12-204(d) of the Family Law Article, which
grants trial judges discretion in calculating child support awards
when the combined adjusted actual income of the parents exceeds
the highest level specified in the support guidelines schedule.2 In
determining the ramifications of section 12-204(d), the court held
that the highest amount listed in the guidelines would provide the
presumptive minimum basic award for parents whose combined
monthly income exceeded $10,000.' The court, however, declined
to recognize a cap on the basic child support obligation4 and upheld
the intent of the legislature to allow trial judges discretion in deter-
mining awards. 5 Furthermore, the court found that section 12-
204(d) does not require a trial judge to extrapolate to determine
awards above the maximum figure listed in the guidelines.6 While
extrapolation may serve as a useful guide,7 a trial judge is obligated
to balance the best interests of the child with the parents' financial
circumstances to determine awards when parental income exceeds
the maximum specified in the guidelines.8
1. The Case.-A divorce decree issued by the Circuit Court for
Anne Arundel County on June 26, 1981, awarded Margaret Voishan
Palma custody of her two daughters and ordered John Voishan to
pay $250 per week as child support.9 An order dated October 7,
1985, increased Voishan's child support obligation to $1400 per
month and awarded him certain visitation rights.'" On March 8,
1991, the circuit court addressed Palma's motion to modify child
support." Evidence presented at the March 8, 1991 hearing re-
vealed that Voishan's annual income was $145,000, while Palma was
1. 327 Md. 318, 609 A.2d 319 (1992).
2. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 12-204(d) (1991).
3. Voishan, 327 Md. at 325, 609 A.2d at 323.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 327, 609 A.2d at 324.
6. Id. at 329, 609 A.2d at 325.
7. Id., 609 A.2d at 324.
8. Id. at 331, 609 A.2d at 325.
9. Id. at 321, 609 A.2d at 320.
10. Id., 609 A.2d at 320-21.
11. Id., 609 A.2d at 321.
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earning $30,000 per year. 2 Thus, the parties' combined adjusted
income was approximately $14,583 per month. Following the hear-
ing, the trial judge entered an order increasing Voishan's child sup-
port obligation for the younger daughter, who was still a minor,
from $700 per month to $1550 per month. 13
Voishan appealed the modification of child support to the
Court of Special Appeals, but the Court of Appeals granted certio-
rari prior to consideration by the intermediate appellate court to ad-
dress the application of the guidelines to parties whose combined
income exceeds $10,000 per month. 14
2. Legal Background.-Prior to the implementation of child sup-
port guidelines, the Court of Appeals consistently upheld the use of
judicial discretion in determining alimony or child support
awards.' 5 In Waters v. Waters, 6 the court declared that "[i]n making
such an award the court can only use judicial discretion. Of course,
there is no special statute or rule governing this discretion. It must
be exercised to the necessary end of awarding justice and based
upon reason and law."' 7
This did not give the court free reign in determining an award.
The court had to balance the best interests and needs of the child
with the parents' financial means.' 8 In addition, several factors tem-
pered judicial discretion: the child's station in life,' 9 which was later
articulated as the family's station in life;2" the age and physical con-
12. Id. at 324, 609 A.2d at 322.
13. Id. at 321, 609 A.2d at 321.
14. Id.
15. See Bowis v. Bowis, 259 Md. 41, 43, 267 A.2d 84, 86 (1970); Burton v. Burton,
253 Md. 233, 237, 252 A.2d 472, 473 (1969); Waters v. Waters, 191 Md. 436, 441, 62
A.2d 250, 253 (1948).
16. 191 Md. 436, 62 A.2d 250 (1948).
17. Id. at 441, 62 A.2d at 253.
18. See Unkle v. Unkle, 305 Md. 587, 597, 505 A.2d 849, 854 (1986); Holston v.
Holston, 58 Md. App. 308, 317, 473 A.2d 459, 463, cert. denied, 300 Md. 484, 479 A.2d
372 (1984); German v. German, 37 Md. App. 120, 122, 376 A.2d 115, 117 (1977);
Kramer v. Kramer, 26 Md. App. 620, 636, 339 A.2d 328, 339 (1975); cf Wagshal v.
Wagshal, 249 Md. 143, 147, 238 A.2d 903, 906 (1968) (holding that the principal con-
siderations in determining a child support award are the needs of the child and the
financial circumstances of the father of the child). The court later rejected the common-
law rule placing primary fiscal responsibility on the father, and adopted the approach of
joint parental financial responsibility. See generally Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508, 517, 374
A.2d 900, 905 (1977) (holding that the sex of the parent cannot be a factor in allocating
a child support obligation).
19. See Wagshal, 249 Md. at 147-48, 238 A.2d at 906.
20. See Unkle, 305 Md. at 597, 505 A.2d at 854; German, 37 Md. App. at 122, 376 A.2d
at 117; Kramer, 26 Md. App. at 636, 339 A.2d at 339.
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dition of the parties; their financial circumstances; their ability to
work; and expenses in educating the children.2'
The inadequacies of such a case-by-case approach to awarding
child support have been summarized as: "(1) a shortfall in the ade-
quacy of orders, when compared with the true costs of rearing chil-
dren as measured by economic studies; (2) inconsistent orders
causing inequitable treatment of parties in similarly situated cases;
and (3) inefficient adjudication of child support amounts in the ab-
sence of uniform standards. 22 In an attempt to temper the seem-
ingly unfettered judicial discretion present in case-by-case
adjudication,2 3 Congress enacted the Child Support Enforcement
Amendments of 1984.24 These amendments required each state to
establish guidelines for calculating child support awards while mak-
ing the guidelines25 available to all judges or other officials with the
authority to determine such awards.2 6
Despite the federal provision's effective date of October 1,
1987,27 the General Assembly did not enact the Maryland Child
Support Guidelines until February 1989.28 The General Assembly
considered several models for implementing child support guide-
lines before finally adopting the Income Shares Model. 29 The prem-
ise of this model is that a child should receive the proportion of
parental income he or she would receive if the parents remained
21. See Unkle, 305 Md. at 597, 505 A.2d at 854; German, 37 Md. App. at 122, 376 A.2d
at 117; Kramer, 26 Md. App. at 636, 339 A.2d at 339.
22. Robert G. Williams, Guidelines for Setting Levels of Child Support Orders, 31 FAM. L.Q.
281, 282 (Fall 1987).
23. See id.
24. Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 45 C.F.R.
§ 302.56 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 667 (1988)).
25. The implementing regulations state that the term "guidelines" refers to quanti-
tative standards to be utilized in calculating child support awards. 45 C.F.R. § 302.56.
26. See Williams, supra note 22, at 281.
27. See id.
28. See Tannehill v. Tannehill, 88 Md. App. 4, 11, 591 A.2d 888, 891 (1991). Enact-
ment was done as an emergency measure. Failure to comply with federal provisions
mandating the adoption of child support guidelines could have resulted in the loss of up
to $35 million in federal funds for Aid to Families with Dependent Children. Id. Origi-
nally, the guidelines were advisory, but later the General Assembly amended the figures
and mandated their use by April 10, 1990. See id., 591 A.2d at 892.
29. See SEN. JUD. PROC. COMM., 1989 MD. GEN. ASSEMBLY FLOOR REPORT ON S.B. 49,
app. at 3 [hereinafter FLOOR REPORT]. First used in the state of Washington, the Income
Shares Model was further developed by Dr. Robert Williams of the National Child Sup-
port Guidelines Project staff under a grant from the Office of Child Support Enforce-
ment of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Maryland Senate Bill 49
was modeled after Colorado's child support guidelines. Id.; see generally Charles Brack-
ney, Battling Inconsistency and Inadequacy: Child Support Guidelines in the States, 11 HARV. WO-
MEN'S L.J. 197 (1988) (discussing three models for guidelines).
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together.3 0 Accordingly, child support awards are calculated by
combining the income of the parents and then prorating the obliga-
tion in proportion to each parent's adjusted gross income.
Under the Income Shares Model, the first step in calculating
child support payments requires the determination of each parent's
monthly "adjusted actual income."'3 Next, the trial judge combines
the adjusted actual income of both parents to find the "combined
adjusted income" of the parents.3 The judge then examines the
schedule of basic child support obligations in section 12-204(e) to
find the corresponding "basic child support obligation" for that
combined adjusted actual income and the given number of chil-
dren. 3 The basic child support obligation is divided between the
parents in proportion to their adjusted actual incomes.3 4 Finally,
work-related child care expenses, child care expenses for a child
with special needs, extraordinary medical expenses, and school and
transportation expenses are combined and the sum is divided be-
tween the parents in proportion to their adjusted actual incomes.35
Child support obligations calculated according to this formula are
presumptively correct.3 6 Nonetheless, evidence that the application
of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in a particular
case can rebut this presumption. 7
During the period when the guidelines were advisory, a judge
who had decided not to adhere to the section 12-202 guidelines had
to consider the factors dictated by the preguidelines case law.38 In
Gates v. Gates,39 a case reviewing a disposition prior to the effective
30. See FLOOR REPORT, supra note 29, app. at 3. See also Williams, supra note 22, at
292.
31. See Voishan, 327 Md. at 323, 609 A.2d at 321. Section 12-201(d) of the Family
Law Article defines "adjusted actual income" as "actual income minus: (1) preexisting
reasonable child support obligations actually paid; (2) except as provided in § 12-
204(a)(2) of this subtitle, alimony or maintenance obligations actually paid; and (3) the
actual cost of providing health insurance coverage for a child for whom the parents are
jointly and severally responsible." MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 12-201(d) (1991).
32. Voishan, 327 Md. at 323, 609 A.2d at 321; see also MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 12-
201(e) (1991).
33. Voishan, 327 Md. at 323, 609 A.2d at 322. Section 12-204(c) provides for extra-
polation of the basic child support obligation to the next higher level when the com-
bined adjusted actual income amount falls between amounts in the schedule. See MD.
CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 12-201(c) (1991).
34. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 12-204(a) (1991).
35. Id. § 12-204(g)-(i).
36. Id. § 12-202(a)(2)(i).
37. Id. § 12-202(a)(2)(ii).
38. See Gates v. Gates, 83 Md. App. 661, 664, 577 A.2d 382, 384 (1990). See supra
text accompanying notes 19-21.
39. 83 Md. App. 661, 577 A.2d 382 (1990).
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date of the guidelines, the Court of Special Appeals held that the
trial judge's decision to increase a child support award twofold to
equal the figure in the guidelines amounted to an abuse of discre-
tion.4" The trial court did not address any of the factors that prior
decisions found to be necessary in calculating child support
awards, 4' nor did the court address the facts in support of a material
change in circumstances.42 The factors in the preguidelines case
law become relevant once the use of the guidelines would yield in-
equitable results.
In Tannehill v. Tannehill,4" the Court of Special Appeals held that
a child support award calculated according to the guidelines carries
a rebuttable presumption that the amount of the award is correct.4 4
Nonetheless, the court noted that a trial court may deviate from the
guidelines if the resulting application would be unjust or inappro-
priate in a particular case.4 5 In such an instance, a court must make
a specific finding on the record stating the reasons for deviating
from the figures set forth in the guidelines, in addition to stating
how its calculation deviated from the guidelines.46 Moreover, the
court implied that in cases warranting a departure from the guide-
lines, a trial court must state how the order serves the parties' best
interests.47 Thus, the factors applicable in determinations of child
support in the preguidelines case law remain applicable in cases
where a court finds the application of the guidelines to be unjust or
inappropriate.
Robert Williams, a researcher for the Child Support Guidelines
Project, lauded the guidelines as a mechanism for increasing settle-
ments because they set expectations for child support levels.48 Yet
he acknowledged the difficulty that several states have experienced
applying the guidelines to both extremes of the income range.49
For example, the Colorado Court of Appeals has held that where
the parties earn an income in excess of the highest amount set forth
in the guidelines, the judge may use her discretion to determine a
40. Id. at 664, 577 A.2d at 384.
41. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
42. See Gates, 83 Md. App. at 664, 577 A.2d at 384.
43. 88 Md. App. 4, 591 A.2d 888 (1991).
44. Id. at 13, 591 A.2d at 893.
45. See id. at 13-14, 591 A.2d at 893 (citing MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 12-
202(a)(2)(iv) (1991)).
46. Id. at 15, 591 A.2d at 893.
47. Id.
48. See Williams, supra note 22, at 286.
49. Id. at 287.
722 [VOL. 52:718
FAMILY LAW
child support award.5" In In re Marriage of Van Inwegen,5" the Colo-
rado Court of Appeals concluded that $1000, the amount set forth
in the guidelines for one child with parents earning $10,000 per
month, is the minimum presumptive amount of child support for
one child where the parties' combined monthly income exceeds
$10,000.52 But the court maintained that this presumption is rebut-
table and a trial judge may exercise her discretion to determine a
different amount. 53 Nevertheless, the trial judge must consider the
factors included in Colorado's statute before making any discretion-
ary child support obligation determination.54
Other jurisdictions have handled child support calculations
similarly where the parties earn more than the highest amount es-
tablished in the guidelines. Two District Courts of Appeals of Flor-
ida, for instance, accord with the reasoning of the Colorado court. 55
In Hinshelwood v. Hinshelwood,56 a Florida court noted that the guide-
lines would retain their relevancy as a point of reference despite the
fact that the parties' combined income exceeded the highest amount
set forth in Florida's guidelines.57 Consequently, the court found
the trial judge erred by failing to consider the factors listed in the
guidelines.58
50. See In re Marriage of LeBlanc, 800 P.2d 1384, 1388 (Colo. App. 1990), cert. denied,
1991 Colo. LEXIS 408 (Colo. 1991); In re Marriage of Van Inwegen, 757 P.2d 1118,
1120 (Colo. App. 1988).
51. 757 P.2d 1118 (Colo. App. 1988).
52. Id. at 1120.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1121. The relevant factors in Colorado's statute include: "(a) [t]he finan-
cial resources of the child; (b) [t]he financial resources of the custodial parent; (c) [tihe
standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved; (d)
[t]he physical and emotional condition of the child and his educational needs; and (e)
[tihe financial resources and needs of the noncustodial parent." COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-10-115(1) (West 1987). See also LeBlanc, 800 P.2d at 1384 (holding that apportion-
ment of the minimum presumptive amount of child support without considering
mandatory factors is error).
55. See Harrison v. Harrison, 573 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Hin-
shelwood v. Hinshelwood, 564 So. 2d 141 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
56. 564 So. 2d 141 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
57. Id. at 141.
58. Id. Citing Hinshelwood, the court in Harrison found the trial court in error for
failing to take the factors outlined in Florida's statute into account when determining the
child support obligation for parties earning greater than the highest amount in the
guidelines. See Harrison, 573 So. 2d 1018. Florida's statutory factors resemble those set
forth in Maryland case law and include "the needs of the children, their ages and station
in life, the parties' prior standard of living relative to financial status, and each spouse's




The Supreme Court of Connecticut explained the inapplicabil-
ity of the guidelines at high income levels by noting that the statisti-
cal basis for support guidelines loses its validity as the combined
income of the parties increases.5 9 The court pointed out that the
legislature made no provisions for extrapolation to higher income
levels.6 ° As a result, the court upheld the findings of the trial court,
which had considered the guidelines, found them inappropriate for
setting a presumptive support amount, and proceeded to weigh the
statutory criteria and other guideline factors to arrive at its final
determination. 6'
3. Legal Reasoning.-Voishan required the Court of Appeals to
address the issue of the application of the guidelines to upper in-
come range parties for the first time.62 In Voishan, the court inter-
preted section 12-204(d) of the Family Law Article to require a
balance ofjudicial discretion and adherence to the guidelines.6" Be-
cause section 12-204(d) lends a subjective quality to the guidelines
when applied to upper levels of income, the Voishan court main-
tained that such awards will not be disturbed unless clearly errone-
ous.' The trial judge's determination of a child support obligation
involved an analysis of the needs of the child and the parents' finan-
cial means.6 5 Thus, the trial judge met the subjective element of the
statute and did not abuse his discretion in making his findings.66
Although the Court of Appeals conceded that the maximum ba-
sic child support obligation should provide the presumptive mini-
mum basic child support award for combined monthly incomes
above $10,000,67 the court denied that the legislature intended to
59. See Battersby v. Battersby, 590 A.2d 427, 431 (Conn. 1991) ("[T]he proportion
of household income spent on children declines as household income increases."). See
generally Williams, supra note 22, at 288 (describing a study of household expenditure
patterns).
60. Battersby, 590 A.2d at 429-30.
61. Id. at 430-31.
62. Voishan, 327 Md. at 322, 609 A.2d at 321.
63. Id. at 332, 609 A.2d at 326.
64. Id. For this standard of review, the court relied on Rule 8-131(c), which states
that an appellate court "will not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the evidence
unless clearly erroneous, and will give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to
judge the credibility of the witnesses." MD. R. 8-131(c).
65. Voishan, 327 Md. at 333-34, 609 A.2d at 327.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 331-32, 609 A.2d at 326. The court noted that Colorado's intermediate
appellate court has repeatedly held that "there is a rebuttable presumption that the ba-
sic child support obligation at the uppermost level of the guidelines is the minimum pre-
sumptive amount of support." In re Marriage of LeBlanc, 800 P.2d 1384, 1388 (Colo.
App. 1990), cert. denied, 1991 Colo. LEXIS 408 (Colo. 1991).
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set a ceiling for the basic child support obligation at the upper limit
of the schedule.68 In reaching this conclusion, the court deferred to
legislative intent and disregarded the plain meaning of section 12-
204(d), which does not call for mandatory deference to the highest
award in the schedule for income above the schedule levels. 69 On
the contrary, the Voishan court found that section 12-204(d) confers
latitude to the trial court by allowing judicial discretion to influence
the determination of child support awards. 70 The court noted that
the rationale that a child's standard of living should not deviate
from what it would be had the household remained intact conflicts
with the artificial ceiling that Voishan's view espoused. 7' Conse-
quently, the court held that the legislature did not intend for the
maximum basic child support obligation in the schedule to apply to
children whose parents' monthly income exceeds $10,000.72
The Voishan court also noted that a strict extrapolation theory,
which involves the utilization of a formula to extend the guidelines
to the parties' financial circumstances, would significantly impede
the judicial discretion granted by section 12-204(d). 73 Analysis of
legislative intent further renders the extrapolation argument defec-
tive. The court acknowledged the lack of legislative history advocat-
ing a cap on awards or a limit on judicial discretion for the upper
income levels.7 4 Despite the petitioning of several associations for
an extension of the guidelines to upper income cases, the General
Assembly chose to leave the determinations of awards in the upper
income range to the discretion of trial judges.75 The court con-
curred with the Attorney General's conclusion that
68. Voishan, 327 Md. at 325, 609 A.2d at 323.
69. Id. at 327, 609 A.2d at 324-25.
70. Id. at 325-26, 609 A.2d at 323.
71. Id. at 326, 609 A.2d at 323.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 327, 609 A.2d at 323-24.
74. Id. at 325-26, 609 A.2d at 323.
75. Id. at 327-28, 609 A.2d at 324. The Fair Family Law Association of Maryland
complained that families in the upper income bracket are bereft of any guidelines indi-
cating their obligations and argued that the same percentage of total family income for
those earning $10,000 should apply for those earning more than $10,000. See id. Repre-
sentatives from the Family Law Section of the Montgomery County Bar Association also
advocated greater certainty for the obligations of parties falling within the upper income
bracket and recommended the extension of the guidelines. See id at 328, 609 A.2d at
324. Although relegated to a footnote, the court also recognized the approach of the
Supreme Court of Connecticut. Id. at 329 n.4, 609 A.2d at 325 n.4 (citing Battersby v.
Battersby, 590 A.2d 427, 429-30 (Conn. 1990) (holding that where the legislature failed
to provide for strict extrapolation in a statute, the court would not create such a
provision)).
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at very high income levels, the percentage of income ex-
pended on children may not necessarily continue to decline
or even remain constant because of the multitude of differ-
ent options for income expenditure available to the afflu-
ent. The legislative judgment was that at such high income
levels judicial discretion is better suited than a fixed
formula to implement the guidelines' underlying principle
that a child's standard of living should be altered as little as
possible by the dissolution of the family.7 6
Although the legislature declined to adopt more specific formu-
lae for incomes exceeding the guidelines, the Voishan court declared
that the policies underlying the guidelines should be recognized in
award determinations." To support this contention, the court cited
section 12-202(a), which states that "in any proceeding to establish
or modify child support .. .the court shall use the child support
guidelines set forth in this subtitle."17' Thus, a trial judge must use
the schedule to guide his determinations, but his discretion operates
to balance the factors in the particular case. 7 9
The court also refused to embrace the theory espoused by the
Maryland chapter of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers
(AAML) that the trial judge placed "too much reliance on a mechani-
cal application of the guidelines.""0 In addition, the AAML argued
that the child support obligation should not have been divided into
an eighty-three to seventeen ratio.8' In response to this argument,
the court invoked the policies underlying the Income Shares Model
and preguidelines case law that each parent " 'share the responsibil-
ity for parental support in accordance with their respective financial
76. Id. at 328, 609 A.2d at 324.
77. See id. at 328-29, 609 A.2d at 324.
78. See id. at 328, 609 A.2d at 324 (citing, with emphasis, MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW
§ 12-202(a) (1991)).
79. Id. at 329, 609 A.2d at 324 (noting that "[e]xtrapolation from the schedule may
act as a 'guide' "). The court found the principles outlined in Unkle to be of relevance to
determinations following the establishment of the guidelines. See id., 609 A.2d at 325
(citing Unkle v. Unkle, 305 Md. 587, 597, 505 A.2d 849, 854 (1986)). Further, the court
suggested that failure to consider relevant factors may border on abuse of discretion.
See id. at 332 n.5, 609 A.2d at 327 n.5 (citing In re Marriage of Van Inwegen, 757 P.2d
1118, 1121 (Colo. App. 1988)).
80. See id. at 329, 609 A.2d at 324. The AAML argued that evidence of actual house-
hold expenditures for the income range exceeding the schedule was not presented in
formulating the guidelines. Therefore, the AAML contended that the guidelines are
completely irrelevant to higher income parents. See id.
81. Id. at 330, 609 A.2d at 325. The AAML's observation that the legislature did not
include the phrase "shall be divided between the parents in proportion to their adjusted
incomes" in § 12-204(d) neglects its inclusion in § 12-204(a)(1), (g)(l), (h), and (i). See
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resources.' "82 The court also noted the trial judge's regard for the
reasonable needs of the child when calculating each parent's pro-
portionate share.13 Thus, the Voishan decision is a synthesis of
Voishan's and the AAML's polar arguments in that it strikes a bal-
ance between the use ofjudicial discretion and the application of the
principles inherent in the Income Shares Model upon which the
guidelines are based.8 4
4. Analysis.-Maryland's child support guidelines mark a de-
parture from the relatively unlimited discretion accorded to trial
judges prior to their enactment. The schedule imposed by the Gen-
eral Assembly reins in this discretion considerably by providing
figures for awards corresponding to the given number of children
and the combined monthly income of the parents.8 5 Even in cases
where the combined monthly income exceeds the scope of the
guidelines, the policies underlying the guidelines still apply and a
judge may extrapolate to determine an award.8 6 While the majority
opinion did not regard the guidelines as producing such a narrow
limit when applied to parties earning more than $10,000 combined
monthly income, it did recognize that the guidelines do signify a
balancing ofjudicial discretion with the application of figures gener-
ated from evidence of spending on children.
Regardless of the limits placed on discretion by the underlying
principles of the guidelines, the melding of fixed rules and discre-
tion deserves comment. Despite the introduction of judicial discre-
tion in cases where the application of the guidelines would produce
unjust or inappropriate results, the application of the guidelines to
82. Id. (quoting Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508, 517, 374 A.2d 900, 905 (1977)).
83. Id.
84. The concurring opinion in Voishan accorded with the majority's balancing of the
guidelines with judicial discretion. Yet this view held that the principles underlying the
guidelines should qualify judicial discretion. The concurring opinion proposed that a
presumptive floor and a presumptive ceiling, dictated by the policies inherent in the
guidelines, should demarcate the range of discretion. Id. at 335-36, 609 A.2d at 328
(McAuliffe, J., concurring). Judge McAuliffe would set the highest basic child support
obligation as the presumptive minimum for combined monthly income exceeding
$10,000. Because the maximum schedule payment was 10.4%6 of the maximum com-
bined income listed in the schedule, the concurring opinion stated that 10.4%6 of the
combined income should be the presumptive maximum. Id. at 336, 609 A.2d at 328
(McAuliffe, J., concurring). Although the concurring opinion faulted the trial judge's
method of calculating child support for its latitude in discretion, the figure that the trial
judge awarded fell within the range delineated by the presumptive minimum and maxi-
mum advanced by the concurring opinion.
85. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 12-204 (1991).
86. See Voishan, 327 Md. at 329, 609 A.2d at 324.
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the circumstances of the parties generally involves the utilization of
fixed rules. In cases where the parties' income exceeds the highest
income in the guidelines, however, judicial discretion must
predominate, in that numeric criteria only set a range for
determinations.
Child support obligation decisions for upper income parties in-
volve a synthesis of an Aristotelian tenet and a Platonic tenet in
terms of a fixed rule and discretion dichotomy. Although this dia-
lectical argument may seem spurious at first glance, it has been
noted that
[t]he classic debate between legalists advocating justice
through fixed rules and empiricists, who argue in favor of
justice through discretion, goes back as far as the political
philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. Although Aristotle
spoke of a "government of laws and not of men" and Plato
believed that the wise and fair man presents greater prom-
ise for producing just decisions, both philosophies recog-
nized the need for some mix of law and discretion. 7
Today, the combination of judicial discretion and fixed rules pro-
vides the optimal means of deciding upon child support awards for
upper income parties.
Traditionally, discretion has dominated the realm of family law
because of a general belief that legal determinations should be fash-
ioned to the unique circumstances of the family."8 Yet, there is a
danger inherent in the broad discretion accorded trial judges in the
area of family law. Until the implementation of guidelines, discre-
tionary child support standards produced inadequate results
whereby "[slocial scientists and children's advocates have docu-
mented the negative long-term effect of a reduced standard of living
on the emotional, intellectual, and physical development of chil-
dren." ' In addition, such discretion led to inconsistent, inequita-
ble, and unpredictable decisions. °°
On the other hand, the legislature has seen fit to allow judicial
discretion when the application of the fixed rules would do the par-
87. Jane C. Murphy, Eroding the Myth of Discretionary Justice in Family Law: The Child
Support Experiment, 70 N.C. L. REV. 209, 211 n.3 (1991) (citations omitted). See also Mary
Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law, 60
TUL. L. REV. 1165, 1167 (1986) (remarking on Aristotle's acknowledgment that in the
area of human sciences, which encompasses law, no general rules can be valid for all
cases).
88. See Glendon, supra note 87, at 1167.
89. Murphy, supra note 87, at 221.
90. See id. at 222.
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ties a disservice. 9 The allowance of discretion in Maryland's statute
suggests that vestiges of the "uniqueness of family" argument lin-
ger. Likewise, where the parties' income exceeds the highest
amount in the schedule, the interplay of discretion and fixed rules
applies.9 2 In that situation, the dual emphasis correctly shifts to dis-
cretion guided by the principles underlying the model for the fixed
rules, the Income Shares Model.
Because the court has held that the highest child support award
in the guidelines is the presumptive minimum award for families
with monthly incomes exceeding $10,000, the needs of children of
affluent parents have been satisfied. For the legislature to dictate to
parents that a certain amount of their wealth, beyond that which
meets their children's necessities, must be spent on their children
would seem outrageous to many. Such a mandate could be seen as
a usurpation of the parental role, in that the state would construc-
tively dictate allowances for children. The court's concurrence with
the Attorney General's conclusion regarding the multitude of in-
come expenditure options available to the wealthy supports the ad-
mittedly problematic nature of the extension of fixed rules for the
wealthy.93
5. Conclusion.-The Voishan court limited unbridled discretion
by mandating that a trial judge consider the needs of a child in light
of the parents' financial means when setting child support obliga-
tions for the affluent.9 4 Yet, the court did not allow the fixed rules
of the guidelines to have an overreaching influence over the trial
judge's discretion. The refusal to recognize a cap and the disavowal
of a requirement to extrapolate suggest a restraining of the applica-
tion of fixed rules. This balance ofjudicial discretion and fixed stat-
utory rules will best serve the affluent parties by providing a general
expectation of the amount of an award while tailoring the exact de-
termination to the needs of the parties.
LAUREN R. CALIA
91. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw, § 12-202(a)(2)(ii) (1991).
92. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
93. See supra text accompanying note 76.
94. Voishan, 327 Md. at 329, 609 A.2d at 324-25.
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B. The Jurisdictional Limits of Parental Kidnapping
In Trindle v. State,9 5 the Court of Appeals outlined the require-
ments for obtaining criminal jurisdiction in extraterritorial parental
kidnapping cases.96 The court held that Maryland courts have juris-
diction in such cases if the intended result of the crime has its effect
in Maryland.9 7 The effect of the offense is felt within the state if the
custodial parent is deprived of her rights under Maryland law, even
when the physical acts of the crime do not occur within the state. 98
In reaching its decision, the Trindle court followed a number of ex-
traterritorial parental kidnapping decisions from other
jurisdictions.99
1. The Case.-William Trindle and his wife, Alexa Matthai,
were divorced in March 1989.100 The court granted Matthai, who
continued to reside in the family home in Kent County, Maryland,
custody of their three children,'' and provided Trindle with rea-
sonable visitation rights. 102 Trindle lived in Overbrook, Penn-
sylvania, with his new wife, Sharon Marcus. 10 3 Matthai and Trindle
made arrangements for the children to visit Trindle and Marcus on
weekends.' 0 4 For these weekend visits Matthai drove the children to
Wilmington, Delaware, on Fridays to meet Trindle. On Sundays,
Trindle would return the children to Matthai in Wilmington. 0 5
In May 1989, Trindle requested an extended weekend visit
from Thursday, May 11, through Sunday, May 14, so that the chil-
dren could accompany him to a special event in Philadelphia.10 6
Matthai agreed, and Trindle promised to telephone her at the end
of the weekend in order to arrange a time to transfer the chil-
dren. 0 7 On Saturday, May 13, Trindle contacted Matthai's aunt
and informed her that he would not be returning the children.' 0 8
95. 326 Md. 25, 602 A.2d 1232 (1992).
96. See id. at 31-32, 602 A.2d at 1235.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 32, 602 A.2d at 1235.
99. See id. at 32-35, 602 A.2d at 1235-37.
100. Id. at 28, 602 A.2d at 1233.
101. Id. Trindle and Matthai had three children together: Jamila (born on Jan. 1,







108. Id. at 28-29, 602 A.2d at 1233.
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Matthai and the police subsequently learned that on May 13, Trin-
die, Marcus and the children left by airplane from New York to fly to
Amman, Jordan using tickets that had been purchased by Marcus. 10 9
When Matthai contacted Trindle by phone, he stated that he
would only agree to return the children if Matthai renegotiated the
property settlement that they had reached in their divorce, granted
him joint custody of the children, and deposited a large sum of
money in his checking account." In September 1989, Trindle,
Marcus and the children were deported from Jordan and forced to
return to the United States."' When they returned, Trindle and
Marcus were arrested and returned to Kent County. Matthai
regained custody of her children." 2
Trindle was convicted in the Circuit Court for Kent County of
violating section 9-305 of the Family Law Article' "' and section 2 of
article 27,1 14 the Crimes and Punishments Article. Marcus, who was
109. Id. at 29, 602 A.2d at 1234.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 30, 602 A.2d at 1234.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 26, 602 A.2d at 1232. The Family Law Article provides in pertinent part:
If a child is under the age of 12 years, a relative who knows that another
person is the lawful custodian of the child may not:
(1) abduct, take, or carry away the child from the lawful custodian to a place
outside of this State;
(2) having acquired lawful possession of the child, detain the child outside of
this State for more than 48 hours after the lawful custodian demands that the
child be returned;
(3) harbor or hide the child outside of this State knowing that possession of
the child was obtained by another relative in violation of this section; or
(4) act as an accessory to an act prohibited by this section.
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 9-305 (1987).
114. Trindle, 326 Md. at 26-27, 602 A.2d at 1232-33. Article 27, § 2 provides:
Any person who shall without the color of right forcibly abduct, take or
carry away any child under the age of twelve years from the home or usual place
of abode of such child, or from the custody and control of the parent or par-
ents, or lawful guardian or guardians of such child, or be accessory thereto, or
who shall without such color of right and against the consent of the parent or
parents or lawful guardian or guardians of such child, persuade or entice from
the usual place of abode or house of such child, or from the custody and con-
trol of the parent or parents, or guardian or guardians of such child, or be
accessory thereto, or shall knowingly secrete or harbor such child, or be acces-
sory thereto, with the intent to deprive such parent or parents, guardian or
guardians, or any person who may be in lawful possession of such child, of the
custody, care and control of such child, shall be guilty of a felony, and upon
conviction shall suffer imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term not exceed-
ing twenty years, in the discretion of the court.
For the purposes of this section, the terms "usual place of abode",
"home", and "house" include the real property appurtenant thereto.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 2 (1992).
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tried jointly with Trindle, was convicted only of violating article 27,
section 2.115 Marcus and Trindle appealed these judgments to the
Court of Special Appeals where they challenged the jurisdiction of
the Maryland courts over the matter, arguing that none of the al-
leged conduct took place within the state. 1 6 Alternatively, Trindle
asserted that Family Law Article, section 9-305 pre-empted the field
of parental kidnapping, thereby invalidating his convictions under
article 27, section 2.' 17 Marcus took this argument one step further.
Because Trindle's conviction as the principal under article 27, sec-
tion 2 was invalidated, she argued, her conviction as an accessory
under the same statute must also be invalidated." 8
The Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari before the cases
were heard by the Court of Special Appeals.' '9 Unfortunately, Trin-
dle died before the case was argued on appeal, rendering moot all
issues he had raised.' 2 ° The court, however, affirmed Marcus's con-
viction under article 27, section 2.121
2. Legal Background; Court's Reasoning.-
a. CriminalJurisdiction.-In Trindle, the court upheld the juris-
diction of the Circuit Court of Kent County, relying on the authority
of Pennington v. State.1 22 Pennington was charged with obstruction of
justice for stabbing a woman in the District of Columbia in order to
prevent her from testifying in a case in Baltimore City. 123 The Pen-
nington court held that a Maryland circuit court had jurisdiction over
such a matter.' 24 The court recognized that although Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article, section 1-501 provides that each circuit
court "has full common-law and equity powers and jurisdiction in all
115. Trindle, 326 Md. at 27, 602 A.2d at 1233.
116. Id. at 30, 602 A.2d at 1234.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See id. at 27-28, 602 A.2d at 1233.
120. Id. at 30, 602 A.2d at 1234. Because Trindle had not received the one appeal to
which he was statutorily entitled, all convictions and sentences against him were vacated,
and his case was remanded with instructions to dismiss the criminal charges against him.
Id. See also Jones v. State, 302 Md. 153, 158, 486 A.2d 184, 187 (1985) (holding that
when a "deceased criminal defendant has not had the one appeal to which he is statuto-
rily entitled, it may not be fair to let his conviction stand").
121. Trindle, 326 Md. at 36, 602 A.2d at 1237.
122. See id. at 32, 602 A.2d at 1235. See also Pennington v. State, 308 Md. 727, 521
A.2d 1216 (1987).
123. See Pennington, 308 Md. at 728, 521 A.2d at 1216.
124. Id. at 746, 521 A.2d at 1225.
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civil and criminal cases within its county,"' 25 there had been no stat-
utory expansion of criminal jurisdiction, and therefore, the courts
must turn to the common law of Maryland to determine such juris-
dictional issues.'
26
"The general rule under the common law is that a state may
punish only those crimes committed within its territorial limits."'' 2 7
There is, however, an exception to this rule. If the result of the
crime is an essential ingredient of the offense, and the result is
caused within the state by conduct that occurs in another jurisdic-
tion, the state in which the result was caused may take jurisdiction
over the matter. 28 In Pennington, the court interpreted the obstruc-
tion of justice statute in such a way that "causing or attempting to
cause a particular result-the obstruction of justice-forms an es-
sential ingredient of the offense."'' 29 Underlying the court's reason-
ing was a previous interpretation of the same statute that found that
in a case involving the obstruction ofjustice, "the ultimate victim is
inevitably the court." 3 0 When the offense is against the state itself,
"[i]t thus would appear to make sense to view the gravamen of those
crimes as being the injury to the State and to conclude that jurisdic-
tion exists where the offended agency of the State is located.' 3'
Thus, the Pennington court's determination that Maryland had juris-
diction over the case was really two-fold: first, the result of the of-
fense had its effect in Maryland, and second, the victim of the
offense was the court.
The Trindle court focused on the first reason for its determina-
tion that Maryland has jurisdiction over the instant case. The court
held that Marcus's conduct consisted of "knowingly secreting and
harboring Matthai's children" and that her conduct was intended to
deprive Matthai of the custody of her children. 3 2 The court also
stated, "It is clear that the intended result of that conduct, i.e. de-
priving Matthai of custody, forms an essential ingredient of her of-
fense and had its effect in Kent County, Maryland, although the acts
125. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 1-501 (1989).
126. See Pennington, 308 Md. at 728-30, 521 A.2d at 1216-17.
127. Id. at 730, 521 A.2d at 1217.
128. See id. at 731-33, 521 A.2d at 1218-19.
129. Id. at 734, 521 A.2d at 1219.
130. Id. at 735, 521 A.2d at 1220. See also Romans v. State, 178 Md. 588, 592, 16 A.2d
642, 644 (1940) ("[I]t is quite clear that the corrupt act, or one of threat or force, em-
ployed to influence or intimidate or impede any such juror, witness, or officer in the
discharge of his duty in a court, must necessarily be, also, an endeavor to obstruct or
impede in such court the due administration of justice.").
131. Pennington, 308 Md. at 739, 521 A.2d at 1222.
132. Tindle, 326 Md. at 32, 602 A.2d at 1235.
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which produced that result took place outside of this State."1 3 3
The majority relied on several child custody cases from other
jurisdictions to support its decision that Maryland had jurisdiction
over this case. For example, in People v. Harvey,'3 4 the Michigan
Court of Appeals held that "[a]cts done outside a state which are
intended to produce, and in fact do produce, detrimental effects
within the state may properly be subject to the criminal jurisdiction
of the courts of that state."'' 3 5 In addition to the fact that the detri-
mental effect of Harvey's act occurred in Michigan, the court based
its reasoning on the fact that it was a Michigan court's custody order
that was violated.'3 6 The Trindle majority also relied on case law
from Alaska,'3 7 Wyoming,' 3 8 and Texas 3 9 to support its deci-
sion.' 4 ° The majority, however, rejected the decisions of three
states that did not support the view that child abduction or custody
interference can be heard in the state where the parental custody
has been deprived by acts or omissions that occurred outside the
state. 141
b. Convictions Under Article 27, Section 2.-In response to Mar-
cus's argument that she could not be convicted under article 27, sec-
133. Id.
134. 435 N.W.2d 456 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
135. Id. at 457.
136. Id.
137. See Wheat v. State, 734 P.2d 1007 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987). The Wheat court
stated:
A crime may be "committed" not only where the acts constituting the offense
are committed, but also where the harm occasioned by those acts occurs .... It
is this prohibited result, rather than the proscribed conduct per se, that is the
gravamen of the offense, and it is precisely this result that occurred in Alaska.
Id. at 1008-10.
138. See Rios v. State, 733 P.2d 242 (Wyo. 1987) (upholding Wyoming's jurisdiction
in an extraterritorial parental kidnapping case, even though the State did not have a
statute permitting prosecution for acts occurring outside the state).
139. See Roberts v. State, 619 S.W.2d 161, 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) ("This interest
in protecting the viability of its judgments and the rights of possession of its residents
gives the State of Texas jurisdiction to punish the acts of a person committed wholly
outside the territorial boundaries of Texas when those acts thwart this valid interest.").
140. See Trindle, 326 Md. at 33-35, 602 A.2d at 1236-37.
141. Id. at 36, 602 A.2d at 1237. See People v. Gerchberg, 181 Cal. Rptr. 505, 506
(Cal. Ct. App. 1982) ("California cannot punish for conduct taking place outside of Cali-
fornia unless the defendant has, within this state, committed acts which amount to at
least an attempt to commit a crime punishable under California law."); State v. McCor-
mick, 273 N.W.2d 624, 628 (Minn. 1978) (finding that a "[d]efendant constitutionally
and historically can only be tried in the district where the crime occurred"); State v.
Cochran, 538 P.2d 791 (Idaho 1975) (deciding that absent proof that the kidnapping
occurred in Idaho, jurisdiction does not exist in that state).
734 [VOL. 52:718
FAMILY LAW
tion 2 as an accessory, the court determined that she was not
convicted as an accessory, but as a principal in her own right.' 4 2
The Trindle court reasoned that Marcus participated with Trindle
both in the preparation and consummation of the plan to "secrete
and harbor" the children from Matthai's lawful custody, and that in
so doing she was guilty of conduct expressly punishable under arti-
cle 27, section 2.143
3. Analysis.-The opinions of the majority and dissent in Trin-
die represent two different interpretations of Maryland common law,
Maryland's child abduction statute, and cases concerning parental
kidnapping from other jurisdictions. A comparison of these two ap-
proaches makes it clear that the majority opinion is the more ra-
tional and better reasoned. While the dissenting opinion, authored
by Judge Eldridge, concluded that "a state such as Maryland has no
territorial jurisdiction over an offense committed in another state,
even if that offense may have had some 'effects' in Maryland,"' 4 4 a
close analysis of the reasoning reveals that this determination is not
quite accurate.
a. The Common Law.-The majority in Trindle relied solely on
Pennington for its interpretation of Maryland common law. 45 There-
fore, a comparison of the Pennington case and the Trindle dissent ef-
fectively reveals the flaws in the dissent's interpretation of Maryland
common law. To support the view that Marcus's conviction was in-
consistent with settled Maryland common-law principles, 146 Judge
Eldridge distorted the Pennington court's reasoning by selectively re-
viewing the common-law authority.' 47  For example, the dissent
quoted from Pennington that "'under the common law . . . a state
may punish only those crimes committed within its territorial lim-
142. Trindle, 326 Md. at 36, 602 A.2d at 1237.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 39, 602 A.2d at 1239 (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
145. See id. at 31, 602 A.2d at 1235.
146. Id. at 37, 602 A.2d at 1238 (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
147. Compare Judge Eldridge's partial dissent in Trindle, 326 Md. at 39, 602 A.2d at
1239 (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), in which he argued that
settled Maryland common-law principles dictate that Maryland has no territorial juris-
diction over an offense committed in another state, even if that offense has an effect in
Maryland, with Pennington v. State, 308 Md. 727, 733, 521 A.2d 1216, 1219 (1987),
which established that accepted common-law principles permit Maryland courts to take
jurisdiction over a crime when a particular result is an element of the crime and that
result is felt within the state.
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its.' ""4 The dissent failed to acknowledge, however, that while the
court in Pennington cited this statement as the general rule in Mary-
land, it also enumerated several exceptions, 4 9 including one which
suggests that when the result of certain criminal conduct occurring
outside a state has its effect within the state, the effected state may
take jurisdiction over the matter.' 50 Although the dissent cited Pen-
nington extensively, it ignored the ultimate decision reached by that
court, and disregarded many of the authorities analyzed in Pen-
nington that recognize this exception to the jurisdictional rule.' 5'
b. Statutory Construction.-The majority and the dissent agreed
that Marcus was convicted under the portion of article 27, section 2
that punishes one who "shall knowingly secrete or harbor such child
. . . with the intent to deprive such parent or parents . . . of the
custody, care and control of such child .... "t but they disagreed
in their interpretations of the statute. The majority recognized that
the intent to deprive Matthai of custody of the children is an essen-
tial element of the crime, which had its effect in Maryland.153 By
contrast, the dissent recognized that intent to deprive of custody is
an element of the crime, but did not acknowledge that this particu-
lar offense produced an effect that occurred in Maryland.' 54 Ac-
cording to the dissent, "In]either an act which is an element of the
offense nor an effect which is an element of the offense occurred in
Maryland."' 5 5 The interpretation adopted by the majority was sup-
ported by the meaning given to similar statutes in other jurisdic-
tions, 15  while the dissent offered only weak support for its
conclusion. 57
148. Trindle, 326 Md. at 37, 602 A.2d at 1238 (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting Pennington, 308 Md. at 730, 521 A.2d at 1217).
149. See Pennington, 308 Md. at 730, 521 A.2d at 1217. See also supra notes 127-131 and
accompanying text.
150. See Pennington, 308 Md. at 731-33, 521 A.2d at 1218-19.
151. See id. at 733, 521 A.2d at 1219 (citing Grindstaff v. State, 57 Md. App. 412, 470
A.2d 809, cert. denied, 299 Md. 655, 474 A.2d 1344 (1984); United States v. Kibler, 667
F.2d 452 (4th Cir. 1982); Medley v. Warden, 210 Md. 649, 123 A.2d 595, cert. denied, 352
U.S. 858 (1956); State v. Kriss, 191 Md. 568, 62 A.2d 568 (1948); Romans v. State, 178
Md. 588, 16 A.2d 642 (1940); Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1911)).
152. Trindle, 326 Md. at 32, 44, 602 A.2d at 1235, 1242. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 2 (1992).
153. Trindle, 326 Md. at 32, 602 A.2d at 1235.
154. Id. at 46, 602 A.2d at 1242 (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
155. Id.
156. See infra notes 158-163 and accompanying text.
157. See infra notes 164-175 and accompanying text.
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c. Child Abduction Cases from Other Jurisdictions.-The cases cited
by the majority carefully analyzed the various interpretations of ex-
traterritorial criminal jurisdiction offered by other jurisdictions. For
example, in Rios v. State,'58 the Supreme Court of Wyoming re-
viewed many of the same cases and statutes that were analyzed by
the Trindle majority.' 59 In addition, that court analyzed Wyoming
common law in a way comparable to the Pennington court's analysis
of Maryland common law. 6 ' In Wheat v. State,'6 ' the Court of Ap-
peals of Alaska also reviewed the cases analyzed by the Trindle ma-
jority.'6 2 Like Trindle, the courts in both Wheat and Rios rejected the
three cases relied upon by the Trindle dissent. 63
The case law cited by the dissent provided weak support for its
position that the Maryland courts did not have jurisdiction over this
case. For example, the dissent cited People v. Gerchberg,'64 a case in
which the California Court of Appeals conceded that its jurisdic-
tional rule concerning extraterritorial kidnappings has been criti-
cized by legal writers.' 65 Likewise, in State v. McCormick,'66 the
Minnesota Supreme Court admitted that there are persuasive argu-
ments for giving Minnesota jurisdiction in extraterritorial parental
kidnapping cases, 16 7 outlining many of the same arguments used by
158. 733 P.2d 242 (Wyo. 1987).
159. See id. at 248-49 (reviewing People v. Gerchberg, 181 Cal. Rptr. 505 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1982); State v. McCormick, 273 N.W.2d 624 (Minn. 1978)).
160. Id. at 245.
161. 734 P.2d 1007 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
162. See id. at 1011.
163. See id. ("In short, to the extent that differences in applicable statutory provisions
do not distinguish Gerchberg, McCormick and Cochran from the present case, we find these
decisions unpersuasive and decline to follow them."); Rios, 733 P.2d at 249 ("With due
deference to the rulings of our sister states, and recognizing a difference in statutory
language, we conclude that Wyoming properly could exercise subject matter jurisdiction
in this instance.").
164. 131 Cal. Rptr. 505 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982). See Trindle, 326 Md. at 51 n.7, 602 A.2d
at 1245 n.7.
165. See Gerchberg, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 506. The rule in California, as stated in Gerchberg,
is that the state "cannot punish for conduct taking place outside of California unless the
defendant has, within the state, committed acts which amount to at least an attempt to
commit a crime punishable under California law." Id. The California Court of Appeals
seemed to grudgingly follow the rule, stating that "[alithough that doctrine has been
criticized by legal writers, the Supreme Court continues to adhere to it." Id.
166. 273 N.W.2d 624 (Minn. 1978). See Trindle, 326 Md. at 51 n.7, 602 A.2d at 1245
n.7.
167. See McCormick, 273 N.W.2d at 628 ("It is true that Minnesota is the state which
has the greatest and perhaps the only interest in the subject of this litigation. In the
context of this case, it is equally clear that the custodial parent and her children have
significant contacts with this state. The order violated is that of a Minnesota court. Any
unwarranted intrusion into the sovereignty of a sister state can be corrected by the re-
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the majority in Trindle.168 Nevertheless, the McCormick court de-
cided to refuse jurisdiction based on the fact that criminal cases do
not enjoy the "same flexibility" in rules governing extraterritorial
jurisdiction as civil cases.' 69
In addition to relying on weak case law from other jurisdictions,
the dissent attempted to distinguish the cases relied upon by the
majority in two ways. First, the dissent claimed that the child abduc-
tion statutes from those other jurisdictions are significantly different
from Maryland's statute. The dissent pointed out that the Michigan
statute relied upon in Harvey 7 0 and the Texas statute relied upon in
Roberts '' include the retention of a child in violation of a custody
order as an element of the offense.' 72 The dissent, however, did not
adequately explain why this difference should change the outcome
of this case. Although the statutes are different, the Maryland stat-
ute clearly was violated because Marcus deprived Matthai of her cus-
tody of the children. Furthermore, the statutes relied upon in Wheat
and Rios did not include violation of a court order as an element of
the offense. 173
Second, the dissent noted that in these cases the noncustodial
parent was supposed to return the child to the custodial parent in
the forum state. 174 Again, the dissent failed to show the significance
of this statutory difference. In fact, the location at which the child
was to be returned to the custodial parent did not matter, because in
those cases the primary issue was that the noncustodial parents de-
prived the custodial parents of their rights in the forum state. 75
fusal of the governor of that state to grant extradition. These are persuasive arguments
for approving jurisdiction in Minnesota.").
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.350a (1991). See People v. Harvey, 435 N.W.2d 456,
457 (Mich. 1989).
171. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.03 (West 1989). See Roberts v. State, 619 S.W.2d
161, 162 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
172. Trindle, 326 Md. at 48-49, 602 A.2d at 1244 (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
173. See ALAsKA STAT. § 11.41.330 (1989); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-204 (1977 & Supp. 1988).
174. See Trindle, 326 Md. at 49-50, 602 A.2d at 1244 (Eldridge, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
175. See Wheat v. State, 734 P.2d 1007, 1010 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987) ("Crystal's
mother was deprived of the lawful custody of her daughter .... It is this prohibited
result, rather than the proscribed conduct per se, that is the gravamen of the offense.");
Roberts, 619 S.W.2d at 164 ("The act of appellant retaining Tanya in Colorado resulted in




4. Conclusion.-The differences between the majority and dis-
senting opinions in Trindle are the result of differing interpretations
of Maryland common law, the child abduction statute, and case law
from other jurisdictions. Not only are the majority's interpretations
in all three of these areas more logical and the result of more thor-
ough analysis than those of the dissent, but the majority's decision
furthers the public interest by guaranteeing a forum in which a cus-
todial parent can seek justice. As the Wyoming Supreme Court in
Rios asked, if the state in which the custodial parent resides does not
allow the noncustodial parent to be prosecuted for his criminal be-
havior, where can the custodial parent seek justice?176
It should also be noted that the Trindle decision differs from pa-
rental kidnapping cases in other jurisdictions by its failure to em-
phasize that Marcus's actions were in violation of a Maryland court
order.'77 It is possible that this lack of emphasis was due to the fact
that article 27, section 2 does not specifically mention the violation
of a court order as punishable behavior. 78 Nevertheless, the effect
is a broad holding that will provide Maryland courts with greater
latitude in the area of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction in the
future.
JAEL E. POLNAC
C. Expanding the Scope of the Prohibition Against "Child Selling"
In State v. Runkles, 179 the Court of Appeals considered whether
article 27, section 35C prohibits a person from receiving compensa-
tion for inducing a parent to relinquish custody of his or her
child. ' The court held that section 35C contains an expansive
prohibition against all types of child selling, rather than a limited
176. Rios v. State, 733 P.2d 242, 250 (Wyo. 1987).
177. Even in states that do not make violation of a court order an element of the
offense, the courts do mention that it is an important factor to consider in determining
jurisdiction. See Wheat, 734 P.2d at 1012 ("The custody decree violated by Wheat was
issued in Alaska, and it is clear that Alaska had homestate jurisdiction over the issue of
custody."); Rios, 733 P.2d at 250 ("In this instance Rios' ex-wife became a resident of the
State of Wyoming, and under many jurisdictional concepts, she would be entitled to
enforce the provisions of the New Mexico custodial decree in the courts of the State of
Wyoming.").
178. See supra note 114 for the text of article 27, § 2. See also Tindle, 326 Md. at 50,
602 A.2d at 1245 (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The failure
to return a child to Maryland, in violation of a court order, is not an element of the Art.
27, § 2, offense charged in this case.").
179. 326 Md. 384, 605 A.2d 111 (1992).
180. See id. at 391, 605 A.2d at 115.
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proscription against only for-profit adoptions. 8' Due to the broad
interpretation applied by the Court of Appeals, the Runkles decision
is likely to affect subsequent cases involving divorce and child cus-
tody, as well as those cases dealing with specialized areas of family
law such as surrogacy. Thus, conduct not punishable in the past-
participation in surrogacy agreements and certain child custody ar-
rangements-may now draw criminal sanction under Runkles.
1. The Case.-On August 16, 1989, Allen Runkles approached
Warren Seymour and informed him that for $4000 he would per-
suade Seymour's former daughter-in-law to sign over custody of her
six-year-old son to Seymour, the child's paternal grandfather.' 82 In
the past, the child's grandfather had frequently attempted to obtain
custody of his grandson, Jason, without success.' 83 At the time of
this initial contact, Jason and his younger brother, D.J., lived with
their mother, JoAnn Bauerlien, as well as Runkles, their mother's
live-in boyfriend.18 4
Pursuant to his conversation with Runkles, Seymour directed
his attorney to prepare a Consent to Custody Order for his former
daughter-in-law to sign. 185 On August 18, when Seymour went to
pick up his grandson for his regular visitation time, the child's
mother did indeed sign the transfer of custody papers. 186 After-
wards, the grandfather and Runkles walked out to the garage and,
out of the mother's presence, the child's grandfather handed Run-
kles an envelope containing $4000 in exchange for the custody
papers. 187
Unfortunately for Runkles, after their initial conversation, the
grandfather had contacted the police and informed them of the pro-
posed transaction.1 88 As a result of this information, the police set
up surveillance and monitored the entire transaction between Run-
181. Id. at 400, 605 A.2d at 119.
182. Id. at 389, 605 A.2d at 114. The defendant, Runkles, claimed, however, that the
child's grandfather actually approached him first to suggest that Runkles persuade his
girlfriend to transfer custody of her child. Brief for Appellant at 2 n. 1, Runkles v. State,
87 Md. App. 492, 590 A.2d 552 (1991) (No. 90-855). The Runkles court, however, did
not consider this contention because, pursuant to a plea agreement, the parties agreed
to a statement of facts, which included the stipulation that Runkles had approached the
child's grandfather first. See id. at 2.
183. Runkles, 326 Md. at 389, 605 A.2d at 114.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 389-90, 605 A.2d at 114.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 390, 605 A.2d at 114.
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kles and Seymour.' 89 Consequently, when Runkles re-entered his
home with the $4000, the police immediately arrested him.' 90 Run-
kles was charged with "selling, bartering, or trading a child in ex-
change for money" in violation of article 27, section 35C. 9'
After Runkles's arrest, the child's mother admitted to the police
that he had persuaded her to relinquish custody of her son to Sey-
mour, but she denied any knowledge of the money exchange that
took place after the signing of the custody papers.' 92 Runkles
waived his right to a jury trial, and, pursuant to a plea agreement,
the trial judge found him guilty of "selling, bartering, or trading a
child in exchange for money" in violation of section 35C. 193 Run-
kles was sentenced to five years in prison, dating from his arrest on
August 18. The judge, however, suspended the balance of Run-
kles's sentence in favor of five years probation.' 94
Runkles appealed, contending that the evidence presented at
his trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction. 195 In a two-to-one
panel decision, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the judgment
of the lower court, finding that section 35C applied only to adoption
situations and not to mere transfers of child custody.' 9 6 Judge Moy-
lan, the dissenting judge on the panel, maintained that the legisla-
ture designed section 35C to cover "any commercial trafficking in
children" and thus did not intend to limit the statute to prohibiting
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 389, 605 A.2d at 113-14. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35C (1989).
192. Runhkles, 326 Md. at 390, 605 A.2d at 114. The mother's explanation for her
decision to transfer custody at this time was that she had been experiencing difficulties
with her son and that she thought that he would be "better off" living with his grandfa-
ther. Id. The Court of Appeals held that the child's mother did not violate § 35C be-
cause she had no knowledge of the money that Runkles received in exchange for the
custody transfer and thus she did not intend to sell, barter, or trade her child for anything
of value, which the statute explicitly prohibits. Id. at 403, 605 A.2d at 120-2 1. Intent is a
key element of the crime; thus, the court concluded that "[n]o matter how the mother
may be judged morally, she was legally blameless; she was an innocent party in the af-
fair." Id.
193. Id. at 390, 605 A.2d at 114. The trial judge found Runkles guilty because he felt
that the transfer of custody was tantamount to the start of adoption proceedings. Id. at
391, 605 A.2d at 114. The trial judge, however, did not specify whether he thought that
article 27, § 35C proscribed a wider range of situations than mere for-profit adoptions,
as the Court of Appeals later concluded it did. Id. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35C
(1989).
194. See Runkles v. State, 87 Md. App. 492, 494, 590 A.2d 552, 553 (1991), rev'd, 326
Md. 384, 605 A.2d 111 (1992).
195. Id.
196. Id., 590 A.2d at 556.
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only exchanges of children in the adoption context. 19 7
The State petitioned for a writ of certiorari, asking the Court of
Appeals to decide whether "the Court of Special Appeals err[ed] in
construing Maryland's child selling statute as limited to proscribing
for-profit adoptions, rather than any for-profit exchange of child cus-
tody .. . After granting the petition and ordering the issuance
of the writ, 199 the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the
Court of Special Appeals and remanded the case to that court with
directions to affirm the judgment of the circuit court.20 0
Writing for the majority, Judge Orth held that article 27, sec-
tion 35C was not restricted to prohibiting for-profit adoptions.2 0,
Rather, the statute proscribes all for-profit exchanges of child cus-
tody.2 °2 The court further concluded that the evidence presented
was legally sufficient to sustain Runkles's conviction because it es-
tablished the corpus delicti of the offense charged, as well as the
criminal agency of the defendant.20
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Bell contended that it was not
necessary to look to section 35C's legislative history because it is
clear from the statute's plain and ordinary meaning that the legisla-
ture did not contemplate prohibiting the defendant's conduct in this
case. 204 Judge Bell determined that the legislature did not intend to
reach "mere transfer[s] of custody" when promulgating article 27,
section 35C.20 5  He further concluded that Runkles's conduct
merely constituted influence peddling, not statutorily proscribed
child selling. 206
2. Legal Background.-Prior to 1989, there existed no general
crime of "child selling." The closest prohibition against such con-
duct was found in section 5-327 of Maryland's Family Law Article.
Section 5-327 states in relevant part:
(1) An agency, institution, or individual who renders any
service in connection with the placement of an individual
for adoption may not charge or receive from or on behalf
197. See id. at 502, 590 A.2d at 557 (Moylan, J., dissenting).
198. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Runkles, (No. 91-95) (emphasis added).
199. See Runkles, 326 Md. at 392, 605 A.2d at 115.
200. Id. at 406, 605 A.2d at 122.
201. Id. at 400, 605 A.2d at 119.
202. Id. at 402, 605 A.2d at 120.
203. Id. at 406, 605 A.2d at 122.
204. See id. at 406-07, 605 A.2d at 122 (Bell, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 408, 605 A.2d at 123 (Bell, J., dissenting).
206. Id.
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of either the natural parent of the individual to be adopted,
or from or on behalf of the individual who is adopting the
individual, any compensation for the placement.
(2) This subsection does not prohibit the payment, by an
interested person, of reasonable and customary charges or
fees for hospital or medical or legal services.2 °7
Section 5-327 is clearly applicable only to adoption proceedings and
the violation of this provision is punishable by a fine not to exceed
$100 or imprisonment for three months or both.2 °a
Public outcry over two incidents of "baby selling" caused the
Maryland legislature to re-assess the sufficiency of the existing law
on this subject. 20 9 The first incident involved a couple from Anne
Arundel County who sold their child for $3500 and three ounces of
cocaine. 2  Because such a transaction was not within the adoption
context, it fell outside the scope of section 5-327's prohibition and,
therefore, the circuit court judge dismissed the case. 21 ' The second
incident involved a Pennsylvania couple who offered, by way of an
advertisement in a Baltimore newspaper, to put their child up for
adoption in return for compensation. 2  Under a Pennsylvania law
comparable to Maryland's section 5-327, but authorizing a harsher
penalty, the couple was convicted of child selling.
2 13
The public outrage created by these two cases prompted the
Maryland General Assembly to enact "remedial legislation" in order
to assuage the public's disenchantment with the existing law.
214
The purpose of Senate Bill 58,25 as initially proposed, was merely
to increase the maximum penalty for a violation of section 5-327
from a $100 fine and three months in prison to a $10,000 fine and
five years in prison.216 By the time the legislature was ready to enact
the bill, however, it had undergone a complete transformation.
Amendments had removed any mention of adoption from the stat-
207. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-327(a) (1984).
208. See id. § 5-327(d). This statute is included in Maryland's Family Law Article
under the subsection of "Adoption".
209. See Runkles, 326 Md. at 388, 605 A.2d at 113.
210. Id. at 386, 605 A.2d at 112. The police believed that the couple had previously
sold another one of their children for $5000. Id. at 387 n.2, 605 A.2d at 115 n.2.
211. See id. at 387, 605 A.2d at 113.
212. See id. at 386, 605 A.2d at 112.
213. See id. at 387, 605 A.2d at 113.
214. See id. at 388, 605 A.2d at 113.
215. Md. S.B. 58, 1987 Sess. Senate Bill 58 was initially proposed by Senator Paula
Hollinger. It was eventually codified as § 35C in the Crimes and Punishments Article.
Runkles, 326 Md. at 398-99, 605 A.2d at 118.
216. See Runkles, 326 Md. at 394, 605 A.2d at 119.
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ute.2 1 7 Hence, the new provision was not the mere expansion of
section 5-327's penalties, as the initial bill had contemplated.2 1 a
The reason for the bill's transformation arose from concerns
that a mere modification of section 5-327 would not satisfy the legis-
lature's ultimate goal of promulgating a general prohibition against
baby selling within and beyond the adoption context.21 9 Conse-
quently, the General Assembly created an entirely new statute, enti-
tled "Child Selling," and placed it in the Crimes and Punishments
Article rather than in the Family Law Article. 22 ' This new statute,
codified as article 27, section 35C, states in pertinent part that "[a]
person may not sell, barter, or trade, or offer to sell, barter, or trade
a child for money or property, either real or personal, or anything
else of value."'22 ' A violation of this provision may be punishable by
a $10,000 fine or five years in prison or both.222
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Runkles, the Court of Appeals ad-
dressed two aspects of article 27, section 35C. First, the court ad-
dressed whether section 35C prohibits only for-profit adoptions. 223
After determining that the section proscribes more than just for-
profit adoptions, 4 the court attempted to determine exactly what
conduct the legislature intended the new statute to prohibit. 22 5 Sec-
ond, the court attempted to define the type of evidence that is le-
gally sufficient to sustain a conviction against a defendant who
217. Id. at 399, 605 A.2d at 118.
218. Id.
219. See id. at 398, 605 A.2d at 118.
220. See id. at 399, 605 A.2d at 118. Section 5-327 still exists as part of Maryland's
Family Law Article and remains unaltered as a prohibition against for-profit adoptions.
Id. at 400, 605 A.2d at 119.
221. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35C (1989). Notwithstanding any holding or dictum to
the contrary in Massey v. State, 320 Md. 605, 579 A.2d 265 (1990), there is no statute of
limitations for the crime created by § 35C because it is a misdemeanor punishable by
imprisonment in the penitentiary. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35C, editor's note.
222. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35C(b).
223. See Runkles, 326 Md. at 400, 605 A.2d at 119.
224. After reviewing the legislative history of article 27, § 35C, the court concluded
that the scope of the new statute's prohibition must include more than just for-profit
adoptions because that was, and still is, section 5-327's function. Id. In particular, the
court stated that "[it is of particular significance that SB 58 left FL § 5-327 absolutely
untouched .... So now there are two statutes in effect, one intended to prohibit the sale
of the adoption of a child, and the other intended to prohibit generally the sale of a
child." Id. (emphasis added). Because § 5-327 was left entirely intact, the court con-
cluded that § 5-327 would continue to control for-profit adoption situations, while arti-
cle 27, § 35C would cover a broader range of situations. Id.
225. Id. at 401, 605 A.2d at 119-20.
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violates this statute.226
a. Scope of Article 27, Section 35C.-The circumstances that led
to Runkles's prosecution arose shortly after the effective date of the
new statute.227 Therefore, the interpretation of article 27, section
35C was a matter of first impression for the court. In order to con-
strue section 35C, the court first looked to the plain meaning of the
statute's language.228 Had the language been clear on its face, the
Runkles court would not have looked any further to determine the
provision's meaning. 229 But, because of the "significant difference
of opinion among those learned in the law" as to exactly what the
legislature intended this statute to cover, the court found the lan-
guage of section 35C to be ambiguous. 230 The court then noted
that it was necessary to consider legislative history in order to avoid
interpreting the statute in a way that was "unreasonable, illogical or
inconsistent" with the legislature's underlying purposes.23'
226. See id. at 403-04, 605 A.2d at 121.
227. Article 27, § 35C went into effect on July 1, 1989. The incident that led to the
prosecution of Allen Runkles occurred on August 18, 1989. See id. at 388, 605 A.2d at
113.
228. See id. at 392, 605 A.2d at 115. See also State v. Bricker, 321 Md. 86, 92, 581 A.2d
9, 12 (1990) (finding that "[w]hen interpreting a statute, the starting point is the word-
ing of the relevant provisions").
229. Runkles, 326 Md. at 392, 605 A.2d at 115. See generally State v. Fabritz, 276 Md.
416, 421, 348 A.2d 275, 278 (1975) (stating that "[w]here there is no ambiguity or ob-
scurity in the language of a statute, there is usually no need to look elsewhere to ascer-
tain the intention of the Legislature"); Fowell v. State, 206 Md. 101, 105, 110 A.2d 524,
526 (1955) (determining that "[w]here the statutory language is plain and free from
ambiguity and so expresses a definite and sensible meaning, that meaning is conclusively
presumed to be the meaning which the Legislature intended").
230. Runhles, 326 Md. at 392, 605 A.2d at 115.
231. Id. at 392-93, 605 A.2d at 115. See also Potter v. Bethesda Fire Dep't, 309 Md.
347, 353, 524 A.2d 61, 64 (1987) (finding that "[iun construing statutes .... results that
are unreasonable, illogical or inconsistent with common sense should be avoided when-
ever possible consistent with the statutory language, with the real legislative intention
prevailing over the intention indicated by the literal meaning" (citation omitted)). See
generally Bricker, 321 Md. at 92, 581 A.2d at 12 (holding that "[i]n the event that ambigu-
ity clouds the precise application of the statute, the cardinal rule of statutory construc-
tion is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent"); Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore,
309 Md. 505, 513, 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987) (finding that "where a statute is plainly
susceptible of more than one meaning and thus contains an ambiguity, courts consider
not only the literal or usual meaning of their words, but their meaning and effect in light
of the setting, the objectives and the purpose of the enactment").
The majority in Runkles noted that a court may always look to a statute's legislative
intent if it will be useful in construing the provision. Specifically, the Runkles court
stated that a court is never "precluded from consulting legislative history as part of the
process of determining the legislative purpose or goal [of a law]." Wilde v. Swanson,




After reviewing the legislative history, the Runkles court deter-
mined that the legislature's objective in enacting section 35C was to
deter future cases of baby selling that the existing law either did not
prohibit or did not adequately punish.123 The legislature likely be-
lieved that such a statute was necessary in order to prevent the
emergence of a market for babies.23 3
The Runkles court, however, never defined exactly what the leg-
islature contemplated by the phrase "sell, barter, or trade a
child.""' 4 Instead, the court decided to deal specifically with the
question at hand-whether Runkles's specific conduct was prohib-
ited under the statute. 2 5 In keeping with this apparent judicial re-
straint, the court chose not to "mark the precise boundaries of the
entire area which the Legislature intended to cover. "236
Because of the broad and, as of yet, undefined scope given to
article 27, section 35C, the court was free to conclude that the legis-
lature intended to include the mere consent to transfer custody of a
child in exchange for money within the prohibition against selling,
bartering, or trading a child.2 37 The court stated that "[i]n the light
of the legislative intent that art. 27, § 35C have a broad reach, we
find it patent that ordinarily a consent to the transfer of legal and
physical custody of a child for money is proscribed by the stat-
ute."'238 The Court of Appeals agreed with the circuit court's deci-
sion that it does not matter whether adoption or custody is in
question because either way a "child is still being traded for
money!" 23 9
b. Legal Sufficiency of Evidence.-After determining that Run-
kles's conduct fell within the ambit of section 35C, the court still had
to decide if the evidence against him was legally sufficient to sustain
his conviction. 24" The test to determine legal sufficiency is
232. See Runkles, 326 Md. at 393-400, 605 A.2d at 115-19.
233. See Avi Katz, Surrogate Motherhood and the Baby Selling Laws, 20 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 1, 8 (1986) (discussing the fact that most child selling statutes seem to be "specif-
ically targeted at the elimination of the baby black market").
234. See Runkles, 326 Md. at 401, 605 A.2d at 120. Although the court never ex-
pressed its opinion as to what exactly the legislature intended section 35C to cover, it
concluded that "to say that the legislature intended other than the statute reach far and
wide would not only be unreasonable and illogical, but inconsistent with common
sense." Id.
235. Id. at 401-02, 605 A.2d at 120.
236. Id. at 402, 605 A.2d at 120.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 391, 605 A.2d at 114 (quoting the trial judge).
240. See id. at 402-03, 605 A.2d at 120-21.
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"whether the evidence either shows directly or supports a rational
inference of the facts to be proved, from which the trier of fact could
fairly be convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the defendant's
guilt of the offense charged."24 ' In Runkles, the State was required
to prove facts that would establish the corpus delicti of the crime
charged, as well as facts that would establish the criminal agency of
the defendant.242
(1) Corpus Delicti.-In order to establish the corpus delicti 4 3 of
the offense charged, the court had to find that Runkles committed
the crime created under article 27, section 35C-namely, the sale,
barter, or trade of a child for anything of value.244 If the consent to
transfer legal and physical custody in return for money constitutes
the sale, barter, or trade of a child under section 35C, then there
was legally sufficient evidence to prove the corpus delicti in this
case. 245 Under such a construction, the agreed statement of facts
presented sufficient evidence to establish that there was a child in-
volved, that the defendant "sold" that child, and that the defendant
received something of value in return for the child. 46 Conse-
quently, the prosecution succeeded in establishing the corpus delicti
of the offense charged in this case.
(2) Criminal Agency.-Runkles argued that because he had no
authority to consent to the transfer of custody of the child in ques-
tion, he could not be held responsible for trading the child for
money.247 In so arguing, he relied on a well-accepted principle of
law that one who uses an intermediary to commit a crime cannot be
241. Williams v. State, 5 Md. App. 450, 459, 247 A.2d 731, 737 (1968).
242. Rundes, 326 Md. at 404, 605 A.2d at 121.
243. Corpus delicti means "the body of the crime." The purpose of proving the
corpus delecti of an offense charged is to avoid punishing someone for a crime that was
never in fact committed. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. Scorr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW
§ 1.4 (b), at 18-19 (2d ed. 1986). LaFave and Scott state:
the corpus delicti embraces the fact that a crime has been committed by some-
one-i.e., that somebody did the required act or omission with the required
mental fault, under the required (if any) attendant circumstances, and produc-
ing the required (if any) harmful consequence, without embracing the further
fact (needed for conviction) that the defendant was the one who did or omitted
that act or was otherwise responsible therefor."
Id.






considered a principle in the first degree.248 The court, however,
concluded that because Runkles caused the consent to the transfer
of custody through an innocent human agent,249 he is legally a prin-
cipal in the first degree and must be held accountable for the acts
and omissions of his intermediary. 250
4. Analysis.-"Somewhere within most of us there is at least an
intuitive reaction that there is something indecent about the pros-
pect of a market for babies, "251 noted one commentator. It was
amidst this sort of ideological atmosphere that the Court of Appeals
made its decision in Runkles. Although the court purported to exer-
cise judicial restraint in this case, 25 2 it is clear that Runkles decided
far more than was necessary in order to answer the question
presented for consideration. Consequently, the court's decision in
Runkles will likely have a lasting impact on the state of family law in
Maryland.
Because of the strong public sentiment against baby selling2 53
and the fact that this case arose soon after article 27, section 35C
became effective,254 the court seemed to be searching for a justifica-
tion to convict Runkles. The desire to hold him accountable under
section 35C led the court to assign this statute an extremely broad
reach.255 In his dissenting opinion, Judge Bell stated that "[u]nlike
the [majority] .... I believe that the terms [of a statute] should be
given their plain and ordinary meanings, rather than the meanings
which serve to support a desired result. '256
The majority in Runkles concluded that section 35C's prohibi-
tion against child selling did not only forbid for-profit adoptions,
248. See id. at 405, 605 A.2d at 121; see also LAFAVE & Sco'rr, supra note 243, § 6.6 (a),
at 569.
249. See Runkles, 326 Md. at 405, 605 A.2d at 121. The Court of Appeals concluded
that "[d]espite [the mother's] rationalization, after the fact, to explain why she allowed
herself to be persuaded by Runkles, the child would have remained with her except for
Runkles's intervention. Certainly, the grandfather so believed; he offered to pay Run-
kles $4,000 to intervene." Id. See also LAFAVE & Sco'rr, supra note 243, § 6.6(a), at 570
(noting that "the use of an innocent or irresponsible agent" will not destroy the wrong-
doer's principal-in-the-first-degree status).
250. See Runkles, 326 Md. at 405, 605 A.2d at 121.
251. J. Robert S. Prichard, A Market For Babies?, 34 U. TORONrO L.J. 341, 347 (1984).
252. The Court of Appeals stated that "[tihe full sweep of the statute must await an-
other day; we do not now mark the precise boundaries of the entire area which the
Legislature intended to cover." Runkles, 326 Md. at 402, 605 A.2d at 120.
253. See id. at 388, 605 A.2d at 113.
254. See id.
255. See id. at 401, 605 A.2d at 119-20.
256. Id. at 407, 605 A.2d at 122 (Bell, J., dissenting).
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but proscribed all for-profit transfers of child custody.257 The dis-
sent, however, contended that the statutory language was clear and
that the legislature did not intend for the statute to reach the de-
fendant's conduct in this case.2 58 The dissent concluded that the
plain meaning of section 35C-"sale, barter, or trade"-suggests
that the prohibited conduct includes only those transfers occurring
within a commercial context. 2 9 Judge Bell insisted that, at most,
Runkles was offering to persuade his girlfriend to give up custody of
her child, not offering to sell the child itself.260
The majority, however, seemed to believe that the dissent's rea-
soning was simply a matter of semantics and, as the trial judge
pointed out, any way one looks at it, "a child [was] still being traded
for money."'26 ' The majority contended that the arguments set
forth by Judge Bell did not adequately reflect the legislative purpose
intended by the General Assembly when it enacted this statute-
namely, that "[s]elling a baby on the open market is a practice which
must be stopped. 262
The Runkles court clearly engaged in result-oriented decision
making. Its desire to rectify a rapidly intensifying social problem
motivated the Court of Appeals to set forth an extremely broad in-
terpretation of section 35C. By punishing Runkles for conduct that
was arguably not prohibited by the statute, the court apparently be-
lieved that its decision would deter other potential child sellers.
The question remains whether the court's ends really justify its
means.
The breadth given to section 35C by the majority left the dis-
senters worrying about the possible implications of such an inter-
pretation. Because the instant case dealt with conduct that was
morally reprehensible, it is likely that the court sought to find a vio-
lation of article 27, section 35C even though the conduct was not
directly prohibited by the statute. In order to find such a violation
and activate the newly enacted statute, the court needed to construe
the statute broadly. Consequently, the majority's decision seems to
leave little leeway for future courts to narrow the scope of section
35C.
257. See id. at 400-02, 605 A.2d at 119-20.
258. Id. at 408, 605 A.2d 123 (Bell, J., dissenting).
259. See id. at 407 n.3, 605 A.2d 123 n.3 (Bell, J., dissenting).
260. See id. at 408, 605 A.2d at 123 (Bell, J., dissenting).
261. Id. at 391, 605 A.2d 114 (quoting the trial judge),.
262. Id. at 394, 605 A.2d at 116 (quoting the transcript of the testimony of Senator
Hollinger, Senate Bill 58's sponsor, in front of the Senate Judicial Proceedings
Committee).
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Maryland is virtually alone in its enactment of a specialized child
selling statute. Most states merely have statutes equivalent to sec-
tion 5-327 of Maryland's Family Law Article, which prohibit receiv-
ing compensation in exchange for the adoption of a child, with
exceptions for reasonable medical and legal expenses. 63 Although
the statutes in other jurisdictions usually have more stringent penal-
ties for a violation than those that exist under section 5-327, they
are explicitly limited to the adoption context.2  Public dismay over
the increase in instances of child selling not covered by existing law,
combined with the leniency of section 5-327's penalties, compelled
the Maryland legislature to enact a separate "child selling" stat-
ute.265 At this point, however, no other state has felt the need to
enact such specialized legislation.
The court's decision in Runkles is likely to have a profound im-
pact on Maryland's family law. It may not only affect specialized
areas by prohibiting such things as surrogacy arrangements that are
potentially implicated under section 35C,"6 but perhaps the most
disturbing ramifications of Runkles's interpretation of section 35C
may come in the context of divorce and child custody proceedings.
Anticipating the legal problems created by construing section 35C
263. See ALA. CODE § 26-10-8 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-126 (1974); CAL. PE-
NAL CODE § 273 (West 1970); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-115 (1973); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 13, § 928 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.212(e) (West Supp. 1988); GA. CODE
ANN. § 74-418(b) (Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 18-1511 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40,
paras. 1526, 1701, 1702 (Smith-Hurd 1980); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-9 (Burns Supp.
1984); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.9 (West 1980); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (Baldwin
Supp. 1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:286 (West Supp. 1984); MD. CODE ANN., FAM.
LAW § 5-327 (1984); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § llA (Law Co-op. 1981); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 27.3178 (Callaghan 1980); NEV. REV. STAT. § 127.290 (1981); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:3-54(a) (West Supp. 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-37 (Supp. 1983); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3107.10 (Baldwin 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 866 (West 1983); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 4300 (1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-6-4.2 (1984); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-1-135 (1984); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.06 (West Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-07-203 (1978); W. VA. CODE § 48-4-5(c) (Supp. 1984); and WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 946.76 (West 1982). See also Natalie Haag Wallisch, Independent Adoption: Regulating the
Middleman, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 327, 348-49 n.175 & n.176 (1985); Katz, supra note 233, at
8-9 n.34.
264. See Wallisch, supra note 263, at 348-49.
265. See Runkles, 326 Md. at 398-99, 605 A.2d 118.
266. The legitimacy of surrogacy arrangements has become questionable under sec-
tion 5-327 of the Family Law Article, though it has only recently come to the forefront of
the political arena. See Jennifer S. Leete, Note, Permissible Reimbursement of Birth Mothers'
Expenses in Direct Adoptions, 51 MD. L. REV. 716, 721 n.107 (1992). Leete states that "[i]t
is widely recognized that [surrogacy arrangements are] dependent upon large payments
to the natural mother. One can only assume that if § 5-327 does in fact limit these
payments, surrogacy arrangements will virtually cease in Maryland." Id. (citations
omitted).
FAMILY LAW
to encompass the transfer of custody for value, the Court of Special
Appeals warned:
[t]o read § 35C to include the transfer of custody would
render criminally liable any parent (or lawyer) in divorce or
custody proceedings wherein as part of a marital agree-
ment, one parent agreed to relinquish a claim to custody in
exchange for any other thing of value-visitation, spousal
support, or property.267
The majority in the Court of Appeals found this conclusion to
be "unreasonable, illogical, and inconsistent with common
sense," 268 and consequently dismissed the intermediate appellate
court's argument on this subject, questioning the legitimacy of its
concerns. 269 Nevertheless, the Runkles decision must leave the peo-
ple of Maryland wondering where exactly the reach of article 27,
section 35C will end and what is to prevent courts from holding
other people and institutions liable for taking custody of children in
exchange for remuneration in other nonadoption contexts.27 °
5. Conclusion.-In State v. Runkles, the Court of Appeals held
that article 27, section 35C prohibited more than just for-profit
adoptions. 27' The court concluded that the legislature meant to
prevent all for-profit transfers of child custody.2 72 While its deci-
sion seemed reasonable under the circumstances, the court may
have invited a mass of future litigation due to its broad and result-
oriented interpretation of section 35C. If the state chooses to pros-
ecute those involved in surrogacy arrangements and child custody
267. Runkles v. State, 87 Md. App. 492, 501, 590 A.2d 552, 556 (1991), rev'd, 326 Md.
384, 605 A.2d 111 (1992).
268. Runkks, 326 Md. at 402 n.8, 605 A.2d 120 n.8. The majority likely dismissed this
concern for reasons set forth in Petitioner's Brief, which stated that
such "exchange" of custody between the child's parents (even through their
lawyers) does not remotely contemplate a sale of the child from one parent to
the other. The Court of Special Appeals' scenario implicitly assumes, as it
must, that the two parents, prior to any such agreement, shared custody and
were, to use the intermediate appellate court's commercial analogy, in effect
joint "owners" of the child. Of course, one cannot buy what he already owns.
Thus, not only does the Court of Special Appeals' hypothetical offend the spirit
of Section 35C, it violates the statute's express language.
Brief for the Petitioner at 13-14 n.4, Runkles (No. 91-95).
269. See Runkles, 326 Md. at 402 n.8, 605 A.2d at 120 n.8.
270. Notably, if the legislature is dissatisfied with the way in which the court has con-
strued a particular statute, it can always rewrite the provision in order to clarify its
intent.
271. See Runkles, 326 Md. at 400, 605 A.2d at 119.
272. See id. at 402, 605 A.2d at 120
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proceedings pursuant to this new statute, the onus will be on the
courts to restrict the boundaries of section 35C by reading Runkles
narrowly and applying its finding sparingly.
SAMANTHA ROSENBERG
VIII. INSURANCE
A. The "Lines of Business" Exception to the Requirement for Terminating
Agent Agreements
In Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. v. Insurance Commissioner,' the
Court of Appeals held that an insurance company wishing to termi-
nate a written agreement with an agent is not necessarily required
by article 48A, section 234B(b) to provide that agent with a ninety-
day written notice of termination. 2 The court relied on distinctions
between certain lines of insurance business to justify the exemption
of agents who solicit life and health insurance from the coverage of
the notice requirement.' In construing the notice requirement of
section 234B(b), the court considered not only the plain meaning of
the statute, but also gave great weight to both the legislative pur-
pose and prior legislative forms of the statute.4 The court con-
cluded that the interpretation of the statute offered by the Insurance
Commissioner was "too rigid an application of. . . [the] rules of
statutory construction" and thus rejected the Commissioner's
interpretation.5
1. The Case.-On January 1, 1985, Gerald Veydt entered into a
written insurance agency contract with Lincoln National Life Insur-
ance Company to write life and health insurance policies. 6 The
agency agreement between Veydt and Lincoln National provided
that either party could terminate the appointment, with or without
cause.7 However, the agreement did not contain a minimum period
for notice of termination.8
1. 328 Md. 65, 612 A.2d 1301 (1992).
2. See id. at 71, 612 A.2d at 1304. See also MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 234B(b)
(1991).
3. See Lincoln Nat'l, 328 Md. at 72, 612 A.2d at 1304; see also id. at 68-69, 612 A.2d
at 1303 (quoting the Court of Special Appeals's summary of the differences between
property and casualty agents and life and health insurance agents).
4. See id. at 75-76, 612 A.2d at 1306. For a discussion of the statute's legislative
purpose and prior legislative forms, see infra notes 30-39 and accompanying text.
5. Lincoln Nat'l, 328 Md. at 77, 612 A.2d at 1307.
6. Id. at 67-68, 612 A.2d at 1302. Specifically, the contract stated that Veydt shall
"solicit applications for Individual Life Insurance, Individual Disability Insurance,
Group Insurance, Annuities and solicit subscriptions for securities offered by or through
[Lincoln National]." Id. at 67, 612 A.2d at 1302.
7. See id. at 68, 612 A.2d at 1302.
8. Id.
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In a letter dated March 28, 1988, Lincoln National informed
Veydt that his contract to write life and health insurance policies was
being canceled effective March 31, 1988.' Veydt subsequently filed
a complaint against Lincoln National with the Commissioner alleg-
ing that article 48A, section 234B(b) required Lincoln National to
give at least a ninety-day notice prior to termination.' ° In response,
Lincoln National argued that the notice requirement of section
234B(b) was not applicable to the lines of business covered by
Veydt's contract with Lincoln National-health and life insurance."
Thus, the question presented to the Commissioner centered on the
construction of section 234B(b). 12
The Commissioner concluded that Lincoln National's conduct
violated section 243B(b).' 3 In particular, the Commissioner ruled
that Lincoln National failed to comply with the ninety-day notice re-
quirement and ordered Lincoln National to reinstate the contract.' 4
In construing the statute's application, the Commissioner focused
on the omission of the word "agents" from the second exception. 15
While the first exception expressly excludes certain "agents or bro-
kers or policies" 6-thereby not affording agents the protection of a
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. At the hearing, Lincoln National presented expert testimony detailing the
differences in the company-agent relationship when an insurance agreement involves
life and health insurance agents, on the one hand, and when the agreement involves
property and casualty agents, on the other. Id.
12. See id. at 69-70, 612 A.2d at 1303. See also MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 234B(b)
(1991). Subsection (b) provides in part:
If an insurer intends to cancel a written agreement with an agent or broker, or
intends to refuse any class of renewal business from the agent or broker, the
insurer shall give the agent or broker not less than 90 days written notice.
Notwithstanding any provision of the agreement to the contrary, the insurer
shall continue for not less than one year after termination of the agency agree-
ment to renew through the agent or broker any of the policies which have not
been replaced with other insurers as expirations occur. This subsection shall
not apply to: (1) agents or brokers or policies of a company or group of compa-
nies represented by agents or brokers who by contractual agreement represent
only that company or group of companies if the business is owned by the com-
pany or group of companies and the cancellation of any contractual agreement
does not result in the cancellation or refusal to renew any policies of insurance;
or (2) life, health, surety, wet marine and title insurance policies.
Id.
13. See Lincoln Nat ', 328 Md. at 69, 612 A.2d at 1303.
14. See id.
15. See id. The second exception reads "life, health, surety, wet marine and title
insurance policies." MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 234B(b)(2) (1991).
16. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 234B(b)(l) (1991). Article 48A defines an agent as "a
person who for compensation in any manner solicits, procures, or negotiates insurance
contracts, including contracts for nonprofit health service plans, dental plan organiza-
ninety-day notice requirement in certain circumstances-the second
exception simply refers to "life, health, surety, wet marine and title
insurance policies.' 7 The omission of the word "agents" from the
second exception was considered by the Commissioner to be inten-
tional. 8 Consequently, the Commissioner ruled that an insurer
must give a ninety-day notice of termination to an agent who sells
life, health, surety, wet marine and title insurance policies.' 9
Lincoln National appealed the Commissioner's decision to the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City, claiming that the Commissioner's
interpretation of article 48A, section 234B(b) was incorrect as a mat-
ter of law.20 The circuit court reversed, holding that Lincoln Na-
tional was not required to give Veydt a ninety-day notice.2 ' That
court concluded that because Veydt sold life and health insurance
policies, he fell within the second exception to section 234B(b).22
The statute, therefore, did not protect him.2 3 Both Veydt and the
Commissioner appealed the decision to the Court of Special Ap-
peals, which reversed the trial court.2 4 On petition by Lincoln Na-
tional, the Court of Appeals granted certiorari and reversed the
Court of Special Appeals.25
2. Legal Background.-
a. Legislative History and Adjudication of Article 48A, Section
234B(b).-In order to provide greater protection to both the agent
and the insured, courts and legislatures have begun to erode the
American Agency System.2 6 In particular, many state legislatures
tions, and health maintenance organizations, or the renewal or continuance of any of
these contracts on the behalf of organizations issuing the contracts." Id. § 166(a). Arti-
cle 48A defines the term policy as "the written instrument in which the contract of insur-
ance is set forth, and includes all clauses, riders, endorsements and papers attached
thereto or made a part thereof." Id. § 364.
17. Id. § 234B(b)(2) (emphasis added).
18. See Lincoln Nat'l, 328 Md. at 69-70, 612 A.2d at 1303 (quoting the Commis-
sioner's findings).
19. Id.




24. Id. See also Insurance Comm'r v. Lincoln Nat'l Ins. Corp., 89 Md. App. 114, 597
A.2d 992 (1991), rev'd, 328 Md. 65, 612 A.2d 1301 (1992).
25. Lincoln Nat'l, 328 Md. at 71, 612 A.2d at 1304.
26. The American Agency System is another name for the common-law principles of
the traditional insurance trade. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Merling, 326 Md. 329, 337-
38, 605 A.2d 83, 87 (1992). Under the American Agency System, if an agency contract
had no fixed time of duration, it could be terminated at any time at the election of either
party. See Don J. Gutteridge, Jr., The Trauma of Termination: Terminating Agents, BEST'S
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have adopted statutes protecting an insurance agent's right to re-
newal commissions on his or her expirations, 27 mandating notice re-
quirements for termination, or both.28 Some states have limited
these protections to agency agreements involving only certain lines
of insurance business and/or certain types of agents. 29
Maryland's efforts to afford greater protection to agents and in-
sureds is evident in article 48A, sections 234A through 234C, first
enacted in 1970.30 The legislature intended for these sections to
"establish standards of fairness in insurance underwriting and treat-
ment of agents or brokers, and to confer authority on the Insurance
Commissioner to remedy failure to observe such standards." 3'
Originally, section 234B provided protection to insurance agents
and brokers by prohibiting insurers from canceling or amending
written agreements with agents or brokers if the cancellation or
amendment was arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory. 32 The sec-
REV.-LIFE-HEALTH INS. ED., Mar. 1987, at 60. Courts have acted to limit such at-will
positions by recognizing causes of action for the terminated agent in both contract and
tort (e.g., breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing). See id.
27. Expirations refer to an agent's work product or information collected by the
agent with regard to his or her client including "a copy of the policy issued to the in-
sured or records containing the date of the insurance policy, the name of the insured,
the date of its expiration, the amount of insurance, premiums, property covered and
terms of insurance." V. L. Phillips & Co. v. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mut.
Cas. Ins. Co., 199 F.2d 244, 246 (4th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 906 (1953).
28. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-709 (West 1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73,
753.02 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 1535 (West 1990 &
Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 60A.171 (West Supp. 1992); Mo. REV. STAT. § 375.033
(1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402:15-C (1983); N.J. REV. STAT. § 17:22-6.14a (1989);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-26.1-03 (1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3905.50 (Anderson
1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 1431.1 (West 1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 744.175 (1989);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 242 (Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN. LAws § 27-3-45 (1989); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAws ANN. § 58-30-8.1 (1990); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.11-1 (West Supp.
1993); WASH. REV. CODE § 48.18.285(5) (Supp. 1992); W. VA. CODE § 33-12A-3 (Supp.
1992).
29. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-709(d) (West 1992) (exempting from the
statutory notice requirement "any contract with an agent for the sale of life or accident
and health insurance"); N.J. REV. STAT. § 17:22-6.14a(e) (1989) (excluding agency
agreements in which the agent "agrees to represent exclusively one company").
30. In 1970, section 234A was entitled "Unfairness in Underwriting"; section 234B,
"Unfairness in Treatment of Agent or Broker"; and section 234C, "Commissioner's Au-
thority." See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 234A-234C (1970) (repealed 1972).
31. Preamble to Act of April 28, 1970, ch. 417, §§ 234A, 234B, 234C, 1970 Md.
Laws 987.
32. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 234B (1970) (repealed 1972). The 1970 version of
section 234B provided in part:
No insurer may cancel or amend a written agreement with an agent, or broker,
or refuse to accept business from such agent or broker if the cancellation or
amendment is arbitrary, capricious, unfair, discriminatory, or based in whole or
INSURANCE
tion did not, however, specify either a notice requirement or a mini-
mum renewal period for the policies of a terminated agent.
In 1972, the General Assembly considered House Bill 444 for
the purpose of amending article 48A." As originally proposed, the
bill addressed only motor vehicle liability insurance. 34 Prior to en-
actment, the Joint Committee on Economic Matters expanded the
scope of the proposed legislation to include all insurance agents or
brokers by striking language that limited its application to motor
vehicle insurance.3 5 But before approving the expanded legislation,
the General Assembly added an exception to section 234B(b), cov-
ering life and health insurance policies.3 6 Apparently, the General
Assembly did not want the expanded version of section 234B to ap-
ply to agents or brokers soliciting insurance policies in certain lines
of business. 7
In 1975, the legislature added a second exception to section
234B(b).3 8  The purpose of the change was to exempt "certain
agents or brokers of a company or group of companies from certain
notice requirements where the business is owned by the company or
group of companies and the cancellation of any contractual agree-
part upon the race, creed, color, religion, national origin, place of residency of
the agent or broker, his applicants or policyholders.
Id.
33. See Act of Apr. 26, 1972, ch. 73, § 234B, 1972 Md. Laws 281-84.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A § 234B (1972) (repealed 1975). Section 234B(b)
read:
If an insurer intends to cancel a written agreement with an agent or broker, or
intends to refuse any class of renewal business from the agent or broker, the
insurer shall give the agent or broker not less than 90 days written notice.
Notwithstanding any provision of the agreement to the contrary, the insurer
shall continue for not less than one year after termination of the agency agree-
ment to renew through such agent or broker any of the policies which have not
been replaced with other insurers as expirations occur. This subsection shall not
apply to life, health, surety, wet marine and title insurance policies.
Id. (emphasis added).
37. The states of Connecticut, New Jersey and Washington adopted similar legisla-
tion. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
38. See Act of Apr. 8, 1975, ch. 229, § 234B, 1975 Md. Laws 1218-20. MD. ANN.
CODE art. 48A, § 234B(b) (1991) provides in part:
This subsection shall not apply to: (1) agents or brokers or policies of a company or
group of companies represented by agents or brokers who by contractual agreement represent
only that company or group of companies if the business is owned by the company or group of
companies and the cancellation of any contractual agreement does not result in the cancella-
tion or refusal to renew any policies of insurance; or, (2) life, health, surety, wet marine




ment does not result in the cancellation or refusal to renew any poli-
cies of insurance."3 9
To summarize, section 234B(b), in its present form, "states two
rules in absolute terms and then states two exceptions."' 40 In the
first and second sentences, the subsection defines the "notice rule"
and the "renewal rule."''4 The third sentence states two numbered
exceptions: (1) the "captive agent exception," and (2) the "lines of
business exception.1 42 Ultimately, the court framed the issue in Lin-
coln National as whether the lines-of-business exception applied to
both rules or only to the renewal rule.43
There has been little prior judicial review of section 234B. In
fact, Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Merling44 is the only case in which the
Court of Appeals had previously examined the section.45 In that
case, Merling brought suit alleging that Travelers Indemnity had in-
terfered with his property and contract rights in expirations by send-
ing renewal policies to Merling's former clients after his
employment was terminated.4 6 Merling relied on the American
Agency System's view that an insurance company is prohibited from
interfering with an agent's property rights in his or her expira-
tions.47 The circuit court agreed and ruled that Merling was entitled
to his commissions as long as his customers continued with the com-
pany.4" The Court of Appeals reversed, claiming that the 1972
amendment to section 234B, which included the notice and renewal
39. Act of Apr. 8, 1975, ch. 229, § 234B, 1975 Md. Laws 1219. These type of agents
are often referred to as "captive agents."




44. 326 Md. 329, 333, 605 A.2d 83, 85 (1992).
45. See id. at 339-42, 605 A.2d at 88-89. Prior to Merling, the Court of Special Ap-
peals conducted a limited review of 234B(d), restricting its evaluation to the substantial-
ity of the evidence in satisfying a showing of arbitrary, capricious, unfair, or
discriminatory action by an insurance company under subsection 234B(d). See Nation-
wide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 67 Md. App. 727, 736, 509 A.2d 719, 723
(1986).
46. See Merling, 326 Md. at 334, 605 A.2d at 85. Merling was an independent agent
whose agreements to write property and casualty coverages for Travelers Indemnity and
two of its subsidiaries were canceled. See id. at 332-33, 605 A.2d at 84-85. Merling filed
a complaint with the Commissioner but the Commissioner concluded that his termina-
tion was lawful under article 48A, section 234B. See id. at 333, 605 A.2d at 85. After the
expiration of the mandated minimum one-year renewal period that followed Merling's
termination, Travelers Indemnity began soliciting business from Merling's former cli-
ents. See id. at 333-34, 605 A.2d. at 85.
47. See id. at 338, 605 A.2d at 87.
48. Id. at 335, 605 A.2d at 86.
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rules, was the legislature's attempt to curtail the American Agency
System.4 9 The court suggested that the legislation was a compro-
mise between an agent's property rights in expirations and the
state's interest in protecting the insureds from cancellations and
nonrenewals. 50 Consequently, the solicitation about which Merling
complained was held to be not only lawful, but required by section
234B.5'
In Merling, the court focused on a small portion of section
234B. Thus, prior to Lincoln National there had been no judicial re-
view of the application of the section 234B(b) exceptions. As a case
of first impression, the outcome of Lincoln National rested solely on
the court's construction of that section.
b. Rules of Statutory Construction.-"[T]he cardinal rule of statu-
tory construction is to determine legislative intent, 5 2 or "the ends
to be accomplished" in enacting a statute.5" The primary source for
determining legislative intent is the language of the statute.54
Words should "be given their ordinary and natural" meaning,55
without resorting to strained, subtle, or forced interpretations for
the purpose of extending or limiting the operation of the statute.56
Further, "no word, clause, sentence or phrase should be rendered
surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory."' 57 Thus, a con-
49. See id. at 340-42, 605 A.2d at 88-89.
50. See id. at 340, 605 A.2d at 88. Under the American Agency System and prior to
subsection 234B(b), the policies written by a terminated agent were often not renewed
because insurers could not use expirations to renew the policies. Subsection 234B(b)
now requires renewal of the agent's policies for at least one year. See id.
51. See id. at 341-42, 605 A.2d at 89.
52. Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 511, 525 A.2d 628, 631 (1987).
See also Department of Env't v. Showell, 316 Md. 259, 270, 558 A.2d 391, 396 (1989)
(explaining that the "primary goal [of statutory construction] is to ascertain and effectu-
ate the intent of the General Assembly").
53. Morris v. Prince George's County, 319 Md. 597, 603-04, 573 A.2d 1346, 1349
(1990).
54. See ANA Towing, Inc. v. Prince George's County, 314 Md. 711, 715, 552 A.2d
1295, 1297 (1989) (stating that "[tihe initial inquiry must be an examination of the lan-
guage used"); Newman v. Subsequent Injury Fund, 311 Md. 721, 723, 537 A.2d 274,
275 (1988) (stating that "when we seek to ascertain .. .legislative intent, the primary
source is the language itself").
55. See Hartford County v. University of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 318 Md. 525, 529, 569
A.2d 649, 651 (1990). See also Dickerson v. State, 324 Md. 163, 171, 596 A.2d 648, 652
(1991) (applying the "ordinary and common meaning"); Newman, 311 Md. at 723, 537
A.2d at 275 (applying the "natural and ordinary signification").
56. See Dickerson, 324 Md. at 171, 596 A.2d at 652.
57. Maryland Port Admin. v. John W. Brawner Contracting Co., 303 Md. 44, 60, 492
A.2d 281, 289 (1985); Sibert v. State, 301 Md. 141, 153, 482 A.2d 483, 489 (1984);
Board of Educ. v. Lendo, 295 Md. 55, 63, 453 A.2d 1185, 1189 (1982).
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struction of a statute that "renders every word operative, rather
than one which may make some idle," is preferred.5" In addition, a
court should not add words or attribute to words meanings that are
not otherwise appropriate. 59 It logically follows that when the legis-
lature uses certain words in one part of a statute and omits them
from others that the omission was intentional.6 °
When there is no ambiguity or obscurity in the language of a
statute, there is some suggestion that a court should not look else-
where to determine legislative intent.6' The Court of Special Ap-
peals, however, has noted that clarity and lack of ambiguity in
statutory language does not preclude a court from consulting external
evidence to determine the goal or purpose of a statute.62 The Court
of Appeals reiterated that position in Morris v. Prince George's
County ,6 explaining that a court is always free to look at the context
of the statutory language and consult legislative history to deter-
mine the purpose or goal of the law, even when the words in a stat-
ute carry a definite meaning.64
The context of a statute may include the "bill's title and func-
tion paragraphs, amendments that occurred as it passed through the
58. See Brown v. Brown, 287 Md. 273, 285, 412 A.2d 396, 403 (1980).
59. See Management Personnel Servs., Inc. v. Sandefur, 300 Md. 332, 341, 478 A.2d
310, 315 (1984).
60. See American Sec. & Trust Co. v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 246 Md. 36, 41, 227
A.2d 214, 216-17 (1967) (stating that "the express imposition of one qualification shows
a deliberate rejection of any other").
61. See Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 294 Md. 183, 189, 448 A.2d 353, 356 (1982) (warning
that "when such language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it
expresses"); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Benton, 278 Md. 542, 545, 365 A.2d 1000, 1003
(1976) (noting that "where there is no ambiguity or obscurity in the language of a stat-
ute, there is usually no need to look elsewhere to ascertain the intent of the legisla-
ture"); Purifoy v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 273 Md. 58, 66, 327 A.2d 483,
487 (1974) (stating that "where statutory language is plain and free from ambiguity...
courts are not at liberty to disregard the natural import of the words").
62. See Weidig v. Tabler, 81 Md. App. 488, 493, 568 A.2d 868, 871, cert. granted sub
nom. Kies v. Tabler, 319 Md. 632, 574 A.2d 312, vacated as moot, 321 Md. 1, 580 A.2d 701
(1990).
63. 319 Md. 597, 573 A.2d 1346 (1990).
64. See id. at 604, 573 A.2d at 1349. Prior to Morris, the Court of Appeals had con-
cluded that legislative intent is more accurately described as legislative goal or purpose
and should be defined by "considering the language of the statute in the context within
which it was adopted." Rucker v. Comptroller of Treasury, 315 Md. 559, 565, 555 A.2d
1060, 1063 (1989) (citations omitted). This view is consistent with the position of the
Supreme Court, which stated that "ascertainment of the meaning apparent on the face
of a single statute need not end the inquiry. This is because the plain-meaning rule is
'rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration
of persuasive evidence if it exists.' " Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981) (citations
and footnote omitted).
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legislature, its relationship to earlier and subsequent legislation, and
other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legisla-
tive purpose or goal." 65 By looking at the context, a court is consid-
ering the statute as a whole, rather than reading particular language
in isolation;66 considering not only the literal or usual meaning of
words in a statute, but the meaning of the words in light of the set-
ting, objectives, and purpose of the legislation.6 7 Finally, any con-
struction by a court must aim to avoid absurd or illogical results.68
Therefore, it is proper for courts, in construing a statute of doubtful
meaning and application, to consider the consequences of a pro-
posed construction so that results that are unreasonable or inconsis-
tent with common sense will be avoided.
c. Review of Administrative Agency Decisions.-Statutory interpre-
tation necessarily involves the resolution of questions of law. As
such, a reviewing court may reverse quasi-judicial decisions of the
Commissioner if the reviewing court finds that the Commissioner
made an error of law.69 A reviewing court may adopt the statutory
interpretation advanced by an administrative agency, but the
agency's interpretation will not be presumed correct.70 Thus, when
an agency's decision is predicated solely on an error of law, no def-
65. Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515, 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987).
66. See Forbes v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 322 Md. 689, 697, 589 A.2d 944, 948
(1991).
67. See Baltimore County Coalition Against Unfair Taxes v. Baltimore County, 321
Md. 184, 204, 582 A.2d 510, 520 (1990).
68. See Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 513, 525 A.2d at 632; see also Pan Am. Sulphur Co. v.
State Dep't of Assessments & Taxation, 251 Md. 620, 627, 248 A.2d 354, 358 (1968)
("[W]herever possible an interpretation should be given to statutory language which will
not lead to absurd consequences.").
69. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 40(5) (1991). Section 40(5) provides in part that:
The court may affirm the decision of the Commissioner or remand the case for
further proceedings; or it may reverse or modify the decision if the substantial
rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced because the administrative
findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (i) In violation of constitu-
tional provisions; or (ii) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of
the Commissioner; or (iii) Made upon unlawful procedure; or (iv) Affected by
other error of law; or (v) Unsupported by competent, material, and substantial
evidence in view of the entire record as submitted; or (vi) Against the weight of
competent, material and substantial evidence in view of the entire record, as
submitted by the Commissioner and including de novo evidence taken in open
court; or (vii) Unsupported by the entire record, as submitted by the Commis-
sioner and including de novo evidence taken in open court; or (viii) Arbitrary
or capricious.
Id.
70. See Supervisor of Assessments v. Chase Assocs., 306 Md. 568, 574, 510 A.2d 568,
571 (1986).
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erence to the agency is necessary.7'
The history of an administrative agency's construction of a stat-
ute, however, is important in determining the weight afforded to the
agency's statutory interpretation. For example, when an administra-
tive agency places a construction on a statute soon after its enact-
ment, the Court of Appeals has said that such a construction "is [a]
strong, persuasive influence in determining the judicial construc-
tion. "72 Likewise, an agency's continuous, long-standing construc-
tion of a statute with legislative approval or acquiescence warrants
considerable weight. 71 Such long-standing acquiescence by the leg-
islature is indicative that legislative intent is being carried out.
Finally, consideration should be given to the nature of the process
through which the agency arrived at its interpretation, such as
whether the interpretation is the product of an adversarial proceed-
ing or formal rule promulgation. 4
The degree of ambiguity in the language of a statute may fur-
ther temper the weight given to an agency's interpretation. If a stat-
ute is ambiguous and thus susceptible to more than one
interpretation, the construction given it by an administrative agency
soon after its enactment deserves deference from a reviewing court
and should not be disregarded, except for the strongest and most
urgent reasons. 75 On the other hand, if the statutory language is
clear and unambiguous, the administrative agency's construction is
not given weight, no matter how long-standing and entrenched it
is.
76
71. See People's Counsel v. Maryland Marine Mfg. Co., 316 Md. 491, 497, 560 A.2d
32, 34-35 (1989); State Election Bd. v. Billhimer, 314 Md. 46, 59, 548 A.2d 819, 827
(1988).
72. Board of Educ. v. Lendo, 295 Md. 55, 63, 453 A.2d 1185, 1189 (1982). See also
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 305 Md. 145, 161, 501 A.2d 1307,
1314 (1986) (stating that "contemporaneous interpretation of a statute by the agency
charged with its administration is entitled to great deference").
73. See Falik v. Prince George's Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 322 Md. 409, 416, 588 A.2d
324, 327 (1991); Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc. v. Department of Employment and
Training, 309 Md. 28, 46, 522 A.2d 382, 391 (1987).
74. See Baltimore Gas &Elec., 305 Md. at 162, 501 A.2d at 1315. Little weight is af-
forded to an interpretation that was reached without either a contested adversarial pro-
ceeding or a formal rule promulgation. Id.
75. See Macke Co. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 302 Md. 18, 22, 485 A.2d 254,
256-57 (1984); Public Serv. Comm'n v. Howard Research & Dev. Corp., 271 Md. 141,
152, 314 A.2d 682, 688 (1974); Macke Co. v. State Dep't of Assessments & Taxation,
264 Md. 121, 135, 285 A.2d 593, 600 (1972); Department of Motor Vehicles v. Grey-
hound Corp., 247 Md. 662, 669, 234 A.2d 255, 258 (1967).
76. See Macke Co., 302 Md. at 22-23, 485 A.2d at 257.
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3. The Court's Reasoning; Analysis.-It is clear that Lincoln Na-
tional and the Commissioner differed fundamentally in their expla-
nations of the plain meaning and legislative intent of section
234B(b). The court rejected the Commissioner's rigid statutory
construction process in favor of a "reasoned elaboration" ap-
proach.77 Under this approach, the court not only considered the
plain meaning of the statute, but also examined the legislative intent
in light of both the insurance industry's practice and the statute's
prior legislative forms. Weight given to the Commissioner's deci-
sion was appropriately minimized by the lack of evidence of any
long-standing, consistent construction by the Commissioner.78
Relying on the presumption that the General Assembly knows
the difference between a subsection and a sentence, 79 the Court of
Appeals based most of its textual analysis on the use of the phrase
"[t]his subsection shall not apply to .... "8 The court found that
because of this wording, each exception applies to both rules of the
subsection.8 ' Had the court concluded otherwise, the word "sub-
section" would have been rendered meaningless and superfluous, in
violation of a well-established maxim of statutory construction. 82
Because the language is clear, the Lincoln National court concluded
that the only reason to reject such an interpretation would be if the
construction manifested an absurd or illogical result.83
The Court of Appeals logically reasoned that less protection is
necessary for life and health insurance agents.8 4 Although the Com-
missioner held a different view, believing that the public interest
may be harmed by treating life and health insurance agents differ-
ently with regard to the notice requirement, the court rejected this
view as merely an erroneous opinion, not entitled to any
deference. 85
77. See Lincoln Nat ', 328 Md. at 77, 612 A.2d 1307. An agency has followed a pro-
cess of "reasoned elaboration" when it "clearly demonstrates that it has focused its at-
tention on the statutory provisions in question, thoroughly addressed the relevant
issues, and reached its interpretation through a sound reasoning process... " Baltimore
Gas & Elec., 305 Md. at 161, 501 A.2d at 1314.
78. See Lincoln Nat'l, 328 Md. at 77, 612 A.2d at 1307.
79. See id. at 71, 612 A.2d at 1304.
80. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 234B(b) (1991).
81. Lincoln Nat'l, 328 Md. at 71, 612 A.2d at 1304 (asserting simply that "[t]hat is
what the language says").
82. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
83. See Lincoln Nat ', 328 Md. at 71-72, 612 A.2d at 1304.
84. See id. at 72, 612 A.2d at 1304.
85. Id., 612 A.2d at 1304-05. The court did note that the Commissioner's opinion




The court bolstered its argument for treating life and health
insurance agents differently than property and casualty agents by
citing Merling as evidence that the legislature had drawn a distinc-
tion between the two types of agents with the 1972 amendment to
section 234B(b).86 Property rights were not an issue for life and
health insurance agents because their policies continued for a de-
fined period of time and their commissions had already vested.8 7 It
was therefore logical to conclude that the minimum ninety-day no-
tice provision was part of the same compromise that sought to pro-
tect insureds from nonrenewal88 In exchange for limited property
rights in expirations, those same agents obtained a right to a ninety-
day notice of termination. 9
A significant weak point in the Lincoln National court's reasoning
was the assumption the court made in drawing the line between the
two types of agents. 90 The court assumed that the agreements re-
ferred to in both the notice rule and the renewal rule are of the same
type-agreements dealing with lines of business that renew and
have expirations. Notably, section 234B(b) delineates two separate
events that may trigger the ninety-day notice requirement: (1) can-
cellation of the agent's written agreement, or (2) refusal of a class of
renewal business.9 1 The second event, given its renewal nature, is
reasonably limited to property and casualty agreements. The first
event-cancellation of the agent's written agreement-however,
carries no implication that it refers only to property and casualty
agreements. In fact, if both events are limited to property and casu-
alty agreements, the court notably failed to offer any justification
for the legislature listing them separately, instead of expressly ap-
plying the ninety-day requirement only to property and casualty
agreements.
A second weakness in the court's opinion was its analysis re-
garding the omission of the word "agents." The captive-agent ex-
ception begins "agents or brokers or policies,"92 while the lines-of-
business exception refers only to "policies." 9 Generally, it is held
86. See id. at 72-73, 612 A.2d at 1305. It is important to note that both the Commis-
sioner and the Court of Special Appeals were without the benefit of the Merling ruling at
the time of their decisions. Id. at 73 n.3, 612 A.2d at 1305 n.3.
87. See id. at 72-73, 612 A.2d at 1305.
88. Id. at 74, 612 A.2d at 1305.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 83-85, 612 A.2d at 1310-11 (Bell, J., dissenting).
91. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 234B(b) (1991).
92. Id. § 234B(b)(l).
93. Id. § 234B(b)(2).
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that when the legislature uses certain words in one part of a statute
and omits them from others, it is assumed that the omission was
intentional.94 The Commissioner followed this reasoning and
strictly read the language to conclude that the lines-of-business ex-
ception did not include agents.95 As the dissent pointed out, such a
literal reading would also avoid a "strained or forced" interpreta-
tion.96 In addition, because the language of this sentence is not
clear on its face, deference should have been given to the interpreta-
tion of the administrative agency.97 The majority, however, did not
consider the presence of the terms "agents" or "brokers" in the
captive-agent exception to be the "keystone of the interpretation
arch."98 Consequently, it refused to give any deference to the Com-
missioner's rigid view of statutory construction.99 The Lincoln Na-
tional court concluded that it was appropriate and necessary to
consider the context of the statute more broadly by examining the
underlying objective and purpose of the statute and prior legislative
forms. 100
In 1972, when only the lines-of-business exception existed, the
Commissioner would have been hard pressed to argue that life and
health insurance agents were not exempt from the notice require-
ment yet life and health insurance policies were. Because securing a
policy necessarily involves an agent, it is difficult to have an agree-
ment without an agent. Similarly, the insertion of the captive-agent
exception in 1975 may logically be construed as an effort to further
narrow the scope of both the notice and renewal rules, instead of
only limiting the obligations under the renewal rule. Apparently,
the Lincoln National court placed greater weight on considering the
context and evolution of the statute, rather than on a strict and nar-
row reading of the language. In addition, the court apparently per-
mitted the addition of explanatory words to a statute if such an
addition would be necessary to fulfill the statute's purpose and carry
out the legislative intent.
Finally, the dissent also criticized the majority for its reliance on
Merling. '' The dissent argued that the use of Merling to support the
94. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
95. See Lincoln Nat'l, 328 Md. at 69-70, 612 A.2d at 1303 (quoting the Commis-
sioner's finding).
96. See id. at 87, 612 A.2d at 1312 (Bell, J., dissenting).
97. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
98. Lincoln Nat'l, 328 Md. at 77, 612 A.2d at 1307.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 77-78, 612 A.2d at 1307.
101. Id. at 90, 612 A.2d at 1313 (Bell, J., dissenting).
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proposition that the legislature intended to draw a line between a
certain excepted line of business and property and casualty business
written by noncaptive agents was dependent on "inference and indi-
rection."'' 0 2 Because the legislature did not say in clear and unam-
biguous terms that the section related only to property and casualty
business, the line drawing appeared to be the action of the court
rather than the legislature.
4. Conclusion.-Lincoln National turned on the statutory con-
struction of article 48A, section 234B(b). In light of the plain mean-
ing of the language and the context of the statute, the Court of
Appeals had little difficulty justifying its position that life and health
insurance agents need not be entitled to the same notice require-
ments as property and casualty agents. Treating the two types of
agents differently is consistent with the characteristics of their re-
spective practices and the apparent legislative intent. The court
sent a message with Lincoln National that statutory construction need
not always be a rigid exercise. When there is any doubt, it is best to
evaluate the statute in its full context, including purpose and prior
legislative forms.
KARA M. MORGENSTERN
B. Surplus Line Insurers Exempt From Forty-Five-Day Notice Rule
In Smith v. Underwriters at Lloyd's of London,1 3 the Court of Ap-
peals ruled that insurance companies writing only "surplus line"' 4
policies in Maryland are not required to provide their policyholders
the degree of notice that other insurers must provide when termi-
nating a policy.' 0 5 By definition, surplus line insurers provide cov-
erage of risks that cannot be insured within the ordinary insurance
system.' 0 6 Although insurance companies that offer other types of
insurance in Maryland are bound by a forty-five-day notice require-
102. Id.
103. 326 Md. 600, 606 A.2d 273 (1992).
104. "Surplus line" insurance is the amount of insurance needed to safeguard the
portion of the insured's property value that cannot be protected through insurance com-
panies authorized to do business in Maryland. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 184(a)
(1991). For example, if property is honestly valued at $500,000, and if only $300,000 of
that amount can be insured through Maryland-authorized insurers, then the property
owner may obtain a surplus line insurance policy from an "unauthorized" insurer for the
remaining $200,000.
105. Smith, 326 Md. at 611, 606 A.2d at 279.
106. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 184(a) (1991).
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ment, °7 the Court of Appeals construed the notice section to ex-
clude surplus line insurers.' 08
The court, however, rejected the contention that surplus line
insurance falls entirely outside the ordinary state insurance regula-
tory scheme as a matter of "geographical jurisdiction."1 9 This con-
clusion could have far-reaching implications for surplus line
insurers: a case-by-case determination will now be required in order
to determine whether the legislature intended other provisions of
the Insurance Code to apply to such insurers.'l 1
1. The Case.-Harry Smith had owned and operated an auto
body shop in Baltimore City since 1974."'1 Unable to obtain fire
insurance for the shop through ordinary insurance channels,
Smith's insurance broker, Mayer & Steinberg, Inc. (M&S),
purchased "surplus line" insurance through All Risks, Ltd., a sur-
plus line insurance broker licensed to operate in Maryland." 2 All
Risks in turn "placed" the surplus line insurance coverage with a
syndicate of underwriters affiliated with Lloyd's of London.", 3
The surplus line fire insurance policy was renewed annually for
several years.' "4 On April 2, 1984, coverage was extended for an-
other year. 1 5 In July 1984, All Risks arranged an inspection of the
body shop; following the inspection, All Risks asked Smith to repair
107. Id. § 240A(a)(3). This section contains the requirement that "[t]he insurer shall
see that written notice ... is sent to the insured not less than 45 days prior to the date of
the proposed cancellation or expiration of the policy." Id. The term "insurer" is
broadly defined, and "includes every person engaged as indemnitor, surety, or contrac-
tor in the business of entering into contracts of insurance." Id. § 3. A "person" is de-
fined as "an individual, insurer, company, association, organization, Lloyds, society,
reciprocal or interinsurance exchange, partnership, syndicate, business trust, corpora-
tion, and any other legal entity." Id. § 4. Thus, nearly every conceivable type of entity
involved in the business of providing insurance is covered by the notice provision in
§ 240A.
108. See Smith, 326 Md. at 611-15, 606 A.2d at 279-81; see also infra notes 148-165 and
accompanying text.
109. Smith, 326 Md. at 609, 606 A.2d at 278. The "geographical jurisdiction" argu-
ment claims that insurance policies issued geographically outside the state are not sub-
ject to the state's regulatory jurisdiction. See id. at 608, 606 A.2d at 277.
110. See infra notes 179-180 and accompanying text.
111. Smith, 326 Md. at 601-02, 606 A.2d at 274.
112. Id. at 602, 606 A.2d at 274.
113. Id. This syndicate was described in the insurance policy as "certain Underwriters
at LLOYD'S, LONDON," directed by John Michael Poland, a resident of England. Id.
The Court of Appeals refers to Poland in its decision as the representative of the Under-
writers at Lloyd's of London. Id. at 602 n.3, 606 A.2d at 275 n.3. This note, however,
will refer to both the underwriting syndicate and Poland as "Lloyd's of London."




certain defects that the inspection had revealed." 6 On November
14, claiming that Smith had failed to provide notice that he had
made the requested repairs, All Risks informed Smith that the un-
derwriting syndicate was canceling his policy, effective November
24, 1984.1 1
On February 10, 1985, slightly less than three months after the
notice of cancellation was sent, Smith's body shop was heavily dam-
aged by fire."' When Lloyd's of London refused to cover the loss,
Smith sued both M&S and Lloyd's." 9 Smith did not allege that
Lloyd's of London had no right to cancel the policy; rather, Smith
argued that he was entitled to forty-five days advance notice. 20
Lloyd's moved for summary judgment on the ground that the
statutory provision requiring a forty-five day notice period for can-
cellation of policies was inapplicable to surplus line insurance carri-
ers. 12 ' The circuit court granted summary judgment for Lloyd's of
London, 122 and both Smith and M&S1 2 3 appealed. 124 Prior to con-
sideration by the Court of Special Appeals, the Court of Appeals
granted certiorari 125 to consider whether surplus line insurers are
exempt from the forty-five-day notice requirement. 26
2. Legal Background.-
a. Statutory Provisions.-Subtitle 15 of the Maryland Insurance
Code, 1 2 7 entitled "Unfair Trade Practices," contains the forty-five-
day notice requirement at issue in this case. That provision states:
The insurer shall see that written notice of intention to can-
cel for a reason other than nonpayment of premium or no-
tice of intention not to renew a policy issued in this State is
sent to the insured not less than 45 days prior to the date
116. Id.
117. Id. The insurance policy contained a provision that allowed the syndicate to can-
cel the policy on ten days' notice. Id. at 602 n.2, 606 A.2d at 274 n.2.
118. See id. at 602, 606 A.2d at 275.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 602-03, 606 A.2d at 275.
122. Id.
123. Because M&S and Lloyd's were codefendants, a grant of summary judgment in
favor of Lloyd's might subject M&S to a greater share of total liability. In addition, there
was an unresolved issue of whether M&S had failed to fulfill a contractual obligation to
replace the surplus line insurance coverage in the event of cancellation. See Brief for
Appellee John Michael Poland at 4, Smith (No. 92).
124. Smith, 326 Md. at 603, 606 A.2d at 275.
125. Smith v. Lloyd's of London, 324 Md. 312, 596 A.2d 1078 (1991).
126. Smith, 326 Md. at 603, 606 A.2d at 275.
127. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 1-660, 212-40J (1991).
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of the proposed cancellation or expiration of the policy, as
the case may be.' 2 8
The Court of Appeals noted that this case essentially involved a
question of statutory construction: Was section 240A(a)(3) in-
tended to apply to surplus line insurers like Lloyd's of London?' 29
Although Lloyd's falls under the definition of "insurer" in section 3
of the Insurance Code, 3 ° surplus line insurers generally are gov-
erned by a separate part (Subtitle 13) of article 48A.' 3 And unlike
ordinary, state-approved insurers, surplus line insurers such as
Lloyd's of London are categorized as "alien,"' 3 2 "unauthorized"' 33
insurers.13
4
The statutory definition of surplus line insurance, in section
184(a), states that " '[s]urplus line' insurance means the full amount
or policy of insurance required to protect the interest of the insured
which cannot be obtained ... from insurers authorized to do busi-
ness in this State. . .. ,,135 The only major requirements imposed
upon surplus line insurers are that each insurer must file an affidavit
with the Insurance Commissioner supporting its eligibility to be
such an insurer, 3 6 and that every policy must bear a conspicuous
endorsement or legend on the first page stating that the policy " 'is
issued by a nonadmitted insurer not under the jurisdiction of the
Maryland Insurance Commissioner.' ,137 If the surplus line insur-
ance is purchased through a broker, the broker must be licensed in
Maryland.' 38 The important remaining question, therefore, was
128. Id. § 240A(a)(3).
129. See Smith, 326 Md. at 603, 611, 606 A.2d at 275, 279.
130. "'Insurer' includes every person engaged as indemnitor, surety, or contractor in
the business of entering into contracts of insurance." MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 3
(1991).
131. Id. §§ 183-99.
132. Id. § 6. This section classifies insurers as either "domestic," meaning "formed
under the laws of this State," § 6(1); "foreign," meaning "formed under the laws of any
jurisdiction other than this State," § 6(2); or "alien," meaning "formed under the laws
of any country or jurisdiction other than the United States of America, its states, dis-
tricts, territories, and commonwealths," § 6(3).
133. Id. § 7. Under this section, insurers are designated as either "authorized,"
meaning "duly authorized, by subsisting certificate of authority issued by the [Insur-
ance] Commissioner, to engage in the insurance business in this State," § 7(1); or "un-
authorized," meaning an insurer that "is one not so authorized." § 7(2).
134. Smith, 326 Md. at 604, 606 A.2d at 275.
135. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 184(a).
136. Id. § 185.
137. Id. § 186.
138. See id. § 184(b)(l). The Court of Appeals noted that the broker in this case, All
Risks, was "a Maryland licensed surplus line broker." Smith, 326 Md. at 602, 606 A.2d at
274.
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whether the statutory notice provision governs insurers, like
Lloyd's, who satisfy these definitions.
b. Statutory Construction: Plain Meaning vs. Legislative Intent.-
The Court of Appeals generally has endorsed the "plain meaning"
approach to statutory construction."3 9
[A] statute should be construed according to the ordinary
and natural import of its language, since it is the language
of the statute which constitutes the primary source for de-
termining the legislative intent. Where there is no ambigu-
ity or obscurity in the language of a statute, there is usually
no need to look elsewhere to ascertain the intention of the
Legislature. Thus, where statutory language is plain and
free from ambiguity and expresses a definite and sensible
meaning, courts are not at liberty to disregard the natural
import of words with a view towards making the statute ex-
press an intention which is different from its plain
meaning. 140
According to such reasoning, a court interpreting a statute "is gen-
erally not at liberty to surmise a legislative intent contrary to the
letter of the statute, or to indulge in the license of inserting or omit-
ting words with the view of making the statute express an intent
which is not evidenced in the original form."' 14 1 The fact that the
Smith court began its analysis directly with the issue of legislative
intent presupposes its conclusion that the "plain meaning" of the
statute was unclear.
4 2
139. See, e.g., Comptroller of the Treasury v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 303 Md. 280, 284,
493 A.2d 341, 343 (1985) (stating that the words of a statute should be construed ac-
cording to their "ordinary and natural import," and that "where statutory language is
plain and free from ambiguity and expresses a definite and sensible meaning, no con-
struction or clarification is needed or permitted").
140. State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 421-22, 348 A.2d 275, 278 (1975) (citations omit-
ted), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 942 (1976). Accord Willis v. State, 302 Md. 363, 374, 488 A.2d
171, 177 (1985) (holding that because "the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to
determine the legislative intent," the court should "resort to extrinsic aids to divine the
legislative intent and purpose" only if the language of the statute is ambiguous).
141. State Tax Comm'n v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 182 Md. 111, 116, 32 A.2d 382,
384 (1943). These principles of statutory construction date back almost 140 years. See
Alexander v. Worthington, 5 Md. 471, 485 (1854) (observing that "[e]very construction
* is vicious which requires great changes in the letter of the statute").
142. Resolving the ambiguity of § 240A(a)(3) was the basis for the grant of certiorari.
See Smith, 326 Md. at 603, 606 A.2d at 275. The court first analyzed "the history of the
development of the notice requirement," then performed a comparison of the notice
provision with other provisions of the section, and finally construed the section in light
of "the legislative policy toward substandard property insurance risks." See id. at 611-
15, 606 A.2d at 279-81.
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3. The Court's Reasoning.-Pointing to certain sections of the
Insurance Code that expressly except surplus line insurers from
their scope,143 Smith and M&S argued that, by comparison, all other
sections of the Code were intended to govern surplus line insurers.
The legislature, they urged, expressly excluded surplus line insurers
from the scope of every section that it intended should not apply to
such insurers.144 Because an express exception for surplus line in-
surers is absent from section 240A, they argued, the forty-five-day
notice rule should apply to Lloyd's of London.
45
Lloyd's, on the other hand, argued that Subtitle 13-entitled
"Surplus Lines"-was the only portion of the Insurance Code that
the legislature had intended to apply to surplus line insurance; any
sections in other subtitles that expressly excepted surplus line insur-
ers from their scope were simply reiterating the fact that those subti-
tles did not apply. 1 46 Furthermore, Lloyd's argued, surplus line
insurance has never been subject to Maryland regulation because it
is an "exported risk" that, by definition, falls outside the geographic
jurisdiction of the State. 147
Although the Court of Appeals noted its agreement with por-
tions of each party's argument, it declined to announce as broad a
rule as either party desired. 148 First, the court rejected Lloyd's of
London's "geographical jurisdiction" argument. The court
declared:
by having All Risks cause the Policy issued by [Lloyd's] to
be delivered to Smith in Maryland on a Maryland risk for a
premium ultimately to be paid to [Lloyd's] by a Maryland
resident, [Lloyd's]'s contacts with Maryland are sufficient
to permit Maryland to legislate concerning the terms and
provisions of the Policy. The true legal issue in this case is
whether the General Assembly has done so in § 240A.149
The court then turned to the question of whether the legisla-
ture intended section 240A to apply to surplus line insurers.
Although the organization of the Insurance Code suggests that stat-
143. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 201 (a) (1991) (providing inter alia that "[tlhis
section shall not apply to: . . . (2) Surplus lines insurance . . ."); id. § 21 IA (providing
that "[t]he provisions of this subtitle shall not apply to the following: . . . (e) Insurance
effectuated in accordance with the Surplus Line Insurance Law, Subtitle 13.
144. See Smith, 326 Md. at 607-08, 606 A.2d at 277.
145. See id. at 608, 606 A.2d at 277.
146. See id., 606 A.2d at 277-78.
147. See id., 606 A.2d at 277.




utory sections pertinent to surplus line insurance will be found
under the Surplus Lines Subtitle,'t 0 the Court of Appeals noted that
this general organizational scheme does not eliminate the possibility
that other regulatory measures will be found elsewhere in the
code. '5 Therefore, it may not be assumed that a statutory section
in the "Unfair Trade Practices" subtitle-such as section 240A-
would not pertain both to surplus line insurance carriers and ordi-
nary insurance carriers.' 52 Thus, the Smith court concluded that it is
necessary to perform a complete and separate analysis for each stat-
utory section in order to determine whether the legislature intended
that section to apply to surplus line insurers. 15
In order to answer the question whether the legislature in-
tended the forty-five-day notice provision in section 240A to apply
to surplus line insurers, the court performed a three-step analysis.
The court (1) examined the legislative history of the section; (2)
drew analogies from the classes of insurers covered by other por-
tions of the section; and (3) considered the legislative policy behind
certain other sections of the Insurance Code.'5 4 After reading the
legislative history, the Smith court concluded that "exportable risks"
placed with surplus line insurers probably were not covered by the
original notice provision: "[I]t seems unlikely that the General As-
sembly intended 'insurer,' as used in original § 240A, to embrace an
unauthorized insurer or surplus line carrier."' 55 Later amendments
150. For example, surplus line policies are "written pursuant to Subtitle 13," MD.
ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 43(3) (1991), or "effectuated in accordance with... Subtitle 13."
Id. § 211A(e).
151. Smith, 326 Md. at 609-10, 606 A.2d at 278. The court, however, stated in its
discussion of the potential applicability of Subtitle 15: "the absence of any express ex-
clusion of surplus lines carriers from all of subtitle 15, or from the operation of § 240A,
does not compel the result that surplus lines carriers are thereby included." Id. at 610-
11, 606 A.2d at 279.
152. Id. at 610, 606 A.2d at 278.
153. The Court of Appeals noted that in Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. B. Dixon
Evander & Assocs., Inc., 88 Md. App. 672, 596 A.2d 687 (1991), cert. denied, 326 Md.
435, 605 A.2d 137 (1992), the Court of Special Appeals held § 226 (in Subtitle 15 of the
Insurance Code) applicable to surplus lines insurers. The Court of Appeals concluded,
however, that because this was a different statutory section (pertaining to anti-rebating
provisions rather than to notice requirements), no analogy could be drawn. See Smith,
326 Md. at 608 n.7, 606 A.2d at 277 n.7.
154. See Smith, 326 Md. at 611, 606 A.2d at 279.
155. Id. at 612, 606 A.2d at 279. This conclusion was based on the fact that the notice
provision in § 240A initially was intended to cover only motor vehicle liability insurance.
Because motor vehicle insurance was not initially considered an "exportable" risk, and
was not eligible for coverage by surplus lines insurance, it was unlikely that the legisla-
ture intended the notice provision to apply to surplus lines insurance as well as to motor
vehicle insurance. Id. at 611-12, 606 A.2d at 279.
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to the same section also supported this conclusion.' 56
Next, the Court of Appeals drew an analogy from the classes of
insurers covered by section 240A(b).15 7 The court concluded that
"[t]he term 'insurer' appearing in subsection (b) is not specially de-
fined. Ordinarily, one would read 'insurer' in (b) in the same way in
which one would read the same term as used in (a) [the notice provi-
sion]. From the context of (b), surplus lines insurers are not con-
templated."'5 " Therefore, it is likely that surplus line insurers also
were excluded from the other subsections of section 240A.15 9
Finally, the court turned to Subtitle 27A of the Insurance Code,
the Maryland Property Insurance Availability Act, 6 0 to find "[a] rel-
atively clear expression of Maryland public policy concerning the
minimum period for notice of cancellation of property insurance, in
relation to the substandard market. .. ."' This subtitle provides
an alternative to surplus line insurance for coverage of risks that are
no longer insurable in the standard market.' 6 2 Underwriters issuing
policies under this program may shorten the policy cancellation pe-
riod under certain conditions. 163 Given the similarities between this
"substandard risk" insurance and surplus line insurance, the Smith
court reasoned that if the legislature allowed "substandard risk" un-
derwriters to shorten the minimum notice period for cancellation,
there could be no public policy reason for requiring surplus line
carriers to meet the forty-five-day notice requirement.' 6 4 In light of
this analysis, the court concluded that the scope of the notice re-
quirement in section 240A was not intended to include surplus line
insurers. 165
156. Id. at 614, 606 A.2d at 280 ("Once again ... the General Assembly did not
contemplate that the § 240A 'insurer' included surplus lines carriers whose Maryland
insureds already owned risks treated by the industry as substandard, or unusual.").
157. See id. at 614-15, 606 A.2d at 280-81. Section 240A(b) requires insurers that
intend to withdraw an entire line of insurance from the State to file a plan of withdrawal
with the Insurance Commissioner 180 days in advance of withdrawal. MD. ANN. CODE
art. 48A, § 240A(b)(1)(i) (Supp. 1991).
158. Smith, 326 Md. at 614, 606 A.2d at 281.
159. See id. at 614-15, 606 A.2d at 280-81.
160. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 478A-4781 (1991 & Supp. 1992) (expires June
30, 1996).
161. Smith, 326 Md. at 615, 606 A.2d at 281.
162. See id. at 615-16, 606 A.2d at 281.
163. See id. at 615, 606 A.2d at 281; see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 478C(7) (1991
& Supp. 1992) (expires June 30, 1996).




4. Analysis.-If the Court of Appeals had simply held that sur-
plus line insurers were not subject to the forty-five-day notice re-
quirement in section 240A(a)(3) of the Insurance Code, the impact
would not have been far-reaching. Instead, the court also found it
necessary to reject the commonly held notion 66 that surplus line
insurance carriers are generally outside the "geographic jurisdic-
tion" of the State.' 6 7 The geographic jurisdiction argument asserts
that surplus line insurers are not subject to the general state insur-
ance regulatory scheme because surplus line insurance policies are
not issued "within" the State.168 This means both that surplus line
insurance carriers are not authorized to sell ordinary insurance in
the State, '6 9 and that surplus line insurance carriers, often not phys-
ically present within the State, are represented by surplus line insur-
ance brokers.17 0 Thus, as in the present case, an ordinary state-
authorized insurance broker (like M&S) can request coverage from a
licensed surplus line insurance broker (like All Risks); the surplus
line insurance broker then can contact a "foreign," ' 7' or "alien," 172
"unauthorized"' 71 insurer that has filed the appropriate affidavit
with the insurance commissioner 74 (like Lloyd's of London); and
166. In many federal cases, the Supreme Court has held that surplus line insurers are
not subject to state regulation. See, e.g., Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303
U.S. 77 (1938) (holding that California could not tax premiums paid by an insurer to a
reinsurance company in Connecticut for coverage of a risk in California); St. Louis Cot-
ton Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346 (1922) (holding that Arkansas could not tax
premiums paid to an out-of-state insurer for an insurance policy covering risks within
Arkansas when that insurer was not authorized to do business within the state); Allgeyer
v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (holding that Louisiana could not make it a misde-
meanor for an out-of-state insurance company to insure in-state risks).
Many state and lower federal courts also have exempted surplus line insurers from
state laws and regulations. See, e.g., Florida Dep't of Ins. v. National Amusement
Purchasing Group, Inc., 905 F.2d 361, 363 (11 th Cir. 1990) (exempting surplus line
insurers from the state-law requirement of obtaining a certificate of authority to sell
insurance in Florida); Evanston Ins. Co. v. Merin, 598 F. Supp. 1290, 1297 (D.NJ. 1984)
("[The] special restriction on the manner in which surplus lines insurers may receive
business in New Jersey corresponds to their relatively greater freedom from state
regulation .. ").
167. Smith, 326 Md. at 609, 606 A.2d at 278.
168. See id. at 608, 606 A.2d at 277.
169. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 7 (1991) (designating insurers either as "author-
ized," meaning having a certificate of authority issued by the Insurance Commissioner
to engage in the insurance business in the State, or "unauthorized," meaning not having
the commissioner's authorization).
170. See id. § 184(b)(1) (providing that the surplus line broker must be licensed in
Maryland).
171. See id. § 6(2).
172. See id. § 6(3).
173. See id. § 7(2).
174. See id. § 185.
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finally, the surplus line broker can arrange or "place" the surplus
line insurance coverage-all without any need for direct contact be-
tween the surplus line insurance carrier and the state of Maryland.
In such cases, the surplus line insurance policy truly is issued
"outside" the jurisdiction of the State, and at all times is adminis-
tered within the State through a state-authorized surplus line insur-
ance broker.
Absent some compelling reason to exempt surplus line insurers
from part or all of the ordinary state insurance regulatory scheme,
however, surplus line insurance policies still should fall, at least par-
tially, within the realm of the State's insurance regulatory powers-
if for no other reason than that the policies and their coverage pur-
port to protect the property interests of Maryland citizens. Many
other states do regulate surplus lines insurers, although less strin-
gently than they regulate ordinary insurers. 175
Surplus line insurers argue that there are at least two compel-
ling justifications in favor of exemption or limited regulation. First,
because the risks that are placed with surplus line insurers are those
risks for which ordinary insurance could not be found among state-
authorized insurers, surplus line insurance carriers must be freed
from the onerous regulatory burdens that are imposed upon "au-
thorized" insurers. If they were subject to the strict regulatory
scheme, surplus lines insurers would be unable to offer surplus line
insurance in a cost-effective manner. 76 Second, under Maryland's
175. See, e.g., Arkansas-Oklahoma Gas Corp. v. Lukis Stewart Price Forbes & Co., 816
S.W.2d 571, 575 (Ark. 1991) (holding that the insurance regulatory scheme was in-
tended to provide more freedom for surplus lines insurers through regulation of surplus
lines brokers); Villagonza v. Hawaii Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 772 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Haw. 1989)
(observing that the Hawaii Revised Statutes makes a separate provision for those surplus
insurance coverages that authorized insurers are unwilling to provide); Farmers &
Merchants State Bank v. Bosshart, 400 N.W.2d 739, 742-43 (Minn. 1987) (noting that,
although Minnesota law regulates surplus line insurers, it primarily regulates the insur-
ance agents and brokers who sell the insurance); Railroad Roofing & Bldg. Supply Co. v.
Financial Fire & Casualty Co., 427 A.2d 66, 68 (NJ. 1981) (holding that the provisions
of the state insurance guaranty act did not apply to surplus line insurers). But see Veal v.
Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 325 So. 2d 795, 798 (La. 1975) (finding "no intent to
exempt from this requirement policies issued through Louisiana-licensed brokers for
coverage of Louisiana-based automobiles and Louisiana policyholders"). The dissent in
Veal argued that "[tihe policy in this case was procured by the broker on behalf of the
insured from the unauthorized insurer outside the state and was not solicited or issued
by the unauthorized insurer within the state. The unauthorized insurer was not, there-
fore, transacting business in Louisiana." Id. at 801-02 (Summers, J., dissenting).
176. Insurance for these risks usually cannot be purchased from ordinary insurers be-
cause these insurers would have to charge a premium higher than the statutorily permit-
ted rate in order to adequately match the risk with the cost of insuring the risk. Surplus
line insurers can accept these higher risks by pooling large numbers of similar high risks
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scheme of statutory organization, all of the regulations that are per-
tinent to surplus line insurers are collected within Subtitle 13. To
the extent that Subtitle 13 is not completely parallel to the regula-
tory scheme applicable to ordinary or "authorized" insurers, that
discrepancy exists because surplus line insurers are exempt from
more-onerous regulatory burdens.
Whether or not these or other reasons adequately justify the
exemption of surplus line insurers from statutory provisions such as
the forty-five-day notice requirement, it seems intellectually disin-
genuous to discard the geographic jurisdiction argument without
providing at least nominally compelling reasons. The Court of Ap-
peals justified its holding that surplus line insurance carriers are not
exempt from Maryland's geographic jurisdiction for three reasons:
(1) the policy was delivered to Smith in Maryland; (2) the policy cov-
ered a Maryland risk; and (3) the premium ultimately was paid to
Lloyd's of London by Smith, a Maryland resident.' 7 7 Except for
policies issued to residents of other states, it is difficult to imagine a
surplus line insurance policy that would fail to qualify for Maryland
regulation under this three-prong test. The Smith court's brief treat-
ment of the geographic jurisdiction argument seems inadequate to
dispose of the point so completely.'
Having rejected the geographic jurisdiction and statutory or-
ganization arguments advanced by Lloyd's, the Court of Appeals
found it necessary to reject a "plain meaning" interpretation of the
statute. In so doing, the court embarked upon a journey through
the legislative history of most of the Maryland Insurance Code in
order to ascertain the meaning of the section at issue.179 The court
seemed unconcerned that similar complex analyses will be needed
in the future to determine whether other particular sections of the
Insurance Code were meant to apply to surplus line insurers. In
effect, the court was willing to adopt a case-by-case analysis rule for
determining the applicability of Insurance Code sections to surplus
line insurers.
Although the Smith decision reaches a conclusion that seems
both fair and well-justified under the history of the pertinent legisla-
and charging higher premiums that reflect the actual loss expectation-but only if free
(from a regulatory perspective) to price the insurance coverage accurately.
177. Smith, 326 Md. at 609, 606 A.2d at 278.
178. The court simply held: "[Lloyd's of London]'s contacts with Maryland are suffi-
cient to permit Maryland to legislate concerning the terms and provisions of the Policy."
Id.
179. See id. at 611-14, 606 A.2d at 279-80.
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tive sections, the court actually may have opened the door to the
possibility that more, not fewer, sections of the Insurance Code will
be applied against surplus line insurers in the future. This outcome
could result from the court's rejection of both the "geographic juris-
diction" and "exported risk" arguments. Therefore, the court may
have simultaneously increased the complexity of adjudicating each
surplus line insurance case and granted the Maryland Insurance
Commissioner greater latitude to promulgate more restrictive regu-
lations for surplus line insurers.
Similarly, by rejecting the "statutory organization" argument,
the court may have increased the number of future insurance cases
that will involve a surplus line insurer's failure to comply with statu-
tory sections codified outside the bounds of Subtitle 13. In these
cases, the courts will have to search the legislative history of the con-
tested section' 80 and perform a complete case-by-case factual analy-
sis. Both results will increase the difficulty of adjudicating cases,
cloud the commercial expectations of surplus line insurers doing
business with Maryland brokers, and may increase the frequency
and complexity of litigation and appeals.
5. Conclusion.-It remains to be seen whether the Maryland In-
surance Commissioner will use this case to justify further regulation
of surplus line insurance carriers. Similarly, the legislature may
need to clarify its intention concerning the organization of the In-
surance Code as a result of the Smith decision. But most signifi-
cantly, through its process of deciding that surplus line insurers
need not provide forty-five-day notice of cancellation to policyhold-
ers, the Court of Appeals may have severely restricted surplus line
insurers' overall freedom from state regulation.
DANIEL W. PUGH
180. As described supra notes 139-142 and accompanying text, a court applying the
Maryland rules of statutory construction would not have to review the statute's legisla-
tive history if the "plain meaning" of the section in question is clear. Absent such clar-
ity, the court will have to delve into the "legislative intent" behind the provision.
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A. Never Too Late For Maryland Juveniles
In In re Keith G.' the Court of Appeals held that dismissal of a
delinquency petition is not necessarily the appropriate sanction
when an intake officer has violated the timing requirement of the
juvenile intake procedures of the Juvenile Causes Act, sections 3-
810(c) and (e).2 The Court of Appeals construed sections 3-810(c)
and (e) as not requiring dismissal of the petition, reversing the
Court of Special Appeals.3 In so doing, the court contravened prior
decisions interpreting juvenile statutes and manipulated the pur-
pose of section 3-810 to achieve a desired result.
1. The Case.-On February 1, 1990, the Department of Juvenile
Services (DJS) received a complaint charging Keith G., a juvenile,
1. 325 Md. 538, 601 A.2d 1107 (1992).
2. Id. at 547, 601 A.2d at 1112. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-
810(c),(e) (Supp. 1991) (corresponds to MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-810
(b),(d) (1989)).
The Court of Special Appeals proceeded under the 1989 version of the statute,
while the Court of Appeals referenced the 1991 version. The 1991 amendment, effec-
tive July 1, 1991, inserted present subsections (b) and (k) and redesignated the other
subsections accordingly. All relevant text remained unchanged. Section 3-810 (c)(1)
provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, in considering the complaint,
the intake officer shall make a preliminary inquiry within 15 days as to whether
the court has jurisdiction and whether judicial action is in the best interests of
the public or the child. The intake officer may, after such inquiry and in accord-
ance with this section:
(i) Authorize the filing of a petition;
(ii) Conduct a further investigation into the allegations of the complaint;
(iii) Propose an informal adjustment of the matter; or
(iv) Refuse authorization to file a petition.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-810(c)(1) (Supp. 1991). Section 3-810(e)
provides:
(1) The intake officer may conduct a further investigation if based upon the
complaint and the preliminary inquiry, the intake officer concludes that further
inquiry is necessary in order to determine whether the court has jurisdiction or
whether judicial action is in the best interests of the public or the child.
(2) The further investigation shall be completed and a decision made by the
intake officer within 10 days, unless that time is extended by the court.
Id. § 3-180(e). Subsequent to the case, chapter 19, Acts 1992, approved April 7, 1992,
rewrote subsection (c), extending the time during which a preliminary inquiry must be
made from 15 to 25 days, and deleted (e). See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 3-
810 (Supp. 1992).
3. See In re Keith G., 86 Md. App. 662, 669, 587 A.2d 1164, 1168 (1991), rev'd, 325
Md. 538, 601 A.2d 1107 (1992).
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with felony theft and related offenses.4 Twenty-six days later, on
February 27, 1990, the intake officer conducted a conference with
Keith G. and his parents.5 Immediately after the conference, the
intake officer recommended that the State file a formal delinquency
petition against Keith G. in Juvenile Court.6 The State filed the peti-
tion on March 19, 1990. 7 Keith G. argued that the intake officer's
failure to complete the initial interview within the fifteen-day time
frame prescribed by section 3-810(c) and (e) mandated the dismissal
of the State's petition.' The Juvenile Court agreed and dismissed
the petition.9
The Court of Special Appeals agreed with Keith G. and af-
firmed the Juvenile Court's holding.' ° Relying on the obligatory
language of section 3-810(c)(1)," the court reasoned that "to hold
that the intake officer can ignore, at his or her discretion, the time
frames prescribed by the intake procedure would render that por-
tion of § 3-810(d)(2) meaningless."1 2 The State argued that dismis-
sal was not the appropriate sanction for a violation of a time
requirement within the juvenile system. 3 The court, however, held
that dismissal was appropriate because the parties, rather than the
court, were in control of complying with the timing requirements.14
Finally, the intermediate appellate court recognized that in order to
do what is in the best interest of the juvenile, it is necessary to abide
by the procedural requirements of section 3-810.1'
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari' 6 "to consider the im-
portant public issue presented in the case."' 17 By a six-to-one major-
ity, the court reversed the Court of Special Appeals, holding that
dismissal is not the appropriate sanction for a violation of the time
limitations of section 3-810(c)(1) and (e).'"
4. Keith G., 325 Md. at 541, 601 A.2d at 1108.





10. In re Keith G., 86 Md. App. 662, 663, 587 A.2d 1164, 1165 (1991), rev'd, 325 Md.
538, 601 A.2d 1107 (1992).
11. Id. at 666, 587 A.2d at 1166.
12. Id. at 668, 587 A.2d at 1167.
13. See id. at 665, 587 A.2d at 1165-66.
14. Id. at 669, 587 A.2d at 1168.
15. Id.
16. See In re Keith G., 323 Md. 214, 592 A.2d 505 (1991).
17. See Keith G., 325 Md. at 541,601 A.2d at 1109.
18. See id. at 547, 601 A.2d at 1112.
1993] 779
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
In his dissent,Judge Eldridge objected to the court's permissive
interpretation of section 3-810.' 9 He advocated the lower court's
approach, arguing that it was more in accordance with the legislative
intent underlying section 3-810.20
2. Legal Background.-
a. Generally. -In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,21 the Supreme Court
first recognized the importance of the intake procedure of the juve-
nile system. The Court held that trial by jury is not a constitutional
requirement in the juvenile system.22 In his concurrence, Justice
White remarked, "To the extent that the jury is a buffer to the cor-
rupt or overzealous prosecutor in the criminal law system, the dis-
tinctive intake policies and procedures of the juvenile court system
to a great extent obviate this important function of the jury."2 3
That is, the intake officer assumes the role of the jury for factfinding
purposes and statutory limitations on the officer's discretion pre-
serve fairness in that system.
Two years later, the Court of Special Appeals, in In re Davis,2 4
examined the legislative purpose behind Maryland's Juvenile Causes
Act. Finding protection of the juvenile to be the underlying concern
of the Act,25 the court instructed "judges, in making dispositions in
juvenile cases, [to] think not in terms of guilt, but of the child's need
for protection or rehabilitation. "26
Reaching essentially the same conclusion with respect to the
purpose of the Juvenile Causes Act, the Court of Appeals, in In re
Laurence T. ,27 specifically addressed the intake officer's role in the
juvenile system. 21 While the court conceded that "§ 3-810 ... vests
broad discretion in intake officers to determine whether a petition
should be filed,'' 29 it warned that "such discretion must be exercised
19. Id. at 548, 601 A.2d at 1112 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
20. See id.
21. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
22. Id. at 545.
23. Id. at 552 (White, J., concurring).
24. 17 Md. App. 98, 299 A.2d 856 (1973) (holding that the State does not have to
prove that a juvenile had guilty knowledge for a finding of delinquency).
25. See id. at 103, 299 A.2d at 860.
26. Id.
27. 285 Md. 621, 625, 403 A.2d 1256, 1258 (1979) (holding that the State may not
consider a mother's failure to promise restitution in determining whether to file a peti-
tion against a juvenile).
28. See id. at 625-26, 403 A.2d at 1258-59.
29. Id. at 624, 403 A.2d at 1258.
780 [VOL. 52:778
JUVENILE LAW
within constitutional limits." '
b. Sanctions for Violations of Time Requirements of the Juvenile Causes
Act.-Maryland has recognized several "timing" violations of theJu-
venile Causes Act that may not be cured by dismissal of the petition.
In In re Dewayne H. ," the Court of Appeals held that a violation of
Maryland Rule 915, which requires that a disposition hearing be
held within thirty days, did not warrant dismissal of the juvenile pe-
tition.32 The court relied on two grounds to support its holding.
First, the court reasoned that dismissal of a petition in the post-
adjudicatory stage would violate the purpose of providing a pro-
gram of treatment and rehabilitation for delinquent juveniles. 33
Second, because neither the State nor the juvenile had control over
the scheduling of the disposition hearing, neither party should suf-
fer or benefit from a dismissal of the petition.3 4 The following year,
the Court of Special Appeals relied on the same reasoning to hold
that dismissal was not the appropriate sanction for a failure to con-
duct the adjudicatory hearing within the time requirements set forth
in Maryland Rule 914."
In 1983, the Court of Special Appeals once again invoked the
Dewayne H. "rehabilitative purpose" and "parties' control" reason-
ing to deny dismissal as a sanction for failure to hold a restitution
hearing in a timely fashion.3 6 The court explained that an untimely
restitution hearing "is less deleterious to the juvenile's interests
than delayed disposition. '3' Additionally, the court concluded that
dismissal of the case would violate the purpose of section 3-829,"s
that being to compensate the victim.3 9
30. Id. at 627, 403 A.2d at 1259.
31. 290 Md. 401, 430 A.2d 76 (1981).
32. See id. at 402, 430 A.2d at 77.
33. See id. at 405-07, 430 A.2d at 79-80.
34. Id. at 407, 430 A.2d at 80.
35. See In re Howard L., 50 Md. App. 498, 438 A.2d 939 (1982). Rule 914, in perti-
nent part, provides that "[a]n adjudicatory hearing shall be held within sixty days after
the juvenile petition is served on the respondent unless a waiver petition is filed ......
MD. R. 914(b). See also In re Keith W., 310 Md. 99, 527 A.2d 35 (1987) (holding dismis-
sal inappropriate as a sanction for an untimely adjudicatory hearing).
36. See In re Trevor A., 55 Md. App. 491, 462 A.2d 1245 (1983).
37. Id. at 499, 462 A.2d at 1249.
38. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-829 (1989) ("A restitution hearing to
determine the liability of a parent, a child, or both, shall be held not later than 30 days
after the disposition hearing and may be extended by the court for good cause.").
39. See Trevor A., 55 Md. App. at 499, 462 A.2d at 1249.
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c. Sanctions for Violation of Intake Procedures.-While some viola-
tions of the Juvenile Causes Act may not be cured by dismissal, vio-
lations of intake procedures have traditionally culminated in
dismissal of the juvenile petition. In 1980, the Court of Appeals, in
In rejames S. ,4 authorized dismissal for the State's failure to observe
section 3-812(b), requiring the State's Attorney to file the delin-
quency petition within fifteen days after receiving a referral from the
intake officer. 4 First, the James S. court invoked a cardinal rule of
statutory construction: Courts should "ascertain and carry out the
real legislative intent. '42 The court further clarified this rule:
A corollary to this rule is that if there is no ambiguity or
obscurity in the language of a statute, there is usually no
need to look elsewhere to ascertain the intent of the Gen-
eral Assembly .... A court may not insert or omit words to
make a statute express an intention not evidenced in its
original form .... 11
Applying this rule, and the rule that the word "shall" is presumed to
be mandatory,4 4 the court held that section 3-812 was mandatory
and, therefore, its violation required dismissal of the petition. 45 As
another justification, the court noted "[t]he General Assembly['s]
. . . desire that such matters proceed expeditiously. '46 Finally, the
James S. court added that if the General Assembly did not intend for
the section to be mandatory, it could pursue legislative measures to
cure the judicial interpretation.47
Because the General Assembly did not disturb the James S.
holding through legislative measures, the Court of Appeals once
40. 286 Md. 702, 410 A.2d 586 (1980).
41. The State exceeded the mandate of the statute by approximately one week. Id. at
704, 410 A.2d at 587.
42. Id. at 705, 410 A.2d at 587 (quoting Police Comm'r v. Dowling, 281 Md. 412,
418, 379 A.2d 1007, 1010 (1977)).
43. Id. (quoting Dowling, 281 Md. at 418-19, 379 A.2d at 1010-11).
44. Id. at 706-09, 410 A.2d at 588-89. See also Moss v. Director, 279 Md. 561, 564-
65, 369 A.2d 1011, 1013 (1977) ("It is now a familiar principle of statutory construction
in this State that use of the word 'shall' is presumed mandatory unless its context would
indicate otherwise.").
45. See James S., 286 Md. at 713, 410 A.2d at 591.
46. Id. at 712, 410 A.2d at 591.
47. See id. at 713-14, 410 A.2d at 592. The court stated:
We are told of many problems that may be created if we hold this provision to
be mandatory. We do not deny that such might be the case, but the General
Assembly is in session and it no doubt will take prompt corrective action if it
does not mean the sections to be mandatory.
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again authorized dismissal in In re Patrick A. 48 In Patrick A., the
State's Attorney violated section 3-810 by filing a delinquency peti-
tion prior to completion of intake procedures. 49 In holding that dis-
missal was the appropriate remedy,5" the Court of Appeals once
again looked to the mandatory nature of the statute.5 The court
explained that although the State's Attorney "shares a viable role in
ensuring that a juvenile is rehabilitated . . . , [i]t does not follow...
that the State's Attorney may intentionally ignore the required pro-
cedure in doing so."52
The next use of the dismissal sanction preceded Keith G. by two
years. In In re Steven B. ,13 the intake officer bypassed section 3-810
by automatically forwarding the case to the State's Attorney. 54 The
court once again stressed that "[i]n order to ensure that the best
interests of the child are advocated, it is necessary that both DJS and
the State adhere to the procedural requirements of § 3-810 as man-
dated by the General Assembly."55 Furthermore, the court rea-
soned that because the fifteen-day time limit on conducting the
preliminary inquiry had lapsed, there was "no possible way that the
matters [could] be referred back to the intake officer for compliance
with § 3-810[(c)](3)(ii)." 56 Therefore, dismissal was the appropriate
sanction.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Keith G., the Court of Appeals
confronted the question of "whether dismissal of a juvenile delin-
quency petition is an appropriate sanction where the intake officer's
preliminary inquiry exceeded, without a court order, the time re-
quirement prescribed by . . . § 3-810 .... "5'
The majority began its analysis by discussing several rules of
statutory construction.58 First, the court introduced the rule set
48. 312 Md. 484, 540 A.2d 810 (1988).
49. See id. at 484-85, 540 A.2d at 811.
50. Id. at 484, 540 A.2d at 810.
51. See id. at 490, 540 A.2d at 814 ("We conclude the Legislature intended that the
preliminary investigation by the intake officer be mandatory under the circumstances of
this case.").
52. Id. at 491, 540 A.2d at 814. See also id. at 492-93, 540 A.2d at 815 ("To hold that
the intake procedure can be ignored at the discretion of the State's Attorney would
render the statutory language meaningless.").
53. 84 Md. App. 1, 578 A.2d 233, cert. denied, 321 Md. 385, 582 A.2d 1256 (1990).
54. See id. at 6, 578 A.2d at 226.
55. Id. at 7, 578 A.2d at 226.
56. Id. at 9, 578 A.2d at 227-28.
57. Keith G., 325 Md. at 540, 601 A.2d at 1108.
58. See id. at 542, 601 A.2d at 1109.
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forth in Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore :5 9 "To ascertain and effectu-
ate the legislative intention, a statute is to be construed reasonably
with reference to its purpose, aim, or policy."6 ° While statutory lan-
guage is the primary source of legislative intent, the language must
be construed in light of the overall legislative scheme. 6' In accord-
ance with these rules of statutory construction, the court reviewed
section 3-802, which embodies the purpose of the Juvenile Causes
Act.62 The primary purpose of the Juvenile Causes Act is to provide
a program of treatment and rehabilitation that is consistent with the
child's best interest and "remove from children committing delin-
quent acts the taint of criminality."6 3 The Keith G. court adhered to
this purpose by asserting "that the foremost consideration in ajuve-
nile proceeding after a determination of delinquency is to provide
children with a program of treatment and rehabilitation." '  Given
this "special purpose," dismissal was found to be ordinarily inap-
propriate as a sanction for procedural violations of the Juvenile
Causes Act.65 Thus, in In re Keith W 66 and In re Dewayne H. ,67 re-
spectively, the Court of Appeals held that dismissal of the juvenile
petition was inappropriate "where the adjudicatory hearing was not
held within the time period prescribed by Maryland Rule 914,' '68 or
"where the disposition hearing was scheduled one day later than
permitted by Maryland Rule 915. "69
While the court acknowledged the importance of the intake
procedure,70 it distinguished the instant case from In re Steven B. ,
where the intake officer failed to conduct the preliminary investiga-
59. 309 Md. 505, 525 A.2d 628 (1987).
60. Keith G., 325 Md. at 542, 601 A.2d at 1109 (citing Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 513,
525 A.2d at 632).
61. Id.
62. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 3-802 (1989).
63. Id. § 3-802(2). See also In re Davis, 17 Md. App. 98, 299 A.2d 856 (1973).
The raison d'etre of the Juvenile Causes Act is that a child does not commit a
crime when he commits a delinquent act and therefore is not a criminal. He is
not to be punished but afforded the supervision and treatment to be made
aware of what is right and what is wrong so as to be amenable to the criminal
laws.
Id. at 104, 299 A.2d at 860.
64. Keith G., 325 Md. at 544, 601 A.2d at 1110. See also In re Patrick A., 312 Md. 484,
487, 540 A.2d 810, 812 (1988).
65. Keith G., 325 Md. at 545, 601 A.2d at 1110-11.
66. 310 Md. 99, 527 A.2d 35 (1987).
67. 290 Md. 401, 430 A.2d 76 (1981).
68. See Keith G., 325 Md. at 544, 601 A.2d at 1110 (explaining the Keith W. holding).
69. Id. at 545, 601 A.2d at 1111 (explaining the Dewayne H. holding).
70. See id. at 543-44, 601 A.2d at 1110.
71. 84 Md. App. 1, 578 A.2d 223, cert. denied, 321 Md. 385, 582 A.2d 1256 (1990).
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tion prior to the filing of the delinquency petition.72 Similarly, the
court distinguished In rejames S.,73 reasoning that dismissal was ap-
propriate in that case because the violated provision was in the na-
ture of a statute of limitations.74 Had the legislature intended for
section 3-810 to serve as a statute of limitations, the Keith G. court
reasoned, "[it] would not have empowered the court to extend the
time period for the intake officer to complete his investigation. 75
Thus, in examining the "totality of the circumstances ' 76 of
Keith G.'s case and the purpose ofJuvenile Causes Act, the Court of
Appeals held that dismissal of the case would be inappropriate.77
4. Analysis.-
a. Statutory Construction of Section 3-810.-There are two rules
of statutory construction, supported by Maryland case law, that the
majority in Keith G. ignored. 78 The first rule-that "[a] court may
not insert or omit words to make a statute express an intention not
evidenced in its original form" 7 9 -was used by the James S. court to
hold that section 3-812(b) was mandatory, and therefore, that dis-
72. See Keith G., 325 Md. at 546, 601 A.2d 1111. See also Steven B., 84 Md. App. at 6,
578 A.2d at 226.
73. 286 Md. 702, 410 A.2d 586 (1980).
74. See Keith G., 325 Md. at 546, 601 A.2d at 1111. In James S., the State failed to
comply with § 3-812(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. See James S., 286
Md. at 703-04, 410 A.2d at 586-87.
75. Keith G., 325 Md. at 547, 601 A.2d at 1111.
76. Id., 601 A.2d at 1112. Maryland Rule 1-201(1) provides:
When a rule, by the word "shall" or otherwise, mandates or prohibits conduct,
the consequences of noncompliance are those prescribed by these rules or by
statute. If no consequences are prescribed, the court may compel compliance
with the rule or may determine the consequences of the noncompliance in light
of the totality of the circumstances and the purpose of the rule.
MD. R. 1-201(1) (emphasis added). See also In re Patrick A., 312 Md. 484, 491, 540 A.2d
810, 814 (1988) ("When deciding whether dismissal of a juvenile petition is the proper
sanction, we have instructed the trial judge to examine the totality of the circumstances
....11).
77. See Keith G., 325 Md. at 547, 601 A.2d at 1112.
78. See id. at 548, 601 A.2d at 1112 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). Judge Eldridge
commented:
[I]t is the expressed provision for a court-ordered extension of time which con-
firms the legislative intent that dismissal of the petition should ordinarily be the
sanction where the intake officer's investigation exceeds the statutory time
limit. If the General Assembly had intended that dismissal not be the sanction,
there would have been no reason to have provided for a court-ordered
extension.
Id.
79. In re James S., 286 Md. 702, 705, 410 A.2d 586, 587 (1980) (quoting Police
Comm'r v. Dowling, 281 Md. 412, 419, 379 A.2d 1007, 1011 (1977)).
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missal was the best sanction for noncompliance.8 0 Comparing sec-
tion 3-812 to section 3-810, both of which using the word "shall"
and providing for a court-ordered extension of time, the court ex-
plained: " '[h]ad the legislature intended a more flexible time pe-
riod.., the legislature would have used the word "may" or would
have allowed for an extension of the 15 day time limit.' "81 Simi-
larly, had the legislature intended Keith G. 's flexible interpretation
of section 3-810, it could have used "may" instead of "shall" and
provided for extension without a court order.
The second rule of statutory construction overlooked by the
Keith G. court is that a statute should be construed so that no part of
it is rendered meaningless.8 2 For example, when the State filed a
delinquency petition before complying with the intake procedures of
section 3-810, the Patrick A. court dismissed the petition and re-
marked: "[t]o hold that the intake procedure can be ignored at the
discretion of the State's Attorney would render the statutory lan-
guage meaningless."8 Despite this rule of statutory construction,
the court in Keith G. allowed the intake officer to ignore the timing
requirements of section 3-810(c) and (e), thereby rendering an ap-
parent statutory mandate meaningless.
b. Legislative Intent. -The Keith G. court also ignored the legis-
lative intent underlying section 3-810. While the court recognized
that "the foremost consideration in a juvenile proceeding after a de-
termination of delinquency is to provide children with a program of
treatment and rehabilitation, '"84 it extended that consideration to
apply before any finding of delinquency is ever made. Although this
is certainly the legislative intent for the adjudication and disposition
phases of the juvenile system, it is not the intention for the intake
phase. Keith G. misinterprets the statute by applying the rehabilita-
tive and treatment-centered intent to the intake stage of the juvenile
system.85
80. See James S., 286 Md. at 713, 410 A.2d at 591.
81. Id. at 704, 410 A.2d at 587 (quoting the trial judge).
82. See id. at 705, 410 A.2d at 587 (reiterating that statutes should " 'be read so that
no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless,
or nugatory' " (quoting Dowling, 281 Md. at 419, 379 A.2d at 1011)).
83. In re Patrick A., 312 Md. 484, 492-93, 540 A.2d 810, 815 (1988).
84. Keith G., 325 Md. at 544, 601 A.2d at 1110 (emphasis added).
85. In In re Patrick A., 70 Md. App. 191, 520 A.2d 743 (1987), the Court of Special
Appeals distinguished Dewayne H., a case in which the juvenile had already been adjudi-
cated delinquent, from Patrick A., a case in which the juvenile had not yet been adjudi-
cated delinquent. The court noted: "[T]here has not yet been any showing that [the
latter] is necessarily in need of treatment and services." Id. at 205, 520 A.2d at 750.
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Keith G. simply ignores the true legislative intent for the intake
stage: to promote expediency 6 in an otherwise languid system. 7
After an examination of the legislative intent behind section 3-810,
the James S. court concluded: "[tihe General Assembly has made
plain in the juvenile causes subtitle its desire that such matters pro-
ceed expeditiously."8 8 If the legislature had an alternate intent in
mind, it could have amended section 3-810 after James S. s9 It did
not do so. The Keith G. court, ignoring this, likely contravened the
legislative goal of expediency by allowing the intake officer to disre-
gard the fifteen-day limit on conducting the initial investigation.
c. Purpose of Section 3-810.-While the court acknowledged that
the purpose of the Juvenile Causes Act is to provide for the best
interests of the juvenile,9 ° the court failed to carry out this purpose.
In Steven B., the Court of Special Appeals instructed that "[iun order
to ensure that the best interests of the child are advocated, it is nec-
essary that both DJS and the State adhere to the procedural require-
ments of § 3-810 as mandated by the General Assembly."'" The
Court of Appeals has recognized that the "discretion conferred
upon intake officers ... must be exercised within constitutional lim-
its."92 Logically, that discretion also must be exercised within statu-
tory limits and procedures.
Finally, the Supreme Court has highlighted "accurate factfind-
ing' '93 and "procedural orderliness"94 as integral parts of the juve-
nile system. Initial delays may detrimentally affect the court's
factfinding function in a number of ways. Delay often "clouds" the
memories of witnesses.95 Additionally, "[wihen a child does go to
court, Juvenile Court masters say the initial delays wreak havoc with
86. See James S., 286 Md. at 712-13, 410 A.2d at 591.
87. See Scott Shane, A First Lesson in Justice.- Juvenile Court Cases Routinely Stall for
Months, THE SUN (Baltimore), July 21, 1992, at Al. "In many cities, police give the child
and parent a date a few weeks away [from the arrest] for the child to report to authori-
ties. In Baltimore, no date is set, and [a] stall in [a juvenile's] case is by no means unu-
sual." Id. at A7.
88. James S., at 712, 410 A.2d at 591.
89. See id. at 713-14, 410 A.2d at 592 (predicting that the General Assembly "will
take prompt corrective action if it does not mean the sections to be mandatory").
90. Keith G., 325 Md. at 542-43, 601 A.2d at 1109.
91. In re Steven B., 84 Md. App. 1, 7, 578 A.2d 223, 226 (1990).
92. In re Laurence T., 285 Md. 621, 627, 403 A.2d 1256, 1259 (1979).
93. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971).
94. Id. at 545.
95. See Shane, supra note 87, at A7. Juvenile Court Judge David B. Mitchell repeat-
edly said, "You can't say for sure the case would have come out differently if it had been
held much earlier. But the delay is unconscionable." Id.
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their work, making it impossible to know the extent of a child's
arrest record."96
In short, the court's holding in Keith G. amounts to an approval
of further delays in an already sluggish system. These delays will
undoubtedly diminish "accurate factfinding" and "procedural or-
derliness" in a Juvenile System to which they are integral.97 Unless
initial delays are avoided by compliance with the intake procedures,
the best interests of the child are sacrificed to the conveniences of
the intake officer.
5. Concluion.-In the Juvenile System, "[t]he immediacy of
the response is more important than the severity of the response. '9 8
In In re Keith G. the Court of Appeals first announced that an intake
officer's failure to conduct the initial investigation within the time
frame prescribed by section 3-810(c) and (e) will not result in dis-
missal of the juvenile petition. Although the court noted that there
may be an administrative sanction for the violation,99 the court not
only disregarded previous interpretations and the legislative intent
of section 3-8 10, but the best interests of the juvenile as well.
IRENE Bu'ITERMAN
96. Id. at Al. The delays also make it difficult to track down a juvenile, and "[wihen
efforts to find a juvenile fail, charges eventually are dropped, prosecutors say." Id.
97. See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543.
98. Shane, supra note 87, at A7 (quoting Juvenile Master James P. Casey).
99. Keith G., 325 Md. at 547-48, 601 A.2d at 1112.
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A. Joint Tenancy: Creation and Severance
In Downing v. Downing,' the Court of Appeals held that by sim-
ply placing the words "joint tenancy" in a deed, parties have suffi-
ciently manifested their intention to create a joint tenancy.2
Moreover, neither a mortgage on the property executed by all joint
tenants, nor an agreement between joint tenants conferring upon
one the exclusive right to receive income from the property, will
sever the joint tenancy.3 The holding in Downing reflects the Mary-
land court's favorable view of joint tenancy. Specifically, the court
expounded a policy that will allow the parties' intent to prevail, de-
spite slight procedural problems in the creation of the joint tenancy.
1. The Case.-On August 7, 1972, Helen Downing conveyed
her farm to a "straw man" in fee simple.4 The "straw man" immedi-
ately reconveyed the farm "unto HELEN S. DOWNING, widow, and
JOHN ROBERT DOWNING, as joint tenants, their heirs and as-
signs, forever in fee simple."5 However, two other parties had prop-
erty interests in the Downing farm. First, prior to the conveyances
of August 7, 1972, Helen Downing, with the knowledge and assist-
ance of her son, John Downing, entered into an agreement with
John Meyers,6 providing that Meyers would make payments to
Helen Downing in exchange for the right to raise and harvest crops
on the farm. 7 Second, on October 31, 1985, Helen andJohn Down-
ing jointly executed a mortgage of the farm.8 The mortgage also
named Helen and John as joint tenants.'
Helen Downing died on January 15, 1987.10 Pursuant to her
will, the residue of her estate was to be evenly divided between John
1. 326 Md. 468, 606 A.2d 208 (1992).
2. See id. at 478, 606 A.2d at 213.
3. See id.
4. Id. at 470, 606 A.2d at 209. The old common law rule did not allow a grantor to
create a joint tenancy in himself and another. See id. at 470 n. 1, 606 A.2d at 209 n. 1.
Practitioners would evade this rule by conveying the land to a third-party "straw man"
who would then immediately convey the land back to the grantor and the other grantees
as joint tenants. See id.
5. Id. at 470, 606 A.2d at 209.







Downing and Bonnie Downing, Helen's daughter." Bonnie Down-
ing, as personal representative of the estate, filed a complaint re-
questing the court to construe the deed of August 7, 1972, as having
created a tenancy in common, as opposed to a joint tenancy.' 2
Although John Downing failed to respond to the complaint and an
order of default was granted in favor of Bonnie, he did appear at the
hearing before the master for determination of the appropriate re-
lief.13 At that time, John presented evidence from which the master
concluded that a joint tenancy had not been created.14 The master
based his conclusion on the fact that there was no provision in the
deed for the right of survivorship, the chief incident of a joint ten-
ancy.' 5 The master also noted that the mortgage and the farming
agreement would have destroyed any joint tenancy possibly
created. 16
John Downing appealed. On review of the master's report, the
Circuit Court ruled that the deed did create a joint tenancy, but the
execution of the mortgage severed the joint tenancy, leaving John
Downing and the estate of Helen Downing as tenants in common.17
The Court of Appeals, on its own motion, granted certiorari' 8 prior
to consideration by the Court of Special Appeals.' 9
2. Legal Background.-There are three types of tenancies under
which two or more people may hold title to a parcel of property.
These three concurrent estates are: tenancy in common, joint ten-
ancy, and tenancy by the entirety.20 A tenancy in common requires
that each tenant have an equal right of possession and use of the
entire property.2' On the death of a tenant in common, the dece-
dent's interest in the property passes to the decedent's estate.22 By
contrast, a joint tenancy is characterized by a right of survivorship,
which provides that on the death of a joint tenant, the decedent's
interest in the property does not pass to the decedent's estate, but is
11. Id.
12. Id. at 472, 606 A.2d at 209-10. Under this arrangement, an undivided one-half
of the farm would be placed in Helen's estate. Id.





18. Downing v. Downing, 324 Md. 686, 598 A.2d 755 (1991).
19. Downing, 326 Md. at 472, 606 A.2d at 210.
20. See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.1, at 195 (1984).
21. Id. § 5.2, at 196.
22. See Downing, 326 Md. at 475, 606 A.2d at 211.
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shared proportionately by the surviving joint tenants. 3 At common
law, the four unities of time, title, interest, and possession were es-
sential to the existence of a joint tenancy. 24 The unities of time and
title require that all joint tenants acquire their interests at the same
time and by the same instrument.2 5 The unity of interest requires
that all joint tenants hold the same fractional share, type of interest,
and quality of estate;26 the unity of possession demands that all joint
tenants have an equal right to possession and enjoyment of the
property.2 7 Lastly, a tenancy by the entirety is essentially the same
as the joint tenancy except that the tenants must be husband and
wife.2 ' The tenancy by the entirety, like the joint tenancy, is charac-
terized by the right of survivorship. 9
a. Creation of Joint Tenancy.-At common law, there was a pre-
sumption that a conveyance of land to two or more people created a
joint tenancy.3 0 Maryland has reversed this presumption by statute.
Section 2-117 of the Real Property Article creates a presumption
against joint tenancy in favor of tenancy in common. 3 ' The statute
provides that a written instrument of conveyance will not create a
joint tenancy unless it "expressly provides that the property granted
is to be held in joint tenancy." 3 2
Although the statute uses the phrase "expressly provides,"
Maryland courts have not construed this to require the words "joint
tenancy."' "3 Rather, the standard set forth by the Court of Appeals
requires the use of any express language that manifests an intent of
the grantor to vest the entire estate in the survivor.3 4 Several Mary-
land cases have explained that "[iln the case of a joint tenancy[, in-
23. See id.
24. See Alexander v. Boyer, 253 Md. 511, 519, 253 A.2d 359, 364 (1969).
25. See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 20, § 5.3, at 202.
26. Id. at 202-03.
27. Id. at 203.
28. See id. § 5.5, at 210.
29. Id.
30. See Brewer v. Bowersox, 92 Md. 567, 572, 48 A. 1060, 1062 (1901).
31. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 2-117 (1988). See also Young v. Young, 37 Md.
App. 211, 216-17, 376 A.2d 1151, 1155 (1971) (explaining that "Uloint tenancies in
Maryland are thus not favored legislatively but they are, of course, recognized").
32. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 2-117 (1988). The full text of the statute reads as
follows: "No deed, will, or other instrument which affects land or personal property,
creates an estate in joint tenancy, unless the deed, will, or other written instrument ex-
pressly provides that the property granted is to be held in joint tenancy." Id.
33. See Young, 37 Md. App. at 217, 376 A.2d at 1155; Michael v. Lucas, 152 Md. 512,
514, 137 A.2d 287, 288 (1927).
34. See McManus v. Summers, 290 Md. 408, 413, 430 A.2d 80, 82 (1981).
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tent] must be so clearly expressed as to have no doubt of the
intention [to create a joint tenancy]." ' This standard seems to re-
quire a court to evaluate the factual circumstances when determin-
ing the intent of the parties with respect to the property interest
sought to be created.
The Maryland decisions involving the creation of joint tenan-
cies can be divided in general into two basic categories. The first
involves cases in which the chief incident ofjoint tenancy, the right
of survivorship, was expressly stated in the deed, thereby sufficiently
manifesting the parties' intent to create a joint tenancy. 6 The other
category of cases involves situations in which there was a failed at-
tempt to create a tenancy by the entireties.3 7 In these cases, the
court has explained that the nature of the relationship between hus-
band and wife, or even those who in good faith believe they are hus-
band and wife, is such that, at common law, a right of survivorship is
automatically implied, and conclusively presumed to be the intent of
the parties. 8 In any event, in each of these two categories, either
the intent to create the joint tenancy was obvious on the face of the
instrument, or the intent could readily be inferred from the circum-
stances. Because none of these cases presented an ambiguous in-
tent, the court never expressed specifically what language and
factual circumstances are required for the creation of a joint ten-
ancy, despite the statutory presumption to the contrary. Cases of
this type will involve questions of both construction and intent.
b. Severance ofJoint Tenancy.-As discussed earlier, the four uni-
ties of time, title, interest, and possession are essential to the exist-
ence of a joint tenancy.39 If any of the four unities cease to exist
during the tenancy, the joint tenancy is destroyed and transformed
into a tenancy in common.40 Accordingly, a conveyance of joint-
tenancy property by less than all of the joint tenants will terminate
35. See Hammond v. Dugan, 166 Md. 402, 409, 170 A. 757, 760 (1934); see also Mar-
shall v. Security Storage & Trust Co., 155 Md. 649, 652, 142 A. 186, 187 (1928) (ex-
plaining that the express provision requirement is met if the will clearly demonstrates
the decedent's intent to create a joint tenancy); Boyd v. Boyd, 24 Md. App. 497, 503,
332 A.2d 328, 331-32 (1975) (asserting that there must be no doubt of the grantor's
intent to create a joint tenancy).
36. See, e.g., Michael, 152 Md. at 514, 137 A. at 288.
37. See, e.g., McManus, 290 Md. at 422, 430 A.2d at 87.
38. Id. at 421, 430 A.2d at 86-87 ("The words used, 'tenants by the entirety,' mean in
law that the parties wanted the property to be inalienable by either during their joint
lives, and on the death of one they wished the survivor to take all.").
39. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
40. See Alexander v. Boyer, 253 Md. 511, 519, 253 A.2d 359, 364 (1969).
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the joint tenancy. 4' For example, conveyance by one joint tenant of
a leasehold,42 or of a mortgage,43 will terminate the joint tenancy.
Also, where all joint tenants convey their entire interest in the joint-
tenancy property, the tenancy will be severed.44 A more difficult is-
sue arises, however, in the case of an execution of a mortgage by all
joint tenants. 45 This question had not been addressed by the Court
of Appeals prior to its decision in Downing.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-The Downing court first addressed
whether a joint tenancy was created by the language used in the
deed of August 7, 1972.46 After noting that the common-law pre-
sumption in favor ofjoint tenancies had been reversed by statute to
favor tenancies in common, the court examined the language of the
deed to determine whether it satisfied the statutory requirement
that the intent to create a joint tenancy be expressly provided.47
The court held that the deed created a valid joint tenancy because
the use of the words "joint tenancy" in both the granting and ha-
bendum clauses of the deed was a sufficient manifestation of
* 481intent.
The court then discussed whether the execution of the mort-
gage by both tenants severed the joint tenancy and converted it into
a tenancy in common. 49 The court held that although a mortgage
by one joint tenant destroys the joint tenancy, a mortgage by all of
the tenants would not destroy the joint tenancy because the joint
41. Id. at 520, 253 A.2d at 364.
42. See id. at 521-22, 253 A.2d at 365. Conveyance of a leasehold would destroy the
unities of interest and possession because the grantor's interest changes from a present
possessory interest to a reversionary interest. Id. at 522, 253 A.2d at 365.
43. See Eder v. Rothamel, 202 Md. 189, 195, 95 A.2d 860, 863 (1953) (conveyance of
a mortgage destroys the unity of title). Because Maryland is a "title-theory" state re-
garding mortgages, the joint tenant who conveyed the mortgage would have only equi-
table title to the joint-tenancy property, while the other joint tenant would retain both
legal and equitable title. See infra notes 65-76 and accompanying text.
44. See Register of Wills v. Madine, 242 Md. 437, 441-42, 219 A.2d 245, 247 (1966).
45. This is because although the conveyance of a mortgage by all joint tenants con-
verts their title from legal to equitable, the unity of title is arguably not destroyed be-
cause all joint tenants have the same title at all times. See infra notes 65-76 and
accompanying text.
46. Downing, 326 Md. at 474-76, 606 A.2d at 211-12.
47. See id. at 475-78, 606 A.2d at 211-13. The court has held that a clear manifesta-
tion of an intent to create a joint tenancy satisfies the requirements of the statute, and
deeds manifesting that intent should be effectuated. See McManus v. Summers, 290 Md.
408, 412-13, 430 A.2d 80, 82-83 (1981).
48. Downing, 326 Md. at 478, 606 A.2d at 213.
49. See id. at 479, 606 A.2d at 213.
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tenants would maintain the same interest and title to the property. 50
For these reasons, the Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court
and remanded the case with instructions to order that all rights in
the farm passed to John Downing, as surviving joint tenant, upon
the death of Helen Downing.5'
4. Analysis.-
a. Creation of Joint Tenancy.-The Downing court established an
important precedent by substantially diluting the statutory pre-
sumption against joint tenancies. Although expanding the range of
language deemed sufficient to create a joint tenancy, this decision is
wholly consistent with Maryland precedent-the intention of the
parties should prevail over technical deficiencies in language and
structure.52 Accordingly, the Downing court concluded that when
the parties provide in their agreement that the purchasers are to
take the property as joint tenants, there is sufficient evidence to
show that the parties intended to create a joint tenancy.53 Even
though there was no suggestion of the critical element of right of
survivorship, either by wording or by circumstances, the court rec-
ognized that the words "joint tenancy" constituted sufficient evi-
dence of an intent to create such a right.54
Many states have taken a statutory approach similar to Mary-
land's by reversing the common law presumption favoring tenancies
in common. New York, for example, has adopted a statutory pre-
sumption providing that "[a] disposition of property to two or more
persons creates in them a tenancy in common, unless expressly de-
clared to be a joint tenancy." '55 Accordingly, New York courts have
concluded that a deed that simply uses the phrase "as joint tenants"
in the granting clause is sufficient to establish ajoint tenancy.56 The
New Jersey Supreme Court, confronted with a similar statute,57 also
50. Id.
51. Id. at 479-80, 606 A.2d at 213.
52. See Mitchell v. Frederick, 166 Md. 42, 49, 170 A. 733, 736 (1934) ("The lawful
intention of the parties, in short, is to be carried out, and they are not to be deprived of
freedom to convey whatever they wish, in order to conform to one of the more usual
forms and classifications of ownership.").
53. See Downing, 326 Md. at 478, 606 A.2d at 213.
54. Id.
55. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAw § 6-2.2(a) (McKinney 1992).
56. See Schwab v. Schwab, 112 N.Y.S.2d 354, 355-56 (N.Y. App. Div. 1952).
57. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 46:3-17 (West 1989) ("[N]o estate shall be considered and
adjudged to be an estate in joint tenancy, except it be expressly set forth in the grant or
devise creating such estate that it was or is the intention of the parties to create an estate
in joint tenancy ....").
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concluded that the use of the words "joint tenants" in the proper
places in the deed is sufficient to create a joint tenancy.5" In Califor-
nia, the statute creating a presumption against joint tenancies pro-
vides that "[a] joint interest is one owned by two or more persons in
equal shares, by a title created by a single will or transfer, when ex-
pressly declared in the will or transfer to be a joint tenancy ....1,59
The California courts have ruled that a deed using the language of
"joint tenancy" establishes a prima facie case for such a tenancy.6 °
The statutes outlined above, which are almost identical to the
Maryland statute, create a "rebuttable presumption" against joint
tenancies. 61 As a consequence of Downing, however, the Maryland
statute will likely be construed as creating a much weaker presump-
tion against joint tenancies. The Downing court's ruling, that "[t]he
Court need look no further than the deed itself to conclude that a
valid joint tenancy came into being, "62 implies that once the grantor
uses the necessary language, a nearly irrebuttable presumption of a
joint tenancy is established. Consequently, the court appears to
have attributed a significantly different effect to Maryland's statute
than that given to similar statutes by other state courts. Other states
consider extrinsic evidence to demonstrate that there was no intent
to create a joint tenancy, even though the requisite language was
used.63
The Court of Appeals appears wisely to have chosen a method
of construction of deeds that will be most adept at effectuating the
parties' intent. Common sense dictates that use of the technical lan-
guage "joint tenancy" clearly indicates an intention to create a joint
tenancy. Moreover, since it is often the case, as in Downing, that the
grantor of the deed in question is no longer living, it will usually be
difficult to prove any intent whatsoever. It thus seems the court has
58. See Coudert v. Earl, 18 A. 220, 221 (NJ. Ch. 1889). Although § 46:3-17 had not
been codified prior to the Coudert decision, the New Jersey Court of Chancery was con-
fronted with an earlier version that had language nearly identical to that of § 46:3-17.
See id.; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3-17 (West 1989).
59. CAL. CIV. CODE § 683(a) (West Supp. 1992).
60. See Schindler v. Schindler, 272 P.2d 566, 568 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954).
61. See, e.g., In re Levinsky's Will, 258 N.Y.S.2d 613, 619 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965)
("[The applicable New York statute] creates only a rebuttable presumption of tenancy in
common; and where the muniment of title is ambiguous, and parol evidence shows that
the parties to the transaction so intended, a joint tenancy may be found.
62. Downing, 326 Md. at 478, 606 A.2d at 213.
63. For example, California has held that the use of the language "joint tenancy"
only creates a prima facie case for ajoint tenancy. The parties may still offer evidence of




chosen a path that will lead to both the effectuation of the parties'
intent and a decrease in the administrative burden on the courts.
b. Severance of Joint Tenancy.-The Downing court's determina-
tion that the joint execution of a mortgage by both tenants does not
sever the joint tenancy at first glance seems theoretically inconsis-
tent with language contained in prior decisions. The Court of Ap-
peals has concluded previously that "there can be little doubt that a
conveyance of the legal title by all the joint tenants destroys the
joint tenancy . . . ."I In addition, Maryland follows the title theory
with regard to mortgages.65 According to this theory, the execution
of a mortgage is functionally equivalent to the execution of a deed,
and thus, actually transfers legal title of the property to the mortga-
gee.66 The fact that Maryland is a "title-theory state" would seem to
compel the conclusion that a mortgage, even one executed by all
joint tenants, necessarily destroys the joint tenancy. Yet, the Down-
ing court held that "where all joint tenants join in the mortgage,
none of the unities are destroyed, and there is no reason why the
joint tenancy should not continue."67
This theoretical inconsistency can be reconciled by examining
the court's prior decisions discussing transfer of legal title by all
joint tenants. In Register of Wills v. Madine,6 s the court's statement
concerning the destruction of the joint tenancy by a transfer of legal
title by all joint tenants was not made in the context of separate legal
and equitable titles.69 Rather, the statement concerned the fact that
a transfer of all title in joint-tenancy property destroys any joint ten-
ancy in the proceeds of the sale.70 In fact, the court's subsequent
treatment of an argument in Madine that focused on the separation
of legal and equitable title is arguably consistent with the holding in
Downing. In Madine, the court was presented with the argument that
because a deed executed by all joint tenants was not recorded, legal
title had not passed to the grantee and the joint tenancy was not
64. Register of Wills v. Madine, 242 Md. 437, 441, 219 A.2d 245, 247 (1966).
65. See Bieber v. State, 8 Md. App. 522, 545, 261 A.2d 202, 214 (1970). The Bieber
court explained that "in Maryland a mortgage is a deed, for in this State, as distin-
guished from lien theory states, we take the common law view of a mortgage, as transfer-
ring title of the property to the mortgagee." Id.
66. Id. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 1-101(c) (1988) (including a mortgage in
the definition of a deed).
67. Downing, 326 Md. at 479, 606 A.2d at 213.
68. 242 Md. 437, 219 A.2d 245 (1966).
69. See id. at 441-42, 219 A.2d at 247.
70. See id.
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destroyed. 7' The court disposed of this argument by stating that
the deed, prior to recording, "operated as a contract to convey
which would pass to the State equitable title and the right to formal
legal title." 72
Although the Madine court acknowledged that legal and equita-
ble title represent separate estates, its decision to treat the joint ten-
ancy as destroyed was based upon the conclusion that both legal and
equitable title passed, or would pass by right in the future, to the
grantee.73 Thus, the transfer of title in Madine destroyed the neces-
sary unity of title because all title, legal and equitable, would pass to
the grantee. 74 By contrast, the court in Downing was confronted
with a mortgage that, while transferring legal title to the mortgagee,
retained equitable title in the mortgagors. 75 Therefore, unity of title
was not destroyed because the Downing mortgagees retained some
identical title in the property even after the mortgage was
executed.76
The conclusion in Downing achieves the beneficial and practical
result of maintaining joint tenancies where such a result furthers the
intentions of the parties. Very often family members, as in the
Downing case, jointly mortgage their property without intending to
destroy the joint tenancy. A decision to the contrary would obvi-
ously frustrate those parties' intention with no substantial theoreti-
cal or practical benefit.
5. Conclusion.-The Downing decision sets an important prece-
dent in regard to joint tenancies. Not only is the presumption
against joint tenancies diluted, but the decision establishes a strong
presumption in favor ofjoint tenancies where the requisite intent is
demonstrated by clear language in the deed. Perhaps even more
importantly, the court has set a general tone in favor of both the
creation and maintenance of joint tenancies. By refusing to treat a
mortgage executed by all joint tenants as destroying the necessary
unity of title, the court's decision will not frustrate the intentions of
71. Id. at 442, 219 A.2d at 248.
72. Id. at 443, 219 A.2d at 248 (emphasis added).
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See Downing, 326 Md. at 471, 606 A.2d at 209.
76. See id. This approach is consistent with the holding in Gardner v. Gardner, 25
Md. App. 638, 335 A.2d 157 (1975). In that case, the Court of Special Appeals held that
where joint tenants bought property as joint tenants, and simultaneously assumed an
existing mortgage on the property, the joint tenancy was not destroyed. Id. at 656, 335
A.2d at 162.
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joint tenants who need to mortgage their property, but do not de-
sire to terminate their joint tenancy or rights of survivorship.
DAVID M. KAPLON
XI. STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
A. Safeguarding "Home Rule" Rights
In Ficker v. Denny,' the Court of Appeals held that once the
sponsors of a petition for referendum obtain the requisite number
of signatures, they must file that petition.2 In so holding, the court
reaffirmed principles of statutory construction and agency law while
clarifying the relationship between the circulators and signers of a
referendum petition. Despite the questionable application of estab-
lished rules to the facts of this case, the decision appropriately ad-
vances the aims of the Maryland Constitution.
1. The Case.-In reaction to rapidly increasing property taxes
in Montgomery County, Fairness in Taxation (FIT), a non-profit,
nonpartisan political group was organized under the chairmanship
of Robert Denny.3 In 1990, FIT circulated a petition pursuant to
article XI-A, section 5, of the Maryland Constitution to amend the
Montgomery County Charter.4 The proposed amendment was
designed to limit both the portion of Montgomery County's operat-
ing budget derived from real property tax and the amount of annual
increase permissible in the real property tax rate.5
FIT successfully obtained enough signatures to place its propo-
sal on the ballot.6 Before FIT filed the petition, however, the Mont-
1. 326 Md. 626, 606 A.2d 1060 (1992).
2. Id. at 635, 606 A.2d at 1064. It should be noted that the Court of Appeals lim-
ited its holding to "the circumstances of the present case." See id. at 635 n.5, 606 A.2d at
1064 n.5 ("We do not suggest that there are no circumstances under which a circulating
organization... would not be required to file the petition.").
3. Id. at 629-30, 606 A.2d at 1061.
4. Id. at 629, 606 A.2d at 1061. Section 5 provides:
Amendments to any charter adopted by... any County of this State under the
provisions of this Article may be proposed by ... the Council of the County, or
by a petition signed by not less than 20% of the registered voters of the City or
County, provided, however, that in any case 10, 000 signatures shall be sufficient to
complete a petition. A petition shall be filed with. . . the President of the County Council.
An amendment so proposed shall be submitted to the voters of the.. . County at the next
general or congressional election occurring after the passage of the resolution
or the filing of the petition.
MD. CONST. art. XI-A, § 5 (emphasis added).
5. Ficker, 326 Md. at 629, 606 A.2d at 1061. FIT's amendment would have pre-
vented Montgomery County from obtaining more than 37% of its operating budget
from real property taxes, and would have limited the annual increase in real property
taxes in Montgomery County to 75% of that year's rate of inflation. Id.
6. Id.; see also MD. CONST. art. XI-A, § 5.
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gomery County Council proposed its own tax reform amendment. 7
In response, FIT announced that it would support the Council's
proposed amendment and therefore not submit its original
proposal.8
Robin Ficker and three other signatories9 of FIT's petition
brought an action in Montgomery County Circuit Court against
Denny, seeking injunctive relief to compel FIT to submit the peti-
tion.'° When the Circuit Court denied relief, Ficker requested that
the Court of Special Appeals issue a temporary injunction pending
appeal." Upon denial by the Court of Special Appeals, Ficker filed
for a writ of certiorari in the Court of Appeals.' 2 The Court of Ap-
peals granted certiorari, 3 and reversed the Circuit Court's decision
by ordering that court to enter judgment requiring FIT to submit
the petition. 14
a. Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution: Home Rule.-In 1915,
the Maryland General Assembly adopted article XI-A, the "Home
Rule" amendment, to the Maryland Constitution.'" Article XI-A
confers upon the people of Baltimore City and the counties of Mary-
land the power to govern themselves; it is, thus, the basis for all city
7. Ficker, 326 Md. at 629-30, 606 A.2d at 1061. The Council's proposal was
designed to limit the annual real property tax increase to 100% of the rate of inflation.
Id. at 630, 606 A.2d at 1061.
8. Id. at 630, 606 A.2d at 1061. In addition to the proposed charter amendments
by FIT and the County Council, there was a third amendment proposal limiting real
property taxes already on the ballot. Ironically, this proposal was submitted by the
Plaintiff. In addition, prior to county elections two years earlier, Ficker had circulated a
petition and obtained the requisite number of signatures for a similar amendment, but
the amendment was never placed on the ballot because he failed to properly submit that
petition. Id. at 637 n.2, 606 A.2d at 1065 n.2. See also Ficker v. Montgomery County
Bd. of Elections, 670 F. Supp. 618 (D. Md. 1985), in which Ficker successfully argued
that a Maryland prohibition against "payment of money or other inducements to any
individual for securing signatures on a petition" for referendum violated the First
Amendment.
9. The other named plaintiffs were George Sauer, John Thomas, and Albert Cec-
cone. Sauer and Ceccone both supported the Council's proposed amendment. Ficker,
326 Md. at 636 n.l, 606 A.2d at 1065 n.1.
10. Id. at 630, 606 A.2d at 1062.
11. Id. at 631,606 A.2d at 1062.
12. Id.
13. See Ficker v. Denny, 320 Md. 350, 578 A.2d 190 (1990).
14. See Ficker, 326 Md. at 631-32, 606 A.2d at 1062.
15. See Ritchmount Partnership v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 283 Md. 48, 55-
56, 388 A.2d 523, 528-29 (1978) (explaining the history of the home rule movement and
the theory supporting it); Cheeks v. Cedlair Corp., 287 Md. 595, 597, 415 A.2d 255, 256
(1980).
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and county charters in Maryland. 6 Section 5 of article XI-A sets
forth the method for proposing amendments to charters adopted
pursuant to its authority.'
7
Under section 5, amendments may be proposed by submitting a
petition signed by the lesser of either 10,000 registered voters or
twenty percent of the city or county electorate.' 8 Article XI-A pro-
vides that such a petition "shall be filed with.., the President of the
County Council" and then placed upon the ballot of the next gen-
eral or congressional election for ratification by the voters.' 9 Be-
cause FIT circulated its petition under the authority of article XI-A,
section 5, Ficker argued that the mandatory language of the provi-
sion required FIT to file the petition regardless of the newly pro-
posed County amendment.2 ° The Court of Appeals agreed and
held Denny responsible for submitting the petition.2'
2. The Court's Reasoning.-
a. Statutory Construction.-Basic principles of statutory con-
struction dictate that absent some contrary indication in the context,
use of the word "shall" specifies mandatory intent. 22 This rule is
well established in Maryland. 23 For example, in Barnes v. State ex rel.
16. See MD. CONST. art. XI-A, § 1; Ritchmount, 283 Md. at 55-56, 388 A.2d at 528-29
(describing the purpose of Article XI-A as being "to restore and revitalize local govern-
ment by giving citizens of counties and municipalities the power to legislate .. local
matters free from undue encroachment by state legislatures"). Article XI-A gives to
Baltimore City and the counties of Maryland many of the powers formerly reserved for
the state general assembly, thereby increasing those subdivisions' powers of self govern-
ment. See Cheeks, 287 Md. at 597, 415 A.2d at 256.
17. See MD. CONST. art. XI-A, § 5.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See Ficker, 326 Md. at 630, 606 A.2d at 1062.
21. See id. at 631-32, 606 A.2d at 1062-63.
22. IA NORMAN.J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 25.04, at 445
(4th ed. rev. 1985).
23. See, e.g., In re James S., 286 Md. 702, 709, 410 A.2d 586, 589 (1980); Moss v.
Director, 279 Md. 561, 564-65, 369 A.2d 1011, 1013 (1977) (finding it "a familiar princi-
ple of statutory construction in this State"). The rule is clearly established in other juris-
dictions as well. See, e.g., Anderson v. Yungkav, 329 U.S. 482, 485 (1947) ("The word
Ishall' is ordinarily 'The language of command'."); Janus Petroleum, Inc. v. New York
State Tax Appeals Tribunal, 583 N.Y.S.2d 983, 984 (N.Y. 1992) ("Although the legisla-
ture's use of mandatory language, such as shall or must, is not conclusive, 'such a word
of command is ordinarily construed as preemptory in the absence of circumstances sug-
gesting contrary legislative intent.' "); City of Dover v. Cartanza, 541 A.2d 580, 582
(Del. 1988) ("It is generally presumed that the word 'shall' indicates a mandatory
requirement.").
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Pinkney,24 the Court of Appeals reasoned that a statutory provision
stating that every signature on a referendum petition "shall" be sup-
ported by a statement of the signer's residence and voting precinct,
did, in fact, indicate a legislative demand for this information to be
included. 21 Similarly, the Court of Appeals has found statutory lan-
guage instructing that a criminal defendant "shall" be taken before
an officer of the court without unnecessary delay upon arrest to cre-
ate a "compulsory rule for police conduct." '26
There are instances, however, when a statutory provision is
merely directory rather than mandatory despite the legislature's
choice to use the word "shall." 27 The interpretation must ultimately
rest upon the intention of the legislature.28 In Pressley v. Warden,29
for example, the Court of Appeals held that article IV, section 23, of
the Maryland Constitution, which specifies that a judge "shall"
render a decision within two months after a case is argued, is not
mandatory, but directory.3 ° Similarly, in Maryland State Bar Ass'n v.
Frank,3 the court held that a statutory provision stating that a bar
association "shall" bring charges against an attorney within a given
time period was also only directory. 2
b. Petition Circulator's Degree of Control.-In Ficker, the Court of
Appeals concluded that the circulator of a petition "has no greater
or lesser right of control over the petition than any other signer. '1 3
24. 236 Md. 564, 204 A.2d 787 (1964).
25. See id. at 574, 204 A.2d at 792. The court noted that other state constitutions
have used the word "may" in their versions of this particular provision. Of particular
relevance to the present case, for example, Washington provides that "[w]hen the per-
son, committee, or organization proposing any such referendum ... shall have secured
.. the signatures of thirty thousand legal voters ... he or they may submit said petition
to the Secretary of State." 1913 Wash. Laws 418 (emphasis added).
26. SeeJohnson v. State, 282 Md. 314, 320-21, 384 A.2d 709, 713 (1978).
27. See Barnes, 236 Md. at 574, 204 A.2d at 792. Mandatory statutes are those that, if
violated, invalidate the transaction or subject the violator to some penalty stated in the
statute. Directory statutes are those that, because they have a permissive element, in-
volve no consequences for the violator. IA SINGER, supra note 22, § 25.03, at 441-42.
See In re James S., 286 Md. 702, 710, 410 A.2d 586, 590 (1980).
28. See Barnes, 236 Md. at 574, 204 A.2d at 792.
29. 242 Md. 405, 219 A.2d 25 (1966).
30. See id. at 406, 219 A.2d at 26.
31. 272 Md. 528, 325 A.2d 718 (1974).
32. Id. at 533, 325 A.2d at 721 (overriding the presumption that " 'shall' indicates a
mandatory provision" because "the broad policy of the law regulating conduct of attor-
neys authorized to practice law in this State is designed for the protection of the public,
... and that purpose would be largely vitiated if [a mandatory] interpretation were to
prevail").
33. Ficker, 326 Md. at 632, 606 A.2d at 1063.
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Although this principle is new to Maryland law, several other states
have made similar assertions. For example, in La Fleur ex rel. Ander-
son v. Frost, 4 the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine found to be un-
constitutional a city ordinance that contained a provision giving the
original circulators the power to withdraw the petition in their "sole
and exclusive judgement. ' 3' The Maine court determined that the
circulators are not inherently more interested in the outcome of the
petition than any other signer" and questioned the appropriateness
of forcing all the petition signatories to be subject to the mercy of
"six whom they did not select, whom they may or may not know,
and in whom they may or may not have confidence.""
The Maryland Court of Appeals realized that a signer may wish
to withdraw his or her support and signature from a petition before
it is submitted."8 The court acknowledged that all signers have this
right; however, such a decision is personal and can be exercised
only by the individual signer.3 ' The circulator lacks the authority to
unilaterally withdraw a person's name from the petition or to with-
draw any part of the petition she circulated that a voter has signed.4 °
Thus, the court found that Ficker had as much right to have the
petition submitted as FIT had to drop its support. Moreover, while
FIT had the right to withdraw its own name, it did not have the right
to effectively withdraw the name of every other signer by simply re-
fusing to submit the petition.4 '
c. Petition Circulator as Agent of the Signer.-In Ficker, the court
applied the principles of agency to define the scope of the duty
owed by a petition's circulator to other signers.42 Maryland law had
established that the circulator of a petition is the agent of all its sig-
natories; 43 however, before Ficker, the scope of the circulator's
agency had never been clarified. The Ficker court examined the rela-
34. 80 A.2d 407 (Me. 1951).
35. See id. at 415; see also State ex rel. Howell v. Superior Court, 166 P. 1126, 1128
(Wash. 1917) (the rights of the circulator "are no greater than each of the other several
thousand signers").
36. See La Fleur, 80 A.2d at 415.
37. Id. at 416.
38. See Ficker, 326 Md. at 633, 606 A.2d at 1063.
39. Id.
40. See id. at 633-34, 606 A.2d at 1063-64; see also State ex rel. Hindley v. Superior
Court, 126 P. 920, 923 (Wash. 1912) ("The right to withdraw, like the right to sign, is a
personal privilege, and can be exercised only by the person directly concerned.").
41. See Ficker, 326 Md. at 634, 606 A.2d at 1064.
42. See id. at 632-34, 606 A.2d at 1063-64.
43. See Tyler v. Secretary of State, 229 Md. 397, 403, 184 A.2d 101, 104 (1962).
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tionship between the circulator and the signers and concluded that
the petition sponsor implicitly guaranteed to the signatories "that
once enough signatures are obtained, the measure will be placed on
the ballot."44 In essence, once those signatures are obtained, the
circulator must fulfill that promise. Applying Maryland principles of
agency, the Ficker court held that the organization served as Ficker's
agent and, therefore, FIT was obligated to file the petition.4 5
3. Analysis.-By reasoning that the use of the word "shall" in
article XI-A, section 5, imposes a mandatory obligation upon the
circulator of a petition to file that petition once all prerequisites are
met, the majority mechanically applied the longstanding rule in
Maryland that absent a contextual indication to the contrary, the
word "shall" will be presumed mandatory.4 6 Nonetheless, the ma-
jority's straightforward application of that principle in this case is
questionable. In fact, when read as a whole, the command that the
petition "shall be filed with the Mayor of Baltimore or the President
of the County Council"47 simply appears to specify where the peti-
tion "shall be filed" once it is submitted, not that the petition must
be filed.4" Had the legislature's purpose been to create an absolute
duty to file the petition, the General Assembly could have drafted a
shorter provision such as: "A petition shall be filed." The dissent
pointed out that many statutory provisions containing the phrase
"shall be filed" are not ordinarily interpreted as creating a duty tofile. 49
Nonetheless, the majority opinion is not necessarily incorrect.
The majority's agency argument alone is strong enough to support
its conclusion that FIT violated Maryland law by failing to submit
the petition. The basis of the court's agency argument was that the
circulator of a petition implicitly promises to submit that petition if
44. Ficker, 326 Md. at 633, 606 A.2d at 1063.
45. See id.
46. Id. at 632, 606 A.2d at 1063.
47. MD. CONST. art. XI-A, § 5.
48. Ficker, 326 Md. at 638, 606 A.2d at 1066 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
49. See id. at 638-39, 606 A.2d at 1066 (Chasanow, J., dissenting). For example, the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article states that "[a] civil action at law shall befiled" no
later than three years'from the date it accrued. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 5-
101 (1989) (emphasis added). However, the dissent's contention that the majority's
holding would require everyone with a civil cause of action to file a suit is not quite
accurate. Even if the language does create an "enforceable duty," that duty can only be
enforced when someone with standing can prove "irreparable injury" would result from
a failure to file such a suit. See Ficker, 326 Md. at 637, 606 A.2d at 1065 (Chasanow, J.,
dissenting).
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enough signatures are obtained.5" People do not sign petitions sim-
ply to give the circulator a mere option of filing at a later date.
Thus, the agency relationship created an obligation on FIT to sub-
mit the final document, an obligation enforceable by any petition
signer.5'
The dissent contended that FIT had the right to withhold the
petition because a corollary rule of agency dictates that if unforseen
circumstances arise, and the agent cannot reasonably communicate
with the principal, the agent has the authority to take necessary
steps to prevent the principal from suffering a loss.52 By arguing
that the Council's proposal of an amendment constituted an unfor-
seen circumstance, the dissent found that FIT had authority to with-
hold the petition.5"
Yet the dissent's conclusion is troubling for two reasons. First,
it is not clear that Denny, as agent, was unable to communicate with
the principals before taking action contrary to their specific instruc-
tions. In fact, Denny acknowledged that he could have easily ob-
tained enough written withdrawals in a short time period to bring
the number of signatures below the required number for petition
submission.54 FIT, as agent of the signers, had no right to withhold
the petition before attempting this course of action.55
Second, the dissent argued that having more than one similar
amendment on the ballot would constitute a "loss" to the signers
sufficient to grant FIT the authority to take steps to prevent its oc-
currence. 56 Yet, the assertion that increased choices on the ballot is
a "loss" is questionable at best. Certainly Ficker did not consider it
a "loss," and apparently neither did a majority of the Court of
Appeals.
50. See Ficker, 326 Md. at 633, 606 A.2d at 1063.
51. See id. While the court clearly held that the circulator of a petition under § 5 of
article XI-A implicitly creates an enforceable promise to the signers to file that petition,
it is unclear whether promises the circulator makes to signers that are not part of the
express statutory requirements of that section are also enforceable.
52. Id. at 641, 606 A.2d at 1067 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
53. See id. at 641-42, 606 A.2d at 1067-68 (ChasanowJ., dissenting).
54. Id. at 647, 606 A.2d at 1070 (Chasanow, J., dissenting). The majority and the
dissent agreed that if enough signers withdrew so that the number of signers fell below
10,000, the petition need not be submitted. See id. at 634, 648, 606 A.2d at 1064, 1070.
55. In fact, following the initial denial of Ficker's injunction, FIT did send a letter
advocating support for the Council's amendment to every signer of the petition. Id. at
646, 606 A.2d at 1069 (Chasanow, J., dissenting). It clearly was not unreasonable to
expect FIT to communicate with the signers.
56. See id. at 641-42, 606 A.2d at 1067-68 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
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The court's strongest argument for holding FIT responsible for
submitting the petition is the principle that the circulator of a peti-
tion should have neither greater nor lesser control over the petition
than any other signer. 57 As the Maine court so appropriately rea-
soned in La Fleur ex rel. Anderson v. Frost,58 "There is no justification
for saying the [petition's sponsors] are the most interested citizens
or that the citizen, who later signs . . . .has not exactly the same
interest in the proposal [as the sponsors]." 5 9 While this reasoning is
subject to the practical argument that, in reality, the sponsor of an
amendment is likely to be more interested in its outcome than most
of the petition signers, from a theoretical standpoint the La Fleur
court's argument directly addressed the objectives of Maryland's ar-
ticle XI-A.
The primary objective of article XI-A is to increase popular par-
ticipation in the governing of local matters60 and to give each citizen
a direct voice in local government and lawmaking. 6' To achieve
these objectives, all interested citizens must have an equal voice.
The power derived from government participation should not be
confined to those with the capacity and resources to initiate referen-
dum and petition drives.
4. Conclusion.-The Ficker court took important steps to fur-
ther the objectives of the Maryland Constitution and insure that
powers granted by the Home Rule Amendment remain vested in all
the people. Although each of the approaches used by the court can-
not independently justify its conclusion, on the whole they ade-
quately support the final decision.
HUGH M. BERNSTEIN
B. State Liability for Auto Accidents: Full Speed Ahead in Tort Claims
In State v. Harris,6 2 the Court of Appeals held that a person in-
jured in a car accident with a state motor vehicle could sue the State
57. See id. at 632, 606 A.2d at 1063.
58. 80 A.2d 407 (Me. 1951).
59. Id. at 416 (adding that once the necessary number of signatures has been ob-
tained, the sponsors "become neither more nor less than voters who have signed, and
they have neither greater nor less right nor authority than other signers").
60. See Ritchmount Partnership v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 283 Md. 48, 56,
388 A.2d 523, 529 (1978).
61. See Ficker, 326 Md. at 633, 606 A.2d at 1063.
62. 327 Md. 32, 607 A.2d 552 (1992).
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without first having to file a claim with the State Treasurer.63 The
court considered the potentially conflicting application of two Mary-
land statutes, both of which purported to give plaintiffs a right to
sue the State for negligent use of state vehicles: section 17-107(b)
of the Transportation Article' and the Maryland Tort Claims Act
(MTCA). 6 5 The State argued that because the MTCA had repealed
section 17-107(b) by implication, the plaintiff was required to com-
ply with the MTCA's rigorous procedural requirements.6 6 The Har-
ris court, however, found that both statutes could co-exist
independently, thereby providing the plaintiff with two legal reme-
dies from which to choose.67
1. The Case.-Albert Harris alleged that his car was negligently
struck by a vehicle owned by the State of Maryland and driven by
Thomas Gross, a state employee.6' The accident occurred on Octo-
ber 14, 1983,69 and resulted in physical injuries to Harris. 70 Less
than three years later, Harris filed suit in the Circuit Court for Balti-
more City against both the State and Gross. 7' Harris claimed that
the Transportation Article authorized suits against the State based
on negligent operation of a governmental vehicle on official busi-
ness. 72 At that time, section 17-107(b) of the Transportation Article
read:
An owner or lessee of any motor vehicle registered under
Title 13 of this article may not raise the defense of sover-
eign or governmental immunity, to the extent of benefits
provided by the security accepted by the Administration
under § 17-103 of this subtitle, in any judicial proceeding
in which the plaintiff claims that personal injury, property
damage, or death was caused by the negligent use of the
motor vehicle while in government service or performing a
63. Id. at 41, 607 A.2d at 556-57.
64. MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 17-107(b) (1984) (recodified as amended at MD.
CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 17 -107(c) (1992)).
65. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. §§ 5-401 to -408 (1980 & Supp. 1983) (re-
codified at MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T §§ 12-101 to -109 (1984 & Supp. 1992)).
66. Hams, 327 Md. at 38, 607 A.2d at 555.
67. Id. at 41, 607 A.2d at 556-57.
68. Id. at 35, 607 A.2d at 554. The Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
owned the vehicle. Harris v. Gross, 87 Md. App. 764, 765, 591 A.2d 575, 576 (1991),
aff'd sub nom. State v. Harris, 327 Md. 32, 607 A.2d 552 (1992).
69. Harris v. Gross, 87 Md. App. at 765, 591 A.2d at 576.
70. Complaint at 2, Harris v. Gross (No. 86283027/CL56698) (Cir. Ct. for Baltimore
City 1986).
71. Harris, 327 Md. at 35, 607 A.2d at 554.
72. Id. at 36, 607 A.2d at 554.
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task of benefit to the government. 73
The trial court rejected Harris's Transportation Article claim,
finding that the MTCA dictated the legal remedy for this situation.74
At the time of the accident, section 5-403 of the MTCA waived the
State's sovereign immunity for a variety of claims, including "[a]n
action to recover damages caused by the negligent maintenance or
operation of a motor vehicle by a State employee."' 75 Among other
restrictions and limitations, the MTCA required a claimant, before
going to court, to file a complaint with the State Treasurer, who
then had six months to settle the case. 76 Because Harris had not
first filed his claim with the State Treasurer, the trial court dismissed
the case. 77
The Court of Special Appeals reversed the lower court's deci-
sion,78 finding that the Transportation Article and the MTCA each
separately authorized suits against the State.79 In so doing, the
court rejected the State's argument that the MTCA repealed the
Transportation Article's language by implication.80 The court re-
lied heavily on language in the MTCA purporting not to "limit any
other law that . . . waives the sovereign immunity of the State."''8
The court also supported its finding by reference to an earlier Court
of Special Appeals decision, Collier v. Nesbitt,"2 which found that pas-
73. MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 17-107(b) (1984). The section was passed during the
1981 legislative session and became effectiveJuly 1, 1981. Harris, 327 Md. at 37-38, 607
A.2d at 554-55.
74. Harris, 327 Md. at 35-36, 607 A.2d at 554; Denial of Plaintiff's Motion at 1, Har-
ris v. Gross (No. 86283027/CL56698) (dismissing the case) [hereinafter Denial].
75. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 5-403(a)(1) (1983). The MTCA was passed
during the same legislative session and signed by the Governor on May 21, 1981, the
same day as § 17-107 of the Transportation Article. Harris, 327 Md. at 37, 607 A.2d at
554. However, the MTCA did not become effective until July 1, 1982, a year after the
effective date of § 17-107(b). Id. at 38, 607 A.2d at 555.
76. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 5-406(a) (1980 & Supp. 1983). The section
read:
[AID action may not be instituted... unless the claimant has first presented the
claim in writing to the State Treasurer or his designee and the claim has been
finally denied .... The failure of the State to notify the claimant of a final
denial within 6 months of receipt of the claim shall, at the option of the claim-
ant, be deemed a final denial of the claim for purposes of this section.
Id.
77. Harris, 327 Md. at 35-36, 607 A.2d at 554.
78. Harris v. Gross, 87 Md. App. 764, 769-70, 591 A.2d 575, 578 (1991), aff'd sub
nom. State v. Harris, 327 Md. 32, 607 A.2d 552 (1992).
79. Id. at 769, 591 A.2d at 577.
80. Id. at 768-69, 591 A.2d at 577.
81. Id.; MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 12-103 (1984).
82. 79 Md. App. 729, 558 A.2d 1242 (1989).
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sage of the MTCA had not repealed another section of the Trans-
portation Article waiving the State's immunity.8 3
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari 4 "to consider the sig-
nificant issue of public importance raised in the case." 5 In its brief,
the State argued that the language in the Transportation Article did
not constitute an actual waiver of its sovereign immunity. 6 Alterna-
tively, the State requested that the MTCA's filing requirement be
read into section 17-107(b).8 7 Harris echoed the logic of the Court
of Special Appeals, claiming that the two Acts presented him with
two options for suing the State. 8
2. Legal Background.-The Court of Appeals in Harris ad-
dressed two significant legal issues. First, the court considered
whether section 17-107(b) of the Transportation Article remained
valid after the passage of the MTCA. 9 This required an examina-
tion of the method of statutory construction when two statutes are
potentially in conflict. Second, the court considered whether sec-
tion 17-107(b) constituted an effective waiver of the State's immu-
nity from suit.9 ° This required an examination of the process by
which a state can waive its immunity.
a. Sovereign Immunity.-The concept of sovereign immunity ex-
tends deep into the history of Maryland, federal and British law.9'
Originally, this immunity was based on the idea that "[t]he King can
83. Harris v. Gross, 87 Md. App. at 769, 591 A.2d at 578. The Collier court examined
§ 7-702, which waived the immunity of the Mass Transit Administration (MTA) and
found that the MTCA and § 7-702 both remained viable, stating:
[w]hile both effect a waiver of sovereign immunity, they do so to varied extents.
Section 7-702 of the Transportation Article pertains only to torts committed by
MTA personnel in the course of their employment. By contrast, the Tort
Claims Act is a gap-filler provision authorizing suits where no specific sovereign
immunity waiver otherwise exists.
Collier, 79 Md. App. at 733, 558 A.2d at 1244.
84. See State v. Harris, 324 Md. 686, 598 A.2d 755 (1991).
85. Harris, 327 Md. at 37, 607 A.2d at 554.
86. Petitioner's Brief at 14-17, Harris (No. 91-104).
87. Id. at 19-20. The State argued that the legislature would not logically have
passed one law requiring filing for auto accident suits and, at the same time, pass an-
other law which would allow plaintiffs to circumvent the filing requirement. Id.
88. Respondent's Brief at 4-5, Harris (No. 91-104).
89. Harris, 327 Md. at 38-40, 607 A.2d at 555-56.
90. Id. at 41, 607 A.2d at 556-57.
91. See Comment, The State as a Party Defendant: Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity in Tort
in Maryland, 36 MD. L. REV. 653, 654-58 (1977) (giving a brief history of sovereign im-
munity in Maryland).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
do no wrong. ' ' 92 In England, it was assumed that no court had au-
thority over the King.93 Therefore, the King could not be brought
into court for suit or have an adverse judgment enforced against
him.94 In the United States, the concept of sovereign immunity sur-
vived the American Revolution, and courts granted both federal and
state governments a comprehensive shield from legal suits.95
The Court of Appeals has found that "[t]he doctrine of sover-
eign immunity is firmly embedded in the law of Maryland." 96 No
longer justified on the presumed infallibility of the sovereign, the
immunity is justified by public policy. 97 According to the court, the
immunity "protects the State from burdensome interference with its
governmental functions and preserves its control over State agen-
cies and funds."9
The general doctrine of sovereign immunity allows the State to
waive its immunity from suit through a two-step process. 99 First, the
State must give its clear consent to be sued.' ° Second, the State
must provide or authorize the expenditure of money necessary to
pay any adverse judgments.'' Consent without money authoriza-
92. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *254.
93. See id.
94. See Frosburg v. State Dep't of Personnel, 37 Md. App. 18, 22, 375 A.2d 582, 585
(1977).
95. See id.
96. Katz v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 284 Md. 503, 507, 397 A.2d
1027, 1030 (1979). The court has consistently recognized its existence. See Board of
Trustees v. John K. Ruff, Inc., 278 Md. 580, 584, 366 A.2d 360, 362 (1976) ("Once
venerated, recently vilified, and presently substantially limited, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity has been long recognized by this Court. We have applied the doctrine for
over a century .. "); Davis v. State, 183 Md. 385, 393, 37 A.2d 880, 885 (1944) ("One
of the highest attributes of sovereignty is the immunity of the State from suit at law and
in equity by its own citizens or the citizens of any other State, unless it waives this immu-
nity."). See also Foor v.Juvenile Servs. Admin., 78 Md. App. 151, 162-63, 552 A.2d 947,
952-53 (stating that the first broad waiver of sovereign immunity by the legislature in
modern times came about in 1976), cert. denied, 316 Md. 364, 558 A.2d 1206 (1989).
97. See State v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 34 Md. 344, 374 (1871) (stating that parties with
claims against the government should present them to the legislature, rather than pur-
sue a court action), aff'dsub nom. Railroad Co. v. Maryland, 88 U.S. (21 Wall) 456 (1875).
98. Katz, 284 Md. at 507, 397 A.2d at 1030.
99. See Kee v. State Highway Admin., 313 Md. 445, 455, 545 A.2d 1312, 1317
(1988); Department of Natural Resources v. Welsh, 308 Md. 54, 58-59, 521 A.2d 313,
315 (1986); University of Md. v. Maas, 173 Md. 554, 559, 197 A. 123, 125 (1938).
100. See Mayor of Baltimore v. State ex rel. Blueford, 173 Md. 267, 271, 195 A. 571,
573 (1937); Dunne v. State, 162 Md. 274, 280, 159 A. 751, 753, cert. denied, 287 U.S. 564
(1932).
101. See American Structures, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 278 Md. 356, 359, 364 A.2d
55, 56 (1976); Maas, 173 Md. at 558, 197 A. at 124.
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tion does not constitute an effective waiver.' Additionally, the
State may condition or limit its waiver; it may also place procedural
requirements on plaintiffs seeking to take advantage of the consent
to be sued.' 0
3
In 1981, the legislature passed the MTCA, which waived Mary-
land's sovereign immunity for certain enumerated state actions,10 4
including "negligent maintenance or operation of a motor vehicle
by a State employee."' 0 5 Although the MTCA purported to expand
the State's exposure to suits,10 6 immunity was waived only "to the
extent and in the amount that the State is covered by a program of
insurance."'10 7 Also, the waiver did not allow for an award of
"[p]unitive damages," "[i]nterest prior to judgment," "[i]ndividual
102. Board of Trustees v. John K. Ruff, Inc., 278 Md. 580, 590, 366 A.2d 360, 366
(1976). The court said:
[W]hen the General Assembly expressly authorizes suits to be brought against
one of the State's agencies, it is the giving of a positive consent and has the
effect of waiving sovereign immunity as to that agency within its scope of duties
and obligations. It does not necessarily follow, however, that a money judg-
ment may therefore be obtained, even with respect to matters within the scope
of the duties of the agency .... [A]n action for a money judgment may not be
maintained unless funds had been appropriated for that purpose or the agency
can provide funds by taxation.
Id.
103. See Schultz v. Greater New Orleans Expressway Comm'n, 250 F. Supp. 89, 92
(E.D. La. 1966) ("It is true that a state may waive its immunity from suit and specify such
limitations on the exercise of that immunity as it deems proper .. ").
104. See Gardner v. State, 77 Md. App. 237, 239, 549 A.2d 1171, 1172 (1988) ("Until
1981, the State jealously guarded its sovereign immunity against liability for tort.").
105. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & Jun. PROC. § 5-403(a)(1) (Supp. 1983). In 1985, the
State eliminated the list of specific actions in this statute and substituted general lan-
guage. See Simpson v. Moore, 323 Md. 215, 219, 592 A.2d 1090, 1092 (1991). See also
David E. Beller & Carolyn A. Quattrocki, Tort Claims Act, 22 MD. BAR. J. 17 (July/Aug.
1989). This article explains:
Despite this expansion, the State's waiver is still circumscribed. Most signifi-
cantly, the State does not waive its immunity for any act of State personnel
made outside the scope of their public duties, or made with malice or gross
negligence. The waiver also does not extend to punitive damages or interest
before judgment.
Id. at 18.
106. See Collier v. Nesbitt, 79 Md. App. 729, 733, 558 A.2d 1242, 1244 (1989)
(describing the MTCA as a "gap-filler"). Section 5-402 stated that the MTCA operated
"in addition to and not in limitation of any other law waiving the sovereign immunity of
the State in tort or authorizing the State to purchase or otherwise provide insurance for
tortious conduct." MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 5-402(b) (Supp. 1983).
107. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 5-403(a) (Supp. 1983). The State Insur-
ance Program is now codified in §§ 9-101 through -107 of the State Finance and Pro-
curement Article. Section 9-105(c) reads: "To the extent that funds are available in the
State budget, the Treasurer shall provide sufficient self-insurance, purchased insurance,
or both to cover the liability of the State and its units and personnel under the Maryland
Tort Claims Act." MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 9-105(c) (1988).
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claims in excess of $100,000," or "[a]n aggregate of claims arising
from the same occurrence in excess of $500,000."108 Section 5-406
of the MTCA required that a claimant first present a claim to the
State Treasurer. Only after the Treasurer either denied the claim or
six months had expired could the claimant go into court.'0 9 The
Court of Appeals consistently found that the MTCA provided both
elements necessary for an effective waiver of sovereign immunity. "0
During the same 1981 legislative session, the State approved
language in the Transportation Article that barred the defense of
sovereign immunity for governmental operation of motor vehicles
to the extent of the minimum required auto insurance."' Unlike
the MTCA, which waived only the State's immunity, section 17-
107(b) established liability for state and local governments."i 2 In
addition, section 17-107(b) contained none of the various proce-
dural requirements found in the MTCA.
The stated purpose of section 17-107(b) was to prevent local
governments from avoiding liability for torts involving their vehi-
cles."' The Court of Special Appeals had previously found that
section 17-107(b) constituted such a waiver, and it reiterated that
108. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 5-403(b) (Supp. 1983). See also Belier &
Quattrocki, supra note 105, at 19 ("The 1985 amendment[s to the MTCA] abolished the
statutory limitations on recovery, providing instead that the State will be liable to the
extent of insurance coverage ... ").
109. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-406(a) (Supp. 1983). The courts have
strictly enforced this requirement. See Gardner v. State, 77 Md. App. 237, 240, 247, 549
A.2d 1171, 1172, 1176 (1988).
110. See Lopez v. Maryland State Highway Admin., 327 Md. 486, 489, 610 A.2d 778,
779 (1992); Ritchie v. Donnelly, 324 Md. 344, 374 n.14, 597 A.2d 432, 446 n.14 (1991);
Kee v. State Highway Admin., 313 Md. 445, 448, 545 A.2d 1312, 1314 (1988).
111. See supra text accompanying note 73 for section 17-107(b)'s language. After
amendments made in 1990, the section now reads: "An owner or lessee of any motor
vehicle registered under Title 13 of this article may not raise the defense of sovereign or
governmental immunity as described under § 5-399.4 of the Courts and Judicial Pro-
ceedings Article." MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 17-107(c) (1992). Section 5-399.4 reads:
An owner or lessee of any motor vehicle registered under Title 13 of the Trans-
portation Article may not raise the defense of sovereign or governmental im-
munity, to the extent of benefits provided by the security accepted by the Motor
Vehicle Administration under § 17-103 of the Transportation Article, in any
judicial proceeding in which the plaintiff claims that personal injury, property
damage, or death was caused by the negligent use of the motor vehicle while in
government service or performing a task of benefit to the government.
MD. CODE ANN., CTs. &JUD. PROC. § 5-399.4 (Supp. 1992).
112. See MD. CODE ANN., TRNSP. § 17-107(b).
113. See Harris, 327 Md. at 39, 607 A.2d at 556 (citing Letter from the Secretary of
Maryland Department of Transportation (Feb. 25, 1981)).
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belief in Harris v. Gross." 4 However, prior to State v. Harris, the
Court of Appeals had never directly ruled on whether section 17-
107(b) constituted a waiver of governmental immunity or whether it
was implicitly repealed by the passage of the MTCA." I 5
b. Repeal by Implication.-In numerous instances, the Court of
Appeals has held that without an explicit indication of legislative in-
tent, it will be very reluctant to infer that one statute replaces, over-
turns or modifies an earlier one." 6 The court has referred to this
policy as a "fundamental principle,"' "1 7 based on the assumption
that the legislature is aware of all existing laws when it passes a new
one."' That is, if the legislature intended to repeal an existing law,
it would have stated that intent explicitly in the new law. This doc-
114. 87 Md. App. 764, 769, 591 A.2d 575, 577 (1991), aff'd sub noma. State v. Harris,
327 Md. 32, 607 A.2d 552 (1992).
115. In another decision, however, the court applied § 17-107(b) as valid law without
directly addressing its potential conflict with the MTCA. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.
USF&G, 314 Md. 131, 148, 550 A.2d 69, 77 (1988).
116. See Green v. State, 170 Md. 134, 140, 183 A. 526, 529 (1936) ("It has been fre-
quently said in this court and elsewhere that repeals by implication are not favored
...."); Beard v. State, 74 Md. 130, 134, 21 A. 700, 701 (1891) ("It is a fundamental
principle that the law does not favor repeals by implication .. "); Garitee v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 53 Md. 422, 435 (1880) ("This is a canon of construction which is as well
established as any principle of law.").
117. Department of Natural Resources v. France, 277 Md. 432, 460, 357 A.2d 78, 94
(1976); Beard, 74 Md. at 134, 21 A. at 701. The doctrine has received considerable criti-
cism from some commentators. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the
Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 806 (1983) (declaring that most
canons of statutory construction, of which the disfavor of implied repeals is one, are
"just plain wrong").
118. See Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Schlossberg, 306 Md. 48, 61, 507 A.2d
172, 178 (1986) ("[Tlhe General Assembly is presumed to have intended that all its
enactments operate together as a consistent and harmonious body of law .... ); IA
SINGER, supra note 22, § 23.10, at 346 ("The presumption against implied repeals is
founded upon the doctrine that the legislature is presumed to envision the whole body
of the law when it enacts new legislation.").
However, this presumption has been attacked as largely fictional. See William D.
Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 616
(1988) ("Real legislative awareness of the prior statute is usually either lacking or simply
asserted without proof by the court. . .. "); Posner, supra note 117, at 812 (claiming that
the doctrine of implied repeals is based on "impi[ied] legislative omniscience in a partic-
ularly uncompromising and clearly unrealistic form, for if Congress could foresee every
possible application of a new statute and make provision for it, there would be no need
for judicial interpretation at all"). See also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
Legislative Scholarship and Pedagogy In the Post-Legal Process Area, 48 U. PrT. L. REV. 691,
721, 724 (1987) (noting that Ronald Dworkin and other "new legal process theorists"
have argued that courts should more forcefully overrule obsolete statutes and have ad-
vocated far more expansive lawmaking roles for judges).
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trine is followed by the Supreme Court' 1 9 and courts throughout
the country. 120
In determining whether one statute has repealed another by im-
plication, the Maryland Court of Appeals has considered two fac-
tors: whether there is strong evidence that the legislature intended
to repeal a statute despite the fact that it did not explicitly refer to
the statute in the new law' 2' and the degree of inconsistency be-
tween the two statutes. 1
22
(1) The Intent of the Legislature.-The court has considered a
number of key factors in determining whether the legislature in-
tended one statute to repeal a prior one. For example, the court has
considered subsequent amendments made by the legislature to the
first statute as an argument against an implied repeal. From the
court's perspective, the fact that the legislature made certain
changes but not others signified its belief that the statute in question
remained valid and did not need any corrections other than those
made. 12 3
The court has also noted the legislature's response, or lack
119. See American Bank & Trust Co. v. Dallas County, 463 U.S. 855, 868 (1983); Mor-
ton v. Moncari, 417 U.S. 535, 549 (1974); Red Rock v. Henry, 106 U.S. 596, 601-02
(1883). The Morton Court stated, "The courts are not at liberty to pick and choose
among congressional enactments, and when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it
is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the con-
trary, to regard each as effective." 417 U.S. at 551.
120. See Delaware Compensation Rating Bureau v. Gordy, 213 A.2d 706, 709 (Del.
Ch. 1965); Dunkle v. State, 173 N.E.2d 657, 659 (Ind. 1961); County of Saratoga v.
Saratoga Harness Racing Ass'n, Inc., 176 N.Y.S.2d 654, 657 (N.Y. 1958); State ex rel.
Stokes v. Probate Court, 246 N.E.2d 607, 611 (Ohio Ct. App. 1969); Parisi v. Philadel-
phia Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 143 A.2d 360, 363 (Pa. 1958); City of Richmond v.
Board of Supervisors, 101 S.E.2d 641, 645 (Va. 1958); Copeland Lumber Co. v. Wilkins,
454 P.2d 821, 823 (Wash. 1969); State ex rel. Thompson v. Morton, 84 S.E.2d 791, 795
(W. Va. 1954).
121. See Mayor of Baltimore v. Clerk of the Superior Court, 270 Md. 316, 319, 311
A.2d 261, 263 (1973) ("[T]he intention of the Legislature to ... [repeal] must be clear
and manifest .. "); Pressman v. Elgin, 187 Md. 446, 450, 50 A.2d 560, 563 (1947) ("No
court should ever hold that a statute has been repealed except where the language of a
later statute shows plainly that the Legislature intended a repeal."); State v. Clifton, 177
Md. 572, 574, 10 A.2d 703, 704 (1940) ("No Court should ever adjudge that a repeal
has occurred except when it is inevitable or the language of the act shows plainly that the
Legislature intended it. Such a legislative intent is never presumed.").
122. See Weller v. Maryland Bay Co., 176 Md. 59, 71, 3 A.2d 736, 741 (1939) (deter-
mining the existence of "an irreconcilable repugnancy in the terms of the acts which
make inevitable the conclusion that there was an intention to repeal by the later act
some portion of the earlier one").
123. See Automobile Acceptance Corp. v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 216 Md. 344,
353, 139 A.2d 683, 687 (1958); Lewis v. Gsell, 183 Md. 123, 128, 36 A.2d 702, 704
(1944).
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thereof, to decisions of the courts' 24 and opinions of the Maryland
Attorney General' 25 applying the purportedly repealed statute. Be-
cause these decisions and opinions provide an opportunity for the
legislature to overturn the decision or judgment by expressly re-
pealing the statute, the court has viewed the legislature's failure to
respond as acquiescence in the continued viability of the older
statute. 126
A third factor the court has considered is the breadth of the
scope of the more recent statute. If the statute in question covers an
entire subject comprehensively, it might be found to preempt the
operation of an earlier, more specific statute. 27 However, this is
not a hard and fast rule of the court: the court has also found a
narrow statute to constitute an exception to a broad statute. 28
124. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201, 210, 438 A.2d 1301, 1305 (1981) ("The
General Assembly is presumed to be aware of this Court's interpretation of its enact-
ments and, if such interpretation is not legislatively overturned, to have acquiesced in
that interpretation.").
125. See, e.g., Leitch v. Gaither, 151 Md. 167, 176, 134 A. 317, 320 (1926) ("[Bly im-
plication the Legislature acquiesced in the construction placed upon the act by the At-
torney General as a correct expression of its intention.").
126. However, this failure to respond might also indicate that the Legislature could
not muster the political support for a change, had too many other items on its agenda,
or was jointly mistaken along with the court and Attorney General.
127. See Hitchcock v. State, 213 Md. 273, 279, 131 A.2d 714, 716 (1957) (concluding
that "a complete scheme of regulation ... is a substitute for existing laws on the subject,
and repeals those earlier laws"); Appeal Tax Court v. Western Md. R.R., 50 Md. 274,
296 (1879) (holding that "if the later Act covers the whole subject of the first Act... it
will operate as a repeal of that Act"). See also IA SINGER, supra note 22, § 23.13 ("The
intent to repeal all former laws upon a subject is made apparent by the enactment of
subsequent comprehensive legislation establishing elaborate inclusions and exclusions
of the persons, things and relationships ordinarily associated with that subject.").
128. See Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Schlossberg, 306 Md. 48, 63, 507 A.2d
172, 180 (1986) ("It is well settled that when two statutes, one general and one specific,
are found to conflict, the specific statute will be regarded as an exception to the general
statute."). See also Popkin, supra note 118, at 616 ("The assumption is that the legislature
intends the more specific statute to prevail, given the close attention to detail implied by
the statute's specificity.").
Courts in other states have taken additional factors into consideration. For exam-
ple, if both statutes were passed during the same legislative session, courts have found a
strong presumption that the two statutes were intended to operate together. See People
v. Benton, 261 N.E.2d 793, 795-96 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970); Dunkle v. State, 173 N.E.2d 657,
659 (Ind. 1961); Chappuis v. Reggie, 62 So. 2d 92, 95 (La. 1952); County of Saratoga v.
Saratoga Harness Racing Ass'n, Inc., 176 N.Y.S.2d 654, 659 (N.Y. 1958); City of Rich-
mond v. Board of Supervisors, 101 S.E.2d 641, 645-46 (Va. 1958). See also IA SINGER,
supra note 22, § 23.17 ("In the absence of an irreconcilable conflict between two acts of
the same session, each will be construed to operate within the limits of its own terms in a
manner not to conflict with the other.").
Some courts have also considered language that indicates a general repeal of any
previous, inconsistent statutes. However, giving force to a general repeal seemingly
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
(2) Disagreement Between Statutes.-The degree of disagreement
required to show a repeal is uncertain, given the previous decisions
of the Court of Appeals. In describing the extent of clash needed,
the court has said that the two acts must be "inconsistent, 129 "ir-
reconcilable,"'' 30 or "repugnant."'' The court has supplemented
these terms with modifiers such as "plainly," ' 32 "manifest,"' 33 and
"unavoidable."' 3 4 These phrases imply that a substantial degree of
inconsistency is necessary before an implied repeal can be found,
contradicts the basis of courts' traditional disfavor of implied repeal-the assumption
that a legislature is aware of all of the existing law. Compare State ex rel. Dahl v. District
Court of Fourth Judicial Dist., 333 P.2d 495, 498 (Mont. 1958) (holding that general
"repeated repealer sections ... mean that all acts and parts of acts in conflict therewith
are hereby repealed") with State v. Becker, 234 P.2d 897, 899 (Wash. 1951) ("Such a
repealing clause does not constitute a direct repeal and does not have the effect of re-
pealing any part of the prior act which would not be repealed in its absence.") and State
ex rel. Thompson v. Morton, 84 S.E.2d 791, 796 (W. Va. 1954) (" 'A general repealer
clause in a statute is only declaratory of what would be the legal effect of the statute
without the repealing provision.' " (quoting State v. Jackson, 199 S.E. 876, 877 (W. Va.
1938))).
Conversely, several courts have found that there can be no implied repeal when the
more recent statute contained language explicitly stating that no previous statutes were
intended to be repealed. See, e.g., Rojo v. Kliger, 801 P.2d 373, 378 (Cal. 1990) ("By
expressly disclaiming a purpose to repeal other applicable state laws .... we believe the
Legislature has manifested an intent to amplify, not abrogate, an employee's common
law remedies for injuries relating to employment discrimination."). The California stat-
ute at issue in Rojo, the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), expressly stated that
"[n]othing contained in this part shall be deemed to repeal any of the provisions of the
Civil Rights Law or of any other law of this state relating to discrimination... " CAL.
Gov'T CODE § 12993(a) (West 1992). This statute created certain remedies for employ-
ees facing discrimination but required complainants to file an administrative complaint
first. The common-law remedy allowed direct access to court. Rojo, 801 P.2d at 376.
The court declared that a plaintiff could proceed under FEHA or common law. Id. at
383.
129. Mayor of Baltimore v. Davis, 120 Md. 403, 405, 87 A. 690, 691 (1913). See also
Department of Natural Resources v. France, 277 Md. 432, 460, 357 A.2d 78, 94 (1976)
(requiring "inconsistency"); Kirkwood v. Provident Sav. Bank, 205 Md. 48, 55, 106 A.2d
103, 107 (1954); Green v. State, 170 Md. 134, 140, 183 A. 526, 529 (1936).
130. Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Schlossberg, 306 Md. 48, 61, 507 A.2d 172,
178 (1986); Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149, 155, 297 A.2d 721, 725
(1972) overruled on other grounds by Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d
633 (1992).
131. Smith, 267 Md. at 155, 297 A.2d at 725; Davis, 120 Md. at 405, 87 A. at 691. See
also Adams v. County Comm'rs, 180 Md. 550, 554, 26 A.2d 377, 379 (1942) (requiring
"repugnancy").
132. Davis, 120 Md. at 405, 87 A. at 691; Appeal Tax Court v. Western Md. R.R., 50
Md. 274, 296 (1879).
133. France, 277 Md. at 460, 357 A.2d at 94; Kirkwood, 205 Md. at 55, 106 A.2d at 107;
Green, 170 Md. at 140, 183 A. at 529.
134. Mayor of Cumberland v. Magruder, 34 Md. 381, 386 (1871).
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but offer little help in defining precisely the standard of requisite
disagreement.
Often, the court has avoided the issue of repeal-by-implication
by finding that the statutes in question can be brought into "har-
mony"'" 5 by merging them.' 36 Thus, "the requirements of one will
be construed as embodying the provisions of the other."' 3 7 Alter-
natively, the court has attempted to "give effect to both"' 38 acts by
allowing each one to operate independently.' 39 The court has failed
to explain clearly how it determines whether two acts should be
merged or allowed to exist separately.' 4 °
135. Smith, 267 Md. at 155, 297 A.2d at 725; Welsh v. Kuntz, 196 Md. 86, 97, 75 A.2d
343, 347 (1950).
136. See Police Comm'r v. Dowling, 281 Md. 412, 423, 379 A.2d 1007, 1013 (1977)
(harmonizing a statute allowing a law enforcement officer to appeal a trial board's deci-
sion to dismiss him, with a second granting the police commissioner power to dismiss an
officer, by finding that an officer had the right to appeal a commissioner's decision);
Commission on Medical Discipline v. Bendler, 280 Md. 326, 329-30, 373 A.2d 1232,
1233-34 (1977) (harmonizing a statute allowing a state employee to appeal to a court of
law a final agency decision to fire him or her, with a second stating that the Board of
Review made final decisions for the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, by find-
ing that a Board of Review determination constituted a final agency decision that could
then be challenged in court). See also Mayor of Baltimore v. Clerk of the Superior Court,
270 Md. 316, 320, 311 A.2d 261, 264 (1973) (finding no conflict between a statute re-
quiring a plaintiff to pay all trial court costs in an eminent domain suit, and a second
exempting a city or county from all court costs; the second constituted an exception to
the first).
137. Clerk of the Superior Court, 270 Md. at 319, 311 A.2d at 263.
138. Board of Fire Comm'rs v. Potter, 268 Md. 285, 293-94, 300 A.2d 680, 684
(1973); Montgomery County v. Bigelow, 196 Md. 413, 423, 77 A.2d 164, 168 (1950).
139. See Welsh, 196 Md. at 98, 75 A.2d at 348. In Welsh, one statute required that
mortgages include a schedule of future loans and advances. The other described the
necessary elements of mortgages in Baltimore and Prince George's counties and did not
include a schedule requirement. The court found that the second statute constituted an
exception to the first. Id. See also Chesapeake Beach Hotel Co. v. Hall, 121 Md. 643,
652, 89 A. 445, 449 (1913) (allowing one statute prohibiting alcohol sales between 12
a.m. and 5 a.m. but approving them at all other times, and a second outlawing alcohol
sales on Sundays, to operate independently such that no alcohol could be sold at either
time).
140. In one case, the defendant was alleged to have used a forged check. The action
fell under both the False Pretense Act and the Worthless Check Act. Each Act included
different requirements and penalties. The court considered allowing both laws to oper-
ate, giving prosecutors a choice as to which law to use, but instead found an implied
repeal. Waye v. State, 231 Md. 510, 516, 191 A.2d 428, 431 (1963). The court said:
[W]e do not believe that the Legislature intended to create such an anomalous
and incongruous situation as to limit the penalty, when a worthless check and
property valued at less than $100 are involved, to $50 and eighteen months'
confinement when the prosecution is under § 142 [of the Worthless Check
Act], but to permit a much higher and more severe penalty under identical facts
simply because someone decides to bring the prosecution under § 140 [of the
False Pretense Act].
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In the rare case where two statutes are truly incompatible, the
court has favored the more recent statute over the earlier one, con-
sidering it the most recent expression of legislative intent.' 4 ' How-
ever, it is sometimes difficult to determine which statute is the most
recent. The court has considered different stages in the legislative
process as critical. In some cases, the court has found that the last
statute passed by the legislature dominates. 142 In other cases, the
court has given preference to the law that was more recently signed
by the Governor. 143
3. Analysis.-
a. Sovereign Immunity.-Without explanation, the Harris court
dismissed as "sheer folly" the State's contention that section 17-
107(b) of the Transportation Article did not constitute a waiver of
sovereign immunity. 144 Presumably, the court agreed with the argu-
ment of the Court of Special Appeals that section 17-107(b) con-
tained both elements needed for a waiver. 145 Thus, the statutory
language indicating that a vehicle owner could no longer "raise the
defense of sovereign or governmental immunity" '46 provided the
consent element even without the use of the word "waiver." Like-
wise, the statute's inclusion of language about insurance in the form
of "security" provided the needed authorization for paying judg-
ments. 147 Unfortunately, the lack of any detailed explanation will
Id.
141. See, e.g., Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Schlossberg, 306 Md. 48, 61, 507
A.2d 172, 178-79 (1986); Criminal Injuries Compensation Bd. v. Gould, 273 Md. 486,
495, 331 A.2d 55, 61 (1975).
142. See Elgin v. Capitol Greyhound Lines, 192 Md. 303, 317, 64 A.2d 284, 291
(1949), aff'd sub nom. Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542 (1950). For sup-
port from other states, see Williams v. State, 223 S.W.2d 190, 191 (Ark. 1949); People ex
rel. English v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 19 N.E.2d 170, 171 (Ill. 1938); Newbauer v. State,
161 N.E. 826, 827 (Ind. 1928); McDonald v.Justices of Superior Court, 13 N.E.2d 16, 17
(Mass. 1938); State ex rel. Stokes v. Probate Court, 246 N.E.2d 607, 611 (Ohio Ct. App.
1969), appeal dismissed, 258 N.E.2d 594 (1970).
143. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 70 Md. 237, 239-40, 16 A. 529, 529 (1889). The court
has also said that the act "enacted most recently" prevails. Schlossberg, 306 Md. at 61,
507 A.2d at 178-79. Among the definitions of "enact" is "to make (as a bill) into law."
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 409 (1983). As such, the focus is on
when the Governor signs a bill and makes it a law. Two acts signed by the Governor on
the same day are presumed to have been signed in numerical order. Davis, 70 Md. at
239-40, 16 A. at 529.
144. Harris, 327 Md. at 41, 607 A.2d at 557.
145. See Harris v. Gross, 87 Md. App. 764, 768, 591 A.2d 575, 577 (1991), aff'd sub
nom. State v. Harris, 327 Md. 32, 607 A.2d 552 (1992).
146. MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 17-107(b) (1984).
147. See id.
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most likely prevent the case from having any broad impact on Mary-
land sovereign immunity law.
b. Repeals by Implication.-In analyzing whether section 17-
107(b) and the MTCA were in conflict, the court recited the old pre-
cept that "the law does not favor repeals by implication."'148 It
found no clear legislative intent for a repeal. 4 9 Of the shopping list
of intent indicators described earlier, 150 the court mentioned some
but not others. The Harris court noted that the legislature had "re-
pealed and reenacted, with amendments" section 17-107(b) several
times after the enactment of the MTCA.' 5 ' Also, the court used the
MTCA's no-repeal language to refute the State's argument that the
legislature intended the MTCA to cover fully the area of sovereign
immunity waiver and thereby preempt section 17-107(b).1 52 Inter-
estingly, the fact that both Acts were passed by the same legislature
went unnoted, although it could have served as another argument
against implied repeal.
After finding no intent to repeal, the court held that there was
also no "manifest repugnancy,"15 3  "irreconcilable inconsis-
tency," 154 or "irreconcilable conflict"' 55 between the two statutes.
The court noted that the two statutes set different liability limits and
that section 17-107(b) exposed local governments to suits, unlike
the MTCA, which only applied to the state government. 56 Harris
concluded, "In light of the differences between the two statutes ....
they may be construed in harmony with each other... .
Although the court used its "harmony" rhetoric, it refused to merge
the two statutes and read the MTCA's filing requirement into sec-
tion 17-107(b). 158
Although the court avoided having to choose which law re-
148. Harris, 327 Md. at 39, 607 A.2d at 555.
149. See id.
150. See supra notes 123-128 and accompanying text. See also supra note 128 for a
discussion of factors other states have considered.
151. Harris, 327 Md. at 40, 607 A.2d at 556.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 38, 41, 607 A.2d at 555, 557.
154. Id. at 38, 607 A.2d at 555.
155. Id. at 39, 607 A.2d at 555.
156. See supra notes 104-113 and accompanying text for a more complete description
of the differences between the MTCA and § 17-107(b).
157. Harris, 327 Md. at 41, 607 A.2d at 557.
158. See id., 607 A.2d at 556-57. The Harris court declared: "There is absolutely no
basis in our view for the State's contention that the MTCA notice of claim requirement
as a condition precedent to the waiver of the State's sovereign immunity is somehow
implicitly implanted within the provisions of § 17-107(b)." Id.
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pealed the other, it indicated that MTCA would have prevailed.' 59
The court noted that the MTCA had a higher chapter number and
therefore was presumably signed second by the Governor. 60 Thus,
the court considered the MTCA to be the most recent expression of
legislative intent."16 However, the Harris court never examined
whether the legislature had passed one law before the other; nor did
the court acknowledge that section 17-107(b) took effect first.' 62
The court applied legal principles without fully explaining how
and why they were being applied and without exploring the con-
tours of those principles. As a result, Harris provides little guidance
to lower courts as to how to harmonize two seemingly conflicting
statutes. Further, the legislature is left without much advice as to
how to ensure that its intent will be given full effect.
4. Conclusion.-The most significant impact of Harris will occur
in actions by plaintiffs against the State for motor vehicle accidents.
For plaintiffs whose persons or property are damaged by state vehi-
cles, Harris affirms an important legal alternative to the MTCA.
Each statute presents plaintiffs with different strategic advantages
and disadvantages. As the court has now firmly established, the
plaintiff gets to choose which way to proceed.
MATrHEW H. JOSEPH
159. Id., 327 Md. at 38, 607 A.2d at 555.
160. Id.
161. See id.
162. Section 17-107(b) took effect July 1, 1981, while the MTCA took effect July 1,
1982. See id. Had the court considered this factor, the MTCA would still have prevailed.
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XII. TORTS
A. "Fixing" Punitive Damages and the Advent of State-of-the-Art
Knowledge in Maryland
In Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia,' the Court of Appeals held that
evidence of state-of-the-art knowledge was admissible against manu-
facturers, as well as suppliers and installers, of asbestos in a strict
products liability failure-to-warn claim.2 By permitting the admis-
sion of state-of-the-art evidence against both manufacturers and
suppliers, the decision will undoubtedly affect the cost of many con-
sumer products. Although admission of this evidence may be justi-
fied with regard to manufacturers, its admission against suppliers
and installers is likely to bring about unjust results.
Further, the court held that "actual malice," as demonstrated
by clear and convincing evidence, was required to support an award
of punitive damages in all non-intentional tort actions.' The court
was primarily concerned with correcting what it perceived to be a
"distortion of the traditional purpose of civil tort law, which is to
compensate victims who are injured." 4 This concern was mani-
fested by the court's attempt to strike a balance between proper
awards of compensatory and punitive damages. Although the Ze-
nobia decision may prevent the award of punitive damages in unde-
serving cases, the standard enunciated in the court's holding will
unfortunately preclude punitive damages in many deserving cases as
well.
1. 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992).
2. Id. at 437, 442-43, 601 A.2d at 641, 644.
3. Id. at 460, 469, 601 A.2d at 652, 657. The heightened standard of proof to sup-
port an award of punitive damages-that is, a standard of clear and convincing evi-
dence-was held to apply even beyond non-intentional torts, to all tort actions. Id. at
469, 601 A.2d at 657.
There were two additional parts of the Court of Appeals' holding. First, the court
held that a seller of products has a continuing duty to warn of the dangers associated
with its product. Id. at 448, 601 A.2d at 647. Thus, the seller in Zenobia was "not enti-
tled to automatic relief from its continuing duty to warn merely because it no longer
manufacture[d] a defective product." Id. Second, the court held that a nonparty manu-
facturer is not liable for contribution, id. at 474, 601 A.2d at 660, and therefore reversed
the granting of the cross-claims against Raymark in the Zenobia cases. Id. at 475. 601
A.2d at 660. A full discussion of these points is outside the scope of this Note.
4. Schaefer v. Miller, 322 Md. 297, 332, 587 A.2d 491, 508 (1991) (Eldridge, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
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1. The Case.-In 1948, William Zenobia worked as a painter for
four months in the shipyard of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation at
Sparrows Point, Maryland.5 Zenobia later worked for eighteen
months as a pipe fitter at the Maryland Shipbuilding and Drydock
Company shipyard.6 Louis Dickerson was a laborer in both the
shipyard and the steel mill of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation at
Sparrows Point between 1953 and 1963. 7 During their respective
employments, neither worker received any warnings regarding the
toxic effects of the asbestos fibers present in their work environ-
ment.8 Years later, both workers were diagnosed as suffering from
pleural and parenchymal asbestosis.9
Zenobia and Dickerson filed complaints in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City against various manufacturers, suppliers, and install-
ers of the asbestos products seeking damages for injuries resulting
from their exposure to asbestos.' 0 Both plaintiffs named manufac-
turer Owens-Illinois, as well as suppliers-installers MCIC and Porter
Hayden Company, as defendants." In addition, Zenobia named
supplier-installer Anchor Packing Company as a defendant in his
case.' 2 Dickerson also named manufacturers Eagle-Picher Indus-
tries and Celotex Corporation as defendants in his case.' 3 By the
5. Zenobia, 325 Md. at 428, 601 A.2d at 637.
6. Id. Zenobia's employment at the Maryland Shipbuilding and Drydock Company
shipyard lasted from 1951 to 1952. See MCIC, Inc. v. Zenobia, 86 Md. App. 456, 463,
587 A.2d 531, 534-35 (1991), vacated sub nom. Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md.
420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992).
7. Zenobia, 325 Md. at 428, 601 A.2d at 637.
8. See id. at 427-28, 601 A.2d at 636. Studies have indicated that during the last 40
years, more than 21 million Americans have been significantly exposed to the dangers of
asbestos products. See ERVING J. SELIKOFF, REPORT TO THE U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, DISA-
BILITY COMPENSATION FOR ASBESTOS-AsSOCIATED DISEASE IN THE UNITED STATES 4
(1982). An estimated 200,000 people will die from asbestos-related cancer by the end of
the century. Id. The overwhelming majority of these Americans still do not know that
they have been exposed to this potentially lethal substance. See Jackson v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1323 (5th Cir. 1985) (comparing these figures to
the 20,000 personal injury lawsuits that had been filed as of 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S.
1022 (1986).
9. Zenobia, 325 Md. at 428, 601 A.2d at 636. Asbestosis has been defined as "a kind
of lung disease caused by the . .. prolonged inhalation of asbestos dust . . . [that] has
been shown to be a cause of cancer, especially of the bronchial tubes and pleura [the
membrane that covers the interior surfaces of the lung]." 1 SCHMIDT'S ATrORNEYS' Dic-
TIONARY OF MEDICINE A-397 (17th ed. 1991).
10. Zenobia, 325 Md. at 428, 601 A.2d at 636.
11. Id., 601 A.2d at 636-37.
12. Id., 601 A.2d at 637.
13. Id., 601 A.2d at 636. A number of additional defendants had either been granted
summary judgment or had settled their cases with the plaintiffs at different stages prior
to or during the trial. Id. at 428 n.1, 601 A.2d at 637 n.1.
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time of trial, both plaintiffs had abandoned all theories of liability
except for strict products liability premised on the defendants' fail-
ure to warn of the dangers of asbestos.' 4 Their cases were consoli-
dated for the purposes of trial and appeal.' 5
A Baltimore City jury awarded Zenobia $1,200,000 in compen-
satory damages against all four defendants in his case. 6 The jury
also awarded Zenobia a total of $237,500 in punitive damages.' 7
The jury awarded Dickerson compensatory damages in the amount
of $1,300,000 against all five defendants in his case, as well as puni-
tive damages totalling $609,500.18
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed all the damages awards,
except for the punitive damages award assessed against Porter Hay-
den.' 9 The Court of Appeals granted plaintiffs' and defendants'
cross petitions for writs of certiorari, vacated the decision of the
Court of Special Appeals, and remanded the case to the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City to apply the proper damages standards.2 °
2. Legal Background.-
a. State-of-the-Art Knowledge.-State of the art has been defined
as knowledge that "includes all of the available knowledge on a sub-
ject at a given time .... [including] scientific, medical, engineering,
and any other knowledge that may be available. State of the art in-
cludes the element of time: What is known and when was this knowl-
edge available."'' 2 Essentially, when a defendant is imputed with
state-of-the-art knowledge, that defendant is held to the level of the
14. Id. at 428, 601 A.2d at 636. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j
(1965) (setting forth this cause of action).
15. Zenobia, 325 Md. at 428, 601 A.2d at 636.
16. Id. at 429, 601 A.2d at 637.
17. Id. The punitive damages in favor of Zenobia were assessed against Owens-Illi-
nois in the amount of $235,000 and Porter Hayden in the amount of $2,500. Id.
18. Id. Dickerson's punitive damages were assessed against Owens-Illinois in the
amount of $235,000, Porter Hayden in the amount of $2,500, and Celotex in the
amount of $372,000. Id.
19. MCIC, Inc. v. Zenobia, 86 Md. App. 456, 468-69, 587 A.2d 531, 537 (1991) (re-
versing the award of punitive damages against Porter Hayden on the basis of insufficient
evidence), vacated sub nom. Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633
(1992).
20. Zenobia, 325 Md. at 475-76, 601 A.2d at 660.
21. Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1164 (4th Cir. 1986). See
generally Ellen Wertheimer, Unknowable Dangers and the Death of Strict Products Liability: The
Empire Strikes Back, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 1183, 1207 n.78 (1992) (surveying the approaches
that a number of different jurisdictions have taken towards state-of-the-art knowledge




highest expert in the land. 2
The concept underlying state-of-the-art knowledge can be
found in Maryland case law as early as 1958. In Babylon v. Scruton,2 s
the Court of Appeals stated that "'a person who undertakes such
manufacturing will be held to the skill of an expert in that business
and to an expert's knowledge of the arts, materials, and
processes.' ",24 Despite this language, it is important to note that
the rule in Babylon was not initially applied to hold manufacturers to
the level of state of the art. In fact, the courts ignored any sugges-
tion that Babylon stood for the imposition of state-of-the-art knowl-
edge and consistently applied a negligence-based "reasonableness"
standard when determining the liability of manufacturers. 5 Under
this standard, manufacturers could rely on compliance with industry
standards as evidence of their reasonableness. 26
In 1976, the Court of Appeals adopted the Restatement doctrine
of strict liability in tort.27 Once this theory of liability was estab-
lished in Maryland, there remained an unanswered question as to
what degree of knowledge, if any, was required for strict liability
failure-to-warn claims.2
Two courts addressed this question before it was conclusively
decided by the Court of Appeals in Zenobia. In 1985, the Court of
22. See Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 463 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that
the deposition of the former medical director of a non-party asbestos manufacturer was
admissible to show the existence of state-of-the-art knowledge on the part of the defend-
ant); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Balbos, 84 Md. App. 10, 91, 98, 578 A.2d 228, 269, 271
(1990) (holding that the minutes of an American Textile Institute meeting, as well as the
deposition of the president of the Industrial Health Foundation, were admissible despite
defendant's claim that it was not a member of either organization), afd in part and rev'd
in part, 326 Md. 179, 604 A.2d 445 (1992).
23. 215 Md. 299, 138 A.2d 375 (1958).
24. Id. at 304, 138 A.2d at 378 (quoting 2 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR.,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 28.4 (1956)).
25. See, e.g., Twombley v. Fuller Brush Co., 221 Md. 476, 494, 158 A.2d 110, 119
(1960) (citing Babylon, but framing the issue as "[wihether or not the defendant knew or
ought to have known that its [product] was likely to be dangerous when put to its in-
tended use"); Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 304, 336 A.2d 118, 128
(1975) (citing Babylon, but holding that "a manufacturer or a dealer is liable only if he
knew of or could have by reasonable care discovered the defect").
26. See, e.g., Honolulu Ltd. v. Cain, 244 Md. 590, 224 A.2d 433 (1966). In Cain, the
Court of Appeals held that "[c]onformance to an industry standard is, of course, often
weighty evidence that the action in question is reasonable and non-negligent. It is not,
however, conclusive evidence." Id. at 598, 224 A.2d at 437.
27. See Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 353, 363 A.2d 955, 963
(1976). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
28. Although products liability is generally thought to impose liability without fault,
thus making the defendant's knowledge irrelevant, this is not usually so in failure-to-
warn claims. See infra text accompanying note 71.
824 [VOL. 52:821
Special Appeals confronted the issue in Troja v. Black & Decker Manu-
facturing Co. 29 Although the court expressed a willingness to hold
that state-of-the-art evidence was admissible in strict liability failure-
to-warn claims, Troja did not conclusively decide the question be-
cause the court found that the relevant testimony referred to the
state of the art at the time of trial, instead of at the time of manufac-
ture.30 Less than one year later, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit addressed the state-of-the-art question in
Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp. , t finding "that in Maryland,
state of the art can be considered in a strict liability tort case where
the claimed defect is a failure to warn.' '32
The application of state-of-the-art knowledge was also ad-
dressed by the Court of Special Appeals in Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc.
v. Balbos.33 In Balbos, the intermediate appellate court held that evi-
dence of state-of-the-art knowledge was admissible in a negligence-
based failure-to-warn claim s.34 However, the question of whether
the Court of Appeals would adopt the Fourth Circuit's Lohrmann
holding or narrowly construe the Balbos holding to limit the applica-
tion of state-of-the-art evidence to negligence-based products liabil-
ity claims remained open until the Zenobia decision. The Zenobia
court opted to follow Lohrmann's lead, holding that state-of-the-art
knowledge was relevant and admissible in a strict products liability
failure-to-warn claim.3 5
b. Supplier's and Installer's Liability.-Prior to the advent of strict
liability in Maryland, the general rule in negligence-based products
liability cases was that a nonmanufacturing supplier or installer was
equally as liable as a manufacturer. In Woolley v. Uebelhor,36 the court
held that "a vendor, like a manufacturer, is subject to liability if,
although ignorant of the dangerous character or condition, he could
29. 62 Md. App. 101, 488 A.2d 516 (1985).
30. See id. at 112, 488 A.2d at 521 (referring to "a direct admonition by the court that
it was concerned with the status of the technology as it existed in 1976 [the date of
manufacture], not 1984 [the trial date]"). Cf Robert D. Klein, 'Old Products'.- The Admissi-
bility of State of the Art Evidence in Product Liability Cases, 9 J. PROD. LIAB. 233, 258 (1986)
(categorizing Troja as conclusively establishing the admissibility of state-of-the-art evi-
dence in failure-to-warn claims).
31. 782 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir. 1986).
32. Id. at 1164.
33. 84 Md. App. 10, 578 A.2d 228 (1990), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 326 Md. 179,
604 A.2d 445 (1992).
34. Id. at 48-49, 578 A.2d at 246-47.
35. Zenobia, 325 Md. at 437, 601 A.2d at 641.
36. 239 Md. 318, 211 A.2d 302 (1965).
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have by the exercise of reasonable care discovered it by utilizing the
peculiar opportunity and competence which he has or should have as a dealer in
such chattels.""7
In Phipps v. General Motors Corp. ,38 which introduced strict liabil-
ity in Maryland, the court implied that both manufacturers and sup-
pliers would be held to the same standard by holding that "[flor a
seller to be liable under § 402A, the product must be both in a 'de-
fective condition' and 'unreasonably dangerous' at the time that it is
placed on the market by the seller. '3 9 The use of the generic term
"seller" suggested that the Phipps court did not distinguish between
manufacturers and suppliers or installers of defective products.
This equal treatment of manufacturers and suppliers was reaffirmed
by the Court of Special Appeals in Balbos.4 °
In Balbos, the court revitalized the "peculiar competence" rule
and applied it in a negligence-based products liability case.4 ' The
court treated the installer of asbestos-containing products in exactly
the same manner as the manufacturer, holding them equally lia-
ble.42 The question of whether this equal treatment would be ex-
tended to strict products liability claims, however, remained open
until Zenobia. In Zenobia, the court decided that it would be so
extended.43
c. Punitive Damages.-The landmark case of Knickerbocker Ice Co.
v. Gardiner Dairy Co.4 4 established a cause of action for torts arising
out of contract in Maryland.45 In addition, Knickerbocker held that
punitive damages were recoverable in such an action if malice was
37. Id. at 325, 211 A.2d at 306 (emphasis added).
38. 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976).
39. Id. at 344, 363 A.2d at 959 (emphasis added).
40. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Balbos, 84 Md. App. 10, 578 A.2d 228 (1990), affd in
part and rev'd in part, 326 Md. 179, 604 A.2d 445 (1992).
41. See id. at 50, 578 A.2d at 247.
42. Id. at 49-50, 578 A.2d at 247.
43. Zenobia, 325 Md. at 441-42, 601 A.2d at 643.
44. 107 Md. 556, 69 A. 405 (1908).
45. See id. at 566, 69 A. at 409 ("It may be safely said that, if wrongful or unlawful
means are employed to induce the breach of a contract, and injury ensues, the party so
causing the breach is liable in an action of tort."). See also Gary I. Strausberg, A Roadmap
Through Malice, Actual or Implied: Punitive Damages in Torts Arising Out of Contract in Mary-
land, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 275, 275 (1984) ("A tort arises out of a contract when the act of
breaching an agreement gives rise to a separate cause of action in tort.").
The Court of Appeals found that the Zenobia case properly fit within the "tort aris-
ing out of contract" framework because "the injuries of the plaintiffs are surrounded by
.contractual' relationships, e.g., the employment contract, the contracts to pro-




In Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co. ,7 the court deviated from prior
Maryland decisions and allowed a showing of implied malice for re-
covery of punitive damages.48 Implied malice does not require the
evil intent to injure found in actual malice. 49 Instead, implied mal-
ice encompasses conduct of an extraordinary nature characterized
by extreme recklessness and wanton behavior.5" The Smith doctrine
of implied malice was originally intended to be a limited holding,
"confined to a wanton or reckless disregard for human life, and to the
operation of a motor vehicle."' 5 ' However, the implied malice doctrine
was gradually applied in a variety of situations, eventually becoming
stretched beyond its originally intended scope.52 With two types of
malice available, many felt that a plaintiff had the choice of proving
actual malice or the less-burdensome implied malice in order to
support a claim for punitive damages.53
The companion cases of H & R Block v. Testerman 54 and Wedeman
v. City Chevrolet Co. 55 refined the existing case law. Taken together,
these cases established the "arising out of contract" distinction re-
46. Knickerbocker, 107 Md. at 569-70, 69 A. at 410. At this point in Maryland's legal
history, there existed only one "type" of malice-actual malice. See id. at 569, 69 A. at
410. "Actual malice" has been defined as "the performance of an unlawful act, inten-
tionally or wantonly, without legal justification or excuse but with an evil or rancorous
motive influenced by hate; the purpose being to deliberately and wilfully injure the
plaintiff." Drug Fair of Md., Inc. v. Smith, 263 Md. 341, 352, 283 A.2d 392, 398 (1971).
47. 267 Md. 149, 297 A.2d 721 (1972), overruled by Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia,
325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992).
48. See id. at 168, 297 A.2d at 731.
49. Id. at 161, 297 A.2d at 728.
50. Id.
51. H & R Block, Inc. v. Testerman, 275 Md. 36, 47, 338 A.2d 48, 54 (1975), overruled
by Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992). See also Smith, 267
Md. at 166, 297 A.2d at 731 (expressing concern regarding "the danger of formulating a
test which may be so flexible that it can become virtually unlimited in its application").
52. Compare Smith, 267 Md. at 168, 297 A.2d at 731 (defining implied malice as a
"wanton or reckless disregard for human life" (emphasis added)) with Wedeman v. City
Chevrolet Co., 278 Md. 524, 533, 366 A.2d 7, 13 (1976) (stretching the concept of im-
plied malice to include an "utter disregard for the rights of others" (emphasis added)), over-
ruled by Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992).
53. For example, in Testerman v. H & R Block, Inc., 22 Md. App. 320, 324 A.2d 145
(1974), rev'd, 275 Md. 36, 338 A.2d 48 (1975), the Court of Special Appeals held that,
although there was no showing of malice, the negligent preparation of tax returns "was
in reckless disregard of the rights of others, and would support an award of punitive
damages." Id. at 351, 324 A.2d at 161-62 (footnote omitted).
54. 275 Md. 36, 338 A.2d 48 (1975), overruled by Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325
Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992).
55. 278 Md. 524, 366 A.2d 7 (1976), overruled by Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325
Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992).
828 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 52:821
garding punitive damages.56 In Testerman, the Court of Appeals held
that when the tortious conduct occurs after a contractual relation-
ship is established-that is, the tort "arises out of" the contract-
actual malice is required for an award of punitive damages.5 7 Con-
versely, Wedeman held that if the tort occurs before the contract ex-
ists, then the action is a "pure" tort action requiring only a showing
of implied malice to support an award of punitive damages.58
The Court of Special Appeals, in American Laundry Machinery In-
dustries v. Horan,5 9 attempted to apply the Testerman - Wedeman distinc-
tion to a products liability action. The court decided that although
sales of products in consumer transactions do involve contracts, a
products liability action does not "arise out of" that contract when
the injured plaintiff is not a party to the contract.6" Therefore, the
American Laundry court found that the plaintiffs could properly be
awarded punitive damages on a showing of implied malice alone, in
compliance with the Testerman -Wedeman distinction. 6' Because mal-
ice is not normally found within a products liability setting, the court
set forth the following definition of implied malice for products lia-
bility actions: "Wanton and reckless conduct .. .requires, in this
context, [1] direct evidence of substantial knowledge on the part of
the manufacturer that the product is, or is likely to become, danger-
ous, and [2] a gross indifference to the danger."'62
In Zenobia, the Court of Appeals overruled the Testerman-
Wedeman distinction, as well as the doctrine of implied malice set
56. Prior to Zenobia, this distinction had been upheld by the Court of Appeals in
Schaefer v. Miller, 322 Md. 297, 587 A.2d 491 (1991). The future of the distinction
seemed tenuous at best, however, even in Schaefer. Although it was reaffirmed, the Tes-
terman-Wedeman distinction endured strong criticism from Judge Eldridge in his concur-
ring opinion. Id. at 312, 587 A.2d at 498 (Eldridge, J., concurring in the judgment).
Eldridge, who wrote for the Zenobia majority that overruled the Testerman-Wedeman dis-
tinction, attacked the rule as having "utterly no relationship to the purposes of punitive
damages, lead[ing] to irrational results, and [as having] been arbitrarily and inconsis-
tently applied." Id., 587 A.2d at 499 (Eldridge, J., concurring in the judgment).
57. Testerman, 275 Md. at 47, 338 A.2d at 54. General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 281
Md. 627, 381 A.2d 16 (1977), further refined the holding in Testerman by requiring that
there be a "direct nexus" between the tortious conduct and the contract to the extent
that "[iun one form or another ... the tort arose directly from performance or breach of
the contract." Id. at 637, 381 A.2d at 21.
58. Wedeman, 278 Md. at 529-31, 366 A.2d at 11-12.
59. 45 Md. App. 97, 412 A.2d 407 (1980).
60. Id. at 116, 412 A.2d at 419.
61. Id. The Court of Special Appeals limited its holding in American Laundry to puni-
tive damages arising from a negligence cause of action because the Court of Appeals had
not yet ruled on the propriety of punitive damages in a strict liability action. Id. at 111,
412 A.2d at 416.
62. Id. at 117, 412 A.2d at 420.
forth in Smith. 63 In so doing, the court rejected twenty years of
Maryland precedent surrounding the law on punitive damages. The
Zenobia court held that in all non-intentional tort cases' "the trier of
facts may not award punitive damages unless the plaintiff has estab-
lished that the defendant's conduct was characterized by evil motive,
intent to injure, ill will, or fraud-'actual malice.'"65
3. The Court's Reasoning.-
a. State-of-the-Art Knowledge.-The Zenobia court reasoned that
evidence of state-of-the-art knowledge was admissible in a strict lia-
bility failure-to-warn claim by conducting an in-depth analysis of Re-
statement section 402A.6 6 Section 402A, along with all of the
accompanying official comments, was expressly adopted in Mary-
land under the holding in Phipps v. General Motors Corp. 67 In its anal-
ysis, the Zenobia court recognized that Comment j, which defines
strict liability for failure to warn, "create[s] an exception to the basic
rule set out in § 402A."'68 The court conceded that the "exception"
requires some element of knowledge in a strict liability action in this
context.6 9 Therefore, "negligence concepts to some extent have
been grafted onto strict liability." 7 °
Once the line between negligence and strict liability became
blurred, the court was free to acknowledge the "general rule" that a
manufacturer is not strictly liable in a failure-to-warn case when the
absence of a warning is directly attributable to the manufacturer's
63. Zenobia, 325 Md. at 453, 460, 601 A.2d at 649, 652.
64. See id. at 460 n.21, 601 A.2d at 653 n.21 (defining non-intentional tort actions as
including all negligence and strict liability claims).
65. Id. at 460, 601 A.2d at 652.
66. See id. at 433-38, 601 A.2d at 639-41.
67. See Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 353, 363 A.2d 955, 963
(1976).
68. Zenobia, 325 Md. at 433, 601 A.2d at 639. The "basic rule" of § 402A is that
strict liability imposes liability upon the seller without any showing of fault, thereby mak-
ing the defendant's knowledge irrelevant. Id. at 432, 601 A.2d at 639.
69. Id. at 433, 601 A.2d at 639.
70. Id. at 435, 601 A.2d at 640. The line between negligence and strict liability in
failure-to-warn cases has always been less than clear. In fact, as the Court of Appeals
noted, some commentators have suggested that the distinction is illusory and should be
rejected. See James A. Henderson, Jr. and Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products
Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 272 (1990) (advancing
this proposition).
However, the Zenobia court also pointed out that there remains one important dif-
ference between strict products liability and a negligence-based products liability claim:
contributory negligence is not a defense to a strict liability claim. Zenobia, 325 Md. at
435 n.7, 601 A.2d at 640 n.7.
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lack of knowledge regarding the danger.7" However, in order to cir-
cumvent this general rule, the Zenobia court relied on the Fourth
Circuit's interpretation of Comment j. 72 In Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh
Corning Corp. , the Fourth Circuit held that Comment j encom-
passes state-of-the-art knowledge "because it requires the seller to
give a warning if he has knowledge, 'or by the application of reason-
able, developed human skill and foresight should have knowledge,' of
the danger."74  The Lohrmann interpretation, coupled with the
court's concession that negligence concepts play a role in this type
of strict liability action, led the Zenobia court to its ultimate conclu-
sion that state-of-the-art evidence is necessary to establish knowl-
edge in a failure-to-warn claim.75
b. Supplier's and Installer's Liability.-The issue of the liability of
the suppliers and installers in Zenobia arose in the context of a dis-
pute concerning the admissibility of certain deposition testimony.7 6
The Court of Appeals relied on Comment f of section 402A, 77 enti-
tled "Business of Selling," to support its holding that the asbestos
71. Zenobia, 325 Md. at 433, 601 A.2d at 639.
72. Id. at 436, 601 A.2d at 640-41.
73. 782 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir. 1986).
74. Id. at 1165 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965))
(emphasis added).
75. See Zenobia, 325 Md. at 437, 601 A.2d at 641. The Zenobia court also suggested
that the burden of determining state-of-the-art knowledge falls on the plaintiff as a part
of his prima facie case, because "defectiveness is an element to be proven by the plain-
tiff." Id. at 438 n.8, 601 A.2d at 641-42 n.8. Some jurisdictions, however, have con-
cluded that state-of-the-art knowledge is an affirmative defense to a negligence-based
failure-to-warn claim, whereby the defendant can escape liability by proving that no one
in the land knew that the product was dangerous at the time of its manufacture. See
Beshada v.Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 546 (N.J. 1982) (concluding that
"state-of-the-art is a negligence defense ... [that] seeks to explain why defendants are
not culpable for failing to provide a warning"). See also Wertheimer, supra note 21, at
1207 ("Under this [state-of-the-art] defense as originally constituted, the defendant was
allowed to escape liability by proving that the product was as safe as the technology at
the time of its manufacture made possible.").
76. See Zenobia, 325 Md. at 439, 601 A.2d at 642.
77. Comment f of § 402A reads, in pertinent part:
f Business of selling. The rule stated in this Section applies to any person
engaged in the business of selling products for use or consumption. It there-
fore applies to any manufacturer of such a product, to any wholesale or retail
dealer or distributor, and to the operator of a restaurant....
The basis for the rule is the ancient one of the special responsibility for the
safety of the public undertaken by one who enters into the business of supply-
ing human beings with products which may endanger the safety of their per-
sons and property, and the forced reliance upon that undertaking on the part of
those who purchase such goods.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. f (1965).
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manufacturers were "predecessors in interest" of the suppliers and
installers, and therefore, the depositions were admissible. 78  The
court also relied heavily on the hornbook statement that
when a manufacturer or assembler markets without ade-
quate warnings, a reseller is subject to liability without neg-
ligence in reselling the product without adequate warning.
Thus, all those in the marketing chain subsequent to a sale
by the manufacturer are liable without negligence for the
negligence of the manufacturer in failing to warn or ade-
quately to warn.79
Although the issue is couched in terms of an evidentiary dispute, the
real import of the Zenobia court's holding on this point is that state-
of-the-art evidence is equally relevant and admissible against suppli-
ers and installers of defective products, as well as manufacturers of
those products. 80
c. Punitive Damages.-The Court of Appeals embarked on its
analysis of the law of punitive damages in Maryland by commenting
on the "proliferation of claims for punitive damages in tort cases,
and awards of punitive damages [that] have often been extremely
high."'" In its analysis, the Zenobia court confronted the companion
cases of Testerman82 and Wedeman,83 as well as Smith v. Gray Concrete
Pipe Co.,84 and chose to overrule each in turn. 5
78. See Zenobia, 325 Md. at 442-44, 601 A.2d at 644. A "predecessor in interest" is
defined as any party who has motives to develop a certain line of testimony that are
similar to those of the objecting party. Id. at 440, 601 A.2d at 643. The central idea is
that if the objecting party's predecessor in interest was present at the deposition then all
of the relevant questions were asked. Therefore, the objecting party was not prejudiced
in any way by not being present at the deposition, and the deposition should be admissi-
ble. Id. at 440-41, 601 A.2d at 643.
79. Id. at 442, 601 A.2d at 643-44 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 99, at 697 (5th ed. 1984)) (emphasis omitted). Note,
however, that Prosser and Keeton was discussing products liability claims grounded in neg-
ligence. It does not necessarily follow that the same rules apply to products liability
actions grounded in strict liability. The Zenobia court, however, failed to address this
point.
80. Zenobia, 325 Md. at 441-43, 601 A.2d at 643-44 (holding that the absence of an
adequate warning, as required by the state of the art, makes "middlemen or intermedi-
ate sellers of the defective product ...strictly liable to the plaintiff user just as the
manufacturer is liable to the plaintiff").
81. Id. at 450, 601 A.2d at 648.
82. H & R Block Inc. v. Testerman, 275 Md. 36, 338 A.2d 48 (1975), overruled by
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992).
83. Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., 278 Md. 524, 366 A.2d 7 (1976), overruled by
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992).
84. 267 Md. 149, 297 A.2d 721 (1972), overruled by Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia,
325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
The court first subjected the Testerman-Wedeman distinction-
the "arising out of contract" rule-to strict scrutiny in light of the
fundamental purposes of punitive damages: punishment and deter-
rence.8 6 The court reasoned that the "arising out of contract" rule
does not effectively deter a defendant's behavior because the rule
"focuses on when the conduct occurred rather than on the nature of
the conduct."8 7 The rule was found illogical because the tortious
conduct is equally as offensive whether it occurs before or after the
formation of a contractual relationship.88 Furthermore, the rule has
led to irrational results and inconsistent applications that "under-
mine[] the objective of deterrence because persons cannot predict,
and thus choose to abstain from, the type of behavior that is sanc-
tioned by a punitive damages award."8 9 The Court of Appeals
therefore concluded that this troublesome rule "has no relationship
to the purposes of punitive damages" 9 and wisely chose to aban-
don it. 9 '
When the Testerman-Wedeman distinction was overruled the
court was left with two possible standards for awarding punitive
damages, actual malice and implied malice. In choosing between
the standards, the court reasoned that "the implied malice standard
would not further either objective of punishment or deterrence. "92
Likewise, the doctrine of implied malice had been applied too
broadly and was, by its very definition, too vague to serve as an ef-
fective deterrent.93 The Zenobia court recognized that if a defendant
cannot ascertain what conduct is acceptable and what is not, he will
be incapable of altering his behavior to conform to the limits of that
which is acceptable.94
Before completely overruling it, the court attacked the Smith
doctrine of implied malice for departing from established Maryland
85. See Zenobia, 325 Md. at 453, 460, 601 A.2d at 649, 652.
86. See id. at 453-55, 601 A.2d at 649-50.
87. Id. at 454, 601 A.2d at 650.
88. See id., 601 A.2d at 649.
89. Id. at 455, 601 A.2d at 650.
90. Id. at 454, 601 A.2d at 650.
91. Id. at 455, 601 A.2d at 650.
92. Id. at 456, 601 A.2d at 650.
93. See id. at 459, 601 A.2d at 652.
94. See id. Another problem, as the court noted, is that a vague and inconsistent
standard for punitive damages could lead to the result that "[a] potential defendant will
... become too cautious, refusing to engage in socially beneficial behavior." Id. at 459-
60 n.19, 601 A.2d at 652 n.19 (quoting 2 LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN,
PUNITIVE DAMAGES app. B. at 418-19 (2d ed. 1989)).
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law, relying on out-of-state authority,95 and neglecting to analyze
whether the doctrine of implied malice would further the underlying
goals of punitive damages.96 The court acknowledged, however,
that the Smith court intended to limit its holding, and that the prob-
lem had developed in subsequent cases when this holding was
"freely applied to other non-intentional torts."9 7 Thus, the Zenobia
court clarified this doctrinal confusion in Maryland law.
In its holding, the court announced that a showing of actual
malice will now be required to support an award of punitive dam-
ages in all non-intentional tort actions.98 Turning to the facts in
Zenobia, the court acknowledged that because this standard is "char-
acterized by evil motive, intent to injure, ill will, or fraud, [it] does
not translate easily into products liability cases... [because] it is not
likely that a manufacturer or supplier of a defective product would
specifically intend to harm a particular consumer."99 The Zenobia
court therefore customized its new standard to fit products liability
settings. 00 A products liability plaintiff must now prove "(1) actual
knowledge of the defect on the part of the defendant, and (2) the
defendant's conscious or deliberate disregard of the foreseeable
harm resulting from the defect" in order to justify the jury's consid-
eration of punitive damages.10 '
95. But see id. at 463-65, 601 A.2d at 654-55 (relying almost exclusively on out-of-
state authority to hold that punitive damages are not inconsistent with a strict products
liability claim).
96. Id. at 456, 601 A.2d at 650-51.
97. Id. at 457, 601 A.2d at 651.
98. Id. at 460, 601 A.2d at 652. As noted previously, the Zenobia court also held that
a heightened standard of proof-that of "clear and convincing evidence"-will now be
required to support an award of punitive damages in all tort cases. Id. at 469, 601 A.2d
at 657. The court gave two reasons for this decision: (1) punitive damages tend to
stigmatize the defendant due to their quasi-criminal nature, and (2) the need to insure
that punitive damages are properly awarded. Id. at 468, 601 A.2d at 656.
99. Id. at 460-61, 601 A.2d at 653.
100. See id. at 462, 601 A.2d at 653.
101. Id. See infra notes 140-141 and accompanying text for a comparison of the hold-
ing in Zenobia to that of the Court of Special Appeals in American Laundry Mach. Indus. v.
Horan, 45 Md. App. 97, 412 A.2d 407 (1980).
In the course of its holding, the Zenobia court also laid to rest the popular argument
that punitive damages are inconsistent with the nature of a strict products liability action
because they require an element of fault whereas strict liability imposes liability without
fault. Zenobia, 325 Md. at 463-65, 601 A.2d at 654-55. The court maintained that there
is no inconsistency and explained simply that different levels of proof must be met in
order to recover. Id. at 465, 601 A.2d at 655. For example, a plaintiff may submit state-
of-the-art evidence to support his claim for compensatory damages, and then take his
case a step further, in order to support his claim for punitive damages, by submitting
evidence that the defendant actually knew of the defect and consciously disregarded the
danger. Id.
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4. Analysis.-The Court of Appeals addressed two issues that
were not raised by any of the parties to the litigation. 0 2 The Zenobia
case thus appears to be simply a vehicle by which the Court of Ap-
peals chose to steer Maryland law away from what it perceived to be
excessive, runaway jury verdicts and towards a solid foundation of
compensatory relief for injured plaintiffs.
a. State-of-the-Art Knowledge.-In its analysis of the Restatement,
the Court of Appeals concluded that strict liability failure-to-warn
claims necessarily incorporate some negligence concepts, such as
the requirement of knowledge.'l 3 The fundamental problem with
the analysis is that the court did not provide any justification for its
holding that state-of-the-art knowledge, an arguably high standard,
is the appropriate degree to require. 10 4
Zenobia represents a transition in Maryland from reliance on in-
dustry standards as evidence of a manufacturer's reasonableness to
the strict scrutiny imposed by state-of-the-art knowledge. 10 5 This
102. As to the admissibility of state-of-the-art evidence, the court admitted that
"neither side . . . challenged the trial court's ruling that a knowledge component or
'state of the art' is pertinent in a strict liability failure to warn case." Zenobia, 325 Md. at
436, 601 A.2d at 640.
Additionally, as to the correct standard to support an award of punitive damages,
the court ordered the parties to brief and argue this issue in the following court order:
"In light of the concurring opinion ofJudges Eldridge, Chasanow, and Cole in Schaefer v.
Miller, 322 Md. 297, 312-332, 587 A.2d 491 (1991), what should be the correct standard
under Maryland law for the allowance of punitive damages in negligence and products
liability cases, i.e., gross negligence, actual malice, or some other standard." Zenobia,
325 Md. at 450, 601 A.2d at 647.
103. Zenobia, 325 Md. at 435, 601 A.2d at 640.
104. In other words, the court did not explain its conclusion that if an expert has
knowledge of the dangers of a product, then the manufacturer "should have knowl-
edge" of that danger as well. Id. at 437, 601 A.2d at 641. It should go without saying
that this is not necessarily true. It often takes years for new medical discoveries to be
disseminated to the public, and even longer for the implications of these discoveries to
be absorbed and understood by manufacturers. Because courts have overlapped strict
liability with negligence concepts, Zenobia could have chosen to require a showing of
actual or implied knowledge instead of state-of-the-art knowledge. See, e.g., O'Connor v.
Kawasaki Motors Corp., 699 F. Supp. 1538, 1543 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (holding that "[a]
retailer or distributor may be held liable for a design defect only if it can be charged with
actual or implied knowledge of the defect"). Although the court provides no justifica-
tion for its choice, on the continuum of possible knowledge requirements, state-of-the-
art knowledge does seem to be most in accord with the traditional principles of strict
liability-that is, liability without fault.
105. Industry standards are very different from state-of-the-art knowledge in that
"[s]tate of the art is a higher standard because scientific knowledge expands much more
rapidly than industry can assimilate the knowledge and adopt it as a standard."
Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1164 (4th Cir. 1986). While the
Lohrmann court assumed that once an industry is aware of the state-of-the-art knowledge
it will always choose to adopt it as an industry standard, id., this may not always be the
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development has dramatically changed Maryland law, and not with-
out societal costs. First is the recognition that manufacturers will no
longer be able to cloak themselves in the safety that industry stan-
dards previously afforded them. The days of the "that was common
practice throughout the industry" defense are effectively over. Now
held to the level of an expert, manufacturers will be forced to seri-
ously rethink their current research and development policies,
which will invariably have economic implications for the con-
sumer.' °6 Secondly, Zenobia will affect Maryland law and practice
because of the increased importance it places on discovery proceed-
ings in products liability cases. In order to establish state-of-the-art
knowledge, there will doubtless be a need for additional depositions
of expert witnesses, interrogatories, and requests for documents,
with their subsequent costs both to the litigants and to society.10 7
Although state-of-the-art knowledge is an arguably high stan-
dard, there are jurisdictions that have concluded that knowledge is
totally irrelevant in products liability actions.'0" In such jurisdic-
tions, no element of knowledge is required in order for the plaintiff
to recover, not even that of state of the art. A manufacturer in these
jurisdictions will be held liable even if none of the relevant experts
knew of the product's dangers at the time of its manufacture. Such
holdings are normally reached by concluding that the fundamental
purpose of products liability is some combination of the following:
compensation for the unwitting victim, risk spreading, and accident
avoidance. 10 9 Regardless of how it is described, this is virtually ab-
case. In fact, it may be economically reasonable and highly profitable to an industry not
to alter its policies in accord with the state of the art.
106. One could question whether this is a prudent move in light of the current eco-
nomic recession. With many products (such as new cars) already out of reach for the
average consumer, this push from the Court of Appeals can only serve to raise prices
even higher in order to offset additional research and testing that will be required by
manufacturers in order to minimize liability.
107. The same holds true for the requirement of actual malice to support punitive
damages. The plaintiff s attorney can look forward to attending numerous depositions
in order to establish who in the corporation knew what and when, as well as rummaging
through boxes of corporate documents in the hopes of finding the "smoking gun"
memo which expressly warns the corporation of a product's danger.
108. See Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 740 P.2d 548, 549 (Haw. 1987) (hold-
ing that "in a strict products liability action, state-of-the-art evidence is not admissible
for the purpose of establishing whether the seller knew or reasonably should have
known of the dangerousness of his or her product"); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods.
Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 544 (N.J. 1982) (holding that "strict liability is product-oriented,
asking [only] whether the product was reasonably safe for its foreseeable purposes").





Manufacturers across Maryland can be thankful that the Court
of Appeals rejected this absolutist approach and realized "that
'[d]espite the use of the term "strict liability" the seller is not an
insurer, as absolute liability is not imposed on the seller for any in-
jury resulting from the use of his product.' ,1'
b. Supplier's and Installer's Liability.-After analyzing Comment f
of Restatement section 402A," 2 the court concluded that sellers are
equally as liable as manufacturers in strict liability failure-to-warn
claims when a warning was required "in light of the state of the
art.""' 3 The obvious flaw with this analysis is that Comment f does
not mention state-of-the-art knowledge, nor is it likely that such a
standard was being applied by the courts when the Restatement was
published in 1965." 4
Moreover, the court's reliance on Eaton Corp. v. Wright 115 and
Nissen Corp. v. Miller"16 seems misplaced because both of those cases
are factually distinguishable from Zenobia. In Eaton Corp., the retailer
of the propane fuel canister that exploded was never even named in
the plaintiff's suit. "1 7 In Nissen Corp., the court did not even address
the question of a seller's liability; it focused on the fact that the de-
fendant was a corporate successor to the original seller of a defec-
tive product, and was not involved in the original sale." 8 However,
the result-oriented reasoning of the Zenobia court failed to take these
inconsistencies into account.
The decision in Zenobia, coupled with the subsequent decision
110. See id. at 545-48 (relying on these policy concerns despite the defendant's con-
tentions that it is being held absolutely liable).
111. Zenobia, 325 Md. at 437, 601 A.2d at 641 (quoting Phipps v. General Motors
Corp., 278 Md. 337, 351-52, 363 A.2d 955, 963 (1976)).
112. See supra note 77 for the relevant text.
113. Zenobia, 325 Md. at 441, 601 A.2d at 643.
114. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. f (1965). Roberts v. May, 583
P.2d 305 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978), appears to be the earliest case to apply a state-of-the-art
standard as it is currently recognized in Maryland. Notably, Roberts was not decided
until 1978, thirteen years after the Restatement was published.
115. 281 Md. 80, 375 A.2d 1122 (1977).
116. 323 Md. 613, 594 A.2d 564 (1991).
117. See Eaton Corp., 281 Md. at 83 n.1, 375 A.2d at 1124 n.l. The distributor of the
canister, the Coleman Company, was sued by the plaintiff. Id. at 82, 375 A.2d at 1123.
However, Coleman had placed its own label on the canister prior to distribution. Id.
Therefore, this placed Coleman squarely within the ambit of Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 400 (1965) (imposing liability on a seller for a product manufactured by another when
the seller represents that product as his own).
118. Nissen Corp., 323 Md. at 624, 594 A.2d at 569.
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by the Court of Appeals in Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Balbos," 9
created three different categories of failure-to-warn claims and as-
signed to suppliers and installers a slightly different standard of care
in each category. First, the court decided that a strict liability fail-
ure-to-warn claim will be evaluated under a "should have known"
standard. 120 In this category, state-of-the-art evidence will play a
role in determining what the supplier or installer should have
known.' 2 1 In a negligence-based failure-to-warn claim, the Balbos
court held that the proper standard depends upon the degree of
involvement of the supplier or installer. 22 Therefore, the second
category is that of a negligence-based failure-to-warn claim in which
the supplier or installer does "something more than merely act as a
conduit of goods."' 2' This category is also governed by a "should
have known" standard. 124 However, the critical difference is that
under the second category, the Woolley "peculiar competence"
rule 125 will play a role in determining what the supplier or installer
should have known.' 26 Finally, the last category is that of a negli-
gence-based failure-to-warn claim in which the supplier or installer
acts as "nothing more than a conduit between a manufacturer and a
customer.''127 This category is evaluated under the significantly
lower "reason to know" standard. 28
The distinctions that the court drew in categorizing the differ-
ent types of failure-to-warn claims do have a certain logical ap-
119. 326 Md. 179, 604 A.2d 445 (1992).
120. See id. at 199-200, 604 A.2d at 455 ("In Zenobia we held that a supplier-installer
... is held to a 'should have known' standard when the action is based on the principles
of strict liability under § 402A of the Restatement."). The "should have known" situa-
tion arises when "a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence or of the superior
intelligence of the actor would ascertain the fact in question in the performance of his
duty to another, or would govern his conduct upon the assumption that such fact ex-
ists." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 12(2) (1965).
121. Zenobia, 325 Md. at 442-43, 601 A.2d at 644 (holding that "intermediate sellers
such as the suppliers/installers in the present case have the same interest as the manu-
facturers in attempting to show that the state of the art did not require a warning").
122. Balbos, 326 Md. at 202-03, 604 A.2d at 456.
123. Id. at 203, 604 A.2d at 456.
124. Id., 604 A.2d at 457.
125. See Woolley v. Uebelhor, 239 Md. 318, 325, 211 A.2d 302, 306 (1965). See also
supra notes 36-77 and accompanying text.
126. Balbos, 326 Md. at 203-04, 604 A.2d at 457.
127. Id. at 202, 604 A.2d at 456.
128. Id. at 202-03, 604 A.2d at 456. The "reason to know" situation arises when "the
actor has information from which a person of reasonable intelligence or of the superior
intelligence of the actor would infer that the fact in question exists, or that such person
would govern his conduct upon the assumption that such fact exists." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 12(1) (1965).
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peal. 29 Problems arise, however, with the enhanced "should have
known" standard that the court created to govern two of these cate-
gories. For example, in a strict liability failure-to-warn claim, it
seems inherently unfair to hold a supplier or installer to the same
standard as a manufacturer. 130 Imposing state-of-the-art knowledge
on a manufacturer may be reasonable in light of the fact that manu-
facturers often have extensive research and development depart-
ments to test the safety of their products. However, it seems
inherently unfair, and misconceived for policy reasons, to require
suppliers and installers of products to set up similar testing facilities
before they decide to sell or install a particular product. Yet, this is
what Zenobia foreshadows.
Similarly, it may be time for the court to rethink the underlying
justifications for the Woolley "peculiar competence" rule as it is used
in negligence-based failure-to-warn claims. The rule in Woolley ef-
fectively creates an irrebuttable presumption that nonmanufactur-
ing installers have a "peculiar competence" regarding the products
they install, imposing liability on them simply because of that pre-
sumption.' 3 ' This justification is severely outdated. With today's
129. Note, however, that the court has created the anomaly that a supplier of products
who can properly be labelled a mere "conduit" will be fully liable to the plaintiff in strict
liability, but will escape all liability for negligence. This is because in the strict liability
claim state-of-the-art evidence is admissible against the supplier, but in the negligence
claim the supplier is not liable unless he had "reason to know" of the defect. This em-
phasis on form over substance merely turns the issue of liability into one of proper
pleading.
130. Note that the broader references to both suppliers and installers in this para-
graph, as well as the narrower references to only installers in the next paragraph, are
intentional. This is because in a negligence-based failure-to-warn claim, governed by
the Woolley rule, if a corporation is merely a supplier of products it will probably be
deemed a "conduit" and therefore subject to the "reason to know" standard.
131. See Woolley v. Uebelhor, 239 Md. 318, 325, 211 A.2d 302, 306 (1965). The
..peculiar competence" rule in Woolley was applied by the Court of Appeals to the install-
ers in the products liability asbestos case of Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Balbos, 326
Md. 179, 604 A.2d 445 (1992). Ask yourself critically whether you think that a general
contractor has a "peculiar competence" in the toxic effects of the building materials he
uses. Would he continue to surround himself and his workers with such materials if he
did? Often times such a contractor installs the asbestos-containing products at the spe-
cific direction of the owner of the building. Should the installer still be liable in this
situation?
The Balbos court took special notice of the fact that "Porter [the installer] was
formed by former employees of Johns-Manville [the manufacturer], a company that
dealt almost exclusively in asbestos products. Porter installed or otherwise supplied as-
bestos products acquired almost exclusively from Johns-Manville." Id. at 204, 604 A.2d
at 457. The court in Balbos seemed to be making a special reference to the close rela-
tionship that existed between the installer and the manufacturer in that case. However,
with regards to the liability of other installers, shouldn't Balbos create an exception
rather than the general rule?
high-technology products, even installers of products have little, if
any, "peculiar competence" with regard to the products they
install. 132
This problem of fairness to suppliers or installers, even when
they act as more than mere "conduits," is further exacerbated by the
fact that the dangers of asbestos fibers are arguably latent dangers.
Some jurisdictions have taken the following approach when con-
fronting latent defects:
An installer or handler of a piece of equipment or machin-
ery, manufactured by another, is under no duty to make more
than a visual inspection of the manufactured article for de-
fects, in the absence of some circumstance which a jury
could reasonably believe would put a reasonably prudent
man, under the same or similar circumstances, on notice
that the equipment contained some latent defect.1 33
The creation of such a "latent defect exception" seems to be a rea-
sonable approach.' 34 It is simply unnecessary to make a pool of de-
fendants that has virtually no way of knowing of the dangers of a
product open to a plaintiff's attack.'3 5 The plaintiff will be ade-
132. In fact, the holding in Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 306, 336
A.2d 118, 128 (1975), seems to directly contradict the rule in Woolley. There the court
stated that " '[d]esign negligence . . . in most instances involves questions of specialized
knowledge which the retailer cannot be expected to have.'" Id. at 305, 336 A.2d at 128
(quoting 2A Louis R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODucTs LIABILITY § 18.04
(1991)). Although the authors were referring to the liability of retailers in negligence-
based defective-design claims, that same rationale logically applies to the liability of in-
stallers in strict liability failure-to-warn claims.
133. Hubbard v. Gray Tool Co., 307 S.W.2d 599, 600 (Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1957) (em-
phasis added). See also 5 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 28.29 (2d ed.
1986) (advocating a rule that would hold sellers to a duty of discovering only those
defects discoverable upon a visual inspection).
134. This also seems to be the direction in which the Court of Special Appeals was
moving with its holding in De Chello v.Johnson Enterprises, 74 Md. App. 228, 236, 536
A.2d 1203, 1207 (1988) ("Maryland has long recognized a duty on the part of sellers to
warn of latent dangers attendant upon a proper use of the products they sell, where injury
is foreseeable.") (emphasis added), cert. denied, 312 Md. 601, 541 A.2d 964 (1988). The
Zenobia court seems to have totally ignored the possibility that De Chello created a "latent
defect exception," which would require that the dangers of a latent defect be foresee-
able by the supplier or installer before liability will be imposed.
135. Consider once more the holding in Frericks, 274 Md. at 306, 336 A.2d at 128,
where the dealer of an allegedly defectively designed automobile was absolved from
liability in negligence and strict liability because "[tihe dealer who had nothing to do
with the design of the car cannot be presumed to know of the defective design." Id. at
305, 336 A.2d at 128. The same argument applies with even more force in a failure-to-
warn claim. The supplier or installer-who had nothing to do with the research, testing,
and manufacture of the product-has no way of knowing that the product requires a
warning.
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quately compensated through the imposition of liability on the
manufacturer. 3
6
c. Punitive Damages.-Certain judges on the Court of Appeals,
noticeably concerned with the state of punitive damages law in
Maryland, had on prior occasions come to the conclusion that "the
law of punitive damages is 'broke' and needs 'fixing.' "1137 In Ze-
nobia, the court manufactured an opportunity to "fix" what it per-
ceived to be the deficiencies in Maryland punitive damages law. By
overruling the Testerman-Wedeman distinction, the court reclaimed
some of the consistency, rationality, and logic that had been lost in
the application of that rule. No longer will an award of punitive
damages turn on whether the tortious conduct occurred before or
after the existence of a contractual relationship. This is a welcome
change to Maryland law, as deterrence will be far better served by a
rule that does not turn on such an arbitrary distinction. The Court
of Appeals has finally realized that there is a reason why "[n]o other
jurisdiction has opted to march to the Testerman drum beat, dance to
Wedeman's tune, or vocalize Piskor lyrics." 13
However, the Zenobia court went further. The court abandoned
the Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co. doctrine of implied malice and re-
quired that actual malice be shown in all non-intentional tort cases
to support an award of punitive damages.' 39 In the products liabil-
136. Consider also the insurance implications of the court's holdings. When Zenobia
and Balbos are read together with earlier Maryland cases, it appears that an installer now
has an even greater duty than that of a manufacturer with respect to the product being
installed. An installer can still be held liable for negligent installation of the product and
any act of negligence that occurs during the installation process. See Johnson v. Mitchell
Supply, Inc., 33 Md. App. 99, 363 A.2d 657 (1976) (negligent stacking of building
materials); Ambassador Apartment Corp. v. McCauley, 182 Md. 275, 34 A.2d 333
(1943) (negligent installation of window screen); Holland Furnace Co. v. Rollman, 179
Md. 510, 20 A.2d 500 (1941) (negligent installation of hot air furnace).
Zenobia and Balbos add to the existing liabilities of installers all of the liabilities asso-
ciated with the manufacture of a product, regardless of the fact that the installer played
no part in the manufacturing process. See, e.g., Zenobia, 325 Md. at 442-43, 601 A.2d at
644 (holding installers strictly liable for failing to warn of the dangers of asbestos). The
effect of these holdings may have a disastrous effect on the future of installers across
Maryland once insurance companies fully comprehend the extent of the installers' po-
tential liability.
137. See, e.g., St. Luke Evangelical Lutheran Church, Inc. v. Smith, 318 Md. 337, 364,
568 A.2d 35, 48 (1990) (Rodowsky, J., dissenting).
138. Miller v. Schaefer, 80 Md. App. 60, 78, 559 A.2d 813, 821 (1989) (Gilbert, C.J.,
concurring), aff'd, 322 Md. 297, 587 A.2d 491 (1991).
139. Zenobia, 325 Md. at 460, 601 A.2d at 652. One can only speculate as to whether
the "inferred actual malice" doctrine of Henderson v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 278 Md.
514, 366 A.2d 1 (1976), survives the holding in Zenobia. In Henderson, the court held that
punitive damages were properly awarded based on evidence, though circumstantial, that
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ity setting, this appears to be, at most, a nominal change. The Court
of Special Appeals, in American Laundry Machinery Industries v.
Horan,'41 had previously held that the implied malice standard
translated into the products liability area by requiring that there be
"[1] substantial knowledge on the part of the manufacturer that the
product is, or is likely to become, dangerous, and [2] a gross indifer-
ence to the danger."' 4 ' If, as it appears, the standard has remained
virtually the same after Zenobia, and only the name has been changed
from implied to actual malice, this begs the question: "Why make
this change in a products case?"
The court's rationale was that the standard should be raised to
actual malice because so doing will punish only behavior that is
characterized by an actual evil motive, intent to injure, ill will, or
fraud.142 By creating this "bright line," a potential defendant be-
comes aware of what types of behavior are punishable by punitive
damages. 143 Thus, the defendant will be able to avoid those types of
behavior, and the underlying goal of deterrence will be realized. 144
The critical flaw in the court's reasoning is that, although the new
standard realizes deterrence in the limited class of cases character-
ized by actual malice, it leaves wholly unaffected all other cases char-
acterized by outrageous conduct. 14 5
permitted a reasonable and probable inference of actual malice to be drawn by the jury.
Id. at 522, 366 A.2d at 6. Henderson may prove instrumental in the future to lessen the
plaintiff's burden of showing actual malice, and to afford some degree of flexibility
within the doctrine of actual malice itself.
140. 45 Md. App. 97, 412 A.2d 407 (1980).
141. Id. at 117, 412 A.2d at 420 (emphasis added). Compare this to the holding in
Zenobia, which defined the actual malice standard as requiring: "(1) actual knowledge of
the defect on the part of the defendant, and (2) the defendant's conscious or deliberate
disregard of the foreseeable harm resulting from the defect." Zenobia, 325 Md. at 462,
601 A.2d at 653 (emphasis added). This analysis should result in a conclusion that the
definition of malice, whether it is labelled as implied or actual malice, has not been
changed substantively as it has evolved from American Laundry to Zenobia.
The customized definition of malice for a products liability case seems both reason-
able and workable. Its reasonableness is found in the fact that it requires an element of
culpability before punitive damages will be imposed. After all, given that the goals of
punitive damages are punishment and deterrence, it logically follows that a defendant
should be culpable in some sense before punishment is imposed. The workability of the
definition is manifested in the line of cases, dating back to American Laundry in 1980, that
have successfully used it to govern awards of punitive damages.
142. Zenobia, 325 Md. at 460, 601 A.2d at 652.
143. Id. at 455, 601 A.2d at 650.
144. Id. at 456, 601 A.2d at 650.
145. This is essentially the same point made by Judge Bell in his concurring and dis-
senting opinion. Judge Bell stated that:
The long and short of it is that changing the standard for punitive damages will
eliminate numbers of cases, in which, heretofore, punitive damages would have
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Recklessness can and should be deterred.' 46 Recklessness, by
definition, requires that an actor be aware of the dangerous circum-
stances surrounding him, yet choose to disregard those dangers.
147
The very fact that the actor chooses his course of conduct, while being
aware of the dangers, means that deterrence can play a role. If, at
the moment of choice, the potential defendant is at all affected by
the thought that his conduct may be subject to punitive damages,
deterrence has been realized. In this sense, the law can become
proactive, affecting future behavior, rather than merely reactive to
past events. 1
48
To this end, the law of punitive damages did need some re-
working. However, the Court of Appeals went too far in aban-
doning the Smith doctrine of implied malice and resurrecting the
"insurmountable roadblock"'141 of actual malice. The desired re-
been appropriate and those cases now are eliminated not because their facts are
not egregious enough to justify such an award but because other, less serious,
and perhaps, undeserving, cases may also qualify for such damages. With all
due respect, that is not a sufficiently good reason to change the rules of the
game.
Id. at 484, 601 A.2d at 664-65 (Bell, J., concurring and dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
146. Few would argue that deterrence is not one of the major purposes of criminal
law. Many jurisdictions, including Maryland, have enacted criminal "reckless endanger-
ment" statutes in order to deter reckless behavior. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 120
(1992). It is difficult to comprehend why the Court of Appeals, by enforcing this crimi-
nal statute but denying civil punitive damages for reckless behavior, has taken the ap-
proach that recklessness is capable of being deterred in criminal cases, but not in civil
cases.
147. See Minor v. State, 326 Md. 436, 439, 605 A.2d 138, 139 (1992) (interpreting
Maryland's reckless endangerment statute as requiring "that the defendant consciously
disregarded a substantial risk").
148. Consider the following example: A day care center is hiring new employees.
During the job interview, one applicant confesses to the owner of the day care center
that he is a pedophile. Although the owner harbors no malice towards any of the chil-
dren, he hires the pedophile on the mistaken assumption that the pedophile would not
molest any of the children with whom he works. Several children are molested; the
pedophile is convicted and sentenced to prison. The children's parents bring a tortious
action for negligent supervision and hiring against the center's owner. Under Zenobia,
no punitive damages will lie because the defendant did not act with actual malice. Is this
a desired result? As a matter of public policy, wouldn't society rather have the owner
stop and consider the implications of hiring a pedophile to work at the day care center?
See also Zenobia, 325 Md. at 482-83, 601 A.2d at 664 (Bell, J., concurring and dissenting)
(formulating another hypothetical example where punitive damages should properly be
awarded).
Consider also the effects of Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 370, 601 A.2d 102,
116 (1992), which would limit the parent's non-economic damages (including emotional
distress, pain and suffering, etc.) to $350,000. Taken together, are Edmonds and Zenobia
enough to stifle this litigation altogether? Is this a desired result?
149. Aeropesca, Ltd. v. Butler Aviation Int'l, Inc., 44 Md. App. 610, 626, 411 A.2d
1055, 1064 (1980).
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suits could have been achieved by overruling the Testerman-Wedeman
distinction, increasing the standard of proof to that of "clear and
convincing evidence," setting the general rule for an award of puni-
tive damages to require actual malice, but retaining the doctrine of
implied malice for use as an exception to this general rule. 50 Abol-
ishing the Testerman-Wedeman "arising out of contract" distinction
would return consistency and logic to the application of punitive
damages. The heightened standard of proof would exclude many
undeserving cases. The establishment of actual malice as the gen-
eral rule for punitive damages would set the tone that Maryland law
will allow punitive damages only in the most egregious of cases.
However, the court would still be free to review, on a case-by-case
basis, whether a particular case is shocking enough to fall within an
exception under which a showing of implied malice would be
sufficient. 151
5. Conclusion.-The practical effects of Zenobia include the cre-
ation of a more relaxed standard for products liability plaintiffs to
establish the liability of corporate defendants, through the use of
state-of-the-art evidence. Additionally, those plaintiffs now have a
larger pool of potential defendants from which to choose, because
suppliers and installers are now equally as vulnerable as manufac-
turers. 5 2 Therefore, compensatory damages will be easier to re-
cover. Products liability defendants, however, have been spared the
150. This "exception to the general rule" approach regarding the doctrine of implied
malice is distinguishable from the approach taken by Judge Bell in his concurring and
dissenting opinion. Judge Bell advocated the retention of implied malice for use as "a
floor, not a ceiling." Zenobia, 325 Md. at 480, 601 A.2d at 663 (Bell, J., concurring and
dissenting). The problem withJudge Bell's approach is that it would return Maryland to
the post-Smith, pre-Testerman-Wedeman days, when the law of punitive damages was char-
acterized by a general confusion over whether the plaintiff was allowed to show implied
malice or required to show actual malice in any given case.
151. The appeal of this approach is that it will encourage plaintiffs who cannot show
actual malice to plead punitive damages only in certain cases. These cases arise when
plaintiffs have a good faith belief that the defendant's conduct was so egregious that it
will compel the court to allow the case to fall within the exception to the actual malice
requirement. In this sense, judicial efficiency will be furthered by the elimination of
frivolous punitive damages claims. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
Hopefully, the Maryland courts have learned their lesson from the post-Smith confu-
sion regarding punitive damages and will employ a standard of strict scrutiny before a
case is classified as falling within the exception. The criteria for falling within the excep-
tion may vary considerably. Nevertheless, some suggestions include reckless conduct
that results in: grievous bodily harm to an innocent plaintiff, a decrease in the plaintiff's
quality of life, or severe emotional or psychological harm to a young child. See supra note
148.
152. Zenobia, 325 Md. at 441, 601 A.2d at 643.
1993] TORTS 843
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
imposition of punitive damages unless the plaintiff can prove, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant had actual knowl-
edge of the defect and deliberately disregarded its dangers. 3
Thus, punitive damages have been severely limited.
Zenobia was decided in a products liability setting. However, the
Court of Appeals chose not to limit the punitive damages aspect of
its holding to the field of products liability.' 5 4 Therefore, in any
non-intentional tort action in the future, the plaintiff will have to
prove that the defendant acted with actual malice in order to sup-
port an award of punitive damages. 155 Far from serving the Court
of Appeals's stated goals of punishment and deterrence, the practi-
cal effect of this aspect of Zenobia may be to leave a large amount of
tortious conduct unpunished and undeterred.
ERIC B. BRUCE
B. Account Malpractice and Contributory Negligence
In Wegad v. Howard Street Jewelers, Inc.,156 the Court of Appeals
addressed the availability of the contributory negligence defense in
accountant malpractice actions, holding that a client who unreason-
ably relies on an accountant's advice may be found contributorily
negligent.' 57 The court ruled that the Circuit Court for Baltimore
County properly declined to give ajury instruction offered by How-
ard Street Jewelers, 5 8 which would have obviated the contributory
negligence defense by requiring the jury to absolve a client of fault
for its losses even if the client unjustifiably relied on its
accountants.159
Although the Wegad decision builds on extensive Maryland pre-
cedent in the areas of the propriety of jury instructions and general
153. See id. at 469. 462, 601 A.2d at 657, 653.
154. See id. at 460, 601 A.2d at 652.
155. Id.
156. 326 Md. 409, 605 A.2d 123 (1992).
157. See id. at 417-22, 605 A.2d at 127-30.
158. Howard Street Jewelers requested that the following specific jury instruction ac-
company the general instruction for contributory negligence:
The client can rely on the accountant's knowledge and skill. It is not contribu-
tory negligence for a client to follow an accountant's instructions, or rely on his
advice, or to fail to consult with another accountant or to discover the source of
a financial problem itself where the client has no reason to suspect his account-
ant's advice and instructions are wrong.
Id. at 412-13, 605 A.2d at 125.
159. See id. at 417-18, 605 A.2d at 128.
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contributory negligence law,' 6 ° it warrants criticism for its failure to
address the two conflicting standards developed by other state
courts for determining the availability of such a defense in account-
ant malpractice actions.1 6 1 While it did not explicitly recognize
either standard, the court's decision belies a preference for allowing
accountants to raise the contributory negligence defense any time
they can contend that the client's negligence contributed to its
loss. 16 2 It appears that, in the future, accountants in similar situa-
tions may escape liability even if their failure to perform their pro-
fessional obligations is unrelated to the negligence of their clients.
1. The Case.-Gilbert Wegad had been employed as Howard
Street Jewelers's accountant since 1948.161 Wegad sent Howard
Street Jewelers an annual engagement letter, which stated in part
"that his services did not include an audit and would 'not be
designed and cannot be relied upon to disclose fraud, defalcations
or other irregularities.' "" The same letter also stated that How-
ard Street Jewelers would be informed " 'of any matters that come
to [Wegad's] attention which cause [him] to believe that the infor-
mation furnished . . is not correct.' "165
In 1983, store management began to notice cash flow difficul-
ties, and these difficulties were discussed with Wegad at their yearly
meeting."' Whether Wegad warned Howard Street Jewelers that
employee theft was a possible cause of the cash shortage was dis-
160. See id. at 414-21, 605 A.2d at 126-30.
161. Compare National Surety Corp. v. Lybrand, 9 N.Y.S.2d 554, 563 (1939) (limiting
the contributory negligence defense to situations in which the client's negligence proxi-
mately caused the accountant's breach of duty) with Craig v. Anyon, 208 N.Y.S. 259, 268
(1925) (applying the contributory negligence defense with no limitation).
162. A court applying the National Surety standard, see infra notes 227-234 and accom-
panying text, to the facts of this case would not have found contributory negligence as a
matter of law, because the evidence did not meet the high standard for proving that
Howard Street Jewelers's actions had any relation to Wegad's negligence. See generally,
Eric R. Dinallo, Note, The Peculiar Treatment of Contributory Negligence in Accountants'Liability
Cases, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 329, 355-61 (1990) (providing several examples of the use of
the contributory negligence defense in different situations, and assessing the possibility
of success under the two different standards).
163. See Howard Street Jewelers, Inc. v. Wegad, 87 Md. App. 351, 354, 589 A.2d
1285, 1286 (1991), rev'd, 326 Md. 409, 605 A.2d 123 (1992). Wegad was first an em-
ployee of an accounting firm, and later, the principal of his own firm. Id.
164. See Wegad, 326 Md. at 417 n.3, 605 A.2d at 127 n.3.
165. Id.
166. See Howard Street Jewelers, 87 Md. App. at 354, 589 A.2d at 1286.
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puted by the parties; 67 however, at the time, Howard Street Jewel-
ers did seek to guard against theft by sales personnel.16 1
In 1984, Lore Levi, the wife of Howard Street Jewelers's
founder, became suspicious that Betty Mauck, the store's cashier,
was embezzling funds.' 69 Mauck handled ninety percent of Howard
Street Jewelers's cash, was responsible for maintaining all sales and
layaway receipts, and "closed out" the cash register at the end of
each business day.' 7 1 Julius Levi, however, dismissed his wife's the-
ory, refusing to believe that Mauck, who had been with the business
for many years and was "highly respected," would steal from the
business. 171
Nonetheless, a month's worth of Mauck's work was provided to
Wegad for his review.' 72 Unfortunately for Howard Street Jewelers,
Wegad found nothing, despite suspicious discrepancies in the
records.'77 After Wegad's review, store management took no fur-
ther action to investigate the activities of Mauck. 174
By pure chance, Howard Street Jewelers later discovered
Mauck's embezzlement scheme.' 75 While Mauck had the day off, a
customer attempted to make a payment on an item the customer
had laid away on the previous day. No sales slip could be found.
The next day, when Mauck returned to work, the slip was immedi-
ately found. 176 The store conducted an investigation of the layaway
sales transaction and discovered Mauck's defalcations.177
Howard Street Jewelers filed suit against Wegad for profes-
sional malpractice on the ground that he had failed to detect that
Mauck was embezzling funds. 178 In February, 1990, the case went
to trial before a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. 179
At the close of trial, the court refused to issue a jury instruction
167. See id. at 354 n.2, 589 A.2d at 1286 n.2 ("[Howard Street Jewelers] denies that it
was told by [Wegad] at the year end meeting in 1983 that theft was a possible source of
the problem. [Wegad] presented evidence to that effect, however.").
168. Id. at 354, 589 A.2d at 1286.
169. See id.; see also Wegad, 326 Md. at 421 n.5, 605 A.2d at 130 n.5.
170. See Wegad, 326 Md. at 421, 605 A.2d at 129-30.
171. Id. at 421 n.5, 605 A.2d at 130 n.5. Mrs. Levi's son also dismissed the suspicions,
believing his mother to be "paranoid."
172. Howard Street Jewelers, 87 Md. App. at 355, 589 A.2d at 1287.
173. Wegad, 326 Md. at 422, 605 A.2d at 130.
174. Id.
175. See Howard StreetJewelers, 87 Md. App. at 355 n.3, 589 A.2d at 1287 n.3.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Wegad, 326 Md. at 411, 605 A.2d at 125.
179. Id. at 411-12, 605 A.2d at 125.
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offered by Howard Street Jewelers to specifically address the con-
tributory negligence issue in the context of accountant malpractice,
supplementing the general contributory negligence instruction.' 8 °
Instead, the court issued an instruction that set forth the general
standard for contributory negligence.'' The jury found Wegad
negligent; however, because Howard Street Jewelers was found con-
tributorily negligent, judgement was entered in favor of the ac-
countant. 8 2 Howard Street Jewelers appealed, contending that the
trial judge "erred in refusing to give a requested jury
instruction."18 3
The only issue addressed by the Court of Special Appeals was
whether "the trial court err[ed] in refusing to give a requested in-
struction that a client's reliance on his accountant is not contribu-
torily negligent [sic] in an action against the accountant for
malpractice."'8 4 The Court of Special Appeals reversed the judg-
ment of the trial court, 185 concluding that Howard Street Jewelers
was entitled to a refined contributory negligence instruction to in-
form the jury "that [Howard Street Jewelers] could justifiably rely
upon its accountant's knowledge and skill and, further, that it is not
180. Id. at 412-13, 605 A.2d at 125.
181. The trial court gave the following instruction on contributory negligence to the
jury:
Now, the plaintiff cannot recover if his or her or its, in this case we are talking
about a corporation, own negligence is the cause of the plaintiff's damage or
injury. Since the plaintiff in this case is a corporation, the issue of contributory
negligence as it is called is to be considered in relation to the acts or omissions
on the part of the corporation's principals or agents. So, in this case the issue
relates to the consideration of acts or omissions on the part of either Julius
Levi, Lore Levi, or Alvin Levi [the principals]. And negligence, as I instructed
you a moment ago is doing something that a person using ordinary care would
not do or not doing something that a person using ordinary care would do.
Ordinary care being that caution, attention or skill that a reasonable person
would use under similar circumstances.
And so with respect to the issue of contributory negligence, the defendant
has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence, which I will
explain later, that the plaintiffs negligence was a cause of the plaintiff's damage
or loss.
So that means that if you find from the evidence that one or more of the
plaintiff's principals was guilty of negligence which was a direct cause of the
plaintiff's loss or damage, then your verdict must be for the defendant. And
that would be regardless of whether you find that the defendant was also negli-
gent and regardless of whose negligence was greater.
Id. at 413, 605 A.2d at 125-26 (brackets in original).
182. Id. at 412, 605 A.2d at 125.
183. Id.
184. Howard Street Jewelers, Inc. v. Wegad, 87 Md. App. 351, 352, 589 A.2d 1285,
1285 (1991), rev'd, 326 Md. 409, 605 A.2d 123 (1992).
185. Id. at 364, 589 A.2d at 1291.
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contributory negligence to do so, at least where it had no reason to
suspect that the advice and instructions given were wrong." 18 6
After granting Wegad's petition for certiorari,'87 the Court of
Appeals reviewed the case and reversed.'
2. Legal Background.-
a. Contributory Negligence in Maryland.-To determine the avail-
ability of the requested contributory negligence jury instruction in
accountant malpractice actions, the Court of Appeals relied on
Maryland case law concerning the propriety of jury instructions,' 8 9
contributory negligence in medical malpractice cases,' 90 and gen-
eral contributory negligence cases.'91 It is a well-settled principle of
Maryland law that in order to successfully invoke the doctrine of
contributory negligence, "it must be demonstrated that the injured
party acted, or failed to act, with knowledge and appreciation, either
actual or imputed, of the danger of injury which his conduct in-
volve[d].1' 19 2 Courts have consistently held that the injured party is
186. See id. at 360-62, 589 A.2d at 1289-90. In making its decision, the intermediate
appellate court relied upon Santoni v. Schaerf, 48 Md. App. 498, 428 A.2d 94 (1981),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Moodie v. Santoni, 292 Md. 582, 441 A.2d 323 (1982). In
Santoni, a medical malpractice action, the surviving spouse and personal representative
of the decedent-patient sued the Baltimore City Health Department for failing to diag-
nose a hepatitis condition caused by mandatory drug treatment of all city employees for
the treatment and prevention of tuberculosis. The intermediate appellate court held
that "it is not contributory negligence for a patient to follow a doctor's instructions or
rely on his advice ... or to fail to diagnose his own illness... " Id. at 507, 428 A.2d at
100. While the patient could be held accountable "for what a reasonably prudent per-
son in his position would have done," id. at 511, 428 A.2d at 101, the Court of Special
Appeals found that the facts of Santoni were not legally sufficient for the issue of contrib-
utory negligence to reach the jury. See id. at 519-20, 428 A.2d at 105-06.
187. See Wegad v. Howard Street Jewelers, Inc., 324 Md. 534, 596 A.2d 488 (1991).
188. See Wegad, 326 Md. at 417-22, 605 A.2d at 127-30.
189. See id. at 414, 417-19, 605 A.2d at 126-28. In Sergeant Co. v. Pickett, 285 Md.
186,401 A.2d 651 (1979), the Court of Appeals set forth the general rule regarding jury
instructions as a two-part test: "(1) the instruction must correctly state the law, and (2)
that law must be applicable in light of the evidence before thejury." Id. at 194,401 A.2d
at 655. Even if a requested jury instruction passes the Pickett test, however, the trial
judge is not obliged to give the specific requested instruction "if the matter is fairly
covered by instructions actually given" by the trial court. See MD. R. 2-520(c); see also
State Roads Comm'n v. Parker, 275 Md. 651, 688, 344 A.2d 109, 129 (1975) (holding
that no requirement exists to grant a specific requested instruction if the instruction
given by the trial court "fully and fairly" covers the issues in a particular case).
190. See Wegad, 326 Md. at 414-16, 605 A.2d at 126-27.
191. See id. at 417-19, 605 A.2d at 127-28.
192. Menish v. Polinger Co., 277 Md. 553, 560-61, 356 A.2d 233, 237 (1976) (cita-
tions omitted). See also Moodie v. Santoni, 292 Md. 582, 587, 441 A.2d 323, 325 (1982);
Ritter v. Portera, 59 Md. App. 65, 69, 474 A.2d 556, 558 (1984).
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charged with the standard of care of an "ordinarily prudent person
under the same or similar circumstances, and not that of a very cau-
tious person . .. .,193
Before Wegad, the Court of Appeals had not addressed the issue
of contributory negligence in accountant malpractice actions. In
general, such actions come under the scope of section 522A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states that "[t]he recipient of a
negligent misrepresentation is barred from recovery for pecuniary
loss suffered in reliance upon it if he is negligent in so relying. 1' 4
As in other contributory negligence actions, the injured party is held
to the standard of care of a reasonably prudent person.' 95
Because Wegad was a professional malpractice action, the views
of the court with respect to other professional malpractice actions
are instructive. 196 In Moodie v. Santoni,' 97 a medical malpractice ac-
tion, the Court of Appeals held that a contributory negligence in-
struction must be given to the jury unless there was " 'no evidence
of acts or conduct from which a reasonable mind could find or infer
negligence on [his] part,' ,,198 reversing the decision of the Court of
Special Appeals.' 99
In Santoni, the Court of Special Appeals had relied on the "dis-
parity between the knowledge and skill of a doctor and that of a
patient ' '120 to find a patient not contributorily negligent as a matter
of law, even though there was indirect evidence that the patient
knew of the risks of taking a certain medication.2 1°  The intermedi-
ate appellate court held that, as a matter of policy, "the patient has a
right to rely on the doctor's knowledge and skill,"' 20 2 especially
when the doctor is in a better position to recognize any adverse
193. Sanders v. Williams, 209 Md. 149, 153, 120 A.2d 397, 399 (1956). See also
Santoni, 292 Md. at 586-87, 441 A.2d at 325; Schweitzer v. Brewen, 280 Md. 430, 439,
374 A.2d 347, 353 (1977); Diffendal v. Kash and Karry Serv. Corp., 74 Md. App. 170,
176, 536 A.2d 1175, 1178 (1988).
194. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 552A (1977).
195. See id. cmt. a.
196. See Wegad, 326 Md. at 414-18, 605 A.2d at 126-28; see also Howard Street Jewel-
ers, Inc. v. Wegad, 87 Md. App. 351, 360-61, 589 A.2d 1285, 1299 (1991), rev'd, 326 Md.
409, 605 A.2d 123 (1992).
197. 292 Md. 582, 441 A.2d 323 (1982).
198. Id. at 591, 441 A.2d at 328 (quoting Kantor v. Ash, 215 Md. 285, 293, 137 A.2d
661, 666 (1958)).
199. Santoni v. Schaerf, 48 Md. App. 498, 428 A.2d 94 (1981), rev'd sub nom. Moodie
v. Santoni, 292 Md. 582, 441 A.2d 323 (1982):
200. Id. at 507, 428 A.2d at 100.
201. See id. at 509, 428 A.2d at 101.
202. Id. at 508, 428 A.2d at 100.
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symptoms. 2 3 While "[t]here was a possibility of contributory negli-
gence," it was not "a more likely than not conclusion to draw from
the ambiguous factual predicate erected by the defendants." '204
The Court of Appeals framed its analysis in Santoni by noting
that Maryland is extremely liberal in allowing "meager evidence of
negligence ... to carry a case to a jury, ' 20 5 as long as that evidence
is legally sufficient to prove negligence.20 6 Only when reasonable
persons cannot differ on the issue of contributory negligence is the
trial court entitled to bar the defense as a matter of law.20 7 The
Santoni court relied on the test set forth in Lindenberg v. Needles 208
which held that the issue of contributory negligence should not
reach the jury "if there was no evidence from which a reasonable
mind could find or infer that he had directly contributed to his own
injury by behaving as an ordinarily prudent man would not behave,
under the circumstances. '20 9 Thus, when any evidence exists from
which a reasonable mind could find or infer that a patient was con-
tributorily negligent, the issue of contributory negligence belongs in
the province of the jury. 210 This principle may be applied to ac-
countants as follows: when any evidence exists from which a reason-
able person could find that a client was negligent in his bookkeeping
or supervision of employees, the question of contributory negli-
gence should go to the jury.
b. Other States.-Other state courts-in particular, those of
New York-have considered the availability of the contributory neg-
ligence defense to accountants. Different jurisdictions have an-
swered this question with varying results supported by differing
rationales.2 1  The main distinction between jurisdictions is that
some require the client's negligence to be the proximate cause of
the accountant's negligence in order for the accountant to raise the
203. See id. at 510, 428 A.2d at 101.
204. Id. at 518-19, 428 A.2d at 105-06.
205. Santoni, 292 Md. at 587, 441 A.2d at 326 (citing Fowler v. Smith, 240 Md. 240,
213 A.2d 549 (1965)).
206. See id. at 588, 441 A.2d at 326 (quoting Fowler, 240 Md. at 246, 213 A.2d at 554
(citing Ford v. Bradford, 213 Md. 534, 541, 132 A.2d 488, 492 (1957))).
207. See id. at 589-90, 441 A.2d at 327. See also Brown v. Bendix Aviation Corp., 187
Md. 613, 619, 51 A.2d 292, 295 (1947).
208. 203 Md. 8, 97 A.2d 901 (1953).
209. Id. at 15, 97 A.2d at 903-04.
210. See Santoni, 292 Md. at 590-91, 441 A.2d at 327.
211. See David L. Menzel, The Defense of Contributory Negligence in Accountant's Malpractice
Actions, 13 SETON HALL L. REV. 292, 292 (1983) (noting that "[p]erhaps the most inter-




contributory negligence defense, whereas other jurisdictions make
no such causation requirement.21 2
In Craig v. Anyon,2 ts the New York Supreme Court first ad-
dressed whether the contributory negligence defense could be
raised in an accountant malpractice action.2" 4 In Craig, a stock bro-
kerage firm brought an action against its accountants for failure to
detect defalcations by one of the firm's employees.21 5 At trial, the
client contended that this failure constituted negligence.21 6 The ac-
countants responded by claiming that the client had been contribu-
torily negligent in not discovering the employee's scheme. t7 After
the jury found the accounting firm negligent and awarded damages
equal to the employee's defalcations,2 Is the trial judge entered a
judgment solely for the amount of the accountants' fees.21 9 On ap-
peal, the New York Supreme Court agreed with the jury's finding
that the accountants had been negligent.221 However, the court re-
fused to award damages, finding that such damages did not flow di-
rectly from the accountants' negligence. 22 1 The court was "of the
opinion that the loss was not entirely the result of the negligence of
the defendants, but also resulted from the careless and negligent
manner in which the [client] conducted [its] business. "222
The dissent in Craig set forth a principle that was later adopted
by other authorities. 223 The dissent argued that an accountant is
hired for the very purpose of protecting the client from the client's
own failure to discover defalcations.224 Yet under the rule put forth
by the court, accountants who had failed to save the client from the
212. See id. at 293 (analyzing the contributory negligence defense as applied to ac-
countant negligence suits in various jurisdictions); see also Carl L. Hawkins, Professional
Negligence Liability of Public Accounts, 12 VAND. L. REV. 797, 809-12 (1959); Dinallo, supra
note 162, at 332.
213. 208 N.Y.S. 259 (1925), afd, 152 N.E. 431 (N.Y. App. 1926).
214. Id. at 267-69. See Edward F. Noethe, Note, Accountant's Liability: Contributory Negli-
gence in Accountant Malpractice Actions After Lincoln Grain, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 18
CREIGHTON L. REV. 429, 433 (1985).
215. Craig, 208 N.Y.S. at 260.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 260-61.
218. Id. at 261.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 261-62.
221. Id. at 268.
222. Id. at 267. The court found that the client "could have prevented the loss by the
exercise of reasonable care, and that they should not have relied exclusively on the ac-
countants." Id. at 267-68.
223. See Menzel, supra note 211, at 295.
224. See Craig v. Anyon, 208 N.Y.S. 259, 269-70 (1925) (Clarke, P.J., dissenting).
1993]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
consequences of the client's "failure and neglect" could escape lia-
bility. 25 In other words, client negligence could allow the account-
ants to be excused from their failure to perform their contractual
obligations.226
The Craig dissent's concerns were addressed in National Surety
Corp. v. Lybrand.22' National Surety was the first in a line of cases lim-
iting the extent to which a client can be contributorily negligent to
situations in which the client's negligence is a proximate cause of
the accounting firm's breach of duty. 8
In National Surety, a surety company was defrauded by an em-
ployee who embezzled from the company's petty cash. 22 9 The
surety company sued its accountants on the grounds that the ac-
countants were negligent in not discovering the employee's embez-
zlement scheme. 230 The accountants responded by asserting that
the surety company was contributorily negligent for failing to prop-
erly maintain its records, preparing certain internal documents in
pencil, and failing to discover obvious discrepancies in its
records.23 ' The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to
"make out a case for submission to the jury; "232 however, the appel-
late court ruled that the evidence was sufficient to send the case to a
jury.2 3
In response to the accountants' argument that the client had
established no case because the client had been contributorily negli-
gent, the New York court stated, as controlling, the principle first
announced by the Craig dissent:
Accountants, as we know, are commonly employed for
the very purpose of detecting defalcations which the em-
ployer's negligence has made possible. Accordingly, we
see no reason to hold that the accountant is not liable to his
employer in such cases. Negligence of the employer is a
defense only when it has contributed to the accountant's
failure to perform his contract and to report the truth.2 34
225. See id. at 270 (Clarke, P.J., dissenting).
226. See id.
227. 9 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1939). The court did not explicitly reject the analysis in Craig,
but did enunciate a different standard. See Dinallo, supra note 162, at 346.
228. See National Surety, 9 N.Y.S.2d at 563.
229. Id. at 556.
230. Id. at 557.
231. Id. at 558.
232. Id. at 557.
233. Id. at 562-63.
234. Id. at 563.
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As noted by one commentator, "[t]he court was unwilling to find
accountants immune from their negligence because the client was
negligent in conducting [its] business. 23 5
3. The Court's Reasoning.-Before the Wegad decision, the issue
of contributory negligence in accountant malpractice cases had not
been addressed by the Maryland courts. Finding Wegad's appeal to
be "implicitly based upon the principle that a 'litigant is entitled to
have his theory of the case presented to the jury,' "236 the court ex-
amined the propriety of the requested instruction within the frame-
work of the Pickett test for jury instructions. 3 7
The Wegad court first examined the substance of the requested
jury instruction.2 3  Howard Street Jewelers based its requested in-
struction on the language in Santoni-that a patient has a right to
rely on a doctor's knowledge and skill. 23 9 To define "the standard
for contributory negligence which incorporates a client's ability to
rely on the advice of its accountant, ' 240 the Wegad court looked to
the Santoni decision,2 4' where it held that a patient's failure to pro-
tect himself "is not in every case justified by his reliance on his doc-
tor's knowledge and skill."' 24 2 Accordingly, when examining an
accountant malpractice action, the court held that the focus should
be on whether the client "took appropriate precautions to protect
his own interests. 24 3
The court also examined the specific language of Howard
Street Jewelers's requested instruction, holding that the instruction
strayed from the principle set forth in Santoni in that it did not re-
quire reasonable or justifiable reliance.244 The court discussed gen-
eral principles of Maryland contributory negligence law to find that
235. Menzel, supra note 211, at 299. Menzel pointed out that the National Surety court
attempted to align its decision with Craig by claiming that the facts in Craig supported the
decision to present the issue of contributory negligence to thejury. Menzel found, how-
ever, that the National Surety court's attempted rationalization did not withstand scrutiny.
Id.
236. Wegad, 326 Md. at 414, 605 A.2d at 126.
237. See id. See supra note 189 (setting forth the Pickett test).
238. See Wegad, 326 Md. at 414, 605 A.2d at 126.
239. See id. at 414-15, 605 A.2d at 126. See supra notes 197-205 and accompanying
text.
240. Wegad, 326 Md. at 414, 605 A.2d at 126.
241. Id. at 415-16, 605 A.2d at 127.
242. Id. at 416, 605 A.2d at 127.
243. Id. at 417, 605 A.2d at 127.
244. See id. at 416, 605 A.2d at 127. This is in contrast to the Court of Special Ap-
peals, which held that Howard StreetJewelers "sought to have the jury instructed that it
could justifiably rely upon its accountant's knowledge and skill... " Howard Street
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a client may be contributorily negligent when it unreasonably relies
on its accountant's advice. 245 The court held that Howard Street
Jewelers's requested instruction failed to "require that the jury con-
sider whether the client should have known that the accountant
might have been in a worse position than the client to detect the
embezzlement.1 246 Thus, the instruction did not adequately state
the substantive law, failing the first prong of the Pickett test.247 Fur-
thermore, as the court found sufficient evidence for a jury to reach
the conclusion that Howard Street Jewelers was in a better position
than Wegad to discover Mauck's embezzlement,2 4 1 it held that How-
ard Street Jewelers's instruction did not adequately cover the appli-
cable law in light of the evidence before the jury,2 49 thus failing the
second prong of the Pickett test.250
The court also discussed a policy argument against Howard
StreetJewelers's attempt to advise the jury that " '[i]t is not contrib-
utory negligence for a client. .. to fail ... to discover the source of a
financial problem where the client itself has no reason to suspect his
accountant's advice and instructions are wrong.' 251 ' The court
held that, under this language, a client could "rely on its account-
ant's advice, and thereby discharge its duty to protect itself, provid-
ing it has no reason to believe that the advice is wrong. '"252
Conceivably, if such an instruction was found to be appropriate, a
client could avoid its duty to guard against business risks and to take
independent measures to confront those risks "merely by employ-
ing an accountant. ' '253
Finally, the court held that the charge the trial judge gave to the
jury adequately covered the contributory negligence issue.2 5 4
4. Analysis.-It is likely that the court would have accepted
Howard Street Jewelers's proposed instruction if the language of
the instruction was altered to read: "It is not contributory negli-
gence for a client to reasonably follow an accountant's instructions,
Jewelers, Inc. v. Wegad, 87 Md. App. 351, 361-62, 589 A.2d 1285, 1290 (1991), rev'd,
326 Md. 409, 605 A.2d 123 (1992).
245. See Wegad, 326 Md. at 417-19, 605 A.2d at 127-28.
246. Id. at 419, 605 A.2d at 129.
247. See supra note 189.
248. See Wegad, 326 Md. at 421-22, 605 A.2d at 130.
249. See id. at 420, 605 A.2d at 129.
250. See supra note 189.
251. Wegad, 326 Md. at 420, 605 A.2d at 129 (quoting the proffered jury instruction).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. See id. at 422, 605 A.2d at 130.
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or justifiably rely on his advice." As modified, there would appear
to be little basis for the Court of Appeals to reverse the Court of
Special Appeals's decision approving the instruction.2 55 The Court
of Appeals was correct, however, that the instruction's lack of a rea-
sonableness requirement removed the issue of contributory negli-
gence from the rightful province of the jury, in that it denied the
contributory negligence defense as a matter of law.2 56
In an apparently unrealized effect of allowing the trial court's
general contributory negligence instruction to stand alone, the
court has in effect created the substantive Maryland law concerning
the contributory negligence defense in accountant malpractice ac-
tions. While the trial court's description of general contributory
negligence law is correct, the Court of Appeals's acceptance of the
trial court's instruction reveals a failure to grasp the complexities of
the on-going debate among various authorities over the use of con-
tributory negligence in accountant malpractice actions. 257 It is
probable that the Wegad court's approval of the general contributory
negligence instruction as a valid statement of state substantive law
will lead to general contributory negligence principles serving as the
basis for jury decisions concerning contributory negligence in spe-
cialized accountant malpractice actions.
By holding that only general contributory negligence instruc-
tions must be provided to the jury, the Court of Appeals has implic-
itly decided to favor the Craig standard over the National Surety
standard. 258 The court has stated no requirement that a client's
negligence must be the proximate cause of an accountant's negli-
gence in order for the issue of contributory negligence to reach the
jury.25 9 The policy implications of the court's decision may be se-
vere. Commentators agree that the Craig standard is the weaker of
the two standards, in that it allows an accounting firm to escape lia-
bility even when it performs its professional duties in a negligent
manner. 260 In the future, a client who hires an accounting firm to
255. See id. at 416, 605 A.2d at 127 (noting that the requested instruction, on its face,
failed to require reasonableness or justifiable reliance and, consequently, the intermedi-
ate appellate court had misread it).
256. See supra text accompanying notes 195-212.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 213-235.
258. See supra notes 213-233 and accompanying text.
259. See Wegad, 326 Md. at 409-22, 605 A.2d at 123-30.
260. See Menzel, supra note 211, at 310 ("[T]he better reasoned view, and the view
supported by the weight of authorities which have considered the question, is that the
negligence of a client in managing his business should not generally be a defense in
accountant's malpractice actions .... In other words, the better rule is that set forth in
National Surety."); see also Hawkins, supra note 212, at 811 ("[C]ontributory negligence
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discover the source of defalcations, and believes the firm to be neg-
ligent, will be prevented from vigorously pursuing an action against
that accountant, who can now claim that the client was contribu-
torily negligent in failing to discover the defalcation.
5. Conclusion .- The Wegad court has limited the tort liability of
accountants by providing them with the full power of a general con-
tributory negligence defense. The Court of Appeals relied solely on
state precedent and the Restatement to reach its decision, choosing to
ignore the major debate that has arisen concerning contributory
negligence in the context of accountant malpractice. The court's
holding will unnecessarily allow negligent accounting professionals
to escape liability for failing to discover the very defalcations they
were hired to detect. Because the full scope of the issue was not
directly addressed by the court, however, it is possible that in future
cases an argument posited in favor of the National Surety standard
may convince the court to re-examine the sole use of the general
contributory negligence instruction in accountant malpractice
actions.
WILLIAM S. HEYMAN
C. Negligence As a Matter of Law in Obstructed- View Left Turns
In Myers v. Bright,26' the Court of Appeals held that a driver who
attempts to make a left-hand turn off of a roadway and across the
oncoming flow of traffic, and whose view is obstructed, is negligent
as a matter of law if he fails to check to make sure that the oncoming
lane is free of approaching vehicles and subsequently collides with
an oncoming motorist.2 6 2 In upholding the trial court's granting of
a motion for judgment26 on liability in favor of the oncoming
driver, the court agreed with the trial judge that no reasonable jury
could conclude that the turning driver was not negligent or that the
must be accepted as a theoretical defense, but it applies only if the plaintiff's conduct
goes beyond passive reliance and actually affects defendant's ability to do his job with
reasonable care."). But see Dinallo, supra note 162, at 362 (noting that the National Surety
standard's bias towards plaintiffs "prevents accountants in a majority of jurisdictions
from using the contributory negligence defense to the extent it is available to other
professionals").
261. 327 Md. 395, 609 A.2d 1182 (1992).
262. Id. at 403, 609 A.2d at 1186.
263. Maryland Rule 2-519(a) provides for a "motion for judgment" to be made at the
close of all the evidence. Thus, "motion for judgment" is the term now used for what
was formerly termed a "motion for directed verdict." See id. at 411-12, 609 A.2d at
1190.
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oncoming driver was contributorily negligent.2" The court also re-
affirmed that the "boulevard rule," which holds that drivers enter-
ing favored boulevards are negligent as a matter of law if they
collide with vehicles on that boulevard, 265 does not apply to left
turns off of roadways.2 66 Rather, a state statute governing left turns
off of roadways provided the guideline for determining whether the
turning driver breached the standard of reasonable care.2 6 7
The Myers court stated that in certain circumstances, a driver
may reasonably, but wrongly, believe that the turn can be made
safely, thereby presenting a jury question. 268 However, if the driver
does not even attempt to gauge the location or speed of oncoming
vehicles, he is negligent as a matter of law. 2 69 The court also recog-
nized that evidence of contributory negligence on the part of the
oncoming driver would normally create a factual issue to be decided
by the jury.27 The court held, however, that in this case the trial
court was correct in keeping this issue from the jury because the
turning driver failed to present evidence legally sufficient to support
a finding of contributory negligence.27'
1. The Case.-On May 5, 1987, Ida Myers was driving in the
right-hand southbound lane of Pennsylvania Avenue (U.S. Route
11) in Hagerstown, Maryland. 72 Myers was approaching a Burger
King restaurant on her right.2 7 3 In the left lane, a line of vehicles
waiting to turn left extended back from an intersection about fifty
feet beyond the restaurant entrance. 74
Matthew Bright was travelling northbound on Route 11 and
wanted to turn left across both southbound lanes into the Burger
King entrance. 275 The driver of a pickup truck in the southbound
line of vehicles motioned for Bright to turn in front of him. 76 The
turn was unsuccessful. Myers testified that she saw Bright's car
264. See id. at 399-403, 609 A.2d at 1184-86.
265. See infra notes 286-296 and accompanying text.
266. See Myers, 327 Md. at 404, 609 A.2d at 1186.
267. See MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 21-402(a) (1992).
268. See Myers, 327 Md. at 401-02, 609 A.2d at 1185.
269. See id. at 402, 609 A.2d at 1185.
270. See id. at 408, 609 A.2d at 1188.
271. See id. at 410, 609 A.2d at 1189.
272. Bright v. Myers, 88 Md. App. 296, 298, 594 A.2d 1177, 1178 (1991), rev'd, 327
Md. 395, 609 A.2d 1182 (1992).
273. Myers, 327 Md. at 397, 609 A.2d at 1182.
274. Id., 609 A.2d at 1182-83.




emerge from in front of the truck "maybe a split second" before the
crash. 77 She braked as hard as she could, but was unable to pre-
vent the collision.2 78
Myers brought suit against Bright in the Circuit Court for
Washington County.2 79 After the presentation of evidence, the trial
judge granted Myers's motion for judgment on the issue of liability,
precluding the jury from considering whether Bright was liable for
primary negligence or whether Myers was contributorily negli-
gent.2 80 The jury awarded Myers $30,000 in compensatory
damages.2s
The Court of Special Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial
court and remanded the case for a new trial. 2  The court ruled that
the trial judge had erroneously applied the boulevard rule to the
facts of the case.2 85 According to the intermediate appellate court,
the trial court should have focused solely on the state statute gov-
erning left turns off of roadways, which, unlike the boulevard rule,
does not create an absolute right-of-way.284 The Court of Appeals
granted Myers's petition for certiorari, reversed the Court of Special





280. See id. at 397-98, 609 A.2d at 1183. The trial judge noted:
Mr. Bright had a duty to yield the right of way to Mrs. Myers. And that duty to
yield was not lessened by any third party direction. He crossed into her right of
way. He either saw but did not yield or failed to see what was obviously there.
And there is no other response that any trier of fact would come to but that he
is negligent as a matter of law and also she has the right to assume that no one
is going to take the right of way from her. I don't see that she did anything that
contributed to the accident at all.... She was traveling perhaps in excess of the
posted speed limit. But that by itself is not evidence of contributory negligence
from one who must assume that no one is going to take the right of way.
Id.
281. See id. at 398, 609 A.2d at 1183.
282. See Bright v. Myers, 88 Md. App. 296, 306, 594 A.2d 1177, 1182 (1991), rev'd,
327 Md. 395, 609 A.2d 1182 (1992).
283. See id. at 303, 594 A.2d at 1180 (noting that "this case was not one to which
boulevard law should have been applied").
284. See Bright, 88 Md. App. at 304, 594 A.2d at 1181 (discussing MD. CODE ANN.,
TRAtNSP. § 21-402(a) (1987)). Because it reversed on this ground, the Court of Special
Appeals deemed it unnecessary to consider another ground for Bright's appeal-
whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying certain pre-trial discovery mo-
tions. See id. at 305-06, 594 A.2d at 1181-82.
285. See Myers, 327 Md. at 410, 609 A.2d at 1189.
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2. Legal Background.-
a. The Boulevard Rule.-Many of the Maryland motor tort cases
in the last half-century have fallen under the "boulevard rule."
28 6
Under this rule, a driver who is legally required to yield the right-of-
way at an intersection (the unfavored driver) is automatically negli-
gent as a matter of law if that driver collides with a driver traveling
along the favored highway (the favored driver).28 7 Only in very rare
cases could an unfavored driver convince the jury of contributory
negligence on the part of the favored driver.2 8 Also, courts have
consistently found unfavored-driver plaintiffs contributorily negli-
gent as a matter of law, completely barring their recovery.289 The
boulevard rule, however, only applies to vehicles entering a
boulevard.29 ° It does not apply to vehicles exiting a boulevard, in-
cluding those turning left through oncoming traffic.29'
The courts' rigid adherence to this rule led to exceedingly
harsh results in some cases. Favored-driver defendants almost inva-
riably prevailed, regardless of their own unlawful acts. 292 In 1977,
286. The boulevard rule is a judicially constructed rule, comprised of a combination
of several requirements imposed upon drivers entering or crossing through highways, as
set forth in §§ 21-401, -403, and -404 of the Transportation Article. See Tippett v.
Quade, 19 Md. App. 49, 58, 309 A.2d 481, 487 (1973); MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. §§ 21-
401, -403, -404 (1992). For a more in-depth analysis of the boulevard rule, its applica-
tions, and its history, see John William Debelius III, Comment, The Maryland Boulevard
Rule: A Time For Change, 6 U. BALT. L. REV. 223 (1977); John W. T. Webb, Bothersome
Boulevards, 26 MD. L. REV. 111 (1966).
287. See Debelius, supra note 286, at 224.
288. See, e.g., Kopitzki v. Boyd, 277 Md. 491, 355 A.2d 471 (1976) (allowing the ques-
tion of the favored driver's negligence to be submitted to the jury where testimony re-
vealed that the favored driver was traveling nearly twice the speed limit and that another
speeding driver was able to avoid collision); Hensel v. Beckward, 273 Md. 426, 330 A.2d
196 (1974) (finding that a favored driver's excessive speed will not ordinarily be consid-
ered a cause contributing to the accident).
289. See, e.g., Creaser v. Owens, 267 Md. 238, 245, 297 A.2d 235, 239 (1972) ("[I]f the
unfavored driver is a plaintiff, his suit is defeated unless the doctrine of last clear chance
rescues his claim.").
290. See Safeway Trails, Inc. v. Smith, 222 Md. 206, 212, 159 A.2d 823, 826 (1960)
("By its express terms, the boulevard law controls entrance onto the favored highway;
exit from it is not mentioned.").
291. See Tates v. Toney, 231 Md. 9, 12-13, 188 A.2d 283, 285 (1963) (finding the
boulevard rule inapplicable where a driver attempted to turn left off of a roadway, across
oncoming traffic, and collided with a vehicle in the oncoming lane).
292. See, e.g., Hensel, 273 Md. 426, 330 A.2d 196 (finding the unfavored-driver plaintiff
contributorily negligent as a matter of law, completely barring his recovery, even though
he stopped at a stop sign, looked both ways, and proceeded carefully, and the favored
vehicle was being driven at high speed and without headlights on a moonless night). In
perhaps the harshest application of the rule, Johnson v. Dortch, 27 Md. App. 605, 342
A.2d 326 (1975), the unfavored-driver plaintiff was hit almost immediately upon making
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the rule was relaxed when the Court of Appeals, in Covington v.
Gernert,29 3 held that if a favored driver proceeds unlawfully and an
accident ensues, the boulevard rule would not automatically hold an
unfavored-driver plaintiff contributorily negligent as a matter of
law.29 4 This decision was based largely on the statutory redefinition
of "right-of-way" in 1970.295 Unlike the prior wording, the present
definition requires a person to be driving lawfully to claim the right-
of-way. 296 A favored driver may therefore lose his absolute right-of-
way if proceeding unlawfully.
b. The Maryland Left Turn Cases.-Maryland appellate courts
have addressed the propriety of finding a left-turning driver negli-
gent as a matter of law in several prior cases. In Kelch v. Mass Transit
Administration,297 the Court of Special Appeals addressed a trial
judge's decision to grant a directed verdict in a case concerning the
current left turn statute. A bus driver stopped his bus while making
a left-hand turn when he saw a motorcycle approaching him on the
intersecting road. The motorcycle collided with the bus, which ex-
tended into the motorcyclist's lane.298 However, testimony of the
bus driver and a passenger on the bus revealing that the bus had
been at a standstill for several seconds before the collision-possi-
bly giving the motorcyclist time to avoid the accident-was found to
be sufficient to present a question of the motorcyclist's contributory
negligence, and necessitated the submission of the case to a jury.29 9
The Court of Special Appeals has recognized that the duty of a
driver making a left-hand turn is that of exercising reasonable care,
and the driver cannot be charged with absolute liability whenever an
a right turn onto a favored highway. Even though the driver of the favored vehicle was
intoxicated, speeding, and driving without headlights on the wrong side of the road, the
plaintiff's recovery again was completely barred due to his contributory negligence. See
id. at 606-11, 342 A.2d at 327-30.
293. 280 Md. 322, 373 A.2d 624 (1977).
294. See id. at 323-25, 373 A.2d at 624-25. The favored driver was traveling the wrong
way on a one way-street. Id. at 324, 373 A.2d at 625.
295. See id. at 323-25, 373 A.2d at 624-25.
296. The current version of the statute defines "right-of-way" as "the right of one
vehicle or pedestrian to proceed in a lawful manner on a highway in preference to another
vehicle or pedestrian. MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 21-101(r) (1992) (emphasis added).
The previous statute defined "right-of-way" as "[t]he privilege of the immediate use of
the highway." MD. ANN. CODE art. 661/2, § 2(a)(45) (1957). The definition was changed
to its present form when the motor vehicle code was revised in 1970. See Act of May 5,
1970, ch. 534, 1970 Md. Laws 1319.
297. 42 Md. App. 291, 400 A.2d 440 (1979), aff'd, 287 Md. 223, 411 A.2d 449 (1980).
298. Id. at 292, 400 A.2d at 442.
299. See id. at 305, 400 A.2d at 448-49.
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accident occurs during the turn.300 The Freudenberger v. Copeland
court found that a left-turning driver could not be held negligent as
a matter of law simply because his turn across the flow of traffic was
followed by a collision.3"' When the defendant turned left through
the oncoming lane and was struck by the plaintiff, an oncoming
driver, the question whether the defendant was liable was a proper
one for the jury to resolve, given the facts of the case.30 2
In Bennett v. Bass,30 3 the case most factually similar to Myers, a
passenger sued the driver of a car in which she was riding and the
driver of another car. The cars collided when her driver attempted
to make a left turn even though her view of oncoming traffic was
obstructed by a large truck. The trial court found insufficient evi-
dence to submit the issue of the favored driver's negligence to the
jury and granted a directed verdict for the favored driver.30 4 The
Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the negligence of the unfa-
vored turning driver was the sole cause of the accident.3 0 5
3. The Court's Reasoning.-
a. Primary Negligence of Left-Turning Drivers.-The Myers court
began its analysis by recognizing that the basis for determining
whether a left-turning driver has exercised reasonable care is a
Maryland left turn statute,3 0 6 which provides:
If the driver of a vehicle intends to turn to the left in an
intersection or into an alley or a private road or driveway,
the driver shall yield the right-of-way to any other vehicle
that is approaching from the opposite direction and is in
the intersection or so near to it as to be an immediate
danger.3 0 7
The court rejected the argument presented by Bright that he should
not be held liable under this statute because the term "right-of-way"
as presently defined requires a favored driver to travel "in a lawful
manner." 0 8 Bright contended that if Myers was speeding, she
300. See Freudenberger v.. Copeland, 15 Md. App. 169, 175, 289 A.2d 604, 608
(1972).
301. Id. at 178, 289 A.2d at 609.
302. Id.
303. 248 Md. 260, 235 A.2d 715 (1967).
304. Id. at 262, 235 A.2d at 715-16.
305. See id. at 266, 235 A.2d at 717-18.
306. See id. at 399-400, 609 A.2d at 1184.
307. MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 21-402(a) (1992).
308. Id. § 21-101(r). See supra note 296.
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would not have been driving "in a lawful manner" and should not
be afforded the right-of-way under the statute.30 9 The court re-
jected this argument because the turning motorist should have an-
ticipated that vehicles would be approaching in the southbound
lane.310 The oncoming driver's speed could not relieve the turning
driver of his duty to anticipate such other vehicles.3 1'
However, the court did recognize that if the turning driver had
seen a vehicle approaching and nevertheless attempted the turn, be-
lieving that he could safely make it across, a jury question of the




In certain circumstances, a turning driver might make a reasonable
observation of the oncoming traffic and still be unable to judge its
speed.3 t3 Thus, a speeding vehicle might not appear to constitute
"an immediate danger" to a turning driver, and it might be reason-
able for the driver to believe that he could safely make the turn.
31 4
Although drivers are ordinarily entitled to presume that other driv-
ers are obeying the law, visual or aural information that others are
driving unlawfully may act to overcome that presumption-but such
information is not available in every case.315
Bright could not claim such a defense because he failed even to
watch for oncoming traffic, never attempting to gauge the speed of
any southbound vehicles. 316 The court held that "turning blindly
into oncoming traffic is negligence regardless of what that traffic is
doing."-31 7 The fact that the turning motorist was waved on by the
driver of the pickup truck did not relieve Bright of his duty to ob-
serve the oncoming traffic. 31 8 As the court stated, "Someone want-
ing to make a left turn is not relieved of responsibility because
another motorist signals that the coast is clear."331" Rather, "Bright
had the responsibility for making sure-or at least checking to see-
309. See Myers, 327 Md. at 400, 609 A.2d at 1184.
310. See id. at 400-01, 609 A.2d at 1184.
311. See id. at 401,609 A.2d at 1184.
312. Id., 609 A.2d at 1185.
313. Id.
314. See id.
315. See id. at 401-02, 609 A.2d at 1185.
316. See id. at 402, 609 A.2d at 1185.
317. Id.
318. Id. As authority for this proposition, the court cited Kemp v. Armstrong, 40 Md.
App. 542, 546, 392 A.2d 1161, 1164 (1978) ("[T]his statutory duty with respect to
changing lanes can not be delegated to other drivers on the highway."), cert. denied, 284
Md. 741 (1979). Several out-of-state cases were also cited as supportive. See Dawson v.
Griffin, 816 P.2d 374, 379 (Kan. 1991); Government Emp. Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 351
So. 2d 809, 810 (La. App. 1977); Van Jura v. Row, 191 N.E.2d 536, 537 (Ohio 1963).
319. See Myers, 327 Md. at 402, 609 A.2d at 1185.
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that the highway was clear before proceeding across. Because the
evidence is uncontroverted that he did not do so, Bright was negli-
gent as a matter of law."'32° Finally, the court held that this negli-
gence was "unquestionably a proximate cause of the accident. '"321
b. Contributory Negligence of Oncoming Traffic.-Addressing the is-
sue of contributory negligence, the Myers court did not hold that
Bright was absolutely barred at trial from arguing that Myers was
contributorily negligent due to the speed at which she was traveling.
On the contrary, the court recognized that a turning driver is enti-
tled to allege contributory negligence by oncoming traffic.322 The
court held, however, that in this case Bright had simply presented
legally insufficient evidence to support a finding of contributory
negligence, and that therefore the trial court was correct in keeping
this issue from the jury.323 After noting that "there is no hard evi-
dence that Myers was, in fact, speeding[], 324 the court held that,
even if Myers was speeding, Bright had presented insufficient evi-
dence to demonstrate that Myers's speed was a proximate cause of
the accident. 325 The existing evidence could only lead a jury to spec-
ulate that Myers's alleged speeding caused the accident. 32 6 Specifi-
cally, the court held that the oncoming motorist was entitled to be in
her southbound lane and could not have avoided the collision at a
lawful speed. 27 Only if there was sufficient evidence that, had she
been driving at a lawful speed, Myers could have stopped or
swerved, might a jury question have been presented.328
320. See id. at 402-03, 609 A.2d at 1185.
321. See id. at 403, 609 A.2d at 1186.
322. See id. at 405-09, 609 A.2d at 1186-89.
323. See id. at 404, 609 A.2d at 1186.
324. Id.
325. See id. at 405-09, 609 A.2d at 1186-89. See Alston v. Forsythe, 226 Md. 121, 130,
172 A.2d 474, 477 (1961) ("Exceeding the speed limit does not constitute actionable
negligence unless it is a proximate cause of the injury or damage."); 2 KEITH C. MILLER,
AuToMOBILE ACCIDENT LAW AND PRACTICE § 19.10 (1991) ("To show merely excessive
speed is ordinarily not enough to support a verdict based on negligence unless there is
some further showing that this excessive speed is a direct and proximate cause of the
injury.").
326. See Myers, 327 Md. at 405, 609 A.2d at 1187.
327. Id. at 406, 609 A.2d at 1187 ("[Slpeed in excess of the posted speed limit is not
the proximate cause of an accident when the vehicle is where it is entitled to be and the
driver would not have been able to avoid an accident even had he been driving at the
lawful speed.").
328. See id. at 408, 609 A.2d at 1188. The court likewise rejected the argument that
speeding was a proximate cause because were it not for her speed, the oncoming motor-
ist would not have been at the accident site at the precise moment when Bright made his
turn. Id. at 408-09, 609 A.2d at 1188-89. Speeding can proximately cause an accident
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In so holding, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the interme-
diate appellate court's determination that the trial court had misap-
plied the boulevard rule; the high court found that the trial judge
was "merely making an aside about the boulevard rule and recog-
nized that Myers' contributory negligence would have precluded
recovery. "329
c. Judge Bell's Dissent.-Judge Bell filed a dissenting opinion in
which he argued that both issues-Bright's primary negligence and
Myers's contributory negligence-should have been decided by a
jury. First, he agreed with the intermediate appellate court that the
trial court misapplied the boulevard rule and that a jury was re-
quired to decide the factual issue of whether Myers's car was " 'an
immediate danger' of which Bright should have been aware. "330
Second, concerning the contributory negligence issue, Judge Bell
noted the evidence in the record that Myers may have been speed-
ing and asserted that the record simply did not show whether this
speeding may have been a proximate cause of the collision.3 3 '
Therefore, he argued, this ambiguous issue should have been left to
the jury, and the court improperly engaged in "conjecture and spec-
ulation" in making the factual finding that there was no contributory
negligence. 3 2
4. Analysis.-
a. Primary Negligence of Left-Turning Drivers.-The Court of Spe-
cial Appeals was correct in holding that the boulevard rule did not
only when it prevents a driver from somehow avoiding the accident, not when it places a
driver at a particular place, where, coincidentally, another driver happens to be making a
negligent turn. See id. See also 2 PATRICK D. KELLY, BLASHFIELD AUTOMOBILE LAW AND
PRACTICE § 105.6 (1965) ("Excessive or unlawful speed is not causal merely because it
places a vehicle at a particular place at a particular time, but it is causal where it prevents
or retards the operator from slowing down, stopping, or otherwise controlling the vehi-
cle so as to avoid a collision."). This argument was never actually made by Bright. It
was considered by the court merely as a hypothetical argument occasionally raised in
similar cases. See Myers, 327 Md. at 408-09, 609 A.2d at 1188-89.
329. Myers, 327 Md. at 404, 609 A.2d at 1186. The trial judge merely stated, in re-
sponse to Bright's argument that speeding was evidence of contributory negligence, that
"the case law is contrary as far as somebody exceeding the posted speed limit on a
through highway and the boulevard rule." Id. at 398, 609 A.2d at 1183 (emphasis added).
330. See id. at 410-12, 609 A.2d at 1189-90 (Bell, J., dissenting).
331. See id. at 412-15, 609 A.2d at 1190-92 (Bell, J., dissenting).
332. See id. at 415, 609 A.2d at 1192 (Bell, J., dissenting).
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apply to the facts of Myers.333 An earlier decision, Tates v. Toney,33 4
specifically held that the boulevard rule did not apply to a left-hand
turn exiting a boulevard across the oncoming lane. 3 5 Notably, the
Court of Appeals did not find error in the intermediate appellate
court's interpretation of the boulevard rule; rather, it found error in
its interpretation of the trial record. The Court of Appeals deter-
mined that the trial judge did not even apply the boulevard rule to
the case, but was merely "making an aside" about the rule. 36 Had
the boulevard rule been applicable, Bright, as the unfavored turning
driver, automatically would have been held negligent as a matter of
law. While evidence of the oncoming driver's contributory negli-
gence would have been admissible, only in "rare cases" has the un-
favored-driver defendant been able to demonstrate contributory
negligence by the favored-driver plaintiff.33 7
The Court of Appeals held that the Maryland statute governing
left-hand turns off of roadways was applicable to the facts of the
Myers case as a guide to determining the reasonableness of Bright's
conduct.33 8 Unlike its predecessor, 3 9 the statute's current version
encompasses turns into private roads and driveways, not just inter-
secting streets. But unlike violations of the boulevard rule, viola-
tions of this statute are not automatically treated as negligence as a
matter of law. 34 0 Such violations merely represent evidence of neg-
ligence, which should ordinarily be presented to the jury.3 4 '
Nevertheless, given the particular facts of Myers, the court ap-
propriately found the violator negligent as a matter of law. The evi-
dence was uncontroverted that Bright's view was obstructed and
that he attempted to make the turn without even trying to look for
333. Bright v. Myers, 88 Md. App. 296, 303, 594 A.2d 1177, 1180 (1991), rev'd, 327
Md. 395, 609 A.2d 1182 (1992). See Myers, 327 Md. at 410, 609 A.2d at 1189 (Bell, J.,
dissenting) ("I agree totally with the Court of Special Appeals.
334. 231 Md. 9, 188 A.2d 283 (1963).
335. See id. at 12-13, 188 A.2d at 285.
336. Myers, 327 Md. at 404, 609 A.2d. at 1186.
337. See Kopitzki v. Boyd, 277 Md. 491, 495, 355 A.2d 471, 473 (1976).
338. See Myers, 327 Md. 399-400, 609 A.2d at 1184; MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 21-
402(a) (1992).
339. Previously, the statute provided: "The driver of a vehicle within an intersection
intending to turn to the left shall yield the right of way to any vehicle approaching from
the opposite direction which is within the intersection or so close thereto as to constitute
an immediate hazard." MD. ANN. CODE art. 66'/2, § 232 (1957). The statute was
changed to its present form during the revision of the motor vehicle code in 1970. See
Act of May 5, 1970, ch. 534, 1970 Md. Laws 1472.
340. See Freudenberger v. Copeland, 15 Md. App. 169, 178, 289 A.2d 604, 609
(1972).
341. See id. See also Whitt v. Dynan, 20 Md. App. 148, 154, 315 A.2d 122, 126 (1974).
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oncoming vehicles.3 42 Moreover, the evidence clearly demonstrated
that this was a proximate cause of the accident.3 43 Thus, Bright ob-
viously violated the left turn statute-which necessarily implies that
a left-turning driver must look for any "immediate danger"-and,
most important, Bright's conduct was patently unreasonable. In
light of these facts, Judge Bell's assertion in his dissent-that a jury
is required to determine whether Myers's car was an " 'immediate
danger' of which Bright should have been aware[]" 3 44 -is
unpersuasive.
The court was also correct in refusing to consider the favored
driver's speed in determining the turning driver's primary negli-
gence. In so doing, the court appropriately limited the question of
Bright's negligence to Bright's own acts, not the acts of others.
Although the statute states that the turning driver should yield the
right-of-way to a vehicle that is actually "so near as to constitute an
immediate danger," the question is not necessarily one of where the
other vehicle is actually located or how it is proceeding, but whether
the turning driver reasonably believes that the oncoming vehicle is
travelling in such a manner as to constitute "an immediate danger."
Thus, Myers's speed might have been relevant if Bright had looked,
seen Myers, and attempted to gauge her speed before proceeding.
Because Bright did not even check for oncoming vehicles, however,
Myers's speed was irrelevant.
b. Contributory Negligence of Oncoming Traffic.-Because the court
limited its inquiry into primary negligence to the turning driver's
acts and beliefs under the circumstances, it held that evidence of the
oncoming driver's speed could only be raised to show contributory
negligence. 45 Boulevard rule cases have often held that it is im-
proper to submit the issue of contributory negligence to the jury if
the jury must indulge in "nice calculations of speed, time and dis-
tance" in order to find the favored driver contributorily negli-
gent.3 46 Applying this standard to the facts of Myers, although not a
boulevard rule case, the court found insufficient evidence for a jury
to find Myers contributorily negligent without engaging in such cal-
342. See Myers, 327 Md. at 397-400, 609 A.2d at 1183-85.
343. See id. at 400, 609 A.2d at 1185.
344. See id. at 411-12, 609 A.2d at 1190 (Bell, I., dissenting).
345. See id. at 403, 609 A.2d at 1186.
346. See Tippett v. Quade, 19 Md. App. 49, 60-61, 309 A.2d 481, 489 (1973); Harper
v. Higgs, 225 Md. 24, 31, 169 A.2d 661, 663 (1961).
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culations.347 However, the court's holding in the 1977 case of Dean
v. Redmiles 34 seemed to relax the strict requirements previously im-
posed upon individuals alleging negligence by a favored-driver, at
least in the context of the boulevard rule. 349 The Dean court sug-
gested that if the evidence is sufficient to support a conclusion that
the favored driver's speed was a proximate cause of the accident,
then it should be submitted to the jury in a suit against the favored
driver. 5 ° The Myers court's refusal to allow the jury to consider the
evidence marks a turning away from the Dean holding.
Maryland law recognizes that if there is "any evidence, however
slight, legally sufficient as to prove negligence," the evidence should
be submitted to the jury.35' "Legally sufficient" implies that the
party with the burden "cannot sustain this burden by offering a
mere scintilla of evidence, amounting to no more than surmise, pos-
sibility, or conjecture that such other party has been guilty of negli-
gence, but such evidence must be of legal probative force and
evidential value. 352
The Myers court seems strict, if not grudging, in its application
of this standard, but Maryland courts have usually been hesitant in
submitting the issue of a favored driver's negligence to juries when
the only evidence of unlawful driving is of possible excessive speed,
especially when the alleged speeding is a mere five or ten miles per
hour above the speed limit,353 as was the case with Myers.3 5 4 Most
347. Testimony of the parties and a motorcyclist regarding the parties' speed and the
speed limit on the road was very uncertain. See Myers, 327 Md. at 404, 609 A.2d at 1186.
348. 280 Md. 137, 374 A.2d 329 (1977).
349. See id. at 161, 374 A.2d at 342.
350. See id. But see id. at 171, 374 A.2d at 347 (Murphy, C.J., dissenting) (expressing
fear that "virtually all cases involving evidence of excessive speed on the part of the
favored driver, regardless of circumstances, will become jury questions").
351. See Fowler v. Smith, 240 Md. 240, 246, 213 A.2d 549, 554 (1965) (emphasis
added).
352. Id. at 247, 213 A.2d at 554. However, Fowler also stated that "Maryland has gone
almost as far as any jurisdiction that we know of in holding that meager evidence of negligence
is sufficient to carry the case to the jury." Id. at 246, 213 A.2d at 554 (emphasis added).
Therefore, it would appear that the standard for declaring evidence sufficient to submit
to a jury would fall somewhere between a "scintilla" and merely "meager." Unfortu-
nately, these are vague terms and offer courts little guidance.
353. See, e.g., Tippet v. Quade, 19 Md. App. 49, 61-62, 309 A.2d 481, 489 (1973)
(refusing to submit the issue of contributory negligence to the jury, despite testimony
that the favored driver was travelling 70 miles per hour in a 55 miles per hour zone,
because there was no evidence to indicate that the favored driver could have avoided the
collision had he been travelling within the speed limit); but see Kopitzki v. Boyd, 277 Md.
491, 355 A.2d 471 (1976) (submitting the issue of negligence by the favored driver to
the jury when evidence indicated that the favored driver was traveling at a speed of 70-
90 miles per hour, nearly twice the posted speed limit).
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cases imposing liability on favored drivers have involved some sort
of inattention by the favored driver.355 On the whole, such a strict
application will prevent a jury from making determinations based on
mere conjecture. Although Judge Bell's dissenting argument-that
the trial judge in this case had to engage in "conjecture and specula-
tion" himself in order to find that any speeding by Myers was not a
proximate cause of the collision 3 5 6 is not without merit, public pol-
icy concerns may have understandably motivated the Court of Ap-
peals to prefer that a court make this judgment, rather than a jury.
Because Maryland remains in the minority of states that still recog-
nizes the doctrine of contributory negligence, which completely bars
plaintiffs from recovery, rather than comparative negligence, which
allows a jury to apportion damages according to the degree of fault
of the parties,3 57 a strict application of the evidentiary standard will
better protect the plaintiff's right of recovery.
5. Conclusion.-In Myers, the Court of Appeals recognized that
ordinarily evidence of an allegedly negligent left turn off of a road-
way should be submitted to the jury; however, the court carved out
an exception to that rule. If such a violation involves a driver whose
view is obstructed, and who does not even pause to look for oncom-
ing traffic before colliding with an oncoming vehicle, then that
driver will be held negligent as a matter of law. In the future, unfa-
vored drivers may be able to escape such a finding only by offering
354. See Myers, 327 Md. at 404, 609 A.2d at 1186.
355. See, e.g., Green v. Zile, 225 Md. 39, 170 A.2d 753 (1961) (involving a driver, who,
with his vision unobscured, failed to notice a large tractor-trailer turning across his lane
until he was only 30 feet away and could not avoid colliding with the trailer); Harper v.
Higgs, 225 Md. 24, 169 A.2d 661 (1961) (involving a driver, who, while talking with her
passengers, failed to notice a vehicle that stalled while attempting to cross through her
lane at an intersection); see also Kopitzki, 227 Md. at 499, 355 A.2d at 476 (Murphy, C.J.,
dissenting) ("Evidence legally sufficient to find the favored driver's negligence to be a
proximate cause of the accident must be positive evidence of inattention or lack of due
care not based on 'nice calculations of speed, time, or distance.' " (citations omitted)).
But see Dean v. Redmiles, 280 Md. 137, 374 A.2d 329 (1977) (allowing the favored
driver's speed to be submitted to the jury even though there was no further evidence of
inattention).
In Myers, the turning driver did in fact attempt to introduce evidence of inattention
by the favored driver because she had taken medication that morning. See Myers, 327
Md. at 409-10, 609 A.2d at 1189. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, how-
ever, found the testimony insufficient to support the allegation. See id.
356. See Myers, 327 Md. at 415, 609 A.2d at 1192 (Bell, J., dissenting).
357. As of 1988, 44 states had adopted some form of comparative negligence. The
only jurisdictions still clinging to contributory negligence at that time were Alabama,
Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and the District of Co-
lumbia. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 67, at
471 & n.30 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988).
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evidence that, upon pausing to look, external conditions prevented
them from being able to correctly gauge the location and speed of
the oncoming vehicles. The Myers court also recognized that the de-
fense of contributory negligence is available to violators of the left
turn statute, but refused to allow the issue to be submitted to the
jury when the turning driver alleged that the favored driver was only
slightly speeding. Without strong evidence of inattention or exces-
sive speeding by a favored driver, the court will not hesitate to take
the matter away from the jury, carefully guarding the favored
driver's right of recovery.
CHARLES J. KRESSLEIN
D. Contributory Negligence and Assumption of the Risk in Work-Related
Accidents
In Brady v. Ralph M. Parsons Co.,358 the Court of Appeals held
that a violation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH
Act)3" 9 and the Maryland Occupational Safety and Health Act
(MOSH Act) 6. does not preclude the defenses of contributory neg-
ligence and assumption of the risk. 6' Affirming the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals, the Court of Appeals held that although a violation of
such a safety statute constitutes evidence of negligence, neither stat-
ute was intended to relieve workers of a duty to use reasonable care
for their own safety. 62 The court further held that the doctrine of
"nondelegable duties" does not preclude the application of either
defense.363 By permitting the application of both defenses, the
Brady court may have placed a difficult burden on employees who
are unable to protect themselves from the failure of their employers
to obey such safety statutes.
1. The Case.-In 1981, the Mass Transit Administration (MTA)
was in the process of developing the Baltimore subway.3" The
MTA, an instrumentality of the Maryland Department of Transpor-
tation, was the owner of the subway system, and hired several in-
358. 327 Md. 275, 609 A.2d 297 (1992).
359. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988).
360. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 5-101 to -901 (1991).
361. See Brady, 327 Md. at 285, 294, 609 A.2d at 302, 306.
362. Id. at 291, 609 A.2d at 305.
363. Id. at 284-85, 609 A.2d at 301-02.
364. Id. at 279, 609 A.2d at 299.
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dependent contractors to oversee and complete the construction.3 65
Hensel-Phelps Construction Company, the general contractor for
the project, hired Rocky Mountain Skylight, Inc. to install skylights
over the platforms of various subway stations. 366 The decedent,
Donald Brady, was a Rocky Mountain employee.367
In its construction of the subway, the MTA also sought the
assistance of Baltimore Regional Insurance Transit Services
(BRITS) and the Ralph M. Parsons Company.368 BRITS was re-
sponsible for administering insurance and safety programs, while
Parsons was to serve as the construction manager for the subway
project.369 In its contract with the MTA, Parsons agreed to oversee
the project and to ensure that all safety precautions were taken. 70
On June 18, 1981, Brady was working at the Cold Spring Lane
subway station site.37' He and his working team attempted to install
a piece of aluminum cladding to a horizontal beam that was to sup-
port a skylight over the station. 372 Brady instructed and assisted his
team in erecting a ten-foot scaffold directly under the horizontal
beam from which they planned to install the cladding. 373 In order
to make the installation possible, Brady and his coworkers assem-
bled a guardrail on one side of the scaffold, but left the other three
365. Id.; see Brady v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 82 Md. App. 519, 522, 572 A.2d 1115,
1117 (1990) (explaining the parties and their relationships through a schematic draw-
ing), afd, 327 Md. 275, 609 A.2d 297 (1992).
366. Brady, 327 Md. at 279, 609 A.2d at 299.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 280, 609 A.2d at 299.
369. Id.
370. See Brady v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 82 Md. App. 519, 526, 572 A.2d 1115, 1119
(1990), aftd, 327 Md. 275, 609 A.2d 297 (1992). According to its contract with the
MTA, Parsons was to
a) Implement the MTA's safety program to eliminate accidents, promote maxi-
mum efficiency through safe work methods and conditions and the reduction of
direct and indirect costs of accidents.
b) Make frequent and unscheduled inspection of the work in progress and re-
port hazards or unsafe practices to the Resident Engineers for immediate ac-
tion or remedy.
c) Conduct regular safety meetings with the Contractor's foreman and repre-
sentatives of the various crafts employed on the construction program.
d) Assure compliance with OSHA and MOSHA safety requirements and appli-
cable codes.
f) Ensure the contractors' compliance with the provisions of the MTA Con-
struction Safety Manual.
Id.
371. Brady, 327 Md. at 279, 609 A.2d at 299.
372. Id. at 286-87, 609 A.2d at 302-03.
373. Id.
TORTS
sides unprotected. 74 According to one of the workers, if "remain-
ing guardrails had been attached, the top rails would have been
higher than the horizontal beam above the scaffold, and no part of
the scaffold could have been beneath the horizontal beam. This...
would have made the installation of the final piece of cladding more
difficult, if not impossible .... 
After beginning to work on the horizontal beam, Brady fell off
the scaffold and plummeted thirty-seven feet to his death. 76 The
facts relating to the events just prior to Brady's fall were in dis-
pute.377 According to one of Brady's coworkers, Brady disappeared
behind a nearby wall shortly after starting to work on the horizontal
beam.378 Another witness claimed that after climbing from the scaf-
fold onto an adjacent wall, Brady fell when he was hit in the face by
an air-conditioning duct placed there by a coworker. 79
Brady's survivors sued Parsons for negligence, claiming that its
failure to maintain a safe workplace caused Brady's death. 38 0 At
trial, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City granted Parsons's motion
for summary judgment after concluding that the MTA was Brady's
statutory employer, and that Parsons, having assumed some of the
MTA's duties, was entitled to the MTA's immunity from suit as out-
lined in the Workmen's Compensation Act.3 ' The Court of Ap-
peals reversed and remanded the case back to the trial court,
holding that the MTA was not Brady's statutory employer, and that
Parsons was not entitled to any immunity under the Workmen's
Compensation Act.38 2
374. Id. at 287, 609 A.2d at 303.
375. Id.
376. Brady v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 82 Md. App. 519, 521, 572 A.2d 1115, 1116
(1990), affd, 327 Md. 275, 609 A.2d 297 (1992).
377. See Brady, 327 Md. at 288, 609 A.2d at 303.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. See id. at 281, 609 A.2d at 299.
381. See Brady v. Ralph Parsons Co., 308 Md. 486, 494, 520 A.2d 717, 722 (1987),
appealed after remand, 82 Md. App. 519, 576 A.2d 1115 (1990), aff'd, 327 Md. 275, 609
A.2d 297 (1992); see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 15 (1985). According to Maryland's
workers' compensation laws, an employer is required to pay benefits to the employee,
which precludes the employee from taking other legal action. Id.
382. Brady, 308 Md. at 508, 512-13, 520 A.2d at 729, 731-32. According to the Court
of Appeals:
The words "employer" and "employee" in the [Workers' Compensation] stat-
ute are equivalent to and synonymous with the words "master" and "servant."
... Therefore, the test for determining the existence of an employer and em-
ployee relationship ... [is] whether the employer has the right to control and
direct the servant in the performance of his work and in the manner in which
the work is to be done.
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At a second trial, a jury entered a special verdict and found not
only that Parsons was negligent, but also that Brady had assumed
the risk and was contributorily negligent.3 8 3 On appeal, Brady's
survivors argued that the circuit court erred by permitting the de-
fenses of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk to be
submitted to the jury. 84 The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the
judgment, holding that those defenses were available in this type of
action.18 ' The Court of Appeals granted the appellants a writ of
certiorari.3 8 6
The survivors argued before the Court of Appeals that the cir-
cuit court should have been reversed for three reasons.3 87 First,
they argued that both defenses were unavailable to Parsons because
the duty it owed to Brady was "nondelegable." 38 Second, the sur-
vivors argued that both defenses were unavailable because of Par-
sons's violation of a safety statute.38 9 Finally, the survivors argued
that there was insufficient evidence to support either defense. 9 °
The Court of Appeals rejected each argument and affirmed the
judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.39 '
2. Legal Background.-
a. Existence of a Tort Duty.-It is generally the rule that a tort
duty is not created by the mere fact that parties to a contract have
undertaken to perform duties that neither of them have a legal duty
to perform. 92 Although the parties to the contract may be respon-
sible to each other for a breach of their agreement, the breaching
party is not ordinarily liable to third persons to whom the party
Id. at 499, 520 A.2d at 724. After the first Brady court held that the MTA was not Brady's
statutory employer, it further held that if the MTA could not seek immunity from liabil-
ity through the Workers' Compensation laws, then neither could Parsons. Id. at 508,
520 A.2d at 729.
383. Brady v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 82 Md. App. 519, 523, 572 A.2d 1115, 1118
(1990), aff'd, 327 Md. 275, 609 A.2d 297 (1992).
384. Id. at 524, 572 A.2d at 1118. Brady's survivors were also unsuccessful in arguing
that the trial judge improperly excluded the expert testimony of an engineer who would
have testified that Brady could not have realized the risk involved in his work and that
Parsons was capable of minimizing the risk. Id. at 537-39, 572 A.2d at 1125-26.
385. Id. at 539, 572 A.2d at 1126.
386. Brady v. Parsons Co., 321 Md. 46, 580 A.2d 1066 (1990).




391. Id. at 295-96, 609 A.2d at 306.
392. See Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condominium, Inc. v. Whiting-Turner Con-
tracting Co., 308 Md. 18, 32, 517 A.2d 336, 339 (1986).
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owed no previously existing tort duty. 93 This is because there has
been no direct transaction between the party breaching the contract
and the third person. 94 Without any contractual privity between
the parties, it is argued, there is no logical basis upon which the
breaching party may be required to perform the contract for the
benefit of the third party.3 95
Despite this general rule, courts have held that a tort duty to
third persons may be created by contract under certain circum-
stances. For example, in Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condominium,
Inc. v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. ,396 a condominium developer
entered into a contract with the defendant independent contractors,
who were to conform with applicable building codes when con-
structing condominiums bought by the plaintiffs.3 97 The Court of
Appeals found for the plaintiffs and held "that privity [of contract] is
not an absolute prerequisite to the existence of a tort duty. ' '"98 Re-
lying on section 93 of Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, the court
explained:
[B]y entering into a contract with A, the defendant may
place himself in such a relation toward B that the law will
impose upon him an obligation, sounding in tort and not in
contract, to act in such a way that B will not be injured.
The incidental fact of the existence of the contract with A
does not negative the responsibility of the actor when he
enters upon a course of affirmative conduct which may be
expected to affect the interests of another person. 99
In addition, although a contract does not ordinarily create a
previously non-existent tort duty to third persons, a party may by
contract share its tort duties to those third persons with the other
party to the contract.4"' The duties assumed under the contract by
that other party do not ordinarily exceed those owed by the first
party to third persons.40 '
393. See Brady, 327 Md. at 282, 609 A.2d at 300.
394. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 357, § 93, at 667.
395. See id. The privity requirement is therefore an obstacle unless the contract has
been made expressly for the benefit of the third person or the contract has been as-
signed to him. Id.
396. 308 Md. 18, 517 A.2d 336 (1986).
397. Id. at 22-23, 517 A.2d at 338-39.
398. Id. at 32, 517 A.2d at 343.
399. Id. at 27, 517 A.2d at 341 (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 357, § 93, at 667-
68).




b. Nondelegable Duties.-There are some instances in which
courts view a tort duty as so imperative that they will not permit a
party to delegate the performance of that duty to another.4 °2 This
type of duty, commonly referred to as a "nondelegable duty," can-
not be avoided by the employment of an independent contractor.40 3
The term nondelegable is something of a misnomer because the
party on whom it is imposed is free to delegate the duty of perform-
ance to another. 4 4 The party is actually only prevented from dele-
gating the risk of nonperformance to another.40 5 Duties imposed by
statute are often determined to be nondelegable.40 6 In Maryland,
the duty to maintain a safe workplace for independent contractors
has been held to be nondelegable and is imposed upon the
landowner.4 °7
c. The OSH and MOSH Acts.-In 1970, Congress enacted the
OSH Act in order to address the "alarming epidemic of industrial
injuries and deaths. '40  The goal of this legislation was to ensure
that employees were provided with safe environments in which to
work.40 9 To achieve this goal, the OSH Act empowered the Secre-
tary of Labor to promulgate regulations establishing workplace
health and safety standards that, if violated, would subject an em-
ployer to civil and criminal penalties imposed by the Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission.41 0
The OSH Act permits states to preempt these federal regula-
tions by enacting similar legislation to ensure worker safety within
their borders. Upon approval of the Secretary of Labor, states may
develop their own occupational safety and health plans, provided
that they are equivalent to, or more stringent than, the OSH Act.4 1 '
402. See 5 HARPER ET AL., supra note 133, § 26.11, at 83.
403. See Brady, 327 Md. at 285, 609 A.2d at 302.
404. See Rowley v. Mayor of Baltimore, 305 Md. 456, 466, 505 A.2d 494, 499 (1986).
405. Id.
406. See generally 5 HARPER ET AL., supra note 133, at § 26.11 (discussing numerous
examples of statutory duties that have been found to be nondelegable).
407. See Rowley, 305 Md. at 466, 505 A.2d at 499.
408. See Ries v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 960 F.2d 1156, 1160 (3d Cir. 1992).
409. See id.
410. The Secretary of Labor is granted the power to promulgate safety and health
standards in section 655 of the OSH Act; the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission is established by section 661; and the civil and criminal penalties are out-
lined in section 666. See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 655,
661, 666 (1988).
411. See 29 U.S.C. § 667(b) (1988). Subsection (b) provides:
Any State which, at any time, desires to assume responsibility for development
and enforcement therein of occupational safety or health standards relating to
874 [VOL. 52:821
Such a plan was implemented in Maryland with the adoption of the
MOSH Act in 1985. 4 12
Whether violation of regulations promulgated under the OSH
Act creates a civil remedy on the part of injured parties has been the
subject of much debate. According to section 653(b)(4) of the Act:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede or in any
manner affect any workmen's compensation law or to en-
large or diminish or affect in any other manner the common law
or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and employees
under any law with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of
employees arising out of, or in the course of,
employment. 4 13
Some courts have interpreted section 653(b)(4) as precluding the
initiation of any private action on the basis that an employer has
been cited for violations of OSH Act regulations.41 4 Other courts
have held that although section 653(b)(4) might afford plaintiffs the
use of OSH Act regulations in determining the standard of care in
negligence suits, violations of these regulations do not constitute
negligence per se.4 15 Section 653(b)(4) has not stopped still other
courts from applying the negligence-per-se standard.4 16
The issue of the availability of contributory negligence and as-
sumption of the risk as defenses in cases involving these violations is
equally unsettled. Some courts have held that allowing these affirm-
ative defenses is completely inconsistent with the goals of safety
laws like the OSH Act.417 Nevertheless, other courts permit defend-
any occupational safety or health issue with respect to which a Federal standard
has been promulgated under section 655 of this title shall submit a State plan
for the development of such standards and their enforcement.
Id.
412. Brady, 327 Md. at 285 n.4, 609 A.2d at 302 n.4. See Maryland Occupational
Safety and Health Act, MD. ANN. CODE art. 89, §§ 28-49D (1985) (current version at MD.
CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 5-101 to -901 (1991 & Supp. 1992)).
413. 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (1988) (emphasis added).
414. See, e.g., Melerine v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 659 F.2d 706, 709 (5th Cir. 1981)
(holding that no independent cause of action may be sought for a violation of OSH Act
regulations);Jeter v. St. Regis Paper Co., 507 F.2d 973, 976-77 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding
that a violation of OSH Act regulations does not create a civil cause of action).
415. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 808 F.2d 329, 332-33 (4th Cir. 1987);
Bertholf v. Burlington Northern R.R., 402 F. Supp. 171, 173 (E.D. Wash. 1975).
416. See, e.g., Wren v. Sullivan Elec., Inc., 797 F.2d 323, 325-27 (6th Cir. 1986); Prat-
ico v. Portland Terminal Co., 783 F.2d 255, 264-65 (1st Cir. 1985); Dixon v. Interna-
tional Harvester Co., 754 F.2d 573, 581 (5th Cir. 1985).
417. See, e.g., Wren, 797 F.2d at 325-27 (barring contributory negligence and assump-
tion of the risk as defenses to the violation of an OSH Act regulation); Pratico, 783 F.2d
at 268 (finding that contributory negligence is not an available defense in Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act (FELA) cases); Martin v. George Hyman Constr. Co., 395 A.2d 63,
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ants to assert contributory negligence or assumption of the risk in
such cases.'
18
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Brady, the appellants made three
arguments to the court. First, they suggested that contributory neg-
ligence and assumption of the risk were unavailable because Parsons
owed Brady a "nondelegable duty." '419 Thus, according to the ap-
pellants, Brady could not be held accountable for his own actions
because Parsons was not in a position to delegate to Brady any part
of its duty to provide a safe workplace.42 °
The second argument focused on Parsons's failure to comply
with OSH Act and MOSH Act regulations.421 They argued that sec-
tions 483 and 496F of the Restatement (Second) of Torts state that con-
tributory negligence and assumption of the risk are unavailable
when dealing with statutes that are enacted to place the entire re-
sponsibility for compliance upon the defendant.422 Brady's survi-
vors claimed that the OSH and MOSH Acts are the type of safety
statutes addressed by these two Restatement sections and that, for this
reason, neither defense was available.423
Finally, the appellants contended that there was insufficient evi-
dence to support the jury's special verdict that Brady was contribu-
torily negligent and had voluntarily assumed the risk.4 2 4 Finding no
merit in any of these arguments, the Court of Appeals held that
Brady's contributory negligence and assumption of the risk barred
71-72 (D.C. App. 1978) (denying the use of contributory negligence, and allowing as-
sumption of the risk only if the plaintiffs actions were completely "without... coercion
attributable to the defendant"); Bowman v. Redding & Co., 449 F.2d 956, 967 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (holding that the contributory negligence defense is not available unless the plain-
tiff exhibited gross negligence).
418. See, e.g., Ries v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 960 F.2d 1156, 1162 (3d Cir.
1992) (permitting the defendant to assert contributory negligence); Albrecht, 808 F.2d at
332-33 (allowing contributory negligence as an affirmative defense); Minichello v.
United States Indus., 756 F.2d 26, 29-30 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding assumption of the risk
to be a valid defense); Bertholf, 402 F. Supp. at 172-73 (finding that the OSH Act is
inapplicable to FELA cases and therefore does not bar contributory negligence); Law-
rence v. Cavanaugh, 249 Md. 176, 180-81, 238 A.2d 859, 862 (1968) (acknowledging
the availability of contributory negligence and holding that assumption of the risk is
equally available in Maryland-prior to the enactment of the MOSH Act).
419. Brady, 327 Md. at 284, 609 A.2d at 301.
420. Id.
421. Id. at 291-95, 609 A.2d at 305-07.
422. See id. at 291, 609 A.2d at 305; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 483, 496F
(1965).
423. Brady, 327 Md. at 291, 609 A.2d at 305.
424. Id at 286-91, 609 A.2d at 302-05.
his survivors' recovery.4 25
Before addressing the appellants' arguments directly, the court
began its analysis with a "note in passing" questioning the existence
and extent of any tort duty owed to Brady by Parsons.42 '6 The court
recognized that any such tort duty would have to arise out of the
duties assumed by Parsons in its contract with the MTA.42 7 The
court suggested that there were significant questions concerning the
existence of any tort duty.428 However, because both parties to the
appeal proceeded on the assumption that Parsons owed a tort duty
to Brady, the court indulged that assumption and addressed only
those issues presented to it.
42 9
The court found that the appellants' first argument miscon-
strued the meaning of "nondelegable duty."'4 0 The court stated
that the term ordinarily refers to a duty for which the risk of nonper-
formance cannot be avoided by the employment of an independent
contractor. 43 ' The court thus concluded that the concept of nondel-
egable duties is irrelevant to the availability of the defenses of as-
sumption of the risk or contributory negligence.43 2 Without citing
prior precedent, the court further concluded that these defenses are
ordinarily available in actions based upon a breach of a nondelega-
ble duty.433
The court next rejected the appellants' assertion that the OSH
and MOSH Acts placed the entire responsibility for Brady's safety
on Parsons, and held that their reliance on sections 483 and 496F of
the Restatement was misplaced.43 4 The court explained that regula-
tions promulgated under the OSH and MOSH Acts were designed
to encourage a combined effort by employers and employees to
maximize worker safety.435 Thus, the court held that contributory
425. See id. at 295-96, 609 A.2d at 307.
426. See id. at 282, 609 A.2d at 300.
427. Id.
428. See id.
429. See id. at 284, 609 A.2d at 301.
430. Id.
431. Id. at 284-85, 609 A.2d at 301.
432. Id. at 285, 609 A.2d at 302.
433. Id.
434. See id. at 291-93, 609 A.2d at 305-06.
435. See id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1988) (explaining that the purpose of the OSH
Act is to "encourag[e] employers and employees in their efforts to reduce the number of
occupational safety and health hazards at their place of employment"); MD. CODE ANN.,
LAB. & EMPL. § 5-102(b) (1991) (suggesting "that employers and employees have sepa-
rate but dependent responsibilities and rights with respect to making working condi-
tions safe and healthful").
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negligence and assumption of the risk were still factors to be consid-
ered, because neither Act relieved Brady of the responsibility for
maximizing his own safety.436
Finally, the court rejected the appellants' sufficiency-of-the-evi-
dence argument.43 7 The court explained that despite the differing
testimony provided by two of Brady's coworkers, "[c]learly, the jury
could have found that Brady should not have climbed onto the wall,
and was negligent in doing so. ' 438 The court also found that the
risk of a fall was apparent to Brady, and that there was no evidence
suggesting that Brady was forced to assume such a risk.43 9
4. Analysis.-Although the Court of Appeals recognized that
regulations under the OSH and MOSH Acts can be considered in
determining the standard of care that independent contractors owe
other workers, the court limited the influence of these regulations.
By applying the mere-evidence standard and by retaining the availa-
bility of the affirmative defenses of contributory negligence and as-
sumption of the risk, the Brady court put workers at a severe
disadvantage in cases involving job-related injuries and deaths.
a. Existence of a Tort Duty.-Judge McAuliffe, writing for the
court in Brady, began the opinion by noting "in passing" that there
was a question as to whether Parsons actually owed any tort duty to
Brady.44 ° It is unclear whether the court's discussion of this issue
should be considered as part of the holding or mere dicta, because
the court was not required to decide whether Parsons owed a duty
to Brady. 44 1 Regardless, because of the length and detail of the
court's discussion of this issue, the decision will undoubtedly be
cited in future opinions discussing the issue directly. For this rea-
son, the court's reasoning is well worth considering.
In making this "passing" comment, the court first turned to its
earlier Council of Co-owners decision, in which the Court of Appeals
held that a contract between named parties does not create a "non-
existent tort duty to a third person. ' 442 The Council of Co-owners
436. See Brady, 327 Md. at 292-93, 609 A.2d at 305-06.
437. See id, at 288-91, 609 A.2d at 303-05.
438. Id. at 288, 609 A.2d at 303.
439. Id. at 288-89, 609 A.2d at 303-04. The sufficiency-of-the-evidence issue will not
be further addressed by this Note.
440. See id. at 282-84, 609 A.2d at 300-01.
441. See id.
442. See id. at 282, 609 A.2d at 300; Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condominium,
Inc. v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co., 308 Md. 18, 32, 517 A.2d 336, 343 (1986).
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court explained that "[w]hile a contract may serve to define the na-
ture of the obligation undertaken, and thus serve to identify the al-
location or assumption of duties among various parties, it will not
create a legal duty where one does not exist."44 In Brady, the court
applied this language to suggest that by signing a contract with the
MTA, Parsons could not have assumed "new tort duties" to anyone
other than the MTA.444 The court also explained that any tort du-
ties owed by Parsons to Brady could "not ordinarily exceed those
owed by MTA to Brady. 4
45
The court was unclear in its discussion as to whether the duty to
provide a safe workplace would be considered a "new tort duty. "446
The Restatement suggests that a person, like Parsons, who contracts
with an employer to provide protection to a third party, may be held
to a duty "to use reasonable care to protect his undertaking. 447
Despite this language, the court relied on Rowley v. Mayor of Balti-
more,4 4 8 which "pointed out the anomaly of providing greater pro-
tection to employees of an independent contractor than to the
defendant's own employees .... ",44' The Rowley court suggested
that an owner's employees may only rely on workers' compensation,
and therefore, it would be unfair to allow an independent contrac-
tor's employees to collect damages simply because they were not the
direct employees of the owner.45" Thus, the Brady court did not
clearly explain whether the Rowley decision precludes courts from
finding a "new tort duty" arising out of a contract between an owner
and an independent contractor.45' Perhaps this question will be re-
solved in the future when the issue is properly before the court.
The court next focused on the extent of the MTA's duty in or-
der to determine to what extent Parsons owed a duty to Brady.
452
As noted earlier, Judge McAuliffe suggested that "the duties as-
sumed by Parsons would not ordinarily exceed those owed by MTA
to Brady."' 453 By using this standard in future cases, courts will es-
443. Council of Co-Owners, 308 Md. at 32, 517 A.2d at 343.
444. See Brady, 327 Md. at 282, 609 A.2d at 300.
445. Id.
446. See id. at 282-83, 609 A.2d at 300-01.
447. Id. at 282 n.2, 609 A.2d at 300 n.2 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 324A (1965)).
448. 305 Md. 456, 505 A.2d 494 (1986).
449. Brady, 327 Md. at 282-83, 609 A.2d at 300-01 (citing Rowley, 305 Md. at 466-75,
505 A.2d at 499-504).
450. Rowley, 305 Md. at 468-69, 505 A.2d at 500.
451. See Brady, 327 Md. at 282-83, 609 A.2d at 300-01.
452. See id. at 283-84, 609 A.2d at 301.
453. Id. at 282, 609 A.2d at 300.
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sentially put independent contractors in the shoes of their employ-
ers, and their contracts will have the effect of holding the
independent contractors liable only for those duties originally owed
by their employers.4" 4 Thus, to determine Parsons's duty, the court
examined the extent of the MTA's duty.455 In so doing, Judge Mc-
Auliffe relied on section 414 of the Restatement, which provides that:
One who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but
who retains the control of any part of the work, is subject to
liability for physical harm to others for whose safety the
employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care, which is
caused by his failure to exercise his control with reasonable
care.
4 5 6
The court explained that "control", as used in Restatement section
414, implies more than the ability to have work stopped or modified.
Control involves "a retention of a right of supervision that the con-
tractor is not entirely free to do the work in his own way." '4 5 7 The
court "indulged" in the parties' assumption that "the degree of con-
trol retained by MTA, and by contract shared with Parsons, was suf-
ficient to give rise to a duty flowing from Parsons [to Brady] .... ,458
The court's interpretation of section 414 has several flaws in
logic. For instance, suppose that the facts in Brady were changed
slightly, and that the MTA had completely relinquished control by
its contract with Parsons. Because the MTA would no longer have
retained control, it could use section 414 to escape liability. Addi-
tionally, Parsons could escape liability because his duty "cannot or-
dinarily exceed" the duty owed by the MTA. Therefore, if Brady
had not assumed the risk or been contributorily negligent, Brady's
survivors would have been left with no remedy, merely because the
MTA gave Parsons free rein over the project's safety. The court's
interpretation leaves another question unanswered: Does an em-
ployer need to relinquish control before the court will recognize a
duty owed by an independent contractor? If not, a contract will al-
low potential plaintiffs to have two sources of liability for their inju-
ries-the employer and the independent contractor.
454. See id.
455. See id. at 283-84, 609 A.2d at 301.
456. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 (1965) (emphasis added), quoted in Brady,
327 Md. at 283, 609 A.2d at 301.
457. Brady, 327 Md. at 283-84, 609 A.2d at 301.
458. Id. at 284, 609 A.2d at 301.
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b. Nondelegable Duties.-After "indulging" in the assumption
that Parsons owed a tort duty to Brady, the court held that a viola-
tion of a nondelegable duty does not abrogate the common-law de-
fenses of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk.4 59 As
explained earlier, the appellants argued that the nondelegable duty
of the independent contractor prohibited Parsons from delegating
any part of its duty of care to Brady.460 Therefore, according to the
appellants, Brady could not have been held to owe any duty to him-
self with regard to maintaining a safe workplace.4 61 This is an odd,
but interesting, argument.
The doctrine of nondelegable duties is a tool ordinarily used in
two ways. It may be employed by defendants to escape liability by
asserting that a third party was not permitted to delegate a duty to
the defendant.4 62 Alternatively, plaintiffs may use this doctrine to
claim that the defendant cannot escape liability because the defend-
ant was not in a position to delegate the duty to a third party.463 In
Brady, the appellants made a creative attempt to implement the doc-
trine to avoid the consequences of Brady's contributory negligence
and assumption of the risk.
In disposing of the appellants' argument, the court relied on
the Rowley court's categorization of nondelegable duties as a "mis-
nomer." 4  As Judge McAuliffe explained, an owner is free to dele-
gate the performance of a duty, but may not delegate "the risk of
non-performance. "465 Unfortunately, the court provided no ade-
quate explanation as to why this would not abrogate the two de-
fenses.466 Judge McAuliffe merely asserted that "contributory
negligence and assumption of the risk are ordinarily available in an
action based on breach of a nondelegable duty."' 467 This is not to
459. See id. at 284-85, 609 A.2d at 301-02.
460. Id. at 284, 609 A.2d at 301.
461. Id.
462. See id. at 292, 609 A.2d at 305 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 414
cmt. c (1965)). The comment provides the example of a statute that prohibits the sale of
firearms to minors. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 cmt. c (1965). The pur-
pose of such a statute is clearly to protect minors against their own "inexperience, lack
ofjudgment, and tendency toward negligence." Id.
463. See Rowley v. Mayor of Baltimore, 305 Md. 456, 505 A.2d 494 (1986). The
plaintiff in Rowley tried to argue that the defendant had a nondelegable duty to maintain
a safe workplace; however, the court shifted the duty onto the independent contractors,
who were responsible for the upkeep of the premises. Id. at 474-75, 505 A.2d at 503-04.
464. See Brady, 327 Md. at 285, 609 A.2d at 302; see also Rowley, 305 Md. at 466, 505
A.2d at 499.
465. Brady, 327 Md. at 285, 609 A.2d at 302.
466. See id.
467. Id. (emphasis added).
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suggest that the availability of assumption of the risk and contribu-
tory negligence should be restricted in cases involving the breach of
a nondelegable duty. To the contrary, there is little reason why
these affirmative defenses should not be available; otherwise, de-
fendants would be subject to liability for any and all negligent be-
havior of potential plaintiffs. While there is little basis for
questioning the court's conclusion, the court failed to provide any
authority or reasoning to support its broad assertion.468
c. Violation of the OSH and MOSH Acts.-
(1) Statutes Placing Duty of Compliance Completely on Defendant.-
In their argument, the appellants relied on the Restatement (Second) of
Torts sections 483 and 496F, which provide that in cases of statutory
violation, contributory negligence and assumption of the risk are
barred if the goal of the statute is to place the burden of compliance
completely on the defendant.469 In rejecting this argument, the
court chose to interpret the OSH and MOSH Acts very narrowly-a
decision that may have broad implications. 47" The Brady court
pointed to Comment c of section 483, which explains that "[a] stat-
ute may be found to have that purpose [of placing the entire respon-
sibility on the defendants] particularly where it is enacted to protect
...persons against their ... inability to protect themselves. 471
According to Judge McAuliffe, the OSH and MOSH Acts are not the
type of statutes covered by sections 483 and 496F because the pur-
pose of the Acts was to encourage employers and employees to have
"separate but dependent responsibilities" in maintaining a safe and
healthy workplace.472 Thus, the Brady court concluded that the ef-
fect of the two safety statutes is not to place the entire duty upon the
employers, but to encourage employees to take some responsibility
in ensuring their own safety and health.473
The court conceded that there was clear support for precluding
468. See id.
469. See id. at 291, 609 A.2d at 305; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 483, 496F
(1965).
470. Brady, 327 Md. at 291-93, 609 A.2d at 305-306.
471. Id. at 292, 609 A.2d at 305; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 483 cmt. c
(1965).
472. Brady, 327 Md. at 291-93, 609 A.2d at 305-06. See 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1988); MD.
CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 5-102(b) (1991).
473. See Brady, 327 Md. at 292-93, 609 A.2d at 305-06.
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the two affirmative defenses.4 74 In Martin v. George Hyman Construc-
tion Co.,"' a District of Columbia court provided compelling sup-
port for the abrogation of contributory negligence and assumption
of the risk in cases involving the violation of safety statutes.47 6 Ac-
cording to the Martin court:
The congressional determination that "most ... accidents
are due to lack of proper supervision and control" . . . is an
implicit recognition that wage earners will not always exer-
cise due care for their own safety. Finding that these acci-
dents "could be avoided if proper safety measures were
taken"... Congress imposed upon employers.., the sole
responsibility for avoiding those accidents.... To hold that
a wage earner's contributory negligence is a defense for the
employer would impermissibly ignore the congressionally
imposed duty.
4 7 7
The Martin court took a similar stance with regard to the abro-
gation of assumption of the risk. According to the District of Co-
lumbia court, to retain the assumption of the risk defense in worker
safety cases would impose a "take it or leave it" decision upon the
workers who are supposed to be protected by regulations like the
OSH Act. 4 78 The court explained:
To hold that the theoretical availability of the alternative of
declining to continue in the normal activities of the wage
earner's employment might relieve the duty to assure safe
working conditions would be to place upon the wage
earner the responsibility of weighing the risks of employ-
ment hazards against the benefits that might be derived
from encountering those risks. The imposition of such a
burden hardly serves to encourage an employer's conform-
ance to the congressionally mandated duty of care. To the
contrary, it would encourage employers to hire and retain
only those wage earners who demonstrated a willingness to
encounter the risks which Congress has determined must
be eliminated.479
474. See id. at 294, 609 A.2d at 306 (citing Wren v. Sullivan Elec., Inc., 797 F.2d 323,
326-27 (6th Cir. 1986); Martin v. George Hyman Constr. Co., 395 A.2d 63, 71-74 (D.C.
App. 1978); Bowman v. Redding & Co., 449 F.2d 956, 965-67 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
475. 395 A.2d 63 (D.C. App. 1978).
476. Id. at 71-74.
477. Id. at 70.
478. Id. at 73.
479. Id. at 73-74. The Martin court suggested that the assumption of the risk defense
should at least be limited, and the defendant should have the burden of proving:
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Thus, the court in Martin feared that the availability of the two de-
fenses would impermissibly place the wage earners at risk in their
work environments. 480
In Brady, the Court of Appeals found equal support for preserv-
ing the availability of the two defenses.48' Some courts rely on sec-
tion 653(b)(4) of the OSH Act, which prohibits parties from using
the regulations to "enlarge or diminish. . . the common law" rights
of an employer.482 It is possible to construe the abrogation of con-
tributory negligence and assumption of the risk as affecting the em-
ployer's common-law rights; however, the Brady court did not
explain why it chose to adopt this view rather than abrogate the two
defenses.483 By simply choosing one view rather than the other, the
court failed to recognize and weigh in its analysis the lower bargain-
ing position of many employees in the workplace.484
Perhaps it is true that Brady was in a good position to protect
himself, and could have done so had he taken certain precautions
before he mounted the scaffold. 485 Nevertheless, there are count-
less other workers who have considerably less control over their
work environment than Brady had over his. In Wren v. Sullivan Elec-
tric, Inc. ,486 the Sixth Circuit wrote:
"The [worker safety] statute was passed under the police
power of the state for the purpose of protecting those who
are unable to protect themselves, occupying as they neces-
sarily do a position much inferior in financial security to
that of their employers .... It would defeat this beneficent
purpose if it should be admitted as a sound principle that a
(1) that there was available to the wage earner an alternative to encountering
the risk; (2) that the wage earner's choice between the risk and such alternative
was fully voluntary; (3) that such alternative afforded the wage earner the safety
mandated by statute, rule, or regulation; and (4) that the wage earner's deter-
mination to encounter the risk was, under the circumstances, made with willful,
wanton, or reckless disregard for his own safety.
Id. at 74.
480. See id. at 69-74.
481. Brady, 327 Md. at 295, 609 A.2d at 307 (citing, among others, Ries v. National
R.R. Passenger Corp., 960 F.2d 1156, 1162 (3d Cir. 1992); Minichello v. United States
Indus., Inc., 756 F.2d 26, 30 (6th Cir. 1985); Bertholfv. Burlington Northern R.R., 402
F. Supp. 171, 173 (E.D. Wash. 1975)).
482. 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (1988); see, e.g., Bertholf, 402 F. Supp. at 173 (explaining
that contributory negligence is available in FELA cases, when the OSH Act is the appli-
cable safety statute).
483. See Brady, 327 Md. at 294-96, 609 A.2d at 306-07.
484. See id.
485. See id. at 286-91, 609 A.2d at 302-305.
486. 797 F.2d 323 (6th Cir. 1986).
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failure of the employer to obey the statute could be con-
doned by the employee."4 8
7
It is this group of workers discussed in Wren that the Court of Ap-
peals failed to protect in Brady.
(2) Negligence Per Se or Strict Liability.-It has been well estab-
lished in Maryland that a statutory violation constitutes mere evi-
dence of negligence.4 8 Therefore, it is not surprising that the court
in Brady decided that the violation of OSH and MOSH Act regula-
tions constitutes mere evidence of negligence rather than negli-
gence per se.4 a9
By attacking this categorization issue, the appellants were prob-
ably attempting to avoid the ultimate issue of contributory negli-
gence and assumption of the risk.49 ° If the court had accepted the
appellants' argument that violations of the OSH and MOSH Acts
constitute negligence per se, then the appellants would have estab-
lished an irrebuttable presumption of negligence, and Brady's negli-
gence would not have been an issue.491' Nevertheless, the court
rejected the negligence-per-se argument and shifted its focus onto
Brady's own negligence.492
As the court explained, there is a wealth of authority supporting
both the mere-evidence 493 and negligence-per-se 494 standards.
Some courts argue that section 653(b)(4) prohibits the negligence-
487. Id. at 326-27 (quoting American Zinc Co. v. Graham, 179 S.W. 138 (Tenn.
1915)).
488. Pahanish v. Western Trails, Inc., 69 Md. App. 342, 362, 517 A.2d 1122, 1132
(1986); Gardenvillage Realty Corp. v. Russo, 34 Md. App. 25, 30, 366 A.2d 101, 105
(1976). Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288B (1965) (suggesting that a violation
of a statute can be viewed by the courts in two ways: as mere evidence or negligence per
se).
489. See Brady, 327 Md. at 294-95, 609 A.2d at 306-07.
490. See id. at 285, 291-95, 609 A.2d at 302, 305-07.
491. See Martin v. George Hyman Constr. Co., 395 A.2d 63, 68-69 (D.C. App. 1978)
(explaining the abrogation of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk in cer-
tain statutory violation cases).
492. See Brady, 327 Md. at 293-96, 609 A.2d at 306-07.
493. See Albrecht v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 808 F.2d 329, 332-33 (4th Cir. 1987); Penn-
sylvania Power & Light Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 737 F.2d
350, 354 (3d Cir. 1984); Wendland v. Ridgefield Constr. Servs., Inc., 439 A.2d 954
(Conn. 1981); Whirlpool Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 645
F.2d 1096, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Central of G.R.R. v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Comm'n, 576 F.2d 620, 623 (5th Cir. 1978).
494. See Wren v. Sullivan Elec., Inc., 797 F.2d 323, 325-27 (6th Cir. 1986); Pratico v.
Portland Terminal Co., 783 F.2d 255, 264-65 (1st Cir. 1985); Dixon v. International
Harvester Co., 754 F.2d 573, 581 (5th Cir. 1985); Kelley v. Howard S. Wright Constr.
Co., 582 P.2d 500 (Wash. 1978).
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per-se standard, because the enforcement of the standard would in-
fringe on the employers common-law rights.495 This argument has
been refuted by many courts that have adopted the negligence-per-
se view.496 For instance, the court in Pratico v. Portland Terminal
Co. 4 explained that:
[a]llowing OSHA regulations to act as "guides for the de-
termination of standards of care," ... should not be viewed
as expanding the liability of employers. The doctrine of
negligence per se does not have the effect of turning rea-
sonable, nontortious behavior into unreasonable, tortious
behavior. Rather it simply allows the presence of a statu-
tory regulation to serve as irrefutable evidence that particu-
lar conduct is unreasonable. 498
Despite this persuasive support for the adoption of the negligence-
per-se standard, the Brady court once again merely chose one stan-
dard over another without providing a reason. 49 9 Given the court's
past reluctance to apply the negligence-per-se standard in other ar-
eas of law, it is not surprising that the court repeated its unwilling-
ness to subscribe to the negligence-per-se view. 500
5. Conclusion.-There are many instances in which owners, like
the MTA, hire independent contractors to comply with federal and
state safety regulations. Despite these contractual arrangements,
the Brady court showed an unwillingness to bar contributory negli-
gence and assumption of the risk when workers are injured in this
context.5 ' The court was equally reluctant to afford OSH and
MOSH Act violations a great amount of evidentiary weight.50 2 The
notion of allowing negligence per se in statutory violation cases has
long been avoided in Maryland,50 and the Court of Appeals made
no exception in Brady. Therefore, in cases involving the interplay of
OSH and MOSH Act regulations and the relationships between in-
dependent contractors and their employees, the mere-evidence
495. See Albrecht, 808 F.2d at 332-33; Wendland, 439 A.2d at 956-57.
496. See Wren, 797 F.2d at 325-27; Pratico, 783 F.2d at 264-65; Dixon, 754 F.2d at 581;
Kelley, 582 P.2d at 508.
497. 783 F.2d 255 (1st Cir. 1985).
498. Id. at 265.
499. See Brady, 327 Md. at 294, 609 A.2d at 306.
500. See id.
501. See id. at 294-96, 609 A.2d at 306-07.
502. See id.




standard will continue to thrive in Maryland, and potential plaintiffs
will still be in danger of falling victim to contributory negligence
and assumption of the risk defenses.
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